Respond in 1-2 paragraphs to any of your reading on civil society, civil conflict, and human rights. What do you find interesting, provocative, or inspiring among the arguments that our authors have made? What kind of role do you think non-state institutions can or should play in the Middle East?
6 thoughts on “Week 6”
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Marcus has interesting points about the rise and fall of Kurdish movement in Turkey. Having served as a correspondent at Reuters, Marcus personally traveled to Turkey on many occasions to cover Kudistan Worker’s Party (PKK) and their struggle for establishing an independent state. Historically, Kurdish people have been marginalized in terms of their right for a statehood. Furthermore, Kurds have been living in the border regions of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. While the Kurds in Iraq have some political authority, they are pretty marginalized in terms of their political power the remaining three countries particularly Turkey.
This is particularly interesting considering that yesterday Turkish air defense force bombed Kurdish militant groups in Iraq over the civil unrest that Kurds have been causing in Turkey. United States & Western allies recognize PKK as a terrorist organization and therefore condemn any attack on Turkish territory.
I find Marcus’s perspective on Kurdish people’s struggles to gain their statehood quite interesting. I think his experience in the region and the fact that he had been arrested by the Turkish government on the bases of his reports favoring Kurdish movement says a lot about him.
Fareed Zakaria who doubles as a scholar and a journalist for CNN (a conservative media channel) was one of the more interesting reads this week. He asserts, “Arab rulers of the Middle East are autocratic, corrupt, and heavy-handed, but they are still more liberal, tolerant, and pluralistic than those who would likely replace them”. I vehemently disagree with him on this. I contend that he needs to draw a line between academia and media propaganda. His statement is more justifying horrendous acts of war perpetrated by the United States and Israel in the name of “security”. It is quite absurd that these two states pride themselves in being strong ‘democracies’ yet the irony behind it is that they fight tooth and nail to stop the middle east from democratizing. It is quite possible that the leaders that the Middle East electorate goes for—Zakaria would describe them as less “tolerant” and “pluralistic”—are a direct result of the fact that Middle Eastern countries’ sovereignty is constantly being encroached on by the various world democracies that purport to be spreading liberal ideals.
Zagby’s and Asmar’s articles provide some interesting public-opinion polling data. According to Asmar’s paper, Lebanon’s sectarian divisions are bridgeable, if negotiators/mediators pick the right issues to deal with, mainly economic ones. Lebanese youth, regardless of their sectarian identifications, worry about job prospects, and feel that employment opportunities have shrunken in recent years. The Lebanese youth, however, have different views on politics. Christians, in general, think that Lebanon needs to keep the confessional system, while Muslims, especially Sunnis, feel that the system is unfair. Unfortunately, these stats suggest that any political agreement remains a long way off, prolonging Lebanon’s political instability. Zagby’s article shows that despite what some neo-conservatives may say, Arabs do not hate the West. They like Canada and France, for instance. But they do not like the US or the UK, because of both countries’ policies/histories in the Middle East. That fact provides reason for optimism, though. If the US is willing to change its policies towards the Arab world, especially regarding the Palestine-Israel conflict, Arab-US relations will no longer be so strained. .
Non-state institutions seem like they can play an important role in the Middle East, if they can remain independent. But as Wicktorowicz points out, that can be a difficult task. The state can co-opt and control civil society, thereby using it as a pressure valve to vent peoples’ frustrations and preventing them from challenging the regime’s control. Civil society, too, can be contested, particularly when multiple religious groups are vying for influence and power, which can exacerbate sectarian divisions as in Lebanon. However, it will be interesting to see how the Arab Spring influences non-state institutions, and how political parties will use civil society to spread their message and garner support.
A theme that caught my attention from this week’s reading was the relationship between democracy and women’s rights in MENA. Democratic movements in MENA often equate to Islamist movements, which comprise the opposition to secular authoritarian state leadership. It is interesting that authoritarian regimes instituted more progressive women’s rights policies than what future Islamists leaders may implement due to their interpretation of sharia. As Coleman notes, women’s rights activists in both Tunisia and Egypt must command international support without raising fears of Western influence in order to make sure that democracy does not erode their rights. Norton points out that the force of Islamic populism is the base of civil society in the ME, yet it has negative ramifications for the protection of some individual rights. Perhaps this is where the action of non-state institutions can attempt to make an impact by implementing internationally recognized norms. If domestic women’s rights activists can gather support and funding from NHRIs, perhaps they can pressure new leaders to adopt a language that protects women’s rights throughout the constitutional reform process.
Fareed Zakaria’s article, “Islam, Democracy, and Constitutional Liberalism,” resonated with me the most. The most interesting thing about his argument was his assertion that although “Arab rulers of the Middle East are autocratic, corrupt, and heavy-handed…they are still more liberal, tolerant, and pluralistic than those who would likely replace them” (Zakaria 2). I find this sadly true, but oddly hopeful. In a weird way, this statement reminds me of the problem of bipartisan polarization in Congress. Studies show that the American people are actually less politically polarized than Congress. Most people are quite moderate. However, our representatives find it easier to get support if they swing more to the right or to the left. It’s easier to identify with a hardcore Democrat or a hardcore Republican because their policies are so different. Thus, people are able to pick and choose who to vote for, even if they themselves tend to be more moderate.
It’s kind of weird that I thought about this while reading Zakaria’s article, but I kind of see Middle Eastern politics in that same light. The masses tend to be more moderate, yet the politicians are either modern, secular, and authoritarian OR fundamental, Islamist, and radical.
Furthermore, I really like Zakaria “solutions” for maneuvering between these two, very different types of leadership. Firstly, the US needs to push for a solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict. Secondly, economic reforms must happen in order for political ones to follow. And finally, Zakaria’s idea of establishing constitutionalism rather than pushing for a full-fledged democracy makes a lot of sense. Perhaps the US could use a change in their foreign policy towards the Middle East?
I thought it was pretty interesting that even when a nation creates a state human rights institution only to appease foreign powers, with no intention of stopping the violation of human rights, the HRI can check the actions of the government. With just the smallest amount of authority they are able to effect some sort of change (e.g. Tunisia’s LTDH publishing two human rights treaties in the nations Official Gazette). It was also interesting to learn that some NHRIs, such as Palestine’s, receive funding independent of the government, enabling them to be more effective in the protection of human rights. I think non-state institutions should function in a role similar to the NGOs in Egypt. Egypt’s NGOs have banded together in protest against the superficial and ineffective NHRI of their government. The NGOs coordinate their goals and activities to better protect the public against abuse. Non-state institutions should function as checks on the government’s actions. Unfortunately, in the authoritarian governments of many Middle Eastern nations, this is much easier said than done.