Respond in 1-2 paragraphs to any of your reading on civil society, civil conflict, and human rights. What do you find interesting, provocative, or inspiring among the arguments that our authors have made? What kind of role do you think non-state institutions can or should play in the Middle East?
11 thoughts on “Week 6”
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The most striking contrast in the readings seemed to be the conventional assertion by Norton the civil society is at the core of liberalization and democratization and the contrarian argument by Wicktorowicz that civil society can actually be used to impede those processes. Norton seems optimistic in an attempt to counter pervading pessimistic attitudes about the possibility of of democratization in the Middle East fostered by Samuel Huntington and others. He argues that civil society is actually necessary for the functioning of any “participant political system” (11-12). Wicktorowicz, in an examination of the situation of civil society in Jordan, instead view civil society as completely dependent on the bureaucratic and legal structures of control imposed upon them by their governments. He argues that we can no longer assume that all civil society tends towards democratization, but rather that in many Middle Eastern countries it is used as a way to channel potential dissent into discrete organizations that are easily monitored and controlled.
I was interested to see that many of the authors criticized the widely held assumption that civil society is always and inevitably an empowering and good thing. I thought that Norton made the interesting point that in Latin America, Eastern and Southern Europe, civil society was not responsible for overthrowing regimes. In fact, he writes, “Civil society was more the beneficiary than the wrecking ball” (7). I was also struck by Wiktorowicz’s article that suggested civil society often acts more as a social control mechanism than as collective empowerment. Wiktorowicz goes so far as to say that the growth of civil society actually has the ability to threaten political freedom. While I recognize that there is truth in this argument I was less swayed by his example of Nazi Germany, since there were many factors besides a strong civil society at play in Germany at the time. I do not believe that civil society in Germany would inevitably have led to Nazism without an extensive array of other factors. In a free and open democratic society, where civil society is thriving, there is no doubt that groups will arise with views that I find unsavory. However, I believe the answer is more freedom for civil society to thrive (more room for competing views), not less. Still, from these readings, while I feel that civil society should be valued and encouraged, I feel that civil society will not be able to have nearly as much influence unless it is thriving alongside a tolerant, stable, and open government environment.
I was very impressed by Fareed Zakaria’s article. In particular, I was struck by Zakaria’s suggestion that rapid democratization may not be the best way to ensure a successful state—or, I would argue, a thriving civil society. Zakaria’s article suggested a focus on imaginative constitutionalism rather than simply guaranteeing a winner-take-all electoral rule. Isobel Coleman too highlighted the fact that rapid democratization might actually slow the transition to women’s rights. If an extremist Islamist movement comes into power by electoral vote, there is a strong danger that such a government will fail to protect the rights of minorities. I very much appreciated Zakaria’s emphasis on the liberal aspect of ‘liberal democracy’ and support his well-thought-out plan for a slower transition to democracy. Zakaria pointed out, “The trouble with these winner-take-all systems is that, in most democratizing countries, the winner really does take all” (20). While such a plan does now seem a bit infeasible in the post-Arab spring world, as it is understandable that those who have just participated in a revolution want their voice heard as soon as possible, I do think Zakaria’s suggestions hold a great deal of wisdom. I also wonder if any of the current candidates up for election will heed Zakaria’s call to draft a creative and well-grounded constitution that will remember the voices of minorities within the complex nature of many Middle Eastern states.
An interesting point made in several of our readings this week was that Arabs tend to prioritize personal issues over broader political issues, much the same as Americans and citizens worldwide. Zogby identified that people’s work, family, home and job security were consistently evaluated as more important than political issues of the country or Arab nation. This statistic helps elucidate the importance of civil society in shaping a nation’s politics. Civil society gives people the means to create community and share activities and values that they will feel a strong attachment to and thus a strong need to defend. In order for a government to succeed, it must either have support from civil society or control over it. A prime example of this is in Kuwait, where politicians have no chance of success unless they attend diwanniyah, the prominent social gatherings in Kuwaiti society. In Kuwait, politicians integrate themselves into civil society. Jordan shows an alternative method of political success, through heavily regulating social gatherings to prevent unwanted or anti-government organizations. I found this distinction interesting. Many political scientists consider civil society a key tool for democratization. However, as Jordan shows, civil society can be used in a completely opposite manner as a tool for repression and power maintenance for authoritarian regimes who realize the strength and potency of civil society.
Non-state institutions must be aware of these phenomena when intervening in politics. It seems that outside forces have considerable power in swaying governments to act a certain way, but if they get too involved they will threaten the regime and wreak havoc. Cardenas’ article on human rights organizations provides a good example of this. Cardenas says that many NHRIs developed in the Middle East under authoritarian regimes in response to great pressure from NGOs and activists. Although these NHRIs are not always effective, they come from within and legitimize the idea of human rights. One thing I’m curious about is how social networking and new technologies will change the roll and development of civil society in the Middle East. Although Jamal argues that internet has limited value, given that many people do not have access to it, and it can be heavily controlled by government, I would argue that the internet has played a crucial role in the Arab spring and has changed the nature of civil society and the ability of governments to regulate it. Understanding the role internet plays in these issues could be very useful in predicting the outcome of new regime development in the region.
In his work, “Civil Society as Social Control: State Power in Jordan,” Quintan Wiktorowicz challenges the assumption of civil society as social empowerment and argues that in the Middle East, “civil society extends the states social control over its citizens.” I am not convinced. Civil society, no matter the form, is social empowerment.
Wiktorowicz argues well that civil society can hinder unity, and even promote non-democratic sentiment, but assumes that these characteristics preclude social empowerment. However, social empowerment is a step on the way to unity, not the other way around. First, through civil society, people gain a sense that they are part of something bigger. Then, it is communal hate for a dictator, or for Israel, or for the US, or love for a leader that nurture unity. It is true though that society does not always promote democracy. Still though it categorically nurtures social empowerment, including in the examples he provides. Yes, Hitler’s use of civil society brought on non-democratic change, but was it not an exercise of social empowerment? Arguing against the value of civil society on the basis that it is dangerous when non-democratic organizations enjoy it seems to be a pretext for exclusionary thinking and rests upon the assumption of democracy as queen. Furthermore, in the context of the Middle East this concern of Civil society as non democratic serves as a pretext to limit Islamist organization, or at the very least, to write off Islamist organization as a useful form of social organization. I would argue that any social organization in civil society is a good thing, even if it does not endorse democracy, because if we believe anything but that, we begin to limit our faith in the value of free speech and right to assemble. So, Wiktorowicz’ point is fair that, “the expansion of civil society does not lead ineluctably to the realization of greater democracy,” but it does not negate the social empowerment aspect of civil society. Also, I would tell Wiktorowicz not to worry about non-democratic civil society in the Middle East. According to Chapter 5 of “The Middle East” 75% of people in Arab countries believe Democracy is the best form of government.
Wiktorowicz might agree with me about civil society on a global scale. But he would hold the Middle East as an exception to the rule. It is not disputed that civil society in the Middle East was a in part a product of calculated liberalization to extend social control and regime survival. But Wiktorowicz is misguided, however, in his assumption that regime survival precludes the possibility for growth of social empowerment. If I can get the right to assemble, I take it, even if the intent wasn’t benevolent and I have to be subject to surveillance. Assembling is a powerful element of social empowerment, even if mom and dad, Abbas and Mubarak, are watching.
Indeed, relying on civil society to democratize the Middle East is misguided as Wiktorowicz argues. Compare it to believing that affirmative action will end racism in the US. Wiktorowicz takes it further though, to a place where I cannot agree. He asserts that civil society does not enable social empowerment, and I contest that no matter the context of initiation or the level of control, civil society develops a communal environment, which is central to social empowerment, and serves as a building block to resistance. Perhaps if Wiktorowicz saw this spring he would see it differently.
Jordan will become an increasingly interesting case study as neighboring regimes continue to fall. Jordan replaced Syria as the bastion of relative stability in the region, and it is interesting to try to figure out why. I think that Wiktoroicz helps to answer this question through his “political liberalization from above” theory, but it seems strange that other regimes that employed a similar approach ended up so differently. For example, Mubarak implemented a series of limited political reforms that seemed to pacify the population, only to see his careful work scorned in favor of wholesale revolution as soon as momentum started to gather. Wiktoroicz stresses the omnipotence of Jordan’s security apparatus, but an efficient mukhabarat is not unique to Jordan and cannot explain Jordan’s unique status today. I’m sure that King Abdullah’s manipulative top-down liberalization has something to do with his continued unshakable position, but I would put a lot more stock in the divided domestic population that fears a move away from the status quo, as explained by a few of our reading on authoritarianism from last week.
Reading the articles for this week about Arabic civil society, I kept asking myself what components of society could have contributed to or motivated the Arab Spring. Jamal’s article on civil society highlighted the fact that Arabs have a positive view of democracy, even when living under authoritarianism (or because of that?). Zogby’s article further emphasized that civil and personal rights rank as the single, most important issue across the Arab world, even when they are denied to many groups within Arab society. Arabs admire American freedoms and the democratic political system, while criticizing American foreign policy. It would follow that all of these values (for civil liberties, democratic government etc…) would contribute to a drive to overthrow authoritarian governments. Furthermore, Jamal found that more religious Arabs are more likely to vote than less religious Arabs. This could explain the significant role of religious groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, in many of the revolutions.
Fareed Zakaria highlights many important issues and factors which directly contribute to the modern face of the Middle East. He brings in great points which specifically detail economic and political factors that have led to and continue to shape the policies and realities of the region today. Zakaria argues that although Islam has had a monumental influence in the formation of the region throughout history, it does not explain the full story for the reasons why the region “is” like it is today. As Zakaria claims that it is not the key to explaining all of the turmoil in the region. It certainly has problems, namely with the politics and economics of the region. It has had a recent history that has been flooded with authoritarianism. In many ways, it has had instances and experiments with secularism. Some of it proves to be working (Turkey) while not in others such as Egypt and Iran. But if the region wants to really move forward in the eyes of the rest of the world, it must begin first with liberalism i.e. a more liberal society which allows for much needed and much extended religious and social freedoms. These freedoms never come from authoritarian regimes. So, the region needs a political makeover. The problem with the political problem though lies in the issue of the inclusion of Islam into political proceses. Can a secular state survive in the region or do the politics need to be tied to Islam? The results of the Arab spring should give us more insight into the shapes that new political institutions in the region will take.
Another focal point of Zakaria’s piece concerned the economic conditions of the region. In Saudi Arabia, not only is society ruled by Islamic law and a monarchy, but the country (and many others in the region) only has one real source of business, oil. Many of the countries in the region do not have strong middle classes. Instead, many Egyptians are forced to relocate to Gulf states to find work and to then send money back home as remitances. The amount of US aid that is paid to Egypt each year is astounding when it accounts for such a substantial piece of their yearly GDP. Zakaria stresses the importance of economic growth and development in these regions in investments other than just oil. What other economic sources can these countries take up? This is an important move for the future economies of the region, but the Middle East will not be able to create any kind of middle class or any kind of new economies if they are not allowed to do so by their political, religious, and ruling systems.
I think the most interesting part of your question actually lies in the distinction you make between the what kind of role non-state institutions SHOULD play in the Middle East vs. what kind of role non-state institutions CAN play in the Middle East. I will use the human rights organizations discussed by Sonia Cardenas and Andrew Flibbert to demonstrate this point. The necessity for Human Rights organizations stands out in many regions in the Middle East, due to the authoritarian regimes in place, a general lack of civil liberties for most citizens, abundant social inequalities, and a host of other factors. Clearly, any human rights organizations SHOULD address these issues through wide-spread promotion of human rights ideals and harsh critiques for violators – including, and especially, violators within the government. However, it is precisely due to the very practices that human rights organizations must attempt to reform, such as the repression practiced by these authoritarian regimes, that their efforts will be largely fruitless. Cardenas and Flibbert offer many examples of National Human Rights Institutions that exist in the Middle East, and on their faces, they fit the criteria set forth by the UN. Many even accomplish nominal successes as times, and the article gives lengthy descriptions of the small achievements made. Not to sound unappreciative of these rather tiny achievements, but the main message I came away with at the conclusion of each section was: so basically, it can’t do anything. This is not so much reflective of the institutions themselves. I am very aware of the difficult position they are in, considering their job basically forces them to criticize regimes that don’t deal with criticism, even of the most constructive variety, very well. On the contrary, their rather pathetic existences are the result of the situations that they are supposed to be transforming – a catch 22, if I ever saw one. For these reasons, I see an unfortunate discrepancy between the answers to “what role SHOULD non-state institutions play [in the Middle East],” and, “what role CAN [they] play.” Interestingly enough, making the changes necessary for these institutions to fulfill their objectives, in many ways relieves the need for them in the first place.
The article by Fareed Zakaria entitled “Islam, Democracy and Constitutional Liberalism” struck me as interesting. Gathering from Zakaria’s dissection of the problems with the Middle East, it seems that sometimes we must accept the lesser of two evils. While Zakaria wrote this article in 2004, his analysis is spot on. Yasser Arafat spoke truth when he claimed that moving to more democratic elections would allow Hamas to take power. Clinton and the west could not understand this then, but today it is clear as day. What’s more, the powers that be in these nations would allow the Taliban or any other radical group to assume power in a heartbeat. In James Zogby’s article ” What Arabs Think: Values, Beliefs, Concerns” he demonstrates that the United States is one of the most unfavorable nations to the Arab people. They simply do not identify with our way of life. What we view as basic freedoms, especially in the case of women, are groundbreaking reforms for them, for instance, something as trivial as allowing women to drive. Further, Zakaria’s discussion of the Koran’s role in preventing democratic reform adds another dimension to the Middle East that I feel is largely overlooked by Americans when examining this region. Our politics are not grounded in religious text. The Koran is a way of life for the Arab world, whereas the Bible is a reference for us on how to live proper and correct. We turn to the Bible whereas the Arab world live, eat, and breathe the Koran. This distinction is a necessary one that I found Zakaria did a good job of unpacking.
In terms of non-state institutions I feel their role should be expanded. The primary concern with state institutions remains that they will not be objective and simply be extensions of the ruler. I am strong believer that for any real change to occur it must come from the Grassroots. State institutions do not fulfill this goal. Non-state institutions are the closet organizations to the Grassroots problems of the state. Although Al Jeezra seems to be high fondly of Islamic fundamentalist…These institutions have the ability to cause profound change in their regions because the people trust them more than the ruler. This trust is enough to cause change.
I really enjoyed Fahreed Zakaria’s article “Islam, Democracy and Constitutional Liberalism”. I think that Zakaria is right when he talks about the fear that politically correct scholars from the region have in critiquing the Middle East. While I found many points in the article insightful, one concept in particular that he touched on briefly stood out to me. Zakaria, in his section about the rise of religion discussed the concept of “participation”. He references it as being one of the main reasons Islamic fundamentalist groups gained such popularity in repressive countries. Participation in this sense is not necessarily political participation, but is “a sense of meaning and purpose in a changing world”. Groups like the Muslim Brotherhood were able to give everyday individuals some feeling of action and involvement in what was going on around them where the ruling regimes were asking them to remain mere spectators.
This is one of the first times I have ever thought about the positive appeal of fundamentalism. The reason people turn to fundamentalism has always been presented to me as in inherently negative. By this I mean a reaction against something. The examples that are often cited are that they want change in their government, they are opposed to western principles and influence, and they are sick of being mistreated by outside factors. The idea that Zakaria and Fouad Ajami espouse is positive. The are remarking that people turn to religious fundamentalists organizations, not to counter or oppose something, but instead to find the fulfillment of participation. This definition avoids demonizing everyone who supports religious fundamentalism, for they are not all inherently militant or combative. Instead it is showing how people everywhere are attempting to feel like they have some control over their lives and their futures, and in cases where the government will not allow them this sense of control, they must turn to organizations that provide it. That these organizations are religious as a a factor of availability and competition rather than a drive toward militant religiosity.
Norton’s introduction to “Civil Society in the Middle East” makes a fascinating read in light of the Arab Spring. There are two issues with and in his writing that struck me as fascinating. First, he argues that civil society is a prerequisite for democracy, strongly suggesting the correlation between development of civil society in a country and successful democratization. In his introduction, in 1995, he writes that “civil society in society in Tunisia is penetrated, co-opted and controlled.” While he does acknowledge the promising signs such as high literacy rates and an unusually large middle class, his assessment is bleak. But Tunisia will be remembered as the first country to topple its dictator in the Arab Spring. So was Norton’s assessment wrong? Is the correlation between civil society and democratization correct, but just does not also imply a correlation between civil society and ‘likelihood to overthrow regime’?
Second, I am impressed by Norton’s forceful attack of conservative scholars like Huntington who assume inherent dangers in the emerging social forces of Islamic populism. Reading Norton I realize how much the media, both the American as well as the German, play the ‘Islamic movements are against democratization and dangerous for the international community as well as the country itself’ string. If someone had asked me some weeks ago about how I feel that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt seems likely to win upcoming elections (let’s hope they will take place), I would have expressed my negative views–which are solely based on articles that illustrate the danger, rather than the opportunity, of an Islamist party in power. This class in general as well as Norton make me think twice about uninformed generalizations.
Some examples:
“Many of the region’s Islamist movements are attempting to work within the existing systems.”
“The rejection of democracy is not general to Islamists and [Ahmad Moussalli] usefully distinguishes between the ideological perspectives of radicals and moderates.”
“[The Islamist] mainstream position is remarkably flexible with respect to modes of political organization.”
Time will tell…well.