Select a reading of interest for the week and respond to it in 1-2 paragraphs. What made it seem important, controversial, or interesting to you?
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Select a reading of interest for the week and respond to it in 1-2 paragraphs. What made it seem important, controversial, or interesting to you?
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The readings of this week on Morocco are all highly relevant given the most recent elections last week. Interestingly, the PJD won most seats and the future PM of Morocco will be an Islamist from the PJD. The readings all indicate that this development cannot be to the liking of King Mohammed, as it could further erode his position.
Indeed, Hammoudi’s introduction to Moroccan authoritarianism explains several reasons for the King’s legitimacy and holding on to power. For one, he and his predecessors have been recognized as the “commander of the people” and they have had the religious prestige necessary to defend their position. This is the important characteristic of Moroccan authoritarianism that distinguishes it from others in the region–the King is esteemed and revered, not merely feared and tolerated as in other countries in the region. In fact, the other reasons upholding the system are the coercion apparatus, successful struggle against urban political forces and the alliance with rural notables–all of which also characterize (sometimes more, sometimes less) other countries in the MENA.
So. Will the King of Morocco be able to secure his throne given the most recent popular protest, the constitutional change and the elections? As Ottaway predicts, a victory of the PJD alone will not suffice to create a lasting change. More parties will have to commit to change, popular protest will have to continue to exert pressure on the King etc. in order to seize the most important of privileges from the King–power over economic decisions. But the constitutional changes (at least as far as Ottaway describes them) do not include significant alterations to economic decision-making. It is going to be interesting to see how these issues will play out in the months and years to come, as they do decide on the King’s fate.
Two aspects of this week’s readings particularly stood up out to me.
First, coming on the heels of last week’s discussions on Saudi Arabia and Iran, I am astonished at the ways the King’s legitimacy is based on religion. Saudi Arabia claims to be an Islamic State, however its leaders are appointed through internal family politics rather than Islamic measures. Their leaders appointments are not contingent on their piousness, even though it plays a role. The King of Morocco’ on the other hand is head of a state that is not based on Islam,, but his legitimacy is substantially derived from religion. Marina Ottoway says: “It should also be noted that in Morocco religion is an integral part of the king’s power: as the officially recognized “commander of the faithful”. As an Alawite King, he is considered the imam of the Islamic community. Gregory White goes so far as to say that the King is “deeply venerated by the population, who view him as a Sharif (descendent of the prophet) and as a dispenser of God’s blessing”. (Long, Reich, and Gasiorowski, 484)
The Kings dual identity as a head of state, but also a religious leader introduces interesting dynamics in both his ability to govern and the people’s attempts to limit his power. White points out that the King’s connections to religion helps to defuse the dangers of political Islamism in Morocco. In the post 9/11 era this (along with many other factors) has enabled the King to form strong connections to the United State’s in their global fight against terror. This increased Western support then translates into foreign aid, which further entrenches the King’s position. I can also see ways that the King’s religiosity effects popular mobilization from limiting his power. His connection to religion venerates him in the eyes of the population, particularly in the rural areas, which then makes his edicts and his position of power difficult to subvert. Perhaps this is one factor that has led to the many constitutional referendums failing to limit the King’s power.
Abdeslam Maghraoui, in his essay Depoliticization in Morocco, explains that, “the strategy of putting political rights on hold in the name of social or economic imperatives has been a characteristic of most Arab political regimes since the end of colonial rule.” Here Maghraoui is describing the deceptive political schemes by kings and monarchies who are desperate to stay in power. They respond to civil discontent though economic liberalization, which is ineffective because economic liberalization, Maghraoui says, is only compatible with corresponding democratization. I find this very interesting because the article was written nearly ten years ago. However, Maghraoui is still applying current Moroccan protests in the Arab Spring to his same original theory. In a blog he posted on May 23, 2011, he wrote the following:
“On March 9, the king responded by proposing limited constitutional reforms, to be elaborated by a consultative commission whose members were selected by the palace. Such a response is characteristic of the autocratic regime’s refusal to admit the political nature of the challenge they are facing. Instead, they turn the focus to social and governance challenges. For example, since street protests began in February, the government has held a series of roundtable discussions with trade unions and has made significant concessions, including salary increases, retirement benefits, and health insurance for workers. On a parallel track, the government revived measures to fight administrative corruption, cut red tape, and clean up the justice system.” http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2011/05/23/ducking-the-arab-spring-in-morocco/
I slightly disagree with this argument. Although I do believe that King Mohammed VI is trying to avoid true political change by agreeing to limited amendments of the constitution, he is no longer able to make solely economic policy changes. This time he has to address a problem in the government. However, like Marina Ottaway explains, the new constitution is nothing to be excited about. It is not a democratic document and the King has had a strong hand in deciding its content as he handpicked the commission of experts to write it. It is not a “representative organization embodying popular sovereignty” (Ottaway). These protest movements are unlike earlier ones that were ended by small economic liberalization, these protests have strength derived from the success of other countries and there is going to need to be substantial political change to pacify the people.
From the Ottaway reading, I took several things, among them the complicated nature of Moroccan identity. As she wrote, the two most important constitutional issues were about whether Morocco should be an Islamic state and whether a third language (along with Arabic and French) should become an official language. To me, this suggests not only a complicated internal political system, but one that is also implicitly OK with the current regime. The pro-democracy forces are, of course, going to be against the presence of a monarch, but this seems to me to be a tacit acceptance of the current political order. The Islamist question is always a complicated one, and many of the readings indicated that it was only through charisma *and* his role as the Commander of the Faithful that the king ruled effectively.
I think that forming an identity is crucial for Morocco going forward, especially because the country is so heterogeneous. In fact, many of the readings discussed how political parties would break down along fault lines between different groups of people as well as along fault lines among different age groups, resulting in a political mess. Morocco has a long way to go, but it has been stable and hopefully it can continue to modernize and liberalize as it proceeds towards a constitutional monarchy.
What does it mean for a king to “embark decisively on the path of genuine democracy,” as Maghraoui advises (74), and why would this be a good strategy? After reading Maghraoui’s article, this seems a funny place for him to end up. The monarchy has kept power by cultivating a cadre of loyal (mostly rural) elites, by distracting the population with the Western Sahara “issue” (not to mention the Palestine issue), by ever-so-slowly liberalizing the economy, by worst-case scenario scare tactics (e.g. “would you rather have corrupt politicians in charge?! Would you rather have Islamists in charge?!”), by false democratic reforms and the blame game (e.g. 1976 elections), by personal charisma, by claiming divine legitimacy, and perhaps most importantly, according to Maghraoui, by depoliticizing the public sphere and focusing on technocratic economic issues.
These tactics have worked well, and their continued effectiveness in the face of the February 20 protest movement proves their continued relevance. The November 25 elections were quite clearly more of the same, regardless of the minor concessions that the King trumpeted in his constitutional reforms. The voter turnout was under 50 percent, and most of the candidates were old hands. It will be interesting, from an academic point of view, to compare what happens with similar Islamist pluralities in the parliaments of Tunisia and Morocco. But from King Mohammed’s point of view, “genuine democracy” is a non-starter, as well it should be for any authoritarian or monarchical ruler interested in preserving his rule. Meanwhile, the average Moroccan is starting to ask himself what is so different about Tunisia and Egypt, and he isn’t coming up with much for an answer. (The question, posed in French: http://ibnkafkasobiterdicta.wordpress.com/2011/11/23/merci-mais-non-merci/ ).
Maghraoui says “genuine democracy” is necessary for “enduring stability and prosperity,” but at the very least, I don’t think the road to true democracy will be very stable. Whether true democracy would usher in prosperity is an open question, but it would certainly usher out the Alawite monarchy.
Marina Ottaway wrote her article on the new Moroccan constitution in June of this past year. In it she outlines how the King influenced the drafting of the new constitution. She further states that there was no debate on the drafts and yet most people agree that it was the most open process to date in Morocco. Importantly, she mentions that the King will appoint his Prime Minister from whichever party wins the parliamentary election, which she expected to be held in October. These elections were held instead this past week.
In her article Ottaway mentions the PJD- Party for Justice and Development. According to her this is an Islamist party that has been working towards Islamist integration into the political realm. Then in her concluding paragraph Ottaway states that if the PAM- Party of Authenticity and Modernity was to win the parliamentary election that the King would remain strong- lending a greater sense of importance to the election. As mentioned above the elections were held recently and it has been reported that PJD has won the elections.
In an article by the BBC they state that the PJD has taken 80 of the 395 seats which has given them control. There has long since been a debate about the position of Islam in the state and I think it will be interesting to see how this parliament plays out. The King still has final say on matters of defense, security and religion- how will that affect the way that they work together? It has been hinted that the February 20 movement is not happy with the reforms to date. How will they respond to these elections? Only time will tell.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15902703
Azzedine Layachi wrote in March, 2011 that, “The future of Algiers and Rabat may very well be affected by what happens in Benghazi and Tripoli.” He is suggesting that the revolutionary dominoes will continue falling west. With Qaddafi dead, each stable day in Algiers and Rabat proves Layachi wrong. But why is he wrong? If Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya all have similar political structures and histories, as Layachi suggests, why haven’t Morocco and Algeria followed the course of Libya and Tunisia?
Thinking on this brings me to the game that we played in discussion. Even with a similar baseline, the outcome of societal grievance and a leader’s reaction can really be decided by decisions along the way. Each of the three discussion groups had different results even though we were all playing by the same set of rules with the same baselines of legitimacy for the regime and the protestors.
This contradicts popular notions about the Arab Spring, which is that once the spark lit there was no turning back for the revolution. I think the media promotes this idea, epitomized by the image of Bouazizi as an indicator that it was all over for Ben Ali. But it is not that simple.
Maybe in Egypt, if Mubarak had made a different speech, there would have been a different outcome. Maybe if Qaddafi had liberalized instead of called his people rats he would remain in power. The different outcomes in the Maghreb despite similar political structure and similar dissent suggests that the outcome of a revolution is also in the leader’s hands to mess up (Mubarak, Qaddafi, Ben Ali) not just in the strength of the protesters.
But then I am forced to wonder how different the outcomes really are between, for example, Egypt and Morocco. Certainly, a very different process so far, and Egypt’s process appears stronger, more effective, and more legitimate. However, to this point, which country has experienced better change?
While it may seem that Morocco has failed to jump on the revolutionary train, if we look at the current state of Libya, Egypt, or Syria, Morocco seems to have something good going on. A member of the PJD was quoted on BBC yesterday saying, “We are presenting the way of reform without losing the stability, the unity of the country – but at the same time furthering the democratic agenda of Morocco.” Maybe then, Morocco and Algeria haven’t missed the revolutionary train, they are just having their revolutions more gently.
I found the details that Azzedine Layachi lays out in his article “Meanwhile in the Maghreb” about Morocco and Algeria’s responses to protests this past year to be very interesting. Unlike in Libya, the leaders of Morocco and Algeria are making an effort to appease the people. The difference in response can be partially attributed to the political situation prior to 2011 and the nature of the protests themselves. In Morocco and Algeria, the political system was not as authoritarian or repressive as other North African regimes, particularly those of Tunisia and Libya. Although multiparty systems exist in both Morocco and Algeria, the regimes are more or less governed by monarchs in authoritarian rather than democratic regimes. Since these countries, like many in the region, suffer from economic disparities and high unemployment rates, citizens were ready to protest when the Arab spring hit the region. Unlike in Tunisia and Libya, however, the governments in these countries have responded with many concessions and reforms. Although protests are still ongoing, they have never reached the intensity of those in other North African countries, and thus far leaders in these countries have maintained power. It will be interesting to see if such concessions are enough to placate the people, or if Algeria and Morocco will follow the trends of surrounding countries and oust their leaders.