From your readings on the state and authoritarianism in the Middle East, what strikes you as unique or interesting about the types of regimes found in the region? In what ways do you think they differ from one another, and/or why do you think they persist, when much of the world has moved from authoritarianism to democracy or hybrid regimes?
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According to Freedom House, the Middle East holds the fewest “free” countries and the largest number of “not free” countries, in comparison to other global regions (Cammet 140). It seems clear that the colonial origins of many of these states probably shaped their current political regimes. After being subjected to arbitrary European installment of leaders and United States CIA intervention, it is little wonder that power was centralized in an effort to avoid outside meddling. After the Cold War, many countries around the world stopped receiving the same level of Western support/interference (since the Western anti-Communism interest in their countries had disappeared). However, this was not the case in the Middle East, as the West continued to be interested in the abundant oil supply (the region has about two-thirds of the world’s oil) and the rise of the Islamist radical threat. Because of these interests, Western powers continued to provide extensive support to many less-than-desirable authoritarian rulers, further strengthening and lengthening their rule (Bellin 148). Oil revenues have also allowed many Middle Eastern states to fund unusually large security forces. For instance, the region spent an average of 6.7 percent of their GNP on defense expenditures in the year 2000, compared to a global average of 3.8 percent. State support of such a large coercive force would understandably deter public protests for democratization. In these ways, I found Ross’ argument that the presence of oil has hindered democratic development to be somewhat compelling. I certainly do not find it to be the sole causal piece, but the presence of oil does seem to frequently inform the other parts of the puzzle.
Generally, I was intrigued by the notion of bay’a, “that rulers take office only after receiving the bay’a (allegiance) of the leading men of the community.” Although there is no guidance as to who has the power to provide the bay’a (and this usually refers only to the elites who would have the potential resources to unseat a leader), this is the process by which rule is legitimated throughout Arab dynasties (Herb 26). In the past, it seems this system may have often led to corruption. For instance, Bellin cites the promotion of an Air Force commander who was not even a pilot, but who was a trusted friend of Hafez al-Assad. However, I wonder if someday soon the meaning of bay’a will transform, instead referring to a much greater percentage of a state’s people, and demonstrated through democratic elections. After reading so many of these articles concluding that the transition to democracy through popular uprising was very unlikely in the Middle East, the feat of the Arab Spring now seems even more remarkable, and I am intrigued to see what continues to unfold throughout the region.
There are at least two facts about the types of regimes found in the region that are unique. First, the monarchies dependent on oil have created a system with a powerful ruler, who has assigned important government posts and offices to his own family members. This has happened most prominently in Saudi-Arabia, but also in Kuwait and in Qatar (among others). It is fascinating how the discovery of oil completely changed the rules of the game. Merchant families willingly gave up any political power to the royal family in exchange for some share of the new wealth. If anything, the readings all underline the crucial role of oil in enabling the regimes to practice authoritarianism and in blocking all calls for more political participation. This correlation is most clearly shown by Michael Ross, as he empirically found that oil hinders democracy.
The second fact is the realization that the countries at the heart of the Arab Spring, Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia have all been characterized by single-party rule, “in which one political party linked to the ruler dominates political life.” (Cammett) These republics are very different from the monarchies that seem to be able to sail (relatively) smoothly through the Arab Spring, as neither country has a high dependency of oil. Wedeen explains how Asads’ cult has used familial metaphors and a fixed set of vocabulary to “represent the regime’s idealized relationships of domination and national community.” For a long time, the Asads have been able to hold the nation together, probably in a similar fashion as Mubarak and Ben Ali have, too. In Tunisia and Egypt, the masses have already taken back their right to participate from the rulers, in Syria, the situation remains unclear. Yet, the fall of these three single-party regimes imply that idealization of the ruler and tight suppression of civil liberties are not enough to satisfy a countries people in the long run. I would guess that as soon as the oil-dependent, rich monarchies in the Gulf region face the reality of less oil revenue, they also will need to rely on the Syrian way of suppressing their citizens.
Although there are many types of regimes in the Middle East, there are surprisingly few democratic ones. Instead, a variety of authoritarian regimes have persisted. Many of the readings we did for this week pointed to the existence of two main categories of states in the region: oil states and non-oil states. The presence of this resource clearly plays an important role in the development of the state. The Gulf monarchies, for example, have small populations and are rich in oil. The monarchies in these countries have strong control; pluralism and labor unions are not permitted to exist. The people are not inclined to rebel, however, because their governments use oil revenue to provide generous services to the people. Oil is clearly an important commodity in shaping the political scene in many Middle Eastern countries. That being said, oil has only really been important in the last half century. What stood out more to me was the influence of outside countries on the development of states and authoritarian regimes in this region.
As Eva Bellin states in her conclusion, “democracy cannot thrive in chaos”. The Middle East as a whole has been rather chaotic in the last two centuries, particularly after the onset of defensive development, the fall of the Ottoman Empire, and colonialism. These trends often slowed the natural economic development of Middle Eastern states. Citizens of occupied countries such as Libya did not have a chance to learn how to rule their own country, and as a result it was very difficult for them to begin a dynamic democracy after the end of occupation. Even countries that did manage to develop and thrive for a time, were often later disrupted by meddling from outside. The country that comes to mind here is Iraq. The continued chaos in this region has, in varying forms throughout the region, made it difficult for democracy to thrive. Instead one group or family often claims and holds power successfully. Some do it by buying their citizens’ allegiance with oil money (for example Kuwait), some by coercing them through propaganda (for example Syria), and some through carefully building ties and allegiances and putting family in strategic positions (for example Saudi Arabia). It seems that this authoritarian trend works surprisingly well (until recently) in the Middle East because of strong Islamic roots. Since Muhammad, Islamic societies have generally functioned under one supreme ruler in a hierarchical system. Family ties have been historically very important as they continue to be today. It will be interesting to see what sort of regimes develop after the Arab spring considering the continued chaos and historical roots.
I will two concepts are central to understanding why the Middle East and North Africa contain such a prevalent number of authoritarian regimes and why regies like this have persisted throughout history in the region. The first concept is Islam. It concerns the political, social, and religious components of the religion. It is important to remember that Islam in many countries in this region is used not only as a religion, but as a social and political system. We need look no further than Iran or Saudi Arabia and the prevalence of Sharia law in these two countries to see how this system effects these nations. Because of the way in which Islam was used at its beginnings as a common belief system which many diverse tribes and groups of people could adopt, its followers have strictly adhered to it’s system and its rather strict characteristics, in the context of Saudi Arabia and Iran. Because Islam is and has been throughout history such a central component of the picture of Middle Eastern politics, leaders of this region have turned to it s a way to create regional nationalism, to unite their countries, and to connect its citizens with a common religious, social, and political system.
The second important component and cause for much of the current authoritarian control of the Middle Eastern region is the history of imperialism throughout the middle east. It wasn’t until only a few decades ago that the borders for many of these countries were drawn and they gained independence from many European imperial powers. Many of these countries have only been countries for a few decades. I think the history of imperialism in the region combined with an independence-nationalistic movement to unite these peoples and establish countries provided ample justification and opportunity for authoritarian regimes to come into power to try and reunite and establish these countries with their own customs, laws, and social standards. In many ways, I think many of these regimes which only recently came into power are interested in keeping their countries independent and unoccupied and in keeping their citizens and their nation united.
The most fascinating thing about observing the past hundred years in Middle Eastern history is that, in many ways, it seems to mirror Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries. First absolute rulers establishes centralized power, which creates a stronger national awareness, just as divine right monarchs did in Western and Central Europe. Then, this very nationalism that these rulers created backfires against them, as citizens use it to collaborate in revolution against the monarch. In this sense, The first uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt are the equivalent of the French revolution. In both cases, the monarchs fell like dominos across the region. Fortunately, this comparison paints a very promising future for the Middle East in the long-run, considering the state of Europe today; however, it also predicts quite a few potholes and obstacles along the way (think 2 world wars and a massive, institutionalized genocide). In all of these observations, I do not mean to portray a picture of the Middle East as inferior to Europe because they are experiencing these developments later. Rather, I think Europe itself is to blame for the timeline, as colonization and exploitation of the Middle East certainly had some hand in the delay. Overall, I think it will be interesting to see the results of the “Arab Spring” and whether they continue to progress along this path.
Although I find the difference between “strongman” and tribal leaders to be a fascinating aspect of the authoritarian rule in the Middle East, I believe that the progression of family relationships throughout history to be incredibly interesting. Although I don’t know much about the effect that the Islamic religion had on family values, I can’t help but compare the development of the family system in the Middle East to the corresponding family system that developed with the birth of the United States. I believe that the Christian values instilled in the colonies created a patriarchal society that placed value in respect for elders. The father was the respected head of the family and the leader of the state was even considered an endearing “father figure.” In contrast, there seemed to be little respect for elders in the ruling Islamic families. Younger sons sometimes killed their older brothers or even fathers in order to usurp power in their country. What could have created this family dynamic? Is it the difference between a country created under Islam and one under Christianity? I think it is naive to think like that. Is it the difference between an authoritarian government and a democracy? Perhaps.
The question of why authoritarianism persists in the Middle East is particularly fascinating now that authoritarianism might not persist.
Bellin provides interesting thoughts and statistics on how authoritarianism continues in the Middle East and hardly anywhere else. For example, security budgets in the Middle East that are twice the global average (proportion to GDP) suggest that a combination of will to protect the regime and resources to do it have been a part of the persistence. I was also shocked to see that 33.8% of Bahrain’s population is employed by the state’s security apparatus. Odds are that in a family of three one of you will be part of state security. Apart from these shocking numbers, Bellin’s framework helps me understand the Arab spring better.
Bellin highlights four variables that support robust authoritarianisms, the four variables that have kept regimes stable in the Middle East. Does the Arab Spring mean that the robustness of Middle Eastern regimes decayed? If so, what variables caused that decay? The first variable, fiscal health, does not seem to have influenced revolutions. In Egypt, for example, the economy may have been slightly weaker than in the decade preceding, but not enough to affect their security expenditures, and thus it doesn’t appear that fiscal health diminished robustness of authoritarianism. The second variable, international support networks, seemed to remain strong until very late in many of the states, and apparently still remains existent for some countries like Syria. The third variable—a low level of institutionalism—also didn’t change drastically. However, the fourth variable did change. The low level of popular mobilization characteristic of the Middle East disappeared and was replaced by its opposite. Bellin notes that this final variable can be criticized as it is dependent on the other three, but in the case of the Arab Spring, it doesn’t seem that a change in the first three variables affected the fourth. Something out of the calculation came in. Whether that is twitter, shame (as Telhamy suggests), or hunger becomes the interesting question.
What really intrigues me about authoritarian regimes in the Middle East is our assumption that simply because the rest of the world is moving towards a more democratic way of life the Middle East must as well. However, the Middle East even with its name has proved that it is a far cry from anyone region we’ve known. Though it sounds inhumane, could it be possible that these regimes are what works or suits the Middle East or do we just assume our Western view of society is always correct? In her article, Eva Bellin takes a Western approach in explaining these regimes, stating that they simply remain in power because of the strength of the state’s coercive apparatus. Her point is valid, in that military power and consolidation does help explain the life spans of these regimes, but am I being naive in thinking it plausible that regimes such as Saddam’s or Nasser’s were bolstered by the love of the people. Is that not democratic in itself, although not elected, popular sentiment did exist at one point in their regimes. This does not mean I support them in any way, but I just wanted to take a step back and try understand things in an un-democratic way. Moreover, I think we also overlook the people being ruled over when trying to determine why they are successful. Differing experiences and environments breed different ideologies that people are willing to accept.
This is a really interesting post, Carl, so I hope you don’t mind if I reply to you directly. I’m not trying to call you out by any means, just respond to a few points that you forced me to consider.
I absolutely agree that the Middle East can and often is badly misinterpreted by viewing local politics and culture through a strictly Western lens. On a practical level, America and its Western cohorts have done significant damage to the region in recent years by foisting ideals and institutions on societies that simply operate differently than ours. There is an argument to be made that democracy, in general, is one of these inappropriate foreign impositions.
That being said, I’m not sure that there are too many examples of authoritarian regimes in the recent history of the Middle East that have exercised their power fairly and governed with the whole of the nation’s populace in mind. Saddam Hussein and Gamal Abdel Nasser are actually two very good examples of the kind of cult-like leaders whose massive popularity among some (Saddam) or most (Gamal) of the population overshadows tremendous abuses of power, whether outright (Saddam: Kurdish genocide, political repression, Shi’a suppression) or less obvious (Gamal: campaign against MB and Communists, unstable reforms). Although you could argue that either man could have been popularly elected at one point, their lack of domestic accountability to voters or to the checks of other state institutions point to the inherent weakness of authoritarianism. (I understand that you did not endorse either leader, I just agreed that they were good examples.) The charade of “Desert Democracy” that Herb discusses and the ridiculous symbolism that Assad subliminated throughout Syria, as described by Wedeen, are further examples of the frailty or danger of authoritarian rule. In all these cases, I think Bellin’s framework of state coercion, supported by the four conditions that she describes, much more accurately account for the success of the contemporary dynastic system than any speculative popular approval or cultural mores.
There is much more to say about this, thanks for bringing it up. It’s always good to challenge conventional wisdom, and as I said, I don’t disagree with the majority of your argument above.
As Zach and Will have already said, I too find the tenacity of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa to be interesting. The region is one of the only, if not the only, region in which some sort of democratic government has not made an appearance.
Bellin begins her article by outlining the most common explanations for why states in the Middle East have not made the shift between authoritarian regimes and democratic ones. These five explanations are as follows: a weak civil society, state run economy, poor and illiterate population, geographical isolation, and a distinguishing culture. For Bellin, however, these factors are not the answer. She thinks that “the solution…to Middle Eastern and North African Exceptionalism lies less in the absent prerequisites of democratization and more in present conditions that foster robust authoritarianism” (143). I would say that she is right in thinking that the regimes persist because the region is so capable of nurturing authoritarianism. However, in order for democratic tendencies to emerge there needs to be those prerequisites that allow it to form.
The most interesting aspect of the authoritarian regimes in the region to me is their ability to persist, although we have obviously seen a number of them fall over the last year. I found Bellin’s argument about the importance of the structure of the militaries to the longevity of the regimes to be compelling. She argues that authoritarian regimes are only likely to face challenges from militaries (and bureaucracies in general) that are “institutionalized” rather than patrimonial. She defined this to mean organizations that operate according to clear rules and whose members are not entirely dependent upon the ruling regime for their positions. It seems that her argument has been borne out both historically and in the current context. Turkey provides a key example of a country with an institutionalized military that has acted on multiple occasions as a cohesive political force counter to the civilian government. The current circumstances in Syria provide an example of the opposite effect, where the highly patrimonial military has resisted complete fragmentation in the face of deployment against its own civilian population. As Bellin presciently pointed out (in 2004), “Under patrimonial conditions, political reform represents the prospect of ruin for the elite of the coercive apparatus. Political opening and popular accountability would deprive the Alawi officer in Syria of his special prerequisites, if not his life” (149). This theory also explains the continued resistance of members of Qaddafi’s forces in Sirte and I imagine will be useful in examining the prospects of any future Middle Eastern uprisings.
The most obviously unique quality of the existing regimes in the Middle East is the extent to which dynastic monarchs or despots remain throughout the region. While most nations have moved away from such a system and towards some form of representative or parliamentary democracy, the autocratic rulers have clung to the reins of power. Two types of these exist at the moment: tribal leaders that seized additional power, like the rulers of Saudi Arabia, or strongman like al-Assad in Syria or (formerly) Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. The latter type is more vulnerable because they rely heavily on military power and generally rule countries without an excess of oil reserves. They persist only through terror.
Regimes like those led by the al Saud family are much more stable because they rule through economic power. In countries like Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, the sheer amount of oil wealth allows for the general pacification of the population through money. There is really no reason that these regimes would collapse as long as this money continues; they have stuck along this long because economic success dampens opposition and earns Western support.