Select a reading of interest for the week on Egypt or Israel and respond to it in 1-2 paragraphs. What made it seem important, controversial, or interesting to you?
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Select a reading of interest for the week on Egypt or Israel and respond to it in 1-2 paragraphs. What made it seem important, controversial, or interesting to you?
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Jihad—as we know it in the modern era—is a tool against secular state oppression and was born in the 1950’s after Nasser’s violent crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood. Nasser was cut from the same cloth as the Muslim brotherhood—both believing in Social Justice, egalitarianism and anti-imperialist—but believed in separation of religion from the state. This small difference led to a massive falling out between him and the brotherhood. Nasser put member of the Muslim Brotherhood into internment camps because they numerously tried to assassinate him. The repression forced leaders like Sayyid Qutb to interpret Islam is a radicalized fashion giving birth to modern day Jihad—that is opposed to secular government, and later morphing into an anti-western affair. To be relevant in modern day politics, and maybe even to lead the post Mubarak Egyptian state scholars, like Carrie Wikham, have argued that the youthful leaders of the Brotherhood have to advocate a progressive interpretation of Islam so as to encompass those youthful democratic activists we saw on the Egyptian streets.
Nadav Eyal’s article on the tent protests in Israel over the summer I found to be fascinating. I was mainly struck by the different sense I got about this in contrast to the “Occupy Wall Street” protests here. While it appears to be similarly unorganized, the vast majority of Israelis sympathize with the protesters, while I would find it hard to imagine that 87% of Americans support “Occupy Wall Street”. The two protest movements seem to have arisen for similar reasons: governmental deregulation and spending policies over the past couple of decades coupled with the global recession that make people feel as though the government no longer is working for them. What I find most interesting is the struggle middle-class Israelis face in the housing market. It is hard for me to imagine a housing market in which there is simply not enough to go around, and what housing there is costs almost 2x the average U.S. home (as a percentage).
On another note, and as Nej pointed out, this article and these protests really point out the double standard and hypocrisy that Israelis have regarding Palestinians. The protesters claim to be protesting for social justice, but totally ignore Palestinian interests. I understand why it is that Israelis feel this is not a problem or a double standard. However, this hypocrisy is probably the issue that on which I most strongly disagree with Israeli society, and so this article was an interesting mixture of support and opposition to the protesters.
I found Charles Liebman’s chapter on the compatibility of a Jewish state and democracy to be particularly interesting. His account of the rise of the religious elite (i.e. the rabbis) was particularly disturbing. It seems that their rhetoric has only inflamed tensions between Israelis and Arabs. For example, the claim that ‘non-Jews in the land of Israel ought to live in servitude to Jews’ hardly promotes good will between the two communities. Moreover, such an outlandish statement is clearly incompatible with democracy given that it is supposed to ensure the protection of minorities. Whilst Arabs living in Israel may not live in servitude they are undoubtedly treated as second-class citizens and it seems that the legitimacy of this situation has has been reinforced by the proclamations of the religious elite.
I disagree with Liebman’s assertion that a Jewish state is compatible with democracy. Liebman suggests that through making compromises you can ensure their compatibility. Yet how can you compromise with a religion that is supposedly based on the word of God? A genuinely Jewish state would surely be governed based purely on Jewish teachings and would be by definition authoritarian. For me a democratic Jewish state is an oxymoron. I think a more accurate description of Israel would be a quasi-secular state which adheres to certain Jewish traditions and with a population that is dominated by an ethnically Jewish majority.
As Liebman ended his article discussing the incompatibility of Judaism and democracy, I was reminded of the only conversation I have ever had with Professor Mayer. In the midst of discussing the state of Israeli politics, she just shook her head and lamented how much control the religious groups had gained and how freedom was losing out to the political/religious establishment. I could not help but compare her evaluation to Liebman’s description. Liebman’s article highlights how a section of the population see Israel as basically a theocracy. The Goldberg and Reich chapter mentions how with such a low threshold for parliamentary seats, every government must be a coalition government. The smaller religious parties are able to use this to their advantage by taking on cabinet positions in domestic issues. Combined with a historical victim mentality and belief in universal antisemitism, the population has managed to create a political environment that could easily become increasingly undemocratic. I had not quite realized how pervasive that mentality was.
Myron Aronoff’s article on the “Origins of Israeli Political Culture” is interesting because it tackles how Zionism and the modern state of Israel were legitimized, and how its power structure reflects the conflict of interests between different visions of Zionism and Israeli culture. What’s interesting about this article is how it shows the multifaceted process of identification that exists. Secularism, differences in ethnicity and origin between Jews and opinions about foreign policy have all led to a diverse set of groups that vie for power and influence in the creation of an Israeli nation.
Aronoff points out that much of the initial Israeli culture is in fact influenced by Eastern European Jews, and their political and social traditions took root in the creation of Israel. This dominance was represented in the control of the Labor Party during the first decades of independence, and this meant that many groups were marginalized or left out of the conversation, including ultra orthodox Jews, who advocated for greater religious power in the state. The changing demographics and competing visions between Israelis have an important role in the political process.
Zionism and the creation of the Jewish state had two goals: The first was to connect the socially constructed state to the past and attain legitimacy through connection with the biblical past. The second goal of Zionism was to create a practical and present homeland for the Jewish people, a concrete territory they could call home. Both are important, but ultimately the need for a Jewish homeland was vital in an international system where states were legitimized through national identity. Despite the biblical past, Israel is a socially constructed nation and the encouragement to use Hebrew and to create settlements symbolizes this need to return to the native culture and homeland through cultural reinvention.
Lieberman’s article, describing the rise of political Judaism in Israel, shows why the Palestinian-Israeli conflict will not get resolved any time soon. Rather it will probably get worse, if some of the trends that Lieberman highlights—such as the rise of religious parties—continue. These parties, such as Shas, do not distinguish between their faith and the state. They, in fact, see them as one and the same. Or at least, they see the state as a way to bring about their spiritual aspirations, including the incorporation of Judea and Samaria—the West Bank—into Israel.
Religious absolutism also concerns Lieberman. In his article, he describes how political issues have increasingly become moral issues. Secularism, for instance, is not only wrong for some Israelis; it also is immoral, even evil. (275) Such absolutism, Lieberman argues, precludes substantive debate and radicalizes most issues.
Lieberman’s article highlights another problem area: how a bunker mentality has emerged in Israel. According to Lieberman, most Israelis feel that the world is anti-Semitic and that they need a strong state to protect their faith and their people. It is interesting, in particular, how the anti-Semitism charge has been thrown around in recent years. A few years ago, Walt Mearshimer and Kenneth Waltz wrote a paper entitled the Israeli Lobby about the Jewish lobby (especially AIPAC) and its influence on American foreign policy. The report, which had many failings, such as misquotes and lack of citations, was derided as anti-Semitic. Unfortunately, that killed the debate. The “Anti-Semitism” term and the history behind it effectively nulls any criticism of Israel, even if some of the points are valid, or at least are worthy of discussion. Increasingly, it seems that fellow Jews are the only ones who can enter the debate. Tony Judt (who recently passed away) and David Grossman, for instance, fought against what they saw as the growing religiosity in Israel and how it was a barrier to the peace process. They were, unsurprisingly, widely condemned.
Liebman’s chapter on “Religion and Democracy in Israel” was most interesting to me because I had no idea religion was so important in Israeli politics. It sounds kind of stupid, especially since I’ve always known that Israelis believed Israel was a Jewish state. I was surprised to learn, however, that many in the country would actually choose to follow halakah rather than the laws of the Knesset if the two ever contradicted. To a certain extent, this sounds like something that would happen in Iran: sharia law being the law of the land, as opposed to the laws enacted by the state government.
Of course, Israel is no Iran. It’s the only country in the MENA region that is deemed “free” by Freedom House (or was it Transparency International?)… which is also why Liebman’s chapter was so shocking for me. He questions whether democracy is possible in Israel. Is it really that bad? Finally, I think Liebman’s chapter took me by surprise because Americans tend to associate a free country with secularism. Israel, however, is not a secular state. It goes hand in and with Jewish traditions and has a deep-rooted culture of Zionism. That said, is it possible for a state to be “free” and still be very religious? I think so. Israel is a good example. Perhaps the U.S. should keep that in mind as Tunisia’s elections end and the world turns to Egypt. Islamist parties will emerge, but that doesn’t necessarily mean they cannot coexist with the values of liberal democracy.
I found the description of Israeli politics in Goldberg and Reichs article fascinating. Something that stuck out to me was that there has never been a majority party in the Knesset, necessitating a coalition of parties to form a government all through Israels history. I also found the fact that Israel does not have a written constitution rather intriguing. The point I found most troubling was that the Israeli government, which has de facto control over not only the Jewish and Arab Israeli populations but the entire Palestinian population as well, is and has always been “dominated by a relatively small and cohesive Jewish elite that has been mostly homogeneous in background”. This last fact is a serious problem which has fueled the ongoing (and admittedly pre-existing) security problems coming from both the Palestinian population and the surrounding Arab states. There seems to be layers of exclusion in the Israeli state, starting with sephardic Jews who are discriminated against by their European counter parts, then Arab Israelis who continue to struggle to integrate into a majority Jewish state, and finally the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza who exist in a state of apartheid. I hope that some day all three of these divisions will be remedied by the creation of a single Israeli/Palestinian state that gives full and equal representation to all the people living under the authority of the state. I think that the current framework, with the emphasis on coalition government and compromise, could conceivably be expanded to include the Palestinians, which would create further leverage for change that would benefit not only the people living in Gaza and the West Bank but the Arab Israelis and other segment of the population being discriminated against. Since Israel does not have a written constitution, this would not even involve over riding a founding document.
I found Myron Aronoff’s analysis of Zionism as a uniquely powerful force — both religiously and politically — in his article “The Origins of Israeli Political Culture” to be very interesting. As Aronoff states, the primary goal of Zionism, as the dominant paradigm of Israeli political culture, is to cultivate a sense of nationalism and ownership of the land of Israel by its inhabitants. To that end, Zionism’s main challenge is to link the biblical past with the modern state, thereby crafting a historical continuity that increases Israel’s credible claim to that land. Utilizing symbols, myths, and rituals — many based on the concepts of exile and redemption — Zionism has become an ubiquitous influence in Israel, shaping both the political and religious culture. As Cat mentioned, political parties are only viable if they are able to harness Zionist rhetoric. However, this shared vision of Zionism allows for political debate in Israel, as in the case of the state-sponsored funeral for the remains of the followers of Shimon Bar Koziba. Though it was politically controversial, the shared vision of Zionism is what allowed for such a debate to even take place.
I have a personal connection to Nadav Eyal’s article “Tent Revolt in Tel Aviv,” simply because I was in Yaffa/Tel Aviv in July and the beginning of August. It was an interesting time to be in Israel/Palestine, because I got to witness the organization and expansion of tent sites, marches, and informal gatherings. Eyal wrote his article in the midst of the protest’s gathering momentum in August. Although the protests have continued (the latest held on Oct. 29th), it seems that the movement has died down somewhat and protest encampments have been removed from major cities.
Eyal poses the question: “Will the Protests in Israel Bring Down Netanyahu?” He lays out 3 options for Netanyahu, that he can sacrifice many of the policies that he has enacted, that he can attempt to co-opt the Israeli center with a renewed attempt to negotiate with the Palestinians, or that he can ride out the protests and hope that all will pass. I believe that the latter is the course of action that has already been taken. Netanyahu has certainly acknowledged the protests; he even created a committee to examine the protesters’ demands. In October, the committee recommended building almost 200,000 apartments over the next five years, making more apartments available as rentals and increasing housing subsidies for the needy. However, these real estate developments are not to be considered policy sacrifices, and they do not present any drastic change to the system. What I am more concerned about is how these protests shine a spotlight on policies of the Netanyahu government regarding settlements.
What these protests expose is that the government favors the interests of powerful and entrenched groups over the general Israeli population. Why is Netanyahu investing in settlement expansion when he should be investing more in sustainable solutions for housing inside the 1967 Green Line? The two issues are most definitely linked. New homes built in the West Bank are not a solution to housing shortages; in fact, they are part of the problem. Protesters have mainly avoided linking settlements to housing costs in an effort to avoid Palestinian issues in the Israeli social justice protest, which seems ridiculous to me for many obvious reasons*, but also because the cost of settlements has a sizable impact on the economy.
Netanyahu’s approval rating plummeted during the protests, but it rose after his UN speech. The question at hand for next election is which is more important to the Israeli public, issues of national security or domestic social justice?
*One obvious reason is: How can protesters possibly promote social justice and leave out Palestinians issues, when Palestinian homes continue to be demolished 30 minutes from tent sites? (http://www.ochaopt.org/)
I found Aronoff’s chapter, “The Origins of Israeli Political Culture”, particularly interesting. Since Israel is based on Zionism, its political system is unique because political parties have arisen as a result of competing interpretations of the “true Zionist vision”. The only groups given real legitimacy in Israeli politics are those who accept the major tenets of Zionism that are agreed upon by all Zionists, but there is variability in interpretations of certain aspects. In order for a party to establish dominance, it has to gain support for its particular ideological version of Zionism, and attempt to marginalize competing versions. I think this is interesting because the state of Israel was ideologically constructed before it even existed by Zionists who wanted to establish a state for the Jewish people. Therefore, political parties arise as they seek to interpret the original Zionist vision in different ways and come to their own conclusions about society.
I was also interested by Aronoff’s comment on national normality. He points out that there is a divide in Israeli aspirations for national normality–some people find it desirable for Israel to become more like other nations, and are inspired to look to other nations’ systems in constructing their own. However, other Israelis reject the idea of becoming like other nations, because they believe that their uniqueness affirms their ‘chosenness’, and they discourage assimilating to other nations. Living in a secular political culture, it is really interesting for me to see how strongly a religion can shape the formation of a nation and political culture.
I was really surprised in reading Liebman’s article on religion and democracy in Israel just how big a role judaism played in the politics of the nation. I’ve always found the notion that Jews have to the right to the land of Israel a little bit fishy. In my mind Britain had no right to establish the territory as a homeland for Jews. As nice as that idea is, I don’t find the historic and religious claims to the land to be satisfactory enough to justify taking that land. It was also interesting to see how this religious character of the state complicated the conflict with Palestine and the rest of the Middle Eastern World. The religious character of the state has given an inordinate amount of power to religious leaders and politicians will often look to them for support. Giving up the land Israel occupies would be blasphemous as far as the religious elite are concerned and would erode the character of the Israeli state. In contrast to the amount of power given the religious elite is how few Israeli jews are actually religious in practice and behavior. I find that this complicates and takes legitimacy away from the religious and historic claims to the land of Israel even further.