Please respond in 1-2 paragraphs to any of your readings on political Islam.
What do you think best accounts for the success of Islamic movements as the dominant form of social organization outside of the family, and the most prominent form of political opposition?
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Drawing from various readings on political Islam, the success of the Islamic movement is due substantially to two reasons. The first is the near-absence of many social actors that are normally prevalent in western societies. As we previously discussed, the State plays a fairly inconsequential role in everyday life in ME. The lack of state governance in social life could easily foster strong religious movements. Another actor that is widespread in the West yet somehow undermined in the Muslim world is the political civil society. Although civil society in general exist in ME, the politicized ones, or those that can formally challenge the regime, cease to stay in power. The vacuum created by the absence of these social actors is important for the emergence and development of political Islam; a politicized religious movement becomes one of the few channels for the people to voice their social and political demands.
The second reason for the success of Political Islam is the specific type of members that contributes to its leadership. According to Kepel and Eickelman, young, educated urbanites are usually the core of the Islamic movement. None of the three elements can be missing in the big picture – youth motivates rebellious spirit, education inspires revolutionary tactics and technologies, and urban setting allows for sophisticated organization and information transmission. As such, at the macro-level, vacuums generated by the absence of various social actors foster religious movement of Islam; at the micro-level, the young, educated and urban leadership contributes to the success of political Islam.
Oppressive governments who have only brought economic stagnation and defeat to the region help fuel the success of the Islamic movements. When a government betrays its responsibilities, a hatred towards it from its citizens is bound to emerge. Eickelman writes that “the greatest enemy of authority is contempt” and Islamist movements play on the discontent of the masses to gain power. The legitimacy of Islam comes from its cultural authenticity that has existed for centuries and the Islamist movement is a way to connect people without diluting the complexity of the situation. Tessler, Eickelman, and Gelvin point out that it is unemployment, rapid population growth, inadequate housing, mass urbanization paired with the middle and lower classes who feel there is a gap between the status quo and their aspirations, which leads to this religious activism. For the educated, unemployed younger population who have grown up under a corrupted government, the Islamist movement provides hope of a way out of their difficulties and a reassuring sense of their own place in society.
Eickelman closes his piece, “Protest and Bargaining in Muslim Politics”, by voicing a widespread opinion that “the [Islamic] radicals “moment” may have come and gone (135)”. Although Eickelman’s piece dates back to 1996, and the recent eruption of the Arab Spring challenges the idea of a “moment” passed. What was the “radicals moment”? Did it arrive in 2001 with the collapse of the World Trade Centers? Does the tectonic shift of the Arab Spring indicate an imminent rise of political Islam in the Middle East? The domestic political landscape is shifting in Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Tunisia and the OpT; will the absence of a ‘strongman system’ in these regimes welcome in a new “moment” for political Islam?
I’m inclined to say yes. Many of the factors that Eickelman and Tessler cite as indicators of an environment ripe for political Islam still define the domestic sphere of Arab regimes. Rapid population growth, coupled by mass urbanization; widespread unemployment, limited education, and sub-par living conditions; the uneven distribution of economic opportunities and natural resources; all of these factors combined limited the upward mobility of lower-middle class citizens. Tessler, Eickelman and Gelvin draw on historical examples to illustrate that Islamist groups capitalize on the gap between individual aspirations and sociopolitical reality to galvanize support for a ‘new’ order. In recent decades, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizbollah, the Da’wa, Al Qaeda, the PLO, Hamas and the FIS have passed on their message through blaring TVs, political pamphlets and cassettes, effectively gaining support via the Obama slogan: CHANGE. Islamist groups promise a change in the status quo and a strict adherence to Islam is the vehicle for this enlightenment. Historically, Arab regimes have not tolerated any challenge to the established political order, but if they play their cards right, political Islamist groups may be able to fill the gap in “leadership and legitimacy (Tessler, 103)” in the wake of the Arab spring.
Islam’s widespread influence and societal legitimacy are the reasons for its use in social organization and political opposition. Because Islam is so finely woven into society, it is not surprising that it would become a part of social political movements. Also, due to Islam’s prevalence, organizations or movements that incorporate Islam into their doctrines can readily justify their actions. I also think that it is important to note that some political and social Islamic groups were a core aspect of civil society, providing services and maintaining social infrastructure when the state was either unable or unwilling to do so. Social and political Islamist groups can represent the frustrations that citizens may have with the state. An Islamist group that is based in a repressive state may gain popularity and prominence if it is seen as a combatant of the state’s policies and actions. Also, due to Islam’s influence throughout the Middle East and North Africa, social and political Islamist groups have the potential to gain international recognition and acceptance.
Obviously the primacy of religion (Islam) in the Middle East plays a major role in the proliferation of Islamic social organizations and political opposition. Aside from that the failure of governments in the region to provide for their citizens is a big reason that Islamic movements are a popular alternative.
From Palestine to Algeria, and many places in between, Middle Eastern states have been unable to provide many of its citizens basic needs. Not surprisingly, people –especially the youth who have grown up solely under these grossly inefficient governments – turn elsewhere. Islamic movements are often there to fill the gap. Even if one is not in need of economic of social goods, the Islamic movement is an attractive alternative avenue of expression to the existing political systems which are at best broken or corrupt.
This begs the question of why Islamic groups tend to fill this void left by the state more so than other groups, such as secular civil society organizations. One key, as a few of the readings allude to, is that the Islamic system of organization has been around for over a thousand years and can drawn on for human and financial capital. As a corollary, because Islam is an institution with such deep societal and culture roots, it is much harder to represses than traditional civil society. Governments have been fairly effective at keeping these groups from becoming overly politicized, but have found it very difficult to dissuade citizens from supporting the group covertly or ideologically.
Islamist appeals to younger generations and middle-poorer classes best accounts for the success of many if it’s movements. This is a result of older political activists already taking part in existing parties and a changing demographic profile of the Muslim world. The younger generations are more educated, and more aware of their political capabilities. According to Eickelman, those who are educated can pursue jobs other than those in government and politics, so they can “afford” to raise issues and protest. Islam also appeals to the middle class who is outside of the political circles, promising to reestablish social justice and chip away at corruption and authoritarianism. I think mainly, Islam allows for social organization because it often speaks to those who are oppressed, offering them a chance to unite in a revolution and commonly oppose a current government regime.
One other thing that I found interesting was how Islam spoke to the poorer classes. In towns with poor government services, Islamists in places like Algeria carried out most of the activities in the early 1970s. They provided schooling through mosques, sports facilities, and health services. Also, I found it interesting that the waning capacity of Islamist mobilization in the 1970s resulted in new forms of terrorism and violence, which eventually ended up backfiring on terrorists who were dissolved shortly after acts of terrorism such as September 11th.
I agree with Tessler’s thesis in “The Origins of Popular Support for Islamist Movements” that the political economy, more than religious and cultural issues, has favored Islamist movements in the Middle East. Tessler explains that unemployment, inadequate housing and a quickly growing populations have caused significant unrest in various Middle Eastern countries throughout the past century. This growing population of uneducated and unemployed young Arabs have, in many cases, given up looking to their governments for remedies and instead turn to the institutions that seem capable of providing them with these basic needs. Islamist organizations and movements fill this void. By providing social services and charity, Islamist organizations can garner support from a broad base of the population.
Islamist movements are also successful because they draw from a wide base of support. As Gelvin notes, even when governments have crushed individual movements, regimes have been “relatively ineffective in suppressing the impulse behind Islamic groups.” The universal nature of Islam that transcends national boundaries to unite all of the Muslim umma, appeals to both “younger generations in the cities” and the “traditional, God-fearing bourgeoisie” (Kepel).
Finally, for the most militant groups, willing to engage in acts of civil disobedience or violence to achieve their goals, the Islamist interpretation allows militants to be “accountable to God alone.” This free pass justifies otherwise morally or legally dubious actions.
I think that Islam finds footholds in the region because the people have lost all other options. The governments are not functioning as the people want them to, the people are not recognizing outlying circumstances like overpopulation or external pressures that may be keeping their governments from performing well, and they are not happy. This is not to say that the government is the victim, surely the people without adequate schooling, infrastructure, and health care are. That is where Islam comes in. With money coming in from non-state sources, religion can become the savior and the highly functioning unit that creates seemingly positive results for the populace. Tessler also points out that as Islam is not a contending political party (officially at least), it can be more outlandish and critical as they are not the ones who should be enacting change. They are the ones criticizing and providing an alternative to an incensed people. Any good that they do for the people is an added benefit to their cause, as it is not necessary or expected; it comes off as benevolence and good intentions. I wonder if religion took the official seat of power and had to deal with all the road blocks of actually running countries and paying for them, if they would come out as “heroic” in many peoples minds, or be as functional. It is easy to point out the fault in the current government (as we see daily in our own country) but can the other side do a better job? Maybe in some instances, but with great power comes great responsibility and many roadblocks.
God is also a good backdrop to win support under, as it is a mystical and more interpretive guide. Many people will follow God more blindly than they would other politics, meaning that religion has much liberty to push its ideas, as it is backed by a very powerful, and irrefutable, figure with much influence. Islam may come off as the non-state group that can be a refuge for struggling populaces, but it is a slippery slope towards fundamentalism or repression whenever one group has too much power without checks. There are great altruistic services that the religion as a non-state actor does provide in the face of repressive governments, however it is also easier for those with more sinister plans to gain support under the guise of religion and development. However, the grass is always greener….
There are many reasons that increase the success of Islamic movements in the Middle East. For starters, Islam is by its very nature a culture and legal system as well as a religion. As an indigenous belief system native to the region and familiar to almost all Arabs regardless of religion, it has the advantage of “cultural authenticity” in response to the failures of the state (and the accusation of “imported nationalist creeds”). Islam may then be a local solution “untainted” by the manipulations and immorality of imperialism and intervention. In addition, Islamists groups are often the most active and well-organized opposition groups. For those interested in political involvement and change, the organizational and theological advantages of the Islamist groups may inspire more faith (the “absence of alternative opposition parties with a credible platform” certainly helps as well (Tessler 113)). Mosques and religious spaces also aid the Islamist movements significantly. Because there are organizational spaces available to these groups, they may be the only “safe” arenas for gathering and discussion (as well as aid recruitment). The political economy argument is also very convincing. As urbanization and unemployment increase, many weak states are unable to provide social safety nets for a wide variety of citizens. With popular discontent, the “perception of deprivation” and practically no access to social mobility, Islamist organizations may provide an alternative to the status quo through the provision of services such as health care, education, and sanitation. Coupled with increased standards of morality and the ease of information transmission (through mosques or cassettes and increasing media), it is no wonder that Islamic movements often garner so much participation and support.
However, the closing speculations made by both Tessler and Gelvin are extremely interesting when contemplating the future political role of Islamists in the Middle East (as more than opposition parties). Tessler argues that Islamic parties now gain significant political support through their even minimal provision of social welfare as they “can criticize but have no statutory responsibility for delivering services” (113). However, when holding positions of power, they may find that these provisions instead become responsibilities—indeed, a social contract. As such, if they are unable to meet demand the political consequences will be high. Gelvin similarly argues that while the Islamist parties now function on ideals of morality or provision, they have the advantage of being disassociated from the failures of the state. Should they become complicit in the state’s failure, through political rule or participation, and the realities of day-to-day management become apparent, then popular support will also fall.
The Tessler article highlights the most important point, in my opinion, about why Islamic groups have garnered such intense support. He argues that Islamic groups have so much support due to political and economical situations rather than religious ideals of the states. Not only do I think that this analysis is correct but I think it is a really important point in all of these readings. In many ways we have come to know Islam as an image of extremism. Part of the reason for this skewed view is that a good news article is not made from information such as, “Islamic group talks about rational ideas at a café.” The result, however, is that our image and opinions of Islam have become clouded by a negative perception.
In contradiction to the extremist, erratic view of Islam, these readings indicated was that Islamic groups were actually a source of stability during economic and political upheaval. When the government cannot provide food, or education, civil society has a strong impetus to step in and provide these goods. Islam took off as a form of civil society because they promised cultural authenticity, and they targeted those who were most displaced by the economic and political upheaval. Furthermore, when a power vacuum exists, stability, no matter how that stability manifests is often better than no stability at all (or at least people perceive this as the case). I think this idea is somewhat frightening in the political arena because when we see a power vacuum in the Middle East, we know that stability can be found in many forms, even those of “terrorist organizations.” What they may lack in reason, they do not lack in organization and sometimes that is all people ask for.
Reading these articles did highlight the fact that along with the extreme versions of Islam, there are also moderates who have undoubtley paved the way to a more democratic life for themselves, even within the confines of an authoritarian regime. With this is mind, I think that if a group, indentifying as Islam, should not be shut out of the political arena if they are helping to push for democratization. The rhetoric about church and state separation is simply that, rhetoric. As my own classmates have pointed out, the US, while claiming its secularism, has the church integrated into the political spectrum. Whether overtly or not, votes matter in a democracy, thus ideals of people within a country matter, thus whether we like it or not, religion matters. Islam perhaps wears its religion more on it’s shoulders than other countries but I do find this significant reason to exclude Islamic groups from political participation, especially when history has shown that they can be a vital method for increasing social capita among members of the group.
Opposition by definition implies that some reject the status quo and that an alternative is sought out as a preferable option. This is true of any political system, yet the prominence of Islamic movements speaks to a high level of dissatisfaction with the incumbent regime. Our reading concerning Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco alludes to this by stating that it forms a common ground for people and attract support simply by virtue of the fact that they offer a path to change. This path to change when combined with the one commonality that transcends the ethnic, cultural, and geographical divides that exist in the Muslim world, makes Islamist movements an obvious choice for those dissatisfied with the existing government to voice their grievances. This broad appeal was a major reason for their rise to prominence.
The social diversity within the Islamist movements (most notably the seemingly unlikely young, educated alliance with the older middle-class) is an indicator of their ability to mobilize using the faith of the population to bind them together. As social organizations they are permitted to organize because of their religious legitimacy, a luxury afforded to few other opposition parties attempting to attract support under the watchful eyes of various authoritarian regimes. It is because of the religious legitimacy that Islamist movements posses, that they are able to challenge governments, the only option of which, is to attempt to fragment or appease a decidedly dangerous opponent.
I think the domination of political Islam as the dominant form of social organization can be summed up in one word: legitimacy. In a civil society that is deeply rooted in the teachings of religion, religious leaders almost automatically have a kind of legitimacy that all political actors can only hope to one day achieve. They are highly regarded public figures who inspire trust purely by being who they are and holding the religious positions that they hold. However, this semi-automatic legitimacy takes all the pressure off of them to listen to their people. They just say that they are doing the work of God, and following the Qur’an, and they are given carte blanche to do as they see fit. So while they might have a high level of legitimacy, they are also not necessarily acting in the best interest of their people.
In a question of whether or not rapid political changes by Islamic political actors would be better than no changes or democratization at all, I am quite conflicted. On the one hand, I want to say yes. Somewhere deep down I believe that democracy (that is, a functioning democracy); I believe that people should be able to participate in their own governments and have a say in what happens in their own countries. But, I also believe in that same deep-down place, that church and state must remain separated. I cringe every time I walk into a courtroom and see “In God We Trust” hanging ominously over the head of the judge. I think that religion is, by definition, anti-democracy because it excludes those non-believers, and often people think irrationally and then blame their chosen God. Clearly there are exceptions to the rule. Israel has functioned as a democracy since day one of its founding as a Jewish state, but they have also not escaped the perils of political exclusion based on religious ideals. The state operates on a Jewish calendar, one that is not necessarily compatible with the rest of the world. Ultimately, I think my conclusion is that democratic reforms are better than an authoritarian alternative, and if those democratic reforms have to come about through an Islamic political group, then that’s ok. But I think that once the reforms have been made, the new government should attempt to transition to being a secular organization as soon as possible.
Islam, like many religions, has the ability to appeal to a diverse audience. One of the initial pulls to the Islamic movement was that it garnered popular support, and united capitalist and slum dwellers alike, embracing both “a younger generation” as well as “traditional god fearing bourgeoisie” (Kepel). In its early years, the movement also gained support because of its hostility towards communism and socialism. How could Islamic movements appeal to so many different people, for so many different reasons? I seems that when you use a religion to unite a group towards political ends, especially a religion rooted in a text like the Koran, you give your followers an intellectual and super human justification for policy. The Koran and sharia, or islamic law, provide a certain subjectivity under the guise of objectivity, allowing followers of Islamic movements, and leaders of Islamic movements to retain the benefits of a static value system while actually utilizing a very malleable political framework. In this way Islamic movements can have a presence in all aspects of civil society, civil conflict, and civil rights.
But this intellectual and ideological framework, bendable at the will of whoever the strongest leader is at the time is fragile. Up until the attacks of 9/11 the Islamic movement “was beginning to unravel, and…violence hastened it’s decline” as gulfs began to open between jihad extremists and the social, political and cultural aspirations of muslims (Kepel). The attacks of 9/11 was a “paroxysm of destructive violence” which while giving the facade of a united Islamic movement of real political power, was really a physical act that, like such act had done in the past, united the disparate body of muslims but did not provide a foundation for the movement to really stand on. Gilles Kepel says it well when he writes “…the fragile alliance between the young urban poor and the devout middle class, which was held together by intellectuals preaching the doctrines of Islamism, [is] ill prepared for any kind of protracted confrontation with state authorities” (Kepel). So while there is no doubt in the power of Islamic movements as social organizers, how effective are these preachers at supporting real political agency? Can the Koran be a real political constitution?
I think the social leveling aspects of Islam appeal to a wide range of people, particularly lower classes, from a social and theological standpoint. This equalizing characteristic, in addition to the accessibility of Islam, has contributed majorly to the wild and far-reaching popularity of Islamic movements in the past and in current times as well.
Another factor contributing to the dominance of Islamic movements, particularly as a form of political opposition, is their ability to keep the promises they make. With the inability of 1950’s and 60’s Middle Eastern secular governments to keep their promises of social justice, an end to imperialism and development, upon which they had built their legitimacy and political platforms, came a rise in the popularity of Islamic movements in the 1970’s. Their message, cultural authenticity, and ability to keep promises of social change appealed to those most affected by the decision of many secular governments to retreat on their promises. So while many states sought to suppress Islamic movements through violence, they were “relatively ineffective in suppressing the impulse behind Islamic groups,” as Gelvin put it (315).