Week 6

Respond in 1-2 paragraphs to any of your reading on civil society, civil conflict, and human rights.  What do you find interesting, provocative, or inspiring among the arguments that our authors have made?  What kind of role do you think non-state institutions can or should play in the Middle East?

12 thoughts on “Week 6

  1. Connie Sanabria

    Fareed Zakaria reinforced what I once learned from Alex de Tocqueville that change has to be supported by a society in order for it take shape and leave a lasting impression. In my opinion, the supporter’s for Women’s Rights should not see the Mideast Revolutions as bad or as another obstacle embedded in their country’s pre-existing structure of oppression. In a sense, similar to the Mideast Revolutions, women’s rights calls upon the state to alter their behavior towards citizens. If modernization in the government is in the process of happening, I would hope to think that the state would take into consideration the need to ensure a women’s personal freedom in public and private life. In Tunisia, the government permits women to have equal divorce rights to men, and access to birth control and some abortion. Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood rethought about their organization’s beliefs after they received a strong disfavor for their decision to exclude women and non-muslims from their party platform for presidency. Furthermore, women’s movements have demanded for their rights in Algeria, Iran, Israel, Kuwait, Turkey, Yemen, Egypt, and Tunisia (Norton 15). With compromise and alliances, I believe an appropriate mix of Sharia and individual rights can be achieved in the Middle East. Though, I would like to add that women’s rights continue to be a hot topic around the world, especially in developing nations, but if the Middle Eastern women’s rights group can find the money, time, and literate/educated people then there should be no reason for this group to not challenge the government. Additionally, Women’s rights groups can gain international support from other human rights groups to help change the state.

    I like this quote from Norton’s article, “civil society is also a case of mind, a willingness to live and let live” (12). Women’s rights in the Middle East (and around the world) is not a matter of protection, but an empowerment of a group that is self-initiated, integrative of other issues, and gender equitable.

  2. Yixin Zeng

    Amaney Jamal’s “Actors, Public Opinion and Participation” thoroughly illustrates the dynamics in political participation in the Middle East. In the reading, there are two points that I found particularly interesting and somewhat surprising. The first point is Jamal’s narration that Arba citizens have had healthy understanding towards the concept of democracy, and largely view the United States as a truly democratic country. This contrasts my previous thought that, due to anti-U.S. and anti-Israel sentiments in the Arab world (which often stem from “democracy-related” policies implemented in ME by the U.S.), the Arab citizens would naturally rejects the rather Western concept of “democracy.” It may also be plausible that, since the Arab world has had little experiences in democracy and its population is relatively uneducated compared to the West, the notion of democracy must have been different in ME. Jamal’s study shows otherwise; in fact, Arab citizens’ understanding of the elements of a democratic political life is virtually in alignment with that of the Western countries.

    The second interesting point I found in the reading is Jamal’s perception that, while the state’s rule is rather absence in the Arabs’ everyday life, the informal networks in fact serve the interests of authoritarian rulers. One would easily think that, the informal political network organically developed from the citizens would become the substitution to the limited State interference in daily life, especially in the political sphere. Such idea proposes that greater informal political network would foster the democratization of the ME countries and further undermine the state’s rule. Jamal’s writing interestingly rejects such proposition, and argues that the informal network and political communities create the necessary distancing between states and societies; by substituting the state with various social demands not provided by the rentier state government, the political communities serve to protect the existing regime from these demands. The informal political network in ME, therefore, must see a breakthrough in its role in order to transfer from a regime-protector to a regime-defector.

  3. Wahid Ahmed

    Cardenas and Filbbert do a great job of analyzing national human rights institutions in the Middle East. I understood that NHRIs can be used by the state in order to legitimize its actions to the international community. By forming and funding NHRIs, the state can violate human rights, and use the existence of NHRIs to appear as if progress is being made towards the sustainability of human rights. A key issue with NHRIs comes from their funding, solely state sponsored NHRIs cannot freely criticize the state due to state involvement in their actions. Also, Cardenas and Filbbert state that NHRIs have been used to defend the state’s human rights abuses. I found it interesting, though not entirely surprising, that completely state funded NHRIs also defend the state’s practices. I also noticed that while some NHRIs manage to have autonomy from the state, their actions do not provide progress for human rights initiatives on a large scale, but instead aid specific individuals with grievances such as imprisonment.
    I found the level of international pressure to be a key factor in the management of NHRIs. Cardenas and Filbbert use Egypt as an example of a state that did not have adequate human rights protections, but due to its proximity to Israel and the peaceful ties that were formed, did not come under heavy interstate scrutiny.
    Though NHRIs can be used by the state, I still think that their presence is needed, if for nothing else than to further implicate the state in its idleness or build up political and legal president. I also wondered about the length that international actors will go to in the name of human rights, and at what point is it inappropriate for international actors to intervene in the affairs of the state.

  4. Pathik Root

    I was particularly pleased with how Jamal addressed the question of whether democracy is somehow inherently unsuited for the Middle East, or more specifically, how democracy and Islam interact. I think he pretty convincingly proves that democracy is not only feasible but desired (figure 5.2) in the region. Throughout the article he cites “Arab Barometer” figures to prove his point, and refute others’ arguments.

    To connect this idea to a more contemporary situation, it is worth looking at the recent Nobel Peace Prize winner Tawakul Karman in Yemen. She has been a prominent human rights figure for a number of years, and a driving force behind the on going pro-democracy movement. She also happens to be member of the leading Islamic political party Islah. It will be interesting to see what role she plays as the Yemeni revolution continues.

    In regards to the last question, the “can” part seems to be much more important than the “should”. I think that non-state institutions should, ideally play the same role that they do in any liberal democracy, but whether that will or can happen in the near future is another story. Authoritarian regimes in the region, with few exceptions, have managed to repress, co-opt or control civil society. Although, I believe that in the wake of the Arab Spring, it will be increasingly more difficult and costly to do so as time goes on.

  5. cnewbury

    Zakaria’s article presents a crude view on the relationships between western nations and repressive leaders of the Middle East. His argument is, although the more developed nations have much sway over these leaders as they have money and strong militaries, the dictators themselves are relatively free to rule as they please as they are the most “democratic” option for that state. For example, Mubarak knew that he could be just to the political left of whatever fundamentalist that threatens the country in order to be the better option in the eyes of the west. I wonder to what extent this “fear” drives American foreign policy, I imagine quite a bit. I also wonder how this will work out with regards to the Arab spring and the coming influx of new leaders and government. It is in many ways similar to how politics work in the US: you can be as nuts as you want, as long as you are slightly saner than your opponent. When we talked about how George Bush Sr. chose to not overthrow Hussein, he was well aware of this fact in that whoever would replace Hussein would probably be worse than Hussein himself. As we see now in Iraq, with an increase in violence as the Americans gear up to leave, the dictator is gone, but fundamentalists are on the margins, ready to step in and infiltrate once the opportunity arises.
    These countries may not have political stability or exceeding power on the world stage, but repressive leaders who at least communicate an cooperate on many levels with the west do have one weapon in their arsenal that allows them a margin of freedom over the superpowers in how they treat their citizens. With the overthrowing of Mubarak, the death of Qaddafi, and whatever else is to follow in the region, it will be the job of non-state actors to promote repression-free leadership and to empower the citizens to demand the same.

  6. Margaret Souther

    I think Zakaria’s reading “Islam, Democracy, and Constitutional Liberalism” made some great points. So many Middle Eastern regimes are in power because their repression and prevention of a “civil society” prevents the chaos and violence that would emerge with an election or looser individual rights. Wiktorowicz mentions in his article that governments have constant surveillance over its people, keeping a tight leash to prevent any undermining, menacing groups from emerging. Back to Zakaria, however, it’s really hard to try to promote democracy in a place where the kings and ruelrs are more liberal than the people over which they reign. This, Zakaria points out, leads to a vicious cycle where terrorism and opposition grows as a result of such repression. How does the region get out of such a corrupt and toxic cycle?

    It was inspiring to read about women’s roles in some Muslim countries. Indonesia, for example, one of the most Muslim countries in the world, recently elected a woman as president, while Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India elected women as prime ministers. This is very encouraging, considering women cannot drive in Saudi Arabia and were just granted the right to vote. This proves that countries with similar beliefs and Muslim morals could potentially follow in their footsteps. Afghanistan even had 40% of it’s doctors that were women before the Taliban, tyranny, and chaos set them back.

    I also thought Zakaria made a good point in researching the backgrounds of terrorist groups and individuals. Countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt have been breeding grounds of teror, and also seen the greatest influx in wealth over the past 30 years. Democracy is meant to give aid to the poor, which does not help the rich and privileged individuals in control. Also, Zogbar pointed out that many men in middle eastern countries are concerned with politics, work, and leisure time, which supports Zakaria’s theory that many of the oil rich, spoiled rulers have an “overdeveloped capacity for leisure”.

    Lastly, Zakaria raises a good question about the compatibility of religion and politics in a government. Since politics is about compromise and religion is often inflexible, can the two successfully combine and peacefully rule a state?

  7. Lucy Jackson

    One of the more interesting things I read about the development of civil society in the Middle East came from Fareed Zakaria’s 2004 article “Islam, democracy, and constitutional liberalism”. In this article Fareed argues not that western forces need to withdraw their involvement in Arab state building, but rather start advocating for a different type of governance other than democracy, that of constitutional liberalism. As a student of comparative politics, it is hard to divorce from the school of thought that a civil society’s foundational political structure (for example if the society had been colonized, if so by what type of regime, if they were formed by individual nationalists or by a strong leader) is both essential and unavoidable in the state a civil society becomes afterwards. The thought being foundational currents will run throughout the society’s construction unwaveringly, it is hard to imagine many of these developing states moving very far away from them. And in a way, Zakaria is adhering to this point of view, recognizing that democracy is not the answer as “no one can make democracy, liberalism, or secularism take root in these societies with their own search, efforts and achievements.” In other words change has to be supported by a society in order for it to take root, and cannot be imposed by others, disconnected from the social norms and expectations of the society.

    What is interesting though, is that Zakaria does not advocate for the removal of the US from the MIddle East, but rather a change in their diplomatic efforts, changing their dialect towards supporting not democracy (“at least not yet”) but to “seek first constitutional liberalism”. The issue with advocating democracy is that so many developing Arab nations do not have the underlying political structure to support effective elective democracy. Rather with elections, winners really do take all, and the government merely shifts from one dominating factional leader to another. Without the balance of powers, and the power of many powerful factions advocated for in classical democratic texts like Madison’s Federalist 10, democracy can not function as “ambition must be made to counteract ambition” a balance without which no democracy can remain equal. Zakarria points out that part of what made Western democracy effective was the fact that there existent within the foundation of nations like the United states a “constitutional liberal tradition” something which cannot be looked over now.

  8. Marea Colombo

    The Jamal article did a great job, in my opinion, of explaining the benefits that civil society has on authoritarian regimes. Civil society, whether robust or not, seems to always allow for some sort of incision into the authoritarian regime. Even when authoritarian regimes use political inclusion to keep an eye on civil society groups and monitor their political endeavors, they still are allowing entrance into the political system, which is risky. Civil societies increase social capital such that people within the groups learn social norms, and have an almost mini democratic institution. I agree with Claire, however, that we often have this overly positive view of civil society because civil society is often the driving force of democratization. At the same time as civil society creates democratic norms and can help unify people, it can also dichotomize groups that are not part of this given group.
    Civil society in the Arab World is characterized as being very weak. I was trying to think about why civil society here would be so fundamentally different than in other areas of the world. Of course, the use of suppression is so high in many of these countries that civil society has no chance to develop. Another factor I thought was important was that the type of authoritarian regimes that exist in the middle east, specifically dynastic regimes, in which you can easily be bought out to support the government. Furthermore, if you live in a dynastic regime you are unlikely to feel a strong pull towards the government, and rely more on your direct community/family.

  9. Nobuhle Ndlovu

    Isobel Coleman seems to think that yes, these revolts are indeed bad for women’s rights.
    ” Tunisian and Egyptian activists should know that women’s rights often become bargaining chips for some other agenda. In Iraq, the American-appointed Governing Council wasted no time in trying to rescind the Baathists’ progressive family law and replace it with religious law. Only a backlash from women’s groups, and a U.S. veto, prevented the move”.

    The above quote demonstarates that democracy is not necessarily the best thing for women in these regions especially if it goes hand in hand with the adoption of Sharia. This is because as we learned earlier in the cause a lot of people attested the decline of their countries to the the straying from religions beliefs. So with a new beginning a lot of countries will try to stick as close to religious teachings as possible. More than anything else, I believe the author is correct in saying it is up to women’s groups to assert their importance and stand up for their rights. With this in mind, we as the rest of the world, need to make sure we learn to listen and support these women’s groups as much as possible without interfering with the political process in these countries.

  10. Catherine Brown

    Fareed Zakaria suggests that in most societies, “dissidents force their country to take a hard look at its own failings (2).” From the Western perspective–one that espouses individual freedom and equal representation– one failing of the Middle East may be the abundance of autocratic regimes. Indeed, “of the 22 members of the Arab League, not one is an electoral democracy, whereas 63% of all countries in the world are (6)”. Given the strong tradition of religious autocracies in the Middle East, I wonder whether the dissidents of the Arab Spring will continue to push to correct the Western image of a state ‘failing’, or whether dissidents will hold their new regime accountable for another state ‘failing’.

    According to Zogby, “most Arabs give priority to personal concerns; while the lowest priority is political issues in their country (1)”. This suggests that changes in the quality of civil society may serve the desires of the Arab population more fully than a shift in regime type. Would Arab rulers be more likely to restore regional stability by focusing on regime type or reconstructing the institutions of civil society?

    I am hesitant to take a strong stand in either direction at the moment, however I suspect that if national oil money was directed to job security, education and health care, many of the triggers of the Arab Spring would be addressed. Jordan seems to have forged a successful relationship between the monarch and the state parliament. This mix of individual representation and a strong patrimonial monarch seems to serve the Jordanian population well. As Zakaria points out, “the Quranic model of leadership is authoritarianism”. Can this be diversified to give citizens a stronger sense of leadership in the state? Could the Jordanian model be replicated successfully in other Middle Eastern regimes? Would this allow civil society to address the personal needs that Arab citizens seem to prioritize, while providing a strong source of state leadership?

  11. Claire Powers

    I find the role and importance of civil society to be extremely interesting. The arguments of its merits, longevity and significance seem to vary widely in scope. Firstly, it is “viewed as a mechanism of collective empowerment that enhances the ability of citizens to protect their interests and rights from arbitrary or capricious state power” (Wiktowrowicz 43). It is also contended that “civil society is empowerment,” that it breeds tolerance and pluralism, increases social capital, mobilizes ordinary citizens, and can place constraints on authoritarian governing structures (Jamal 211). I agree that civil society can play an extremely important role in the formation and maintenance of the democratic state, and that as a tool by which to increase public participation in politics it is frequently effective. Yet I think it is also important to question the often exclusively positive read of civil societies, and not to subscribe too easily to the wonders of these institutions–they can also threaten democratic institutions as well as strengthen them. As such, political context is extremely important. I like the idea that civil society is not necessarily the driving force in democratization, but rather the beneficiary, as discussed by Norton. I think that the example of Jordan given by Wiktowrowicz is very useful in complicating our understanding of civil society. Wiktowrowicz argues that civil society has been co-opted to instead function as more of a state apparatus, hindering participation and structural improvement through a tight regulation of these channels. Here, civil society becomes simply a less visible form of state control and repression, a good example of when political context matters and civil society does not necessarily correspond with democratization.
    To conclude on a little different note, I was a bit shocked Fareed Zakaria’s article. Can a true and lasting democracy actually be imposed by external forces? As much as the US seems to believe so, I can’t help but feel that talk about what “we” must do to establish democracy in the region is high-handed and ultimately ineffective. If civil society is the building block of democracy, in bypassing it to impose external and top down “solutions,” are we instead weakening the new democracies, as they do not have strong a civil society to balance and support it?

  12. Nadia Schreiber

    When I first started reading the Zogby readings, I thought that they were directly contradicting the Norton reading that I had just finished. Norton talks about the importance of civil society in making democratic changes, and says that developing a civil society is an important step along the process of democratization. Norton says that, “civil society implies a shared sense of identity” (Norton, 11). But, in some ways, the work of Zogby contradicts that, as he proves that “the choices that are given the highest priority reflect concerns quite close to home” (Zogby, 7). At first, Zogby’s book seems to be implying that the cares are only about what matters to an individual. These seemed mutually exclusive, but they are not. The fact that people care about what is close to home means that they care about things that affect their lives, and therefore are interested in the politics around them. While this might not mean that there is a civil society, I think it does imply that there is a civil society in the making. Non-state institutions play an important role in any country going through transitions, and then often into their futures as well. I think often the government-run institutions are the groups causing the problems in the first place, and the distance that a non-state group can have when looking at an issue is important in making decisions that will benefit as many people as possible.

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