Select a reading of interest for the week and respond to it in 1-2 paragraphs. What made it seem important, controversial, or interesting to you?
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Select a reading of interest for the week and respond to it in 1-2 paragraphs. What made it seem important, controversial, or interesting to you?
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I found the lack of organization in the opposition movements very interesting, especially because there seems to be many goals of reducing the king’s power but no way to achieve them. The groups on the same side of the argument are holding each other back. Within the Council to Support the February 20th movement, there are divisions and alliances. In fact, the Marina Ottaway article suggests the council is more structured than the movement itself. They all recognize they should unite, but cannot move on from there and accomplish anything solid. Although parties themseleves are described as disorganized, the new constitution, with some added pressure, seems to be a step in the right direction towards more democracy.
Another topic that I found interesting was the Green March. It just shows how much power the king had to be able to march into the Western Sahara, and how the power move increased the king’s legitmacy as a protector and expander of Moroccan territory.
One of the interesting points of Morocco’s political background and history, as addressed in this week’s readings, is it’s relationship with the United States. None of the articles were about the US’s foreign policy stance per se, but both the article in The New Arab Revolt and the chapter on Morocco in The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa alluded to an intriguing reality. The United States identifies itself as a protector and messenger of democracy; its loyalty to democratic ideals explains its steadfast alliance with Israel, its unilateral intervention in Libya, and its ongoing face-off with Iran.
However, there are a lot of exceptions to the U.S.’s self-imposed democratic rule. When an authoritarian regime supports American interests, it seems that this country is more than willing to turn a blind eye to anti-democratic behavior and human rights infractions. This was particularly evident in the Egyptian uprising against Mubarak, a powerful ally of the US in the region; though the Obama administration backtracked from their original statements, they were not universally supportive of the democratic protestors, and initially urged for “patience” and “rationality.” Morocco is a similar exception.
Assessing the possibilities for democracy in Morocco, the United States’ willingness to support the Moroccan regime is slightly disheartening. Because the monarchy has been so supportive of American policy, fighting on the side of the US in the Gulf War and assisting anti-terrorism efforts in the area, the US has been willing to overlook blatant human rights violations and institutionalized inequality.
Admittedly, King Muhammed VI is a more liberal, reform-minded ruler than his father, and there has been some change in Morocco over the past 20 years. The new constitution, ratified this summer, is one example of this controlled opening up of the political world. However, as Azzedine Layachi points out in the Foreign Policy article, true reform won’t take place until Moroccan society is fundamentally restructured, power is taken away from the elite class, political parties are empowered, and lower classes are given political and economic opportunity. That probably won’t happen as long as the Americans keep shipping foreign aid and military supplies to help maintain the Moroccan regime.
Marina Ottoway’s article on the new constitution in Morocco grabbed my attention because of what she said, but also because of what she didn’t say. I thought she did a good job of explaining the nuances of the new constitution, including the ins and outs of the new privileges of the king, and also what was being said in the constitution simply by not saying something else (such as in her discussion of Amazigh as an official language). I thought it was also interesting the way in which she framed the article with an opening question, of “whether this is just a short-lived victory in the first skirmish of a long battle or a turning point on the road to transforming Morocco into the Arab world’s first constitutional monarchy.” I also liked the way that she put some of the impetus on the Moroccan people, calling on them to continue putting pressure on the king, and saying that history shows us that the people are capable of pressuring the king in certain circumstances.
But I felt that she fell short by not acknowledging the changes that Morocco is making and the steps (however small) they are taking toward becoming a constitutional monarchy, or “a parliamentary monarchy where the king does not govern.” While the steps that the king has taken are noticeably tiny, I think it is important for the international community to acknowledge that the king is maybe moving in the right direction – a little bit of positive reinforcement never hurt anyone. I understand the importance of encouraging him to continue with these reforms, but I think complementing the reforms that he has made is an important part of encouraging him to make more. (quotes taken from: http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/06/20/new-moroccan-constitution-real-change-or-more-of-same/6g”
I thought that a lot of these readings argued the same point: true democratization in not possible to Morocco without the sustained effort of citizens putting pressure on the King for reform. I thought that each article did a good job of explaining different factors that limit this effort: economic and religious pressure.
Most of all, I enjoyed Layachi’s article. I felt that this article brought up a very valid and interesting question about why some Maghrebi countries have pushed for democratization and others haven’t. As explained in this article, the biggest deterrent in Morocco is the fact that the King is willing to make slight concessions to ensure that there will not be a robust revolt. Ultimately, he makes minor sacrifices for political securities. The new constitution, explained in the Ottaway article, gives the appearance of a more democratic solution. However, it ultimately takes away no power from the King and is really only a method of silencing the public to accept the new (seemingly better) status quo.
The question that each article failed to answer (due to the time at which they were written) was where to now? Qaddafi and Ben Ali have both fallen and we are yet to see a sustained effort from Morocco pushing for democratization, as predicted by Layachi’s article. However, time is still to tell, and with the advent of more technologically advanced methods of interaction, the chances of bolstering support seem more likely.
Marina Ottaway’s discussion of the new Moroccan constitution was interesting to me for a number of reasons. Her main point—that the constitution will only bring about significant change if there is continuous pressure on the king from the people—resounds strongly with me. While parliament and the prime minister are given new powers, the powers of the king have not be limited at all. As such, the king presides over “strategic decisions” and what qualifies as “strategic” is left up to his discretion. Furthermore, I read somewhere else that parliament can be dissolved by the king. I have trouble understanding the significance of a constitution drafted by an appointed commission and a parliament that can be dissolved by the king. To me, the constitutional developments seem symbolically significant because they indicate the fact that the king is preemptively making changes, feeling threatened by the larger Arab Spring movement. But as Ottaway says, if the pressure on the king does not continue, his power hasn’t been significantly affected by the changes.
I think it is also interesting that the two most controversial issues (whether Morocco be an Islamic state or not and what the official language(s) will be) of the constitution are issues involving national identity. Of course, identity questions are very important, but I would have expected the role of the king in government to receive more initial attention than these issues. On the other hand, as Ottaway explains, the religious status of the country is important for the king’s legitimacy since he is considered an important figure in interpreting Morocco’s Islam. This leaves me with the question, would the creation of a more secular constitution be a backdoor way of limiting the kings’ power?
Before reading Azzedine Layachi’s article, “Meanwhile in the Maghreb: Have Algerian and Morocco Avoided North Africa’s Unrest?”, I asked myself the same question. It seems to me that the response points to a “yes- for the moment”, especially since the king advertises that the new Moroccan constitution will limit his power. In his article, Layachi points out that King Mohammad IV has provided security and national unity “(not material comforts)” in exchange for loyalty and obedience. More specifically, Mohammad IV has improved legal status of women and “programs to alleviate poverty and illiteracy.” This enhances his legitimacy, which could ward off huge, violent protests for a while, but I truly do believe that the strong influence from their neighboring countries such as Libya and Tunisia and use of technology (texting, tweeting, blogging) will inspire Moroccans to fight for a true constitutional monarchy, they just need someone or some political party to spearhead this movement. Otherwise it will be another “structureless and leaderless amalgam of young people”, which is how Maria Ottoway described the February 20th protest. However, the reforms Mohammad IV has made are an improvement from the brutal regime of the former King Hassan II.
I find interesting how the Moroccan kings have been able to hinder liberalization and democratization. From Maria Ottoway’s article, I learned that religion is an integral part of the king’s power and deems him the “commander of the faithful”. This is up to the point where he is sacred and cannot be criticized. This reminded me of Lisa Wedeen’s article about Assad’s ability to control the people’s psyche. To an extent, the Moroccan kings have been doing the same by using religious and traditional rituals to bolster their image and legitimacy. Also, the fact that over the years the monarch has integrated different economic processes such as privatizing some companies, reducing subsidies, and lifting some price controls and also creating a multiparty system, which creates the illusion that these reforms might change the nature of the regime. Layachi, Magraoui, and Ottoway all point out that despite these reforms, Morocco is no closer to democracy. I do believe that the new constitution does not limit the king’s power and that not only does his power need to be limited, but that the Makhzen needs to ousted or more representative of the people.
Magrhaoui’s article about the de-politicization of Morocco is extremely interesting—can the strategic “concessions” of a monarchy hold off revolution indefinitely? Especially in comparison to the machinations and current status of other states within the region, the skillful manipulation of economic liberalization and political “reform” seems relatively effective within Morocco. Over and over again, it seems that the ruling king was able to placate or de-politicize opposition by a variety of different strategies, including harnessing legitimacy through the “green march,” “reforming” the constitution when faced with dissidents, and mobilizing influential traditional networks. Additionally, the strategic backing of certain programs, keeping political parties off balance, and emphasizing economic rather than political change and growth has aided in the long duration of Moroccan’s autocratic rule. Yet is it truly possible to have successful economic reform without corresponding political liberalization?
Although Maghraoui argues that this “strategy of political control through liberal reform” is shortsighted and will ultimately leave the regime in a position of weakness against the rising Islamist movement, this argument is especially interesting when compared to Ottoway’s observations about the current climate. She argues that public mobilizations against the regime are relatively unorganized and limited. The newly revised constitution also seems to be yet another modification spearheaded by Mohammed VI, promising little real change and political democratization. Thus the effectiveness of these movements has yet to be seen, perhaps they will be merely another reoccurring chapter of depoliticization.