Both Saudi Arabia and Iran claim to be Islamic states. In your opinion, what makes them distinctively religious states, or alternatively, what makes them look more secular than they claim to be? Highlight something from your reading for the week that gives you insight into this question for one of these countries.
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From a Western perspective, Iran seems like a strict Islamic regime. This impression is not entirely misguided. Political control is dominated by the Supreme Leader and the Council of Guardians. These Islamically driven people have the power to appoint military and security positions, rig elections, and deliver political messages by choosing who speaks at mosques. All of these factors suggest that Iran is an Islamic regime. The regime does not have as much control, however, as it would like because of a vibrant and active population. As Shaul Bakhash points out in his article, civil society in Iran is strong despite attempts to suppress it. Women have resisted Islamic dress codes, youth actively engage in Western pop culture, and literacy rates are high among children. The voice of the people was strongly expressed during the 1997 election when the citizenry overwhelmingly elected Khatami over Nateq-Nuri, somewhat in defiance of the Supreme Leader. Although the government had the power to rig the election, in the interest of legitimacy, they chose not to. They strongly persuaded people to vote for Nateq-Nuri, going as far as to only allow people who would speak in his favor lead Friday prayers right before the election. Ironically, this only further convinced Iranians to vote for Khatami because they knew it wasn’t what the repressive regime wanted. The fact that the people have this much power over the government shows that Iran does not have as strict an Islamic regime as it appears. Although still heavily influenced by Islamic law and clerics, non-Islamic trends are present and the people create their own system of checks and balances by threatening the legitimacy of the government when they stray too far towards strict Islamic control.
I think part of the problem why my fellow commentators (and me, if I had written earlier) cannot come to an agreement is due to the lack of a definition of “Islamic state”. If we just consider the basic definition of “an Islamic state is one which is based on the sharia,” Saudi-Arabia and Iran would clearly fall into that category. Yet, that definition is probably insufficient as it cannot do justice to the modern pulse of time. Today, in contrast to some hundred years ago, no government in the world can base all its institutions on Islamic law alone–it would either lose legitimacy or fall apart quickly. Saudi-Arabian rulers have probably realized that some time ago and therefore, in their own way, modeled their government to something that works, rather than strictly adhering to Islamic law and Muhammad’s first community. Should we therefore call this “Saudi Arabian Islam” as Jordan tries to persuade us? I think think we should rather acknowledge that no two Islamic states are the same–Islam can be modern, flexible and workable and that’s pretty awesome. And so, while some observers would believe that Saudi-Arabia is the archetype of an Islamic state, Wahabi Islamic reformists would love to shorten the “marked distance [between the Al Saud and the religious establishment] that has kept the Wahabis from assuming a major role in the political evolution” (Seznec, 80) in Saudi-Arabia.
Is Iran an Islamic state? Based on reading and other student’s posts, there seem to be two arguments why it is not an Islamic state. Neither one is entirely convincing.
The first could be summed up by saying, “Iran is not an Islamic state because it’s constitution affords traditionally secular political institutions, such as an elected president and parliament.” This is true, and because of it, it is fair to say that Iran is not a full Islamic state. But while Iran is not an Islamic state as modeled by the first Caliphate, it does not claim to be so either. Instead, the Islamic Republic of Iran, chooses its name properly. It represents a modern rendition of an Islamic state that incorporates modern political institutions (elections), with traditional Islamic institutions (Ulama, Faqh, Islamic courts). This affords it the combination of “Republic” and “Islamic”. Thus, from the first argument provided, I concede that Iran is not an Islamic State, but rather just what it calls itself, an “Islamic Republic.”
The second argument questions the authenticity of the Islamic Republic on the basis that private life and popular support are not of Islamic sentiment. This however, is more of a critique of the Iranian nation, and less so the state. The regime is explicitly and clearly an Islamic Republic, and popular support or private life cannot negate that reality. Until the people overthrow the regime, popularity does not translate to definitions of the state. All in all, grass-roots support for the regime are not needed to consider the regime at face value, and while the nation may not be Islamic, the state certainly is. After all, the two soccer stars on Tehran’s soccer team, “Persepolis” will most likely face 74 public lashings for immoral behavior—a harsh bamboo reality that exemplifies an Islamic state.
It seems a little silly to try to answer this question after reading Fandy’s piece, which is explicit in its rejection of “Islamic” as a meaningful term in the political arena. Clearly, the Saudi Arabian brand of Islam is important in that country’s political institutions, and clearly, familial ties are even more important. The ‘ulema hold more than symbolic power, especially when it comes to formalizing succession, but they are generally doing the ruling dynasty’s bidding. A particular form of shari’a law is strictly enforced throughout the country, but again, in practice, plenty of religious laws are broken on a regular basis, especially by members of the royal family. Nevertheless, if you are choosing between Islamic and secular, I think that the Saudi Arabian state has to fall into the former category. The “alliance between the royal family and the religious forces in Arabia has been central in the maintenance of the political order” (Fardy 46), even more than oil wealth or personal charisma. Religion might be a tool of the al-Saud, but it still pervades political and social life on a level that is unmatched around the world. If Saudi Arabia is not Islamic, no state is.
Initially, the Seznec reading gave me the impression that Saudi Arabia was more secular that we tend to believe. Seznec writes, “The Al Sheikh, who hail from the same west-cetnral Arabian province of Najd as the Al Saud, have traditionally handled the religious establishment while the Al Saud have provided the sword and the purse” (Seznec 77). Under this reading it seems like there is a separation of church and state. It seems as if the Sheikh family has power that is granted by the ruling family to implement Islamic standards in the community, but it is not directly part of the government. However, after reading the Fandy piece, it becomes much more complicated. The two powerful families play important roles in implementing Islam throughout Saudi Arabian society. It is clear that Islam is used by the state to control their population and legitimize their rule. Many of the posts claim that because the state has so much control over religion and uses it in such a way, that it makes Saudi Arabia less of an Islamic state. I disagree. Fandy writes “Generally speaking, the traditional ‘ulama support state policy, both internal and external. Even their views in dealing with Western powers usually provide legitimacy to the state’s foreign policy. Using various media, such as publications, radio, and television, they propagate this hegemonic discourse legitimizing the state.” This is clear in the fatwas issued by the Ulama, at the request of the ruling family, to execute those responsible for the take-over of the Grand Mosque in 1979. It is clear that Islam is an important part of Saudi society. This is seen in the controls that the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice has over people to pray, how people interact in parties and how women dress. If this committee has legal rights to control the lives of people in such detail, it is hard to argue against the idea that Saudi Arabia is a very Islamic state.
I’m not even convinced that Iranians know whether or not theirs is a true Islamic state. The internal politics of the Islamic Republic appear to be among the most opaque in the world, with relatively secular (by Iranian standards, at least) politicians vying for influence against a set of clerics and a set of Islamic institutions. Iran is almost what you’d get if you combined a parliamentary system with a system based purely on Islamic law, except that the two exist in parallel spaces and clash in a lot of important ways. Because of that, we see Ahmadinejad struggling for influence in his own government. Iran does have a set of Islamic courts, but according to our readings, there are also parallel court systems for other religions. Barring an attack by Israel or the United States, I think that we’ll see the more secular mode of government gaining dominance as a younger, post revolutionary generation of Iranians come into adulthood.
I’d say Saudi Arabia is more clearly an Islamic state, but I agree with my classmates in saying that family politics appear to be more important. Part of the reason that Islam is so critical to the legitimacy of the royal family is the presence of Mecca and Medina in their country. Accommodating the Hajj is, after oil, their primary economic engine, and appearing to move away from Islam would take away from this tradition. Still, religious morality police and enforcement of the veil ensure that Saudi Arabian society more strictly follows Islam, albeit a radical tradition. I’ll be willing to bet that Saudi Arabia remains an Islamic society long after Iran has become a Western-style republic.
I think that as we saw in Persepolis and read about in some of our readings, Iran is officially an Islamic state but privately secular. At the top, it is very Islamic, but lower down, people are more concerned with daily life. The ulama in the seat of power use religion as a justification for their power, and as we read about, the Supreme Leader (Khomeni, now Khameni) has the power to dismiss the president. However, there are those who profit from the system, even though many of the official state laws stem from sharia and fiqh. The police who claim to be enforcing these Islamic laws are quite easily swayed by bribes, and probably aren’t personally as adherent as many in the regime might wish. One of our readings talked about how private space was truly private, and in private spaces people could relax and settle down a little, which was even supported by the ulama. Yet the line is blurry, as when someone was confronted in the street by the police, the policemen said that “Khomeni isn’t here” or something to that effect. Yet the presence of elections and a president do give the government a more secular look (though it is purely for show).
In Saudi Arabia, the government is a dynastic monarchy with a Islamic leanings, but it is not necessarily Islamic in structure. They will always be associated with the Wahhabs, but it is dynastic in nature. The Sauds do not call themselves caliphs, nor do they derive their power from a religious source. In fact, Husein of Mecca calling himself the new Caliph after the fall of the Ottomans was something that deeply irritated the Sauds. They are religious as a group in their beliefs, but can be quite progressive and though their government is not secular, neither is it an Islamic government.
At face value Saudia Arabia definitely seems to be an Islamic state, more so than that of Iran, but both do largely lean on the side of secularism. I think Gordon’s point about the ulema and their role really emphasizes the Islamic way of life is viewed in Saudi Arabia. As Herb attests to, the Idn Saud family made sure to consolidate power solely in their hands. However, were this a truly Islamic state then the ulema would have more say on the political stage. The ulema ultimately are after thought in the ruling family’s decision making. This is not say that Saudia Arabia is not an Islamic state, it just varies by interpretation. Sharia law is still held in high regard as well as following a pure Islamic lifestyle. To say the state is not Islamic is a invalid because its composition is made up of a polity that adheres to Islamic life, it just depends on how one values Islamic life, in politics or society.
Iran on the other hand has showed signs of democracy and secularism over the years, but seems allergic at least socially from Islamic lifestyle, substantiated by the article “Leaving the Islamic Republic at the Door.” I would say Iran is a failed Islamic state. The attempt to censor citizens and impose Islamic lifestyle on them, only made citizens averse to Islamic lifestyle. Islamic lifestyle appeared to be a tool used by the government to gain a tighter grasp on society. Looking at both regions, it does not seem like there has been any pure grassroots attempt at incorporating Islamic lifestyle into all aspects of society. In Saudi Arabia the government restricts it politically and in Iran the government over embellishes it for their greed.
The main question I came away with after reading Mamoun Fandy’s “Context: Concepts, Parameters, and History” was whether Islam in Saudi Arabia wasn’t more influenced by the Saudi Arabian State than vice versa. The take-over of the Grand Mosque in 1979 illustrates how, in many ways, the Saudi government shapes the very religion upon which it relies for legitimacy. Indeed, the Council of Higher ‘Ulama, a body responsible for issuing fatwas and producing Islamic books and sermons was created by a royal decree in 1971, and the king appoints its members and is in charge of submitting the issues on which he would like fatwas to be proclaimed. As Fandy says, it’s very purpose is, “to legitimate the political order,” (36). The Council itself claims to be only subject to Shari’a and not to the king; however, Fandy points out that, “their fatwas very rarely contradict the views of the royal family,” (37). As a result of these arguments, I am skeptical that the Saudi state actually models its government after Shari’a and Islam and more apt to believe that the government shapes and manipulates the religion to legitimize its actions. Therefore, it might be more accurate to use the term “Saudi Arabian Islam” as opposed to “Islamic Saudi Arabia”.
I think the general consensus about the question of whether or not Iran and Saudi Arabia are true Islamic states is that this question is difficult to answer. There are characteristics of each of these countries and the systems that govern their political and social systems that certainly align with what we would consider an Islamic (Sharia) state, but then again there exist other characteristics, though very few, that we might associate with western liberal democracies, such as the fact that Iran is a Republic per the 1979 constitution.
In terms of the entire country and all aspects of society, Saudi Arabia might fit in better within the confines of what an Islamic state looks like. Because the country does not and has never had any kind of constitution, it’s supreme Royal leaders have governed the country according to Wahhabi Quranic teachings. As stated in the Quran, the Royal leaders of the country have been the supposed direct descendants of Muhammad. In this sense, the Quran serves as the constitution per se for the how the country should be governed and how it operates. In this way, the Quran has ensured the continued successive Royal family members as the leaders of the positions of authority in the Saudi government.
Iran on the other hand is ruled by a system which functions differently than that of Saudi Arabia. The first difference comes in the branch and interpretation of Islam that governs the Islamic Republic of Iran, Suffism. This is a different form of Islam than Sunni tradition which governs Saudi Arabia. From the Saudi Sunni perspective, it would seem that Iran does not function as a true Islamic state because of its Suffi adherence and because of the disconnect between its rulers and the Saudi royal family who claim to be descendants of Muhammad. Although Iran is a republic in that its leaders are democratically elected, the country is essentially run by an authoritarian dictator. Although this process in and of itself reflects a well established necessity of a democratic state, Iranian society is very much run according to the Sharia system of law under which many political and social freedoms continue to be denied. In conclusion, each of these two states claims to operate according to islamic law, but there are certainly stark differences between these two systems of islamic law that differ form each other in many ways.
I have to agree with Alison’s evaluation of Saudi Arabia as an incompletely Islamic state. It is clear that Islam is massively important to the culture of Saudi Arabia and its place in the world, thanks to the fact that the country hosts the key pilgrimage sites of Medina and Mecca and that Wahhabism is the state religion. However, I would argue that in order for Saudi Arabia to be considered a fully Islamic state, it would need to be governed by religious figures, which it is not. The ulema in the country operate more as a legitimizing tool for the Al Saud dynasty than as an independent political force. This is evident from the time of the founding of modern Saudi Arabia under Ibn Saud on to the present. During the rule of Ibn Saud, he concentrated nearly all of the state power in his own hands, with limited delegation of authority to family members and personal advisers (Herb 88). None of his closest advisers were major religious figures and a number of them were non-Wahhabi foreigners. After his death, power was consolidated even more within the ruling family, with the subsequent power struggle between his sons Saud and Faisal carried out almost entirely inside the Al Saud family. The ulema were consulted only after an internal consensus had been reached, and they agreed with the family’s decision to oust King Saud (Herb 99).
In the current context, the Al Saud family remains firmly linked to Wahhabism as a legitimizing factor, although in “Rageless in Riyadh” Gause questions “how many Saudis still pay attention to state-appointed arbiters of religion” (208). From the relative subservience of much of the ulema in issuing fatwas favorable to the regime’s policies, it seems that the ulema are tacitly acknowledging the superior, and fundamentally secular, power of the Al Saud family over their positions as religious leaders in Saudi Arabia.
It is clear that neither Saudi Arabia or Iran adheres to the “separation between state and church” doctrine that the United States so fondly recites. Still, just as the United States sometimes allows the line to blur between church and state, both Saudi Arabia and Iran naturally have other foundations guiding them beyond only religion. Still, I would certainly characterize both countries as strongly religious states. It is clear that Iran has gone through phases of “Islamicization”: the early 1980s was a period of revolutionary social transformation, mandating strict Islamic standards of dress and behavior, yet in the 1990s, a period of modernization began, and in 1997 the Iranian people elected the reformist candidate, Khatami. Still, Khatami’s reform efforts were frequently blocked by conservative opposition, and the hard-liners returned to power in 2005. This history indicates that the Iranian state has not, and does not need to be, as religious as it sometimes acts. One of the most engaging articles for this week, “Leaving the Islamic Republic at the Door,” offered a fascinating look at the fact that many Iranians actually reject religious practices in private space; at the same time, the article showed the intrusion of the religious state even in private space (one particularly notable example was the story of an Iranian wedding in which the bride’s father was put on trial for allowing “immorality”: the presence of alcohol at the event). In Saudi Arabia, the presence of a religious state was also clearly described by the readings. According to Maisel, “Saudi political culture is inseparable from Islam” (115). Still, it was interesting to read that family ties often played a more important role than religious theories in Saudi Arabia; the concept of ‘a’iliyya seemed particularly important (Fandy 21). In fact, Fandy writes that Islam has historically been secondary to the a’ila (25). Still, the very existence of a Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Suppression of Vice makes it clear that religion plays a very significant role in the Saudi state (Fandy 37).
I think there are two problems to considering Saudi Arabia a purely Islamic state. Though the legal system operates under Shari’a and the population is held to Islamic standards, the governing officials (the King and those he appoints) do not come to power through “Islamic” means. For example, selecting an heir for the Kingship is not based on religion, but rather on internal family politics. While piousness may affect a person’s chances to be named heir, it does not necessitate it. “One of the consequences of [leaders being appointed by the family] is that the potential king must show his ability to negotiate, and maneuver, and to manage his family and some affairs of state before being chosen and enthroned” (Seznec, 77). A regime cannot claim to be purely Islamic, unless those who lead it come to power through Islam.
A second aspect of the Saudi State that undermines its Islamic nature is that in many ways religion is subservient to the regime, and the regime directs and utilizes religion to uphold its authority. The Ulema in Saudi Arabia seem to be little more than puppets in the hands of the al Saud family. This is seen in the Council of Higher Ulema, which the royal family appoints, and which issues fatwa’s only “regarding things submitted to them by the King”. While the Ulema assert that they are only accountable to the teachings of Shari’a, their teachings rarely differ from the royal family’s opinion (Fandy 36-37), in essence meaning that the regime is using Islam to provide themselves legitimacy, rather than the other way around. These two dilemmas seem to indicate that the Saudi state is not truly Islamic.