Both Saudi Arabia and Iran claim to be Islamic states. In your opinion, what makes them distinctively religious states, or alternatively, what makes them look more secular than they claim to be? Highlight something from your reading for the week that gives you insight into this question for one of these countries.
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Iran in 1979 seems very different than Iran today. In the early 1960s Khomeini intended take the “order and authority” taught by the Quran and use it to guide the government; an institution built to establish order in society. He envisioned a system where clerics were the primary wielders of judicial, legislative, and executive power (81),” allowing Iran to follow the teachings of the imams, pending the return of the 12th imam, and move away from the secularizing policies of the Shah.
While Khomeini may have successfully infused national politics with religious ideology, several parts of domestic life have changed since 1979—creating space for individual expression amidst the idealized Islamic state and Iranian life at home.
Bakhash suggests that the 1979 revolution and political upheavals over the last twenty years have given individuals the ability to embrace self-expression beyond the strictest interpretations of the Quran and the hadith. Iranians can publish magazines that question the relationship between religion and the state. Civil groups have formed in the absence of political parties, providing space for discussion and local mobilization. The Iranian home provides refuge from the public sphere. Both Bakhash and Sciolino suggest that although the bureaucratic structure of the state is strictly Islamic, the domestic sphere has found a more nuanced space for self-expression. Moreover, Sciolino suggests that freedom in the private sphere abides by the teachings of the Quran, as “there is no compulsion in matters of faith (97)”. Although I think that this separation of spheres is an insufficient excuse for true democratic principles of self-expression and free speech, it is a start. It seems that many of the Middle Eastern states have settled for this type of ‘Islamic compromise’ –accepting ‘moderated personal freedoms’ in respect for widely accepted Islamic ideals. Egypt seemed to be one such example of this compromise and it will be interesting to see how Islamic ideals and the new Egyptian government renegotiate this balance in the upcoming months. For now, Iran seems quite content with the balance.
Whether or not Iran and Saudi Arabia are “pure” Islamic states, the use of religion by the political system and the society in general is an incredibly interesting phenomenon. There are of course arguments to be made about secular realities in both nations; Iran employs a strategic and particularly tailored version of Shi’a Islam to fit its governmental needs and Saudi Arabia plays host to a lively and occasionally heated debate between secular liberals and religious conservatives that often results in an “opening up” of the religious state (women will vote in the next elections). However, religion is still engrained into the political identity and the national discourse and it is frequently its manipulation, not its “purity” that has the most remarkable results.
Looking at Saudi Arabia, the state is distinctively religious because it employs religion as a tool and an institution of the state. The Fandy reading did a good job of highlighting this. Islam and shari’a are used as forms of social control, and “morality police” reinforce the cultural fear of noncompliance. This takes a vivid form in the government’s confrontation with secular movements and demands for women’s rights. At the Women’s Drive-In, when 45 women drove their cars in Riyadh, and allegedly stomped on their veils, the government dismissed the demonstration as the acts of “communist whores” and relied on public outrage to demand “justice.” This reliance on good Islamic fervor and social compulsion shows how intrinsically religious beliefs have entwined with population management. Additionally, the Council of Higher Ulema, the council of religious scholars that are meant to inform the government’s interpretation and application of Islamic law, is more frequently employed as a legitimizing factor for the royal family. Rather than ruling independently on state policy, the ulema tend to support and authorize absolutely the actions of the Saudi government. Finally, the manipulation of religion in the Saudi state infuses the culture with a similar Islamic pragmatism. The Fandy reading claimed that about 20% of the population is strictly conservative, 20% are vehemently liberal, and the remaining 60% are “in between.” “They are conservative whenever they are around conservatives and liberal around liberals” (33). Clearly, this is not a “true” form of Islam; it is a uniquely Saudi Arabian application. Ultimately, because one cannot talk about the Saudi Arabian state without talking about religion and Islam, it seems salient to label it a religious state even if the reality is a less than “ideal” Islamic manifestation.
What is an Islamic state? I don’t really know if I could answer this question even if the question was posed as what is a Christian state… Is it a state that says its an Islamic state and follows the Sharia? Is it possible to have a follow the Qur’ans teaching to the tee when dealing with matters of state affairs? I would argue no, it is not.
On the surface and in comparison to the greater Middle East it seems apparent that both Saudi Arabia and Iran are Islamic states. We then move away from the surface and look at how the government is structured and how it deals with everyday life. At this point it becomes apparent that Saudi Arabia is more “Islamic” than Iran. The Seznec piece on the interplay between Islam and democracy in SA was an interesting one. The few things I gleaned from it were what people think an Islamic state looks like, equal income distribution, Ulema having a say in the going ons in the country etc. These are distinctly characteristics we see in Saudi Arabia. But with the Ulema loosing its legitimacy because it constantly sides with the Monarch…we are forced to question how true that is.
In theory these are both Islamic states. In practice there are certain aspects of both regimes that have Islamic characteristics and there are some that do not. The “Leaving the Islamic Republic at the door” reading certainly highlighted how the moral line is often blurred in Iranian society. It pointed to Iran being more of a secular society in practice than it admitted. Going back to my original statement, I do not know exactly what a Islamic state looks like. Where exactly do we draw the line? One of the most famous lines often cited in American politics is “In God we trust”…That does not make America a Christian state, it is evidently secular . Both Saudi Arabia and Iran have varying degrees of portraying Islamic characteristics.
I think that in order to answer this question we first have to analyze what an Islamic state is. I’ve often had trouble defining exactly what an Islamic state is because the term leaves so much to interpretations. Should a state be defined Islamic if it uses Sharia, if the head of state uses Islamic influences in policy, or if the majority of the constituency propels politics due Islam’s influence? I’ve noticed that theocratic regimes tend to justify their sometimes oppressive actions by using religion’s legitimacy to justify the regime and the state.
What I find most interesting about the notion of Islamic states is the disconnect between society and the state. The Guo article’s coverage of a more secular sentiment in society than that of the state. I believe that a constituency is much more concerned with its welfare than the prevalence of the state religion. Guo also highlights the way that religion is used to justify predatory actions by the state. He cites the expulsion of non-Islamic faculty and students from the University of Tehran, justified by the state for the maintenance of Islamic influence, was in reality way to target leaders of protests.
I am interested to see the way that the popular definition of an Islamic state changes in the near future. It is hard to predict due to the wide variety of opinions of Islam, with the inclusion of politics into Islam’s sphere of influence, its definition can only get more complicated.
Viewed from the top, both Iran and Saudi Arabia are clearly Islamic states. The political processes of both countries are dominated by political Islam. In Iran, for example, no candidate may run for election without prior approval from the Council of Guardians, which has vetoed many reformist candidates since its inception. Saudi Arabia doesn’t even allow for opposing political factions. Both countries maintain state control through a mixture of arrests, suppression and media control. Yet the facade of a Islamic state is easy to see through; Khatami’s election in 1997 testifies to this. Khatami mobilized a displaced electorate with talk of reforms for women, an easy of restrictions on entertainment, and simply changed the language used when speaking of the West and its relationship to Iran. On a more pessimistic note, both Iran and Saudi Arabia are plagued by in-fighting among the ruling classes, whether they be clerical or familial. Upper-level factionalism weakens the whole tapestry and allows dissident parties to slip through the cracks.
Culturally speaking, both countries are clearly not as purely Islamic as the political face suggests. This week’s readings were rife with examples out of Iran. The divide between public and private spheres is often frustratingly vague and dangerously unpredictable, but the private spheres are often used as escape outlets from the public regiment. The household is a common private sphere, where Western entertainment and a general relaxing of Islamic strictness is commonplace. Women have found outlets in beauty salons and private swimming lessons, and find new creative ways to express themselves aesthetically despite the strict restrictions on dress. Alcohol is commonplace in the household. So yes, Iran and Saudi Arabia are as close to Islamic states as it gets, but nothing is ever so black and white. Even the strictest Islamic radicals face issues with defining what an Islamic state is; opposition movements in Iran consistently put pressure on the ruling clerical class; an externally Islamic culture masks the secular overtones to everyday life.
Both Saudi Arabia and Iran claim to be Islamic states. In your opinion, what makes them distinctively religious states, or alternatively, what makes them look more secular than they claim to be? Highlight something from your reading for the week that gives you insight into this question for one of these countries.
While the definition of what constitutes an Islamic state may be subjective, I think neither Saudi Arabia or Iran should be considered as such. What does become clear in our readings for this week, particularly in Sciolino’s article “Leaving Islamic Republic at the Door” is that the structure which really defines Iranian and Saudi Arabian Society is not necessarily one whose foundation lies in religion, but rather in family as well as the historical tribal life. Scolino points out that during the revolution the biggest movement within Iranian society was back to family and also emphasizes that the home and hearth are the focal point of all Iranian life where real intimacy is safe, honest interactions are had, and where social and political change really begins. It seems like the relationship between the strict tenets of Islam and the pre-existing private and nuclear structure of these societies have a symbiotic relationship. Under the guise of Islam, governments are allowed to have authoritarian agency, given a myriad of political interpretations of religious texts and law to support whatever end a circumstance calls for. Likewise given a sort of supreme religious law, citizens of a “Islamic State” like Iran can abide by the law’s tenets and having done this, live freely within the most sacred space, their home.
The electoral information put forth in Bakhash’s article “Iran’s Remarkable Elections” shows further that Iran’s electoral system supports and is nurtured by this system. There is a certain Leviathan-esque sentiment in the way this electoral system seems to work. Able to give the facade of have political power and impact, voters can shirk real political responsibility to a higher power, giving their individual authority unto others and relieving themselves of the responsibilities and very public duties of true representative government. Just as arguments are made for the power given women within Islamic states, who while powerless in public are rulers of their own domain, can the same beside for the political inclinations of all Iranians who live under this Islamic State?
From reading Sciolino’s “Leaving the Islamic Republic at the Door”, I’m inclined to believe that Iran is more secular than it claims to be. It seems that everyone violates the rules/laws of Islam behind closed doors, and develop sneaky, sly tactics to outsmart the “police” that will invade private homes if they catch wind of violating the “strict” moral code. Rather than keeping up the Islamic code for religion’s sake, the police instead seem to only do so out of greed (98). Getting caught is determined by how much you can bribe the police to leave you alone. Instead of keeping up the law for moral reasons, they do so to earn extra money. One of the stories that struck me was the wedding in which the party had pitchers filled with Vodka, wine, and beer to both conceal the alcohol and to make it easier to pour out if the party were to be ambushed (98). For private celebrations, people seem to abandon the strict moral code of the Koran, and have even perfected the art of sneaking illegal activities in anticipation of getting caught.
Police and security constantly “look the other way” when facing illegal activities, which proves Iran is not a strict, disciplined Islamic country. those who are wealthy bureaucrats have illegal satellite dishes, play banned music, and watch banned movies (99). Even if people claim to be extremely religious and dedicated to the rules in public, all bets are off once everyone goes behind closed doors. Islam only applies to the public sector and often becomes ignored and thrown out once in private. Iran is Islamic as a state, meaning the rules are dictated by Islam and the Koran, but it is not Islamic as a society.
What is most difficult about this question is simply the definition of an “Islamic state.” Certainly, both Saudi Arabia and Iran proclaim to be Islamic states, however with so many ways to interpret Islam, who is to say what constitutes an Islamic state? Setting aside these larger issues of definition, I believe that while Islam certainly plays a significant role in shaping both society and politics in each state, it also serves as a convenient source of legitimacy for any authoritarian policies the governments want to carry out. The fact that in both countries the morality police or organizations like the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice lay such heavy force on the “suppression of vice” part of their mandate, would indicate that Islam is used as a means of suppressing and controlling people, rather than protecting them and enriching their lives.
Saudi Arabia:
Saudi Arabia certainly has the reputation of being one of the purest Islamic states in the world. However, an important component of Islamic legitimacy is a vibrant ulema that operates independently and can pass judgment on the regime or any individual with their superior knowledge of the Qur’an and Islamic law. As we noted in class, the ulema in Saudi Arabia lack this legitimacy since they are beholden in many ways to the royal family. Furthermore, as the Fandy article indicates, the Islam of Saudi Arabia is distinct from others because it is based on an interpretation by Wahhab and infused with the royal family’s notion of A’iliyya or familialism.
Iran:
Jointly the Sciolino article and Persepolis give us an image of Iran that is diametrically opposed to the public image and that promoted by the regime. The existence of this vibrant, underground society where men and women go to clubs together, or where women take off their veils for aerobics class would suggest that while the government maintains tight control over public interactions, all of Iranian life is hardly consistent with this conservative definition of an Islamic lifestyle.
Both Saudi Arabia and Iran are in my mind non-Islamic; if they appear so, it is because of other political reasons that are intrinsically unrelated to religious ideology and morality. Saudi Arabia, for example, is deep down a family-state, and the control of the population is realized through patronage and family network cultivations. The key of Saudi’s stability rests upon the ruling family’s trade-off between their own control and benefits of those non-ruling families with influential names. By appeasing these commoners, Saudi’s family-state is able to maintain its legitimacy and political support. While everyday life in Saudi Arabia is penetrated by Islamic traditions and practices, the state itself is fundamentally separate from the religion.
Some may argue that Iran poses an opposite case – that the president’s power is inferior to that of the religious Supreme Leader, and that the religious sect of the country imposes control on the military, the media and judiciary. This seems to suggest that Iran is an Islamic state; however, it is conceivable that, without the religious control and the moral police, there is no other way that the state can maintain its power. One should keep in mind that the object of the discussion is “state,” therefore the ruling power of the state apparatus is what we should focus on. As such, religious influence in the state’s ruling in fact makes authoritarianism more likely to persist. Imagine that the president is the one who obtains the greatest power, and that the Supreme Leader has very little control; then the Iranian state would find it challenging to maintain its autocratic regime, as the power-shift from religious heads to the president would make the state vulnerable to democratization movements (since election of the president would naturally become more democratic). Also by observing the everyday life of the Iranians, who constantly seek to infringe the religious controls imposed on them, one can argue that Islam is not the ultimate characteristic of the state. Islamism in Iran, in my mind, serves to maintain the regime’s authoritarianism at large. It is hence disagreeable to say that Saudi Arabia and Iran are Islamic states.
I felt that the majority of our readings support the idea that the outward image of Islamic, religiously orientated states projected by the respective leadership of Iran and Saudi Arabia, while not entirely fabricated, still conceals a largely secular undercurrent. The reading “Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent” indicated that the population of Saudi Arabia does not necessarily identify with Islam to the extent that it could be considered a purely “Islamic State”, despite the top down attempt to categorize it as such. Iran’s investiture of power almost exclusively in a religious leader also speaks to an attempt to define the state as Islamic by virtue of the fact that Church and state have been melded at the highest level. The idea of an exclusively “Islamic Republic” is one that could not possibly translate into practice and inevitably creates a state in which purely religious practices would be at odds with more modern thoughts and conventions. The deviations arising from the over-extension of attempting to create a completely restricted republic are made apparent in Sciolino’s Leaving Islam at the Door.
Islam appears in many instances to be a convenient means of justifying intense regulatory practices that, in the absence of a religious pretext, would be very difficult to implement. The reading concerning the notably absent uprisings in Saudi Arabia during the Arab-Spring alludes to this phenomenon by focusing on the Ulema’s issuing of Fatwas barring street protest at the behest of the royal family. I found this recurring tendency of Saudi Arabia’s leadership to exercise the powerful and far-reaching influence of Islamic religious law (by means of the dependable Ulema) in times of need to be a useful insight into how the royal family views Islam. The primary aims of Saudi royal governance appear to be the safeguarding of its oil production, and enforced stability through the retention of monarchic rule. Gause intimated that Islam exists more as means of supporting and protecting these goals than as an ideal itself in the eyes of Saudi Arabian leaders.
I think that both Iran and Saudi Arabia use Islam as a justification for their governments actions and in reality are more of a secular state than they lead on. As with all religious texts, the Koran is interpretable and therefore the high-ranking Ulema can find their agenda in the Koran, adding legitimacy to the claims of the government. This is not to say that there is no respect for the religion within the government or that in their histories Iran and Saudi Arabia never used it for altruistic reasons and beliefs. However today, it seems much like the scapegoat for repressive regimes, neither of which is based in religious legitimacy as much as nepotism and fixed presidency.
What demonstrates most prominently to me that religion is more a name attached to these countries’ states than a belief flowing through the fabric of society is Sciolino’s piece Leaving the Islamic Republic at the Door. In Iran, the morality police are an entity to dodge rather than a model to follow. Doing distinctly un-Islamic things does not make Iranians evil, overly western, or immoral, but liberated- until they are caught at least. Morality police are a part of Saudi life as well, and it seems that the kingdom has a better hold on a more conservative population, or one that is better at hiding its liberalism. The Fandy article states that 20% is conservative and relatively religious, 20 is liberal, and the rest float between the two (Fandy, 33). This leads me to think that although Islam seems to have a firmer grasp over Saudi life than maybe Iranian life, the two share a commonality in that people will find a way to get around restrictive ideologies of their governments.
What I found most difficult about answering this question was trying to define what an archetypal Islamic state would like that. On the one hand, we have political groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, who theoretically propose a state run entirely by shari’a law. In comparison, almost no other political groups look as extensively Islamic in nature. Thus in comparison, I realized that neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran would come under the definition of a full “Islamic state,” and definitely are more secular than they appear.
However, in each state there exists factions of the state that aim to uphold its Islamic nature. In Saudi Arabia, for example, the Morality Police is one institution that aims to target those who are not being truthful to Islamic Law. Furthermore, the King does not have unhanded control of the state, and must refer to the Ulema and the royal family for approval. So on one level, the government is based on Sahri’a rule. On other level, however, it seems that the government has been more successful at molding shari’a around their governance than the other way around. In Islam, perhaps one of the must important political ideologies is that of Tawahid: the oneness and supremacy of God over all other. It would follow then that the very idea of a King is contradictory to shari’a rule; Michael Herb, in his chapter in All in the Family, argues that the structure of the government has become more of a family affair.
Despite the organization and familial constraints of the government, the state’s adherence to Islamic values and rhetoric distinguishes it from the rest of the Middle East and the state may at least appear Islamic.
That being said, when compared to Iran, Saudi Arabia is clearly closer to a true Islamic state than Iran. Iran, which claims to be one of the most Islamic states in the Middle East, has a contemporary constitution and a comparatively ‘less’ Islamic legal system
Ultimately what I struggled with in answering this post was the thought about whether a true “Islamic state” was actually feasible. In many ways, writers and politicians have criticized the modernization of Iran and Saudi Arabia as being “un-Islamic.” Perhaps, however, we have modernized to a point where the image of a true Islamic state differs extensively than what it has in the past.
Both Saudi Arabia and Iran project an image of being distinctly religious at an official, but under the surface the story gets more complicated, especially in Iran.
The most that the public usually sees from these governments are slightly different interpretations of a fundamentally Islamic state. When Katami won the 1997 Iranian election, the Bakhash article and the textbook chapter on Iran made clear that he was in no way trying to upend the system, but rather offering an milder interpretation of an Islamic state. Although even this “dissent” was not tolerated for very long, it does show that the definition of an “Islamic” state is by no means a fixed one.
At the societal level, there seems to be a sizeable secular – or at least less religious – undercurrent. My favorite piece this week was “Leaving the Islamic Republic at the Door.” As the title indicates, private life in Iran is much different than the public facade. According to the author even a deeply religious government employee curses the Supreme Leader and watches American movies in private. This was also the case in Persepolis. This idea that the Islamic nature of the state does not exist behind closed doors seriously undermined the notion of Iran as an Islamic state, or at least one as the government describes it.
The rest of it (didn’t copy and paste all of it the first time)…
The question becomes, how does one define an Islamic state? Do you base that title off the ruling edict, or on societal trends? Iranians and to a greater extent Saudis are no doubt religious people, but that Islamic identity defines their state depends entirely on which sample of the population is considered and who happens to be in power; neither are inherently Islamic.
Although many argue that Islam is uniquely situated to run a state, due to the explicitly political and social nature of the Qur’an, in reality, the implementation of Islam is often subject to various different interpretations. Where certain fundamentalists may argue that “the glorious Koran and the Sunna…contain all the laws and ordinances that man needs in order to attain happiness and the perfection of his state,” in Iran, Khomeini’s charismatic “rule of the Jurist” has led to yet another form of Islamic governance (Brumberg 83). It is one that expanded beyond the Qur’an and the Sunna, to admit that they could “not by themselves provide for a comprehensive system of government” (Brumberg 83). Instead, “laws must be executed by a person or institution” (Brumberg 84). Khomeini’s form of Islamic governance is based upon no single foundation, and often “zigzagged between messianic notion of politics and a more utilitarian view” (Brumberg 100). The dependence on a single person’s charisma, as well as the potential for disagreement amongst various clerics with growing political power might undermine the Islamic nature of the Iranian government.
As such, one of the ways in which Iran looks more secular than it claims to be is the distinct separation between the public and private sphere, as discussed by Sciolino. Although the public arena may be dominated by strict rules of moral propriety, dictated by clerical interpretations of Islam and the morals police, Bakhash argues that “most Iranians look on the security agencies, the morals police, and the revolutionary committees as instruments of repression, pure and simple,” perhaps rather than as purely religious (113). Thus private life, unfettered by certain religious restrictions, may to some extent continue with some parts even permitted by the government (for example, the aerobics studio). Other gatherings, such as a co-ed escape to the mountains or the consumption of alcohol at weddings, also continue and perhaps present a more secular side of Iran.
After reading Bakhash’s article on “Iran’s Remarkable Elections,” I think one would be hard-pressed to argue that Iran is anything other than an Islamic state. Sure, they have a president who is theoretically in charge of the government and cabinet. But in practice, their president has no power. Bakhash nicely lays out the ways in which Iran’s elections are not really elections at all. “Ultimate authrotiy rests with the Supreme Leader” (Bakhash, 110). This clerically chosen person is in charge of the military, the media, the judiciary, and the Council of Guardians. “Second, the Islamic Republic requires that anyone wishing to run for the presidency must be approved by the Council of Guardians” (110). Not only does this mean that elections cannot be free and fair, it also means that the freedom to run for office is controlled by a group that is controlled by the President, which in turn is controlled the Council of Guardians. (i.e. there is a vicious cycle of un-democratic practices governing the ruling body of Iran.)
While I felt like Bakhash makes a good point about the impressive turnout in the elections, I think that, given the restrictions governing who can and cannot run, and given the fact that the government is completely under the control of the religious bodies, I think it is a very safe claim to make that Iran is an Islamic state.