Please respond in 1-2 paragraphs to any of your readings on political Islam.
What do you think best accounts for the success of Islamic movements as the dominant form of social organization outside of the family, and the most prominent form of political opposition?
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One theme I found throughout the readings was that Islamic movements succeed because of their emphasis on social justice. In a region fraught with human rights violations, poor governance, and a lack of social safety nets, Islamic movements often rise to fill the gaps and provide services and support that governments fail to. This explains why, as Eickelman points out, Islamic movements are most popular among lower middle classes. When Islamic groups do not actually control the government, they also have more freedom to see to the needs of the people without getting bogged down in policy and day-to-day governance. Gelvin addresses this, pointing out that after the 1970s many ME governments failed to accomplish the promises for development and social justice that they had made, leaving a gap that needed to be filled.
Although internal conditions are largely responsible for the success of Islamic movements, another important factor is the historical relationship these movements have with foreign powers in the context of the greater world scene. The Cold War greatly defined relations and power shifts over the past several decades, and the Middle East has been caught in the middle. As Kepel says, to some, Islamists seemed anti-socialist/communist. This led to international support for such groups, which helped them gain and maintain power. On the other hand, many Islamic movements are viewed as extremist and are actively targeted and attacked by outside forces. International powers have always played a defining role in the region, and the stance these powers take on Islamic movements will have a strong influence on how successful they are.
Tessler’s argument for why Islamic movements have garnered much popular support and have emerged as the dominant form of political opposition is convincing. First, many Muslim countries in North Africa had high rates of unemployment, had a disappointing provision of public education, and a poor provision of housing. These problems were all (and are perhaps still) even more drastic in the cities, where plenty of young people built up more and more frustration due to the difficult living conditions. Second, there was (again, still is?) also alienation from the government, as many Arabs attributed “much of the responsibility for their plight to the political regimes by which they are governed.” (Tessler)
Importantly, up until this point the analysis of the causes leading to the frustration is almost identical to the current situation in the United States or in much of Europe. So, why do Arab Muslims turn to Islamic Movements, but Occupy Wallstreet doesn’t?
First, the difference is rooted “in the enduring religious attachments of ordinary Muslims.” (Tessler) In other words, because Islam is so important inside the family, it has it relatively easy to convince Muslims to also be important as a political force outside the family. Second, another reason for the success of Islamic movements is the failure of Arab Socialism, particularly after the war of 1967. This turning point in history effected Islamic movements, as many people started to believe, again, that Islam “could do what no imported doctrine could hope to do…Islam is the solution.” (Tessler) Islamic movements, also due to their organizational and ideological advantages, have simply been able to convince many dissatisfied Arabs that they can best best support political change by supporting Islamist movements.
On a final note, Tessler highlights that there is no strong correlation between support of Islamist movements and attachment to Islam in general. If I understand this correctly, it means that a die-hard Muslim does not necessarily participate in an Islamist movement, as Islamist political movements are not what he understands his religion. So, it is crucial to see the success of Islam against the background of poor governance, poverty, unemployment etc. It will be interesting to see how support will change as soon as an Islamist party is in power, having to deliver higher living conditions, rather than playing the religious opposition card constantly.
My initial reaction is to agree with Entelis and argue that a circumstantial history in the Middle East is responsible for the success of political Islam—that the combination of governments that don’t provide for all their people, periodic power vacuums in the past 200 years, and an absence of the separation of religion and government work together to nurture political Islam’s success. In this line of thought I could agree with Gelvin and point to the Great Nineteenth Century Transformation, World War I and the destabilizing urbanization of the 1930’s as central to the successes of Islam. Or I could note the rise of political Islam in the seventies as a result of government meltdowns and the aftermath of the 1967 War. We might recognize, though, that this interpretation robs political Islam of agency, and gives mere circumstance the credit for their success. But can circumstance alone create a political and social organization so popular and strong as political Islam? Moreover, the circumstances may well provide a void for a social organization to fill, but why has it become political Islam? Entelis attempts to answer this question in the end of chapter five but simply points to more circumstance and again robs political Islam of agency. What I wonder is how political Islam is responsible for its own success.
If we give back agency and decision making to political Islam in our understanding, we can see its form as a product of careful decisions. I recognize that Islam is such a sprawling organization and that decisions may not be made centrally, but certainly Islamist leaders make decisions and these decisions deserve acknowledgement in their success. To begin, political Islam has exceptional marketing. The Arab world has been tortured by modernism, which considering its values and practices could have been the death of Islam. While some might argue that the Arab world didn’t get included into modernism because Islam was holding it back, political Islam has successfully marketed the opposite notion; that the Arab world suffered in modernism because it deviated from Islamic teachings. I think it is no accident that oolitical Islam thrives despite the currents of modernism. Moreover claims of authenticity are an important tool of political Islam to provide suffering people with a clear alternative to modernity. Also political Islam has capitalized well on its social service efforts. It seems recognized by political Islam that people will be won over by a myriad of reasons including Islam as a political solution, Islam as a religious (meaning in life) solution, and Islam as a social service provider.
Certainly circumstance is important when analyzing the success of political Islam, but I think our understanding is robbed when we rob political Islam of agency in their own story.
I have thought about this question quite a bit in the past few years, and although many of the explanations in our readings are persuasive, none really seals the deal for me. Eickelman and Piscatori provide the most salient framework for understanding Islamism’s success, describing a destabilizing mixture of severe unemployment, urbanization, high-education rates, and a huge youth bulge, among other things. This is basically the “lucky break” theory wherein Islamic movements pounce on a dissatisfied population, rallying supporters by providing an impressive array of social services where the state has failed. There is room in this argument for the strength of the Islamic movement’s message (as cleverly disseminated through a variety of media), but not too much. To be honest, this theory pretty much sums up what I found in Egypt, where the only students I knew who were “members” of the Muslim Brotherhood grew up in rural towns where the MB was simply more active and beneficial in most aspects of life than was the state. However, I still wasn’t totally satisfied; I think that there’s a lot more to be said for what Islamic movements represent, holistically and especially ideologically, apart even from the way Middle Eastern societies are organized and the historical place of Islam in the state and the mosque in society (although these things are part of its success as well).
As Jordan points out below, the most interesting aspect of the 20th Century Islamitization of social and political life in the Middle East is its sheer incompatibility with global theories of modernism. Modernist theory often cites this Middle Eastern phenomenon as a temporary stumbling block along the universal development corridor, or occasionally as a statistical outlier that does not hold enough weight to affect the overall theory, but I think it’s interesting to consider this widespread religious revival as not only a reactionary protest movement, but also an alternative framework for dealing with the modern world.
I think that Islam is the dominant form of social organization outside of the family for many reasons. I think the centrality of Islam in society plays a large role in this. Countries in the Middle East are founded around religion – that is the way it has always been. From the Umayyad and Abbasid Empires to the Ottoman regime, the one thing tying people together had always been Islam. The entire day and calendar in the region is based on Islam, with the call to prayer and with most businesses closed on Friday as everyone is at the mosque praying. As pointed out in the reading, this already gives Islamic movements a platform from which to preach. The readings also mention that as a movement, Islamists don’t have to do anything, they can freely criticize without consequence because they are not in power. The support that these groups receive from oil-rich countries that back religious movements is also quite substantial, and can be a huge influence on the population. I know that in Lebanon in 2006, Hizballah was distributing money to the Lebanese people while the government (and Hizballah also) was dealing with the Israeli occupation.
I think that one reason that the readings may not have pointed out was that as a religious movement, it is harder for dictators ruling “Islamic countries” to justify disbanding them. It is easy to tar and feather opposition political parties, but when a movement in an Islamic country uses Islamic theology as part or most of its idealogical base, it seems like it would be difficult to tarnish the Islamic party/movement. There is even tradition in this from the early days of Islam, when Mu’awiya and Ali had armies prepared for battle, but Mu’awiya rode out with the Qur’an held over his head and they proceeded to negotiate instead of fight. Mu’awiya’s family later became the Umayyad dynasty, so maybe it could serve as an archetype for the present day.
It doesn’t seem at all surprising that Islamic movements have arisen in response to authoritarian regimes’ inability to produce adequate results for the Arab people. In countries facing huge unemployment, lack of quality education, inadequate housing, and skyrocketing population rates (which were likely to make the previously listed unsatisfactory conditions worse), it makes perfect sense that many began to look for alternatives to existing regimes. Mosques are a uniquely safe place to gather for political discussions and the narrative of Islam has long been a presence in the area, so the religious setting seems like a logical place for people to explore new ideas. The results of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war prompted a wave of Islamist revival since many Arabs were dismayed by the failure of their states in the war. I was particularly intrigued by the fact that cassettes were a popular way to transmit Islamist methods; it seems that charismatic leaders have long had success transmitting their messages through the sound waves (e.g. FDR’s fireside chats, Hitler’s radio broadcasts, etc.), and the rhythmic sounds of Arabic may have further added to this technique’s appeal.
However, Kepel points out that the Islamist movement had failed to retain lasting political power by the end of the 1990s. Osama bin Laden’s message against American policy was designed to appeal not only to Islamists, but also to those outside the movement (14). Still, according to Kepl, the war in Afghanistan proved that “bin Laden and Mullah Omar’s hopes to ignite in their fellow believers the fire of a worldwide jihad against the West failed miserably” (19). I was also struck by Gelvin’s point that “many in the region consider the Islamist cure more dangerous than the authoritarian disease” (317). Gelvin also claims that new attempts by Islamist movements may fail since many Arabs have already seen supposedly idealistic Islamist movements descend into incompetence and violence (e.g. the 1992 Armed Islamic Group’s violence in Algeria). Ultimately, all of the readings seem to resonate with Tessler’s claim, “What many North Africans and other Arabs appear to want is meaningful political change, and above all responsive and accountable government, rather than Islamic solutions per se” (109). In the future, it will be interesting to see which governments the Arab people deem to be most effective at achieving such goals.
Tessler and Kepel each offer interesting insight into the very reasons for the foundation, resurgence, and popularity of islamism in the Middle East and North Africa. Contrary to perceptions that we may have previously harbored regarding the inner working of political islam, each of these authors argue that political islam exists for reasons other than those of strictly just a religious nature. Kepel writes, “More people began to view islamism as the authentic creed of modern muslims-and to see in it perhaps the outline of an islamic civilization within the multicultural world of the coming 21st century.” Kepel is eluding to the beginnings of many islamist movements in the 1970’s starting around the time of the Iranian Revolution. Tessler’s piece contained a quote from an Algerian man explaining his loyalty to an Islamist movement. His response reflected not religious motivations or reasoning, but rather social reasons. Although many islamist groups in the Middle East such as Hamas and Hizbullah are recognized as terrorist organizations byt the US, and even though they frequently resort to terrorism to achieve their ends, many of these groups exist as providers of social, economic and political infrastructure aside from any religious components of their existence. Many of these organizations also exists to provide education to their followers, something that many authoritarian states do not or would not provide. Another important factor to mention is poverty. Many Middle Eastern countries are quite poor and lack modern social and economic infrastructure. This means that islamist groups have a particular allure with many of their followers as a beacon of hope or a “way out” or “road to improvement” from the social and economic situations of many of the citizens of the countries in these regions.
I find very significant the idea that Islamization is not simply a natural continuation of history but rather a response to the period of secularization in the mid 20th century. Because religions or religious beliefs themselves are often extremely old, religious movements also often get immediately characterized as static or the embracing of the status quo. Certainly looking at the Middle East, people assume that Islam always played a central role in people’s lives, and therefore their political, economic, and social beliefs. However, this assumption really robs such people of any intellect since it argues that they are merely upholding what has always been as opposed to coming to their own conclusions due to the present circumstances. As Tessler shows in the middle of his essay, “The Origins of the Popular Support for Islamist Movements,” people only began to turn away from secular regimes and toward Islamist groups in the mid 20th century, specifically, after the morale-crushing Arab defeat at the hands of the Israeli Army in 1967. As leaders such as Nasser proved unable to deliver the promised Arab victory or freedom from Western imperialism, many in the Middle East turned in the opposite direction, to religious movements. Thus, Islamization is not merely blind continuation of the status-quo but rather a conscious decision to look for a change through a new medium (which just happened to exist for many previous centuries).
I think that recognizing Islamization of the 20th century as a movement designed to combat certain societal issues as opposed to simply a continuation of the status-quo (which I admit I have been unable to explain as well as I would like in the above paragraph) grants much more legitimacy to the goals of the Arab people that they are trying to achieve through their political activism. Tessler certainly describes in detail the abundance of issues at hand, including unemployment, illiteracy, political and economic corruption, and many more. In other words, Islamization is the (possible) solution to these problems, as Tessler argues, as opposed to their source. Indeed, secularization of the previous rulers regimes is more likely to be seen as the root of many present-day problems. It certainly gives much more credit to Islamist movements and their supporters to view their methods as new instead merely continuing efforts that have previously proved not to work.
I apologize if my ramblings have not proved to be particularly coherent. I promise that I have ideas in my head from the readings that I believe make sense; however, I underwent gum surgery today and have been on pain meds since early this morning. Please be patient with me.
Tessler’s argument that support for these Islamist movements stem from economic and political situations rather than the religious affiliation of the Arab peoples is intriguing. I would also boast this argument because it digs at the matter and does not accept anything for face value, which in this is religion as the defining factor. What’s more, it is reasonable to conclude that rapid population growth outpaced the supply housing, as well as the fact that the high rate of those whom dropped out of school or remained uneducated made it harder to find unemployment, thus unemployment rose. These are all factors that bolster social unrest and create volatile lines of distinction between the ruled and rulers. When everyone in your society is floundering, who do you blame? Not yourselves of course, but the government or in the case of most Arabs the political regime that rules over you, which just so happens to be so abjectly corrupt that they are a great scapegoat. Well scapegoat may be inaccurate choice of words because they regimes do privilege certain groups over others and a system of patronage does determine who will succeed. However I digress, this sounds a lot like the society we live in today, only difference is ours is somewhat more watered down and less obviously corrupt but corrupt nonetheless.
On your last breathe with your back against the wall struggling to survive it is logical to assume that one would exhaust any option to survive or simply make things better. This is the situation of the Arab masses. The failure of revolutions in the 70’s only made the appeal to Islamist movement more enticing. Further, movements like these truly only pick up momentum when they are spread through the grassroots and in this case youth are in large part a major factor for the success of Islamist movements. Tessler makes a great point when he states that Arabs looked at Israel for a model of success that demonstrates the prosperity groups receive from identifying with their religion politically. If accepting secualrism basically got nowhere and invited pain
Not finished, posted by accident, by hitting enter, didn’t even get to edit. I feel ashamed and unworthy of finishing but i will try my best. Thanks for the support class.
and disillusionment, then rejecting it should bring about happiness just as Israelis have experienced. Turning to Islam seems like the obvious solution. Also, as Alison eloquently stated these Islamist groups based their campaigns on mud-slinging(I’ve taken too many American history courses), they are not required to provide any positive stands that lay out their plans for the future. These groups act as demagogues and play on the discontent of the masses to gain power.
Ultimately, the success of Islamist movements is based on the social climate. A positive social climate leaves little room for Islamism to prosper, but a negative one invites more hate and uprising.
Whether it was a matter of brilliant planning or sheer luck, the policy of the terrorists to victimize themselves when they were the initial protagonist was successful in uniting a large group of Muslim people against the United States. Kepel explains, “The terrorism of September 11 was above all a provocation- albeit a provocation of gigantic proportions. Its purpose was to provoke a similarly gigantic repression of the Afghan civilian population and to build universal solidarity among Muslims in reaction to the victimization and suffering of their Afghan brothers.” It unified the new victims against the United States aggressor. The terrorists successfully made the United States appear to be a bully in the eyes of the entire world.
However, the real reason that Islamic movements gained such prestige and importance as social organizations in Middle Eastern communities is because of the inefficiency of the secular governments in the mid 20th century. As a result, as Gelvin explains, political Islam is a product of the modern world (Gelvin 309). He writes, “Islamic political groups had an added advantage in their battle with official nationalism: They were able to counterpose their own brand of “cultural authenticity,” as represented by Islam, to the “imported’ secular nationalist creeds, which, they argued, brought nothing but oppression, economic stagnation, and defeat to the region” (Gelvin 315). The nationalists secular governments that had come into power had not been able to honor the promises they had made economically, social or regarding foreign affairs. Therefore, there was a gaping hole in the community for Islamic groups to fill. They could provide things that the government could not and therefore gained legitimacy until they could completely take over governmental responsibilities.
The rise of Islam as a unifying force in the Middle East makes sense for a number of reasons. In many parts of the region, religious gatherings are the only way for people to assemble without attracting the suspicion of secret police. Large political gatherings are often frowned up and punished rather harshly under repressive regimes, but many of them leave religious gatherings relatively untouched either out of a sense of piety or a desire not to light a powder keg. In nations like Iraq, religion reinforced people’s identities as either the dominant faction or the opressed minority, in the case of the Kurds and Shiites. This cultural link produced an easy way for opposition to grow.
In some states in the Middle East, Islam arose as a backlash against a harsh Westernizing regime. Just as in America, movement towards secularization tends to upset people, attempts to move away from strict religious observance caused people to cling more tightly to their deeply held beliefs. The natural response to an oppressive and unpopular government telling a person to give up a belief is to nurture that belief even more powerfully.
Finally, Islam has a lot of power in the Middle East in terms of past glory. People look to the religion and see a time when Muslim rule stretched across the known world. They see Islamism as a way to return to that past glory.
The readings from this week give many viable explanations for the popularity of Islamic political movements throughout the Islamic world. Tessler and Eikelmann present options such as the sanctity of Mosques as gathering places, the ability of community based organizations to provide basic needs to their communities, the “youth bulge” combined with high unemployment, and overwhelming discontent with current regimes and the political-economic situation as reasons for their success.
In light of the Arab spring and the recent success of the Islamic party in Tunisia, Islamic opposition parties are now going to have to adapt to main-stream electoral politics, which is something that very few Islamic organizations across the Middle East have had to deal with. The AKP Party in Turkey has been moderately successful and popular, but Turkey does not face the same political-economic problems as much the rest of the Middle East. Organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah have begun participating in the political system, but they are able to consolidate support based solely on the Israel-Palestine issue, are able to blame the enemy for their failures, and are not in any real sense expected to organize the daily activities of a government.
A fundamental feature of opposition parties is that “they are free to criticize, but have no obligations for delivering services” (Tessler, 113). They gained popularity by capitalizing on peoples discontent with the current state of affairs, and blaming the government for them. The new question then is whether elected Islamic parties will continue to be popular, when instead of arguing against something they are required to institutionalize their messages. Tessler points out that individuals turned to Islamic parties, not for religion, but because of the “problems of social disadvantage and deprivation” (109). It must be questioned then, that if, like other forms of government across the Middle East, Islamic parties are unable to effectively and efficiently solve the socio-economic crisis, will their supporters become disillusioned, and will we see a decrease in their prevelance?
These questions are most directly addressed by Mark Tessler, who attempts to explain the appeal of Islamist movements and the reasons for their prominence. Tessler argues that, as opposition movements, Islamists have three particular advantages over their peers that enable them to often become the most prominent face of opposition to existing Middle Eastern regimes. The first advantage arises from the ability of these groups to use Islam as the foundation for their ideology, thus helping to maintain their coherence. Secondly, he notes that mosques serve as ideal focal points for opposition movements, particularly amidst government repression when secular movements with dedicated gathering places would be more easily targeted. Thirdly, Tessler argues that Islamic movements are able to gain popular support through their charitable work, supplanting governments as sources of assistance. With these points in mind, it seems that Islam aids the effectiveness of Islamic parties and movements by both providing a “cover” for the coordination of activities and the displacement/replacement of government services while shoring up internal party unity by providing a common ideological framework. In countries like Tunisia, where the oppressive regime was secular, the emergence of Islamic parties as an oppositional force seems even more natural. It will be interesting to see if the same happens in neighboring Libya.