Select a reading of interest for the week on Egypt or Israel and respond to it in 1-2 paragraphs. What made it seem important, controversial, or interesting to you?
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Select a reading of interest for the week on Egypt or Israel and respond to it in 1-2 paragraphs. What made it seem important, controversial, or interesting to you?
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I was fascinated by the article, “Tent Revolt in Tel Aviv.” The article, as well as the other readings on Israel, made me realize just how little I actually know about this country. While I feel that I have a relatively firm understanding of the history of Israel’s creation and ensuing wars, these readings made me realize I actually know very little about life inside Israel (outside of what the media covers, which seems to relentlessly highlight suicide bombings and violence). Truthfully, my incredibly naive vision of Israel has always been of a relatively blissful democracy blighted by unfortunate violence. The vision did not include 300,000 protestors in the streets, seemingly with a similar message as the Occupy Wall Street protestors in America. I was shocked to read that the price of groceries has risen 16 percent since 2007 and the cost of fuel has risen 19 percent. Even more alarming was the fact that housing prices have risen 60 percent since 2007. Intrigued by this article, I looked to see if I could find more information about the protests; it appears that by early September, according to a Haaretz article, “the middle classes had packed up and left their tent cities, but the genuinely homeless had nowhere to go.” Even if these protests have diminished since August, I imagine that the complaints expressed in them are still very real, so it will be interesting to watch what continues to unfold. It seems very possible that this discontent could affect Israel’s continued support of the settlements, which might have very significant consequences. I was also interested to learn more about the set-up of Israel’s political system, particularly that Israel has only an unwritten constitution. It was also interesting to compare Israel’s extreme version of a multi-party system in which only 2% of the vote is needed to receive representation with the extremely limited, largely state-controlled, multi-party system instituted in 1976 by Sadat in Egypt.
Carrie Wickham’s piece, “The Muslim Brotherhood After Mubarak: What the Brotherhood is and How it Will Shape the Future,” provided helpful insight on two overlapping questions recently discussed in class.
First, the article provides welcomed empirical support for one of my earlier posts on civil society, which can be summed up by its last sentence, “no matter the context of initiation or the level of control, civil society develops a communal environment, which is central to social empowerment, and serves as a building block to resistance.” Relative to the Muslim Brotherhood, the key phrase of this sentence is “a building block to resistance.” The MB sustained itself for eighty years under waves of government repression and constant surveillance, all the while growing, shifting, and organizing. Now, after the surprising yet historically inevitable overthrow of Egypt’s regime under Mubarak, the MB has overwhelming organizational power. This proves to me that even in conditions of political control, civil society does serve as a building block to resistance in the form of post-regime organization. Progress can be made under wraps, and the MB made so much progress that Wickham closes with, “No democratic solution can succeed without it [the MB].”
This article also has implications for the question of what happens when democracy meets Islamism and how much people should worry about it. If we take another look at Wickham’s closing line, it is striking in this context. Wickham is in fact saying that Egypt depends on their strongest and oldest Islamist group for democracy, quite a bold and surprising claim considering dominant narratives about the incompatibility of Islamism and democracy. Her statement, however, might hold merit in its history. The MB has evolved towards moderate politics since its initiation as a religious outreach association. Its inclusion in Egypt’s political arena, albeit limited, is partially responsible for such moderation. In trying to play the game of democracy and delicately rise to power, the MB has condemned violence and stuck to a middle political ground for Egypt, not insisting on traditional interpretations of the Quran and Sharia Law. If we stop here, it seems there is an answer to the question; the MB in Egypt shows that as it was exposed to democratic processes, it became more moderate, meaning that maybe people don’t need to worry so much about Islamism in the realm of democracy.
However, it is unclear if the MB became moderate because of democratic processes or because of repression from the regime. Throughout the years government repression has also been a strong change agent for the MB. During each wave of intensive repression, the MB has been divided between the radical reformists and the moderates. Radicals have left the MB (most notably Said Qutb) because they see the MB’s politics as hopeless and weak, while the MB itself has moved towards the center after repression, realizing that threatening the regime in a large way is counterproductive.
Using the MB as a case study, the question is whether it has moved more towards the moderation because of its exposure to democracy or repression. Naturally, both played a part. So if we take repression out of the picture, will Islamism still move to the center in the face of democracy? I am left where I started on the question; still unclear.
Current events in Egypt color everything written about the country since antiquity, even when there is not necessarily such a strong connection to the present. Fortunately, Korany’s chapter might be even more relevant today than when it was published a decade ago. I was especially interested in his description of the “social democracy prerequisite school,” which seems to me one of the greatest threats to Egypt’s ongoing democratic transition.
Although it is hard to argue with the theoretical merits of social democracy, it is clear that Egypt is nowhere near meeting Nasser’s three basic guarantees for a true democratic system. Millions of people will remain poor, and to some extent exploited, for the foreseeable future. Political parties will always be governed by self-interest and racked with infighting. But the country simply cannot delay elections until all ideal conditions are met. The SCAF has justified its prolonged rule by claiming that stability is most important, but really, it is a minor miracle that stability has reined for nine months under SCAF authority. As Nasser said, “if socialism and revolution…are faithful expressions of people’s progressive thrust, …democracy is a reaffirmation of the people’s sovereignty.” The revolution happened, and the people still have not voted. “Revolutionary economic change” will either come under a new government or it won’t, but at least in the case of the Arab Spring, the new government must come first. There is no time for a “lengthy transition period” to establish certain social prerequisites before political democracy takes over.
What I found interesting about Wickham’s piece “The Muslim Brotherhood After Mubarak” was the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood experienced internal change. Gathering from what Wickham states it appears that overtime the Brotherhood became a malleable Islamist group in spite of their religious convictions. It almost seems as if the group sold some of strict political views, such as not interacting with secular groups to achieve certain political ambitions. What’s more, the internal conflict within the group that manifests itself as three separate sub-groups all apart of the Brotherhood, makes me question the ability of the group to effectively rule and assume power after Mubarak. They are already divided and they do not even hold an official position of power.
Generally, violence is associated with Islamist groups, but the track record of the Muslim Brotherhood is eerily too clean. Are they religious fanatics or just simply politicians? At the outset they seem to be religiously based, but Wickham notes that they have evolved and learned how to act skillful in a political manner. What does this mean for the Egyptian people? That a matured Islamist group is the best chance for prosperity because they can mitigate tensions within society by denouncing secularism and celebrating religion on the political stage. Further, how will the Muslim Brotherhood handle the U.S.? Hostility is not a route they can take because of their peaceful track record, but it may be the most apt route to assume if they are to promote Islamism, something the U.S. may not fully agree with in a democratic setting. The actions of the Muslim Brotherhood during the next few months will be very telling of Egypt’s future and of their own.
It was interesting to read about the tent revolt in Tel Aviv. I hadn’t heard about it before, and the parallels to the “Occupy Wall Street” movement that has emerged here in the United States this fall are hard to ignore. Just as in this nation, while Israel’s national wealth has grown much of this has gone to the economic elite. Israel has more of a problem of corporation and cartel control of the markets, artificially inflating the prices of basic items like formula and olive oil, and of housing. Many Israelis are angry about a lack of access to cheap housing.
These protests could have a substantial impact on the construction of settlements in the West Bank. The Israeli government subsidizes these projects and those who live in them, while ignoring housing prices at home and alienating those who have no interest in becoming settlers. Political pressure from the protests could bring some of these subsidies home. It seems as if the the protest has not and will not bring down the Netanyahu government, partly because of new concerns about conflict with Iran, but they could certainly spell trouble for his center-right coalition.
I found Carrie Wickham’s article, “The Muslim Brotherhood after Mubarak”, to be particularly interesting. Wickham describes the history of the Brotherhood in Egypt and how governmental policies have affected their tactics and mission. Initially, the Muslim Brotherhood was organized as an anti-system group that was actively against Western ideas and used both violence and anti-Semitic rhetoric. The original goal of the group was to establish sharia rule. Their initial viewpoint that Islam was the only “true” way did not fit well with partisanship, democracy, or a country as diverse as Egypt.
Unsurprisingly, Nasser and the NDP did not take well to the Brotherhood or their mission, particularly after they attempted to assassinate Nasser. Thus the Brotherhood was heavily repressed by the Egyptian government and had to adjust their tactics accordingly. The hard line Sharia-only stance would clearly not work in this context; thus the Muslim Brotherhood adopted different strategies. While some turned to radicalism, ultimately those that favored compromise won out and the Brotherhood joined parliament and sought popular support. By joining the political scene, the group has become more moderate and more integrated with non-members. They have proven to be very popular, especially after the 2005 election when they received enough votes to seriously scare the NDP.
Wickham claims that the Brotherhood is too wise to throw their hard-earned reputation away, and is therefore not attempting to take control of the new government forming in Egypt. There is talk of coalitions. Past evidence has suggested that the Brotherhood is capable of this. Caution must be taken however, because although in the past the Brotherhood has successfully participated peacefully in the Egyptian political scene, until now they were always heavily repressed and their freedom was severely limited. Now, with no one really in charge, it will be interesting to see if the Brotherhood stays true to their word and attempts to become a critical member of a thriving democracy, or if they go back to their original philosophy that Islam is the only “true” way and attempt to take control of the government.
Reading “A Tunisian Solution for Egypt’s Military: Why Egypt’s Military will Not be Able to Govern,” I was struck by how the two seemingly opposite relationships between President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and the Tunisian Military and President Hosni Mubarak and the Egyptian military both resulted in the downfall of the authoritarian regime in question. Ironically, both rulers formed their policy regarding the military for the precise purpose of securing their power.
While Ben Ali purposefully kept the military economically weak and numerically small in order to prevent any sort of military coup, Mubarak followed the opposite approach, creating an enormous and wealthy military in order to defend his regime in the case of a revolt. Neither strategy worked out too terribly well. The Tunisian military felt so little allegiance to Ben Ali that it simply refused to support his repression of the protesters, choosing instead to use its outside training to protect the protesters against Ben Ali’s police forces. On the other hand, The Egyptian military had become so independently powerful that it was able to seize power for itself as Mubarak’s stronghold on the country dwindled.
Although the two contrary schemes resulted in similar outcomes for the two authoritarian rulers, Henry and Springborg are quick to point out the extremely different situations they created following the ousting of Ben Ali and Mubarak. Because the Tunisian military was relatively weak and lacked substantial resources, it had very little choice but to hand over the reigns to civilians for the formation of a new Tunisian government. The Egyptian military, on the other hand, has proved loathe to sacrifice its newfound control, probably due to legitimate fears that it would not receive the same beneficial treatment under a new democracy as it did under Mubarak’s rule. A successful, longterm military-run government, however, is unrealistic since the general population has already indicated its willingness to rebel against this new form of authoritarianism, as it did against Mubarak. Hopefully, the Egyptian military will recognize this and abdicate control before frustration levels get high enough to kick-start another revolution.
I find the role of religion and the state in Israel a very interesting topic. The Jewish faith and the Zionist movement obviously served as the framework for settling and establishing the state of Israel but a lot has changed since the early days of Zionism and since the mid 20th century. Israel is unique in many different ways but most interestingly in that it is really the only modern liberal democracy that has no official separation of church and state. Unlike Britain or the US, religion is not completely isolated from political life and decisions. In many ways, religion and the state are still very much intertwined.
The recognition of and freedom of other religions in Israel shows that the country certainly sees the presence of non Jews in the country, but it is interesting to see how the relationship between Judaism and the Israeli state affect non Jews and religious minorities in Israel. There are certainly many Israelis who are not Jewish and there are many Arabs who live in Israel. The Jewish faith is at the heart of the foundation of the Israeli state. Because of the ways in which the state was founded and the reasons why it was founded, it will naturally always have a place in the society and politics of the country, but where will any existence of separation lie? (if any ever exists) it will be interesting to see how the relationship between the state and the Jewish faith plays out in the future of the Israeli state.
The article I want to focus on is from Carrie Wickham concerning the Muslim Brotherhood. In her article Wickham gives a brief overview of the history of the Muslim Brotherhood. She covers everything from its origination “as an anti-system group dedicated to the establishment of sharia rule” (75) to her concluding decision that “no democratic transition [in Egypt] can succeed without it.” (78)
I find it really interesting to see how this organization has been able to adapt throughout the years. In the beginning they were using violence against their opponents. Then they were essentially eradicated under Nasser in 1954 after which they regrouped into two sections. One section radicalized and the other group began a system of judiciousness and non-violence. This group has been able to win elections, overcoming roadblocks placed before them by the regime. It makes one curious as to how they will do without a regime to block them?
One point that Wickham makes briefly is that the leader of the reformists within the brotherhood, ‘Abd al-Mun’em Abu Futuh, is growing in popularity among not only the reformers within the group but those outside of it. If he becomes such a personality that can find common ground among these two different parties it seems as though there are changes waiting just around the corner for the brotherhood.
I find it really fascinating to see how the Muslim Brotherhood was founded and then has adapted to everything that has been thrown at it. It makes me curious to see how their adaptability will come about in the current political state. Perhaps Wickham will be proved right and democracy cannot be formed without their presence.
I read Mubarak’s final speech in front of Tahrir Square, and was awestruck by the hypocrisy and ridiculousness of what he said. Then I read Joshua Stacher’s article and wondered if President Mubarak read Joshua Stacher’s article on ForeignAffairs.com, because it certainly seems like the the decisions he made between February 7 (when the article was written) and February 10 (when Mubarak gave final speech) could be in direct response to Stacher’s predictions.
Okay, not really. But, If Mubarak had read Stacher’s article, what he would have gleaned both good news and bad news. Bad news is that he would have understood that his time as President was over. However, the good news from the article is that he would be able to institute measures that would placate the protestors, allow him to rule through September, and in the long run sustain the authoritarian status quo in the hands of his appointed Vice President.
His insulting speech in Cairo certainly shows his misguided belief that dedication to the protests was waning, and people were ready to accept a compromise. It appears that he truly believed that by promising a few constitutional changes, and declaring his heartfelt solidarity with the Egyptian youth, the protestors would believe his outright lies and be placated into abandoning their desire for revolution. When I first read Mubarak’s speech, I wondered how in the world he could actually believe what he was saying. However, Stacher’s article is an example of how difficult it was to truly understand the scope and dedication of the protestors. If an independent scholar could come to the conclusion that the regime would survive, how far fetched was it that a biased dictator would believe the same thing?