Civil Society Activist Opposed to the Green Climate Fund

The EU: “An Agreement is Within Reach”

In a very surprising (and potentially welcome) development, some of the main Parties today are indicating that there may be some kind of legally binding regime that emerges after COP-17 after all!  Connie Hedegaard, speaking for the EU, which has proposed a “roadmap [at] the core of the negotiations,” said today that “…an agreement is within reach…  A framework that would be global, and legally binding.”

While the EU has long been a pusher group on the idea of creating a binding regime, the EU’s proposal for the “roadmap” has received some verbal support from the US, in no small part because it calls on India and China to commit to binding targets.  However, poorer nations and blocs, in particular AOSIS, the LDCs, and the African Group are also in favor of the proposal, thus fracturing the coherence of the 131 countries of the G-77 + China.  It’s not a simple poor-v-rich nation debate any more.  Indeed, last night, AOSIS, the LDCs and the EU released a common statement for greater effort and ambition, and stating that “…all parties to the UNFCCC need to commit…,” and committing to an extension of the Kyoto Protocol.

Moreover, Hedegaard is very explicitly positioning the climate change issue as one that should cross the North-South divide that has characterized climate change: “I find it significant and telling that the poorest countries of the world, the most vulnerable, they now stand together with the EU, that all parties will have to commit in the future.”  Further, she pointed out that South Africa and Brazil (half of the BASIC Countries with India and China) have, as of midnight last night, signaled to the EU that it would commit to the binding commitments implicated under the roadmap.

South Africa: the Gracious Host

In a very carefully hedged statement, the South African Minister of Environment positioned itself as active in seeking a solution on the climate change issue and the EU roadmap.  “As you know, the negotiations are still ongoing.  We are part of finding a solution that would be attractive to all delegates.  I’ll just leave it at that.”  Lord, what I wouldn’t give to be a fly on the wall of these debates.  Of course, given that the press and NGO participants are regularly excluded, that is not likely, unless I get nominated to a national delegation.  (Note to self: if academic career doesn’t work out…)

Finally, Hedegaard pointed out that the US has repeatedly said that it would be interested in a legally binding deal under the EU roadmap, provided that others (including developing countries) were bound – a statement that aligns with China’s recent statements.  Optimistic, yes?

Cautious Optimism

However, this optimism should be tempered by the fact that this regime is governed by consensus.  1) the Umbrella Group is probably going to be unhappy with an extension of the Kyoto Protocol, and 2) the other two BASIC Countries are unlikely to be happy with the binding agreements implied in the EU roadmap.  Further, reports on the text of the roadmap, which has been made available so far only to the press that is actually at COP-17, indicates that the binding targets are only going to come into play “after 2020,” when the current (non-binding) requirements of the Cancún Agreements are commonly held to expire.  This agreement could come into force in 2015 – “not an unfair deadline – four more years!” she emphasized – although the US is sending clear signals that it is not interested in establishing a timetable.

Further, alluding to the “small rooms” in which most of the discussions and decisions take place, Hedegaard made it clear (in as diplomatic manner as possible) that “those few big ones… are still not giving in” in committing to a decision in a timely pace.  While the COP is scheduled to end today, and may drag out for a few hours more, this may yet scuttle the progress that has been made over the past 2 days.

The Clock is Ticking…

In short, if you want meaningful, binding action now, your choices are: 1) the non-binding Cancún Agreements starting now; 2) an extension of the Kyoto Protocol (sans Canada, Japan, and the US) starting 2012; 3) wait until 2020 for binding cuts to take place.  This is not to say that no meaningful action will be taken, but it should be emphasized that, if we are going to cut global emissions in such a way as to prevent serious climate change (i.e., above 2 degrees C), it will have to be done through action that is more ambitious than any of the global commitments or agreements made between now and 2020.

Nor is it clear, for option 2, what extending the Kyoto Protocol would mean.  In addition to the fact that three major Annex I economies have clearly stated that they are not interested in a new period, the EU, and technically, post-Soviet states have exceeded their Kyoto requirements.  For it to be meaningful, the new Parties would have to create new targets, which would almost certainly be a profoundly politicized issue.  You can take a look at some of the options considered by the AWG-KP and AWG-LCA here (PDF – specific to the KP) and here (PDF).

In any case, no Decisions have been announced yet; it is 11:11pm Durban time – the COP-17 is scheduled to end today, and we’ll see what comes out.  I predict (hope?) 1) institutionalized GCF; 2) very watered down Kyoto Protocol, obviously sans Canada, US, Japan and BASIC country requirements.  The only question remaining is whether Parties will make a commitment to negotiating a binding regime in a future COP to come into force by 2020.  That could go anywhere at this point.

Abigal Borah, Kicked Out LIKE A BOSS.

Abigail Borah: “The United States Government Does Not Speak on My Behalf”

In an inspiring display of bravery, Abigail Borah, class of 2013 of Middlebury College, spoke today against the politicization and gridlock of COP-17 of the UNFCCC. Here’s how it went down:  At the 7th meeting of the COP today, the various delegates walked through their national positions on climate change.  Two hours and twenty minutes in, the Greece Minister of Environment, George Papakonstantinou, just finished alluding darkly to the unwillingness of some Parties to commit to binding agreements, asserting that – even though Greece is in the midst of an economic crisis – such action is necessary.  The next presenter scheduled was Todd Stern, from the US Department of State.  Then, right before he could speak, this happened (skip ahead to 1:15):

While Borah was making her speech, the COP President attempted to shut her down, stating: “Thank you, can we listen to the speech?  Nobody is listening to you.”  However, this was belied by the fact that, right after she finished her speech (and Borah will now be banned from the rest of the conference), the audience of government delegates, press, and civil society representatives erupted in applause.  In response, the COP President tried to spin the situation: “Mr. Stern, this clapping is for you.  You have a very nice welcome now, so you can start.”

“I’m delighted that I have a very enthusiastic crowd here.  This is great.”

After Borah was ejected, Stern continued with his speech, reiterating comments made earlier in the week – the appropriate, and “only basis” on which climate change can move forward, is the Cancún Agreements.  Later today, in a press conference discussing environmental criticism (and mentioning Borah obliquely) Stern will repeat the idea that the US commitment to Cancún is sufficient as an approach to climate governance: “What is embedded in the Cancún Agreements is much more meaningful in terms of potential emissions reductions than what is in Kyoto; there is no contest.”

To this end, Stern cited actions such as the increase in CAFE standards, and the $90 billion invested in green energy under the Obama administration.  Further, in an attempt to burnish the US’s green credentials, Stern points out that a “leading environmentalist” – Dan Becker of the Safe Climate Campaign for the Auto Industry – described the move as “…the biggest single step that any nation has taken to cut global warming pollution.”  I covered the debate over the Cancún Agreements already, but suffice it to note that, accepting the US’ position that this would be the most appropriate basis for this current COP requires accepting that there would be no binding framework, which would 1) undermine the possibility of the conditional obligations of Cancún; 2) undermine the likelihood of extending the Clean Development Mechanism; 3) undermine the institutionalization of the Green Climate Fund, at a minimum – even though the US is vocally supportive of the GFC.  Indeed, today, Stern said that the US is committed to “promptly moving forward” on that front.

Granted, the CDM (and other flexibility mechanisms) are severely problematic – poor implementation and measurement may mean that countries receive credits for actions that were unnecessary, or double-counted.  You can see a report published today by CDM Watch on the problems of flexibility mechanisms here (PDF).  In short, loopholes currently mean that developed nations can meet their pledges primarily by “accounting tricks,” such as hot air, as indicated in the report.  Thus, being critical of the US’ position should always be tempered by the observation that binding regimes (such as the KP) are no guarantee of success.

In any case, the official US position is that 1) they have already made a proposal for a binding regime that was rejected by China; 2) the US is exercising political leadership, stating that: “It’s nonsense to suggest that what we’re doing is proposing a kind of hiatus to deal with climate change until 2020.  I’ve heard this everywhere from ministers, to press reports, to the very sincere and passionate young woman… I just wanted to be on the record saying that that’s just a mistake.  It’s not true.”

Developed and Developing Countries: AOSIS

On the point of the CDM and the Cancún Agreement, the German NGO Forum on Environment and Development presented a synthetic study (PDF) on the commitments pledged last year indicating that “…the developed countries had put smaller pledges on the table than developing countries,” at a ratio of 5:4 GtCO2e.  This is severely problematic in that this is, in their words, “far out of line of what would be considered equitable,” and exacerbates the problem of the Emissions Gap, and the likelihood of a rise in temperature above 2 degrees C.

As a Caribbean, I thought about these discussions – the inequity between the rich and the poor nations; the remaining Emissions Gap (even with the most optimistic interpretation of the Cancún Agreements); climate responsibility – all of this, as I watched the somber presentation of the AOSIS members.  ” Citing the scientific information that is widely accepted in the conference, the Minister from Grenada stated: “You think that our countries are a paradise.  It’s a paradise when you come to visit, but for us, it’s a living reality.” It’s important to remember that, while climate change (and the mitigation effects of climate change) are likely to be very costly, for too many , climate change could lead to the erasure of an entire people – already, two South Pacific Islands in the state of Kiribati have disappeared beneath the waves.  The AOSIS delegate says he thinks it’s not too late.  I hope he’s right.

Well, Monday started out so promising, with an apparent signal from China that it would commit to a binding agreement on climate.  However, an analysis of what transpired today throws some cold water on the whole shebang.  Let’s see what happened today:

Slipping Beneath the Waves

Secretary General of the UN, Ban Ki-Moon, observed that the Parties of the current COP are the ones who will determine how to address the problem of “…out of control climate change, a world divided bitterly between rich and poor, the vulnerable and the privileged…”  No pressure.  In doing so, he referred to very vivid anecdotes of resident children of Kiribati, fearing to go to sleep at night, due to the threat of their country “…slipping beneath the waves.”  So too, did he cite statistical evidence, such as UNEP’s climate change reports on the Emissions Gap and others.

Further, he responded directly to the repeated concerns that the global recession will make fighting climate change more difficult: “Yes, we all recognize the realities of our time, the economic crisis that dictates fiscal security.  Yet, the world cannot accept ‘no’ as the answer to Durban.  I say to you, this is the time to be ambitious.”  Restructuring national and global energy production (among other things) may be very costly in the very short term; however, rising sea levels, unpredictable agriculture, changes in precipitation – all this would dramatically damage (if you want to put an economic spin on it) global productive capacity.  In the Canadian NGO press conference, Gerry LeBlanc of the United Steel Workers similarly observes that shifting to a green economy is a forward-looking approach to thinking about jobs and the environment – really valid points, but some that are having a hard time gaining traction.

Ban Ki-Moon finally observed that $30 billion, in identified sources, has been earmarked for fast-start financing in the transition towards greener economies in LDCs.  “In Cancún, you created the Green Climate Fund.  Let us launch it here in Durban.”  It seems like the GCF is coming out of here alive: I’ll lay 4-1 odds on an institutionalized GCF by the end of Durban.  Any takers?

Seriously, Canada?

Today, Climate Action Network – Canada, on a panel led by Hannah McKinnon, spoke out bitterly against their government’s action on the UNFCCC.  “What happened to the Canada we know?” asks Stephen Guilbeult.  The panel goes on to point out that Canada – which again, has the 7th highest emissions per capita globally (PDF) – has poor records on 1) indigenous environmental rights; 2) commitments to the climate regime; 3) carbon dioxide emissions.  In particular, the reference by the Harper government to tar sands extraction as ‘ethical oil,’ rankles.  The point is driven home, when Daniel T’Solo, a Deneh activist points out the overwhelmingly disproportionate impact of tar sands extraction on indigenous peoples.

One of the positive developments seen here, is the attention to the local level impacts of climate change on different populations.  At the meeting of the state delegates, as much as the NGO conferences, people are stating concern about the impact of the poor in LDCs, as well as the poor in rich countries – this marks a welcome divergence from a state-centric look at negotiations, which does not capture the importance of societal and human diversity, and what it means for climate vulnerability.  The briefing ends with a really cute display of children’s art, illustrating their concepts of a just future and a just climate.  I believe the children are our future, etc.  Concluding, McKinnon notes that the stated withdrawal of Canada represents a “…failure of political leadership.”

Acting in a Responsible Way?

What to make of China’s recent statements that it will support a binding agreement?  Ostensibly, the reluctance of the major emitters in the developing world to iterated obligations has been the source of the tension and roadblock persisting so far in the debates.  Thus, if taken seriously, China’s recent statements could severely undermine the legitimacy of the US and Canada’s foot-dragging.  Xie Zhenhua certainly seems to buy into this, saying: “It’s time for us to see who is acting in a responsible way to deal with the common challenge of human beings.”

The problem is, it’s not clear today what kind of binding agreement China is discussing, since Xie’s statements today focused on the Kyoto Protocol.  While legally binding, it obviously carries no cost for China.  Thus, the public pronouncements by Xie may serve as a rhetorical cudgel to make the US and OECD defectors look bad, rather than make any progress (initial optimism notwithstanding).  While the Indian delegate mentioned the possibility of considering a second binding agreement, it’s certainly not obvious that this would include conditions for developing countries, a point that the delegate herself brought up.

Basically…

The BASIC Countries – Brazil, South Africa, India, and China – acting as a bloc today, under the coordination of China, primarily have good rhetoric, but this should not be confused with any intent towards a binding regime.  Minister Xie Zhenhua claimed that “…we are countries of action.  the BASIC Countries, together with the G-77 group, will play an active and constructive role in implementing the UNFCCC, the KP, the Copenhagen Accord, and the Cancún Agreement.  The KP should be continued, and a second commitment period of the KP is a must.”

At the same time, the Indian delegate calls out the developed world as not fulfilling their obligations, asserting that the poorest of the world “…should not be expected to make legally binding commitments…” when they are struggling for basic survival.  While true, it is not clear how this precludes action by the industrialized and energy sectors of Brazil and China, at the very least.  Further, for the same reasons listed above, the KP is really attractive as a framework to developing countries (such as BASIC and the G-77), in that they don’t have to commit to anything, and can thus push for it without fear of political blowback.

The Per Capita Argument

The Indian delegate goes on to say that there should be equity in the use of atmospheric resources.  This is a really interesting argument.  Something to keep in mind is that the poorest countries tend to have a really minute impact on the climate in a per capita measure.  One way of thinking about this is that, if the atmosphere consisted of discrete units, which could be allocated to the world’s population, each American, Canadian and Russian (to use the hyperlinked report) would use far more than their fair share, while each Ethiopian, Tanzanian and Bangladeshi would use far less.  If we attempted to regulate climate according to per capita equity, the developed nations would have to cut overall outputs by staggering amounts – 80%, say – to allow the poorer populations more ecological space.  While certainly politically impossible, it’s worth thinking about precisely how problematic the current allocation of the world’s resources is.

Renewing Kyoto

Echoing many of the delegates, Ban Ki-Moon asserted that renewing the KP is sorely needed, stating that, as indicated in previous posts, climate financing, clean development, carbon trading, and afforestation projects are closely linked to the institutional framework of the KP.  Thus, while the regime itself does not provide much in the way of meaningful regulation (honestly, the US, the EU, and Canada’s position that – by only covering 25% of the world’s emissions – it is a poor regime, is a good one), its benefits may extend beyond its content, to the support it creates for other actions.  This may be the only purpose it serves, however, especially considering that some of the domestic commitments – such as those of the EU – far exceed the requirements of the KP.

And on that note, I leave you with the new theme song for the climate conference.  Enjoy.

Xie xie Xie

All About China

Well, today’s updates are primarily about China.  The country gave an interesting announcement about the likelihood of national support for a binding accord – including one with obligations on the developing nations.  While I discuss the US here also, China is a big player, and not much has been heard from them lately.  What have they got to say now?

Are There Any Circumstances in Which China Will Consider a Binding Deal?

Xie Zhenhua, speaking for China!  Alright… it’s always interesting hearing from the main obstructionists; hearing their rationales for action.  Here’s the kicker: in response to the above question, the Chinese delegate actually supported a binding regime, even if it applied to LDCs, saying “We accept a legally binding regime.  With conditions.”

The conditions are:  “Firstly, we need to speak to the UNFCCC and the KP.  A second commitment period is a must.  Secondly, developed countries must honor their commitment of $30 billion fast start fund, and $100 billion a year long term fund.  And the GCF must be accelerated.  And there shall be supervision and monitoring system for technology transfer and financing.  Fourthly, we must have some consensus, some institutional arrangement for issues like funds, technology transfer, and forests, etc.  And we need to have a review by the end of 2015.  Fifthly, we need to speak to common but differentiated responsibility principles and equity.  Every country shall undertake obligations and responsibilities, according to their national capabilities.  China would love to take part in that.  These aspects are not new, and they have been negotiated over the past 20 years.  The important thing is to implement them.”

Moreover, by pointing out that China has unilaterally adopted domestically binding rules to raise their energy efficiency (measured as CO2 emissions per unit of GDP) by 45% by 2020 (notably, while this may lower China’s overall emissions, it does not have to – particularly if economic growth increases faster than efficiency gains), Xie is positioning China as a swing state on a binding regime (note – despite this positive movement, there will not be an Amendment or new Protocol at the end of this COP).  Though not clear, this seems like a signal that China would be open to an arrangement that paralleled that of the Montreal Protocol – accept binding obligations, in exchange for clearly institutionalized financial and technical assistance.  While this may not be enough to generate the international political will needed to get a binding agreement by 2013 or 2014, this may undercut some of the arguments by the Umbrella Group.

So, what does the Umbrella Group have to say about it?

New US Special Envoy

Todd Stern in the house.  He equivocates some about China’s pronouncement, stating that he will discuss what this means directly with Xie Zhenhua later.  Right now, he says the US is primarily interested in two main elements: 1) Carry out the Cancún Agreements on new takings by all the major economies, and a GCF; 2) Figure out what to do about the KP.  While the US hasn’t done much to establish a clear legislative path (in comparison to, say, China) to meet its stated objective under the Cancún Agreements – namely, cut 17% below 2005 by 2020 – Stern points out that the US has, for example, raised the Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency standards for cars sold in the US to 54.4 mpg by 2025.  For Stern, this plus the recent investments in green energy by the Obama administration, point to a continued engagement of the US executive branch with climate change.

Still, one has to wonder about the US’ commitment to the Cancún Agremeents – not because the US may or may not fulfill its stated goals (in large part, this depends on the commitment of the government post-2012 to domestic environmental regulation – sobering, if any of the GOP front-runners win) but because so many of the goals are conditional on the adoption of binding obligations by other Parties.

This is going to be a two-fer, covering relevant new stuff from Saturday and Sunday.  I didn’t update on Saturday, because 1) it’s Saturday, and; 2) See 1).  So, right now, the issues covered here are the Strategic Body on Implementation (SBI) meeting today, to discuss carrying out the Cancún Agreements, and the UNFCCC’s half time status update.

The Quixotic Enterprise: the KP is Dead

COP-17 President, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, starts off noting that we are at the halfway mark, reiterating confidence in – at a minimum – moving forward on the Report of the Transitional Committee of the GCF.

The Chair of the AWG-KP looks so sad.  He says the body is still working towards a second commitment period, asserting that there is among the Parties, “…common ground on the need to work towards continuity,” thus avoiding an implementation gap (if not an emissions gap).  This seems to contradict directly, with the positions of the Umbrella Group, at the very least.  Of course, just in case anyone thought he was pollyanna-ish, he notes that “…ratification with entry into force by 1 January 2013 is not achievable.”  Further, for Annex I “…provisional application does not seem possible either.” So, we can officially forget about a binding agreement starting in 2013.

So, how to get continuity?  The Chair notes that Parties to the AWG-KP have proposed, variously, a “two stage process,” where Parties take a Decision, then pass amendments to the KP later, to be ratified as a second stage; 2) A Decision-only outcome, without an Amendment; 3) Parties adopt unilateral Declarations.  These last two in particular “…would not involve amendments to the KP and ratification.”  While noting that this would lead to reliance on voluntary commitments, at least in the next few years, he observed that pushing for a binding regime here would lead to “…locking in low ambition.”

“We Haven’t Agreed to Anything”

The Chair of the SBI starts off by saying that he is “optimistic” about the direction of the conference, and the possibility of implementing the Cancún Agreements.  However, in discussing one of the draft documents for the Agreements dealing with Least Developed Country commitments (PDF), he says the Parties will “bracket the entire document,” noting that “…we haven’t agreed to anything.” The US delegate noted that this would create, in a very diplomatic phrasing, “time management problems,” but along with Bangladesh and Gambia, supported the motion.

Already heavily bracketed, the document contains some of the politically contentious elements that could come into play, if Parties are serious about getting a globally covering regime (as opposed to one covering just the top 12 emitters), including: 1) institutionalizing financial and technical assistance to the poorest countries; 2) monitoring mitigation practices in LDCs; 3) the role of the GCF.  What makes this a bad sign as well, is that the 48 LDCs, as defined by the UN (i.e., not including China and India), comprise only 2% of world GDP, and a correspondingly small share of global GHG emissions.  A gridlock here does not bode well for including China, India, the US, Canada and the EU under a new agreement in the near future.

Fairness and Obligations

Anyway, at present, the debate is clearly at a stalemate.  Japan, the US, and the rest of the Umbrella Group keep talking about the issue of fairness: the LDCs (especially China) need to take action.  The G-77 + China, also talk about fairness, but say that the historical responsibility of the HICs to current carbon accumulation means the poor countries are off the hook.  Thus, while Japan is now pushing for a new working group to deal with a new protocol – thus, doing away with the mission AWG-KP – the chances of a new agreement soon (e.g., by 2014) remain really, really low.

Conditionality, Soft-Law, and Cancún

There is another way to think about the problem of the lack of cooperation here: the US has taken the position that the Cancún Agreements are an adequate approach (at least in the immediate short term) to addressing international commitments to combating climate change.  At first glance, even with knowledge about the Emissions Gap at hand, the Agreements sound pretty ambitious.  Let’s take a look at some of the more optimistic scenarios projected by major economies and emitters in Annex I (PDF) and non-Annex I commitments (PDF) alike.:

• The US and Canada pledged a cut in the range of 17% from 2005 levels by 2020, and the US promised 30% by 2025.
• Russia and Japan pledged 20 – 25% below 1990 levels by 2020
• Australia pledged 25% below 2000 by 2020
• The EU pledged 30% below 1990 by 2020
• China and India committed only to making their economies more energy efficient, in China’s case, by lowering its CO2e emissions per unit of GDP by 40%; in India’s case by 25% (not including agriculture)
• Brazil projected that specific actions (including limiting deforestation) would reduce emissions in 2020 to 36 – 39% below what they would have been normally.

Granted, these are non-binding and, particularly in the case of China and India, Parties are stressing the fact that these are voluntary agreements.*  The problem is that the Japanese, EU, Australian, and other commitments not covered here, are conditional: that is, the Parties have included language indicating that their actions will only be taken if there is (depending on who you talk to): a “global deal,” a “global and comprehensive agreement,” or a “fair and comprehensive international framework” and the undertaking of “legally binding obligations” by “all major emitters” or “all major economies.”  !!!

Without such a deal, the Parties listed above will either take no action, or take action that falls short of the comparatively ambitious goals.

*NB: Though voluntary, presumably domestic and transnational activists, as well as international actors, can use these commitments as means of shaming.  If Parties fostered activities that violated any possible interpretation of these goals – say, by funding the exploitation of tar sands oil – then Parties could be subjected to moral, social and diplomatic pressure from domestic and global actors, and a loss of political prestige (PDF).  Presumably, that would work as a quasi-enforcement mechanism.

Protests at COP-17

Hammering Out the Green Climate Fund (GCF)

At present, the Parties are still in the proposal stage for the GCF.  Tomorrow, they are planning to discuss the Report published by the Transitional Committee (PDF).  Let’s see… the Report makes a variety of interesting proposals:

1. It should be run by a Board of 24, with parity between developed and developing nations (recall: NGOs have been adamant that it should also include civil society representatives – fat chance of that being the case, particularly since the Transitional Committee is staffed by government representatives);
2. It “will” be funded by developed countries, but “may” receive additional inputs from other sources
3. It should be operationalized as a “country-driven” approach, and will only “encourage” the involvement of the civil society – including “vulnerable groups and addressing gender aspects,” (which is not entirely encouraging for the chances of this instrument being used to empower the most marginalized populations). It will also encourage private sector activities through a private sector facility.
4. On that note, and given the concern of indigenous peoples with respect to REDD, it will fund “…full and agreed incremental costs [for] adaptation, mitigation (including REDD-plus), technology development and transfer… capacity-building and the preparation of national reports by developing countries.
5. At the same time, the Board “will develop mechanisms” for the involvement of civil society groups, women, indigenous peoples, and promote social sustainability in its function.

The last two sound very encouraging.  Very?  Somewhat encouraging.  One hopes, in particular, that the language indicating support for vulnerable populations is taken seriously and is not ignored in the conduct of implemented projects (PDF), a problem that has plagued other international financial institutions.

Obviously, with the KP expiring next year, the GCF would be subsumed under the UNFCCC, which lacks binding, iterated obligations – again, contrasting it with the financial mechanism of the Montreal Protocol.  It should be noted, however, that there remains substantial internal debate about the Report: the US is in favor of moving forward with it, given some amendments; other Parties are opposed; others want to adopt the document almost wholesale.

On to the delegates’ talking points!

The United States:

You know, given China’s and Japan’s withdrawal from the idea of binding commitments under the KP, the US suddenly doesn’t look so bad!  The benefit of lowered expectations…  I’m going to pay a lot of attention to them here, as the US is perhaps the most significant veto state, by virtue of being the largest economy, and the second largest emitter.

Dr. Jon Pershing, the special envoy is finishing up his time representing the US here this week, and will transition to a new delegate next week.  Before leaving though, he had a few points about the current state of the debate.  At present, the delegates are involved in, from his perspective, hammering out a “…package agreement that everyone can support,” again indicating some movement towards a globally applicable draft document.  Still, the US remains uninterested in a legal regime.

In discussing possibly the most likely outcome – the implementation of the GCF, Pershing states that the US is trying to make “…fully operational each of the key elements we agreed to in Cancún…” namely “…technology, adaptation, finance, and transparency.”  So, interest in moving towards a Green Climate Fund seems shared among the various Parties – and is certainly supported by the NGO community.

There is some stated confusion regarding who would be subsumed under legal obligations.  Pershing states, in the course of one speech, that rules would have to apply to “all major economies,” “all Parties,” and “major emerging economies.”  The problem is, these are different subsets of the international society – but they do, at least, include the BRIICS nations.  Nevertheless, it is worth noting that, while the US is usually portrayed as the bogeyman in the UNFCCC, the lack of progress towards a legal regime is the foot-dragging of the G-77 + China.  You really have to feel for AOSIS on this one.  With the Umbrella Group and the G-77+China at loggerheads, they and the EU have limited scope.

Another problem characterizing the debates, is that Parties seem to differ as well on what the timeline for additional action will be.  Some see the COP as aimed towards getting an agreement to cover action “between now and 2020,” some are looking for “a proposal beyond 2020.”  The US’ position is that Cancún “…takes us through 2020,” and is vocally skeptical about whether there is additional international interest, not only within the US, but among other nations, in creating new pledges between now and then.  Thus, for the US, Cancún (nonbinding, yes, and?) is the way to go.

The Emissions Gap

Recognizing, however, that (as indicated earlier) fully implementing the Cancún Agreement would still lead to an Emissions Gap, Pershing states that moving towards that is nevertheless a step in the right direction.  In short, rather than making the perfect the enemy of the good, Pershing states that you have to “…marry a politically pragmatic outcome with a scientifically important conclusion.  If you demand more than the politics can deliver, you don’t succeed.”

In contrast, however, Runge-Metzer speaking for the EU, calls for even more ambition than has been indicated so far, given the implications of an unstable climate on global well-being.  At the very least, Parties should start, by the latest next year, 1) trying to understand what the Cancún Agreements mean for Parties; 2) continue the CDM; 3) develop a clear accounting mechanism for all GHG emissions.

The EU

My main man, Tomasz Chruszczow!  Artur Runge-Metzer, in the house!  In discussing his region’s push for a “road map” towards an “…instrument, that eventually we will have on the board, all emitters.  100%.  Globally.”  He claims that developed and developing countries are on board for a legally binding agreement involving 100% of the Parties – this sounds extremely unlikely.  At the same time, the EU is also on board with the idea of creating a second commitment period of the KP which, again, has been rejected so far by Japan, the US and Canada.

Even the EU, however, thinks that a binding agreement will not emerge before 2013 – 2015, but stresses that one has to be created at, “…by the latest, 2020.”  All major economies will have binding emissions agreements, with “common, but differentiated responsibilities.”  Perhaps with voluntary commitments among the poorer LDCs?

Chruszczow makes a point about the problem of linking China with the G-77 as a negotiating bloc: understandably, the G-77 is concerned about applying binding emissions requirements to poor, comparatively agrarian, under-industrialized countries – particularly since they tend to have less emissions per capita than the wealthy nations.  China, however, has per-capita emissions of almost 6 tons of GHGs, while India has emissions at only 1.8 tons per capita.  The implication is that China is covering their irresponsibility with concern about the legitimate grievances of poorer LDCs who are now being asked to respond to a problem not of their making.

Positive Outcomes?

Perhaps the most positive is the interest from all Parties in the GCF.  Other than that, I’ve learned how to spell “Chruszczcow.”

Demonstrations Outside COP-17

Good news!

Oh, wait.  No there isn’t.  Anyway, back to COP-17.  At present, the EU is by far, the biggest pusher for a binding regime.  They’ve already adopted, in 2008, a regional plan to cut 20% of EU emissions by 2020, and promised that they will increase that to 30%, if a binding agreement is signed for the post-Kyoto commitment period.  Moreover, they’ve been pretty adamant about getting parties on board a “road map” towards a binding agreement which should enter into force by the latest, 2020.

At present, it’s not entirely clear what the EU proposed Durban Road Map will look like: one major issue is that Tomasz Chruszczow stated on November 24 that a binding regime should include “100 percent of all emissions under one global umbrella,” while other recent press releases refer to targeting the “major emitters.”  This is an important distinction – due to the necessity of obtaining consensus to create protocols and new agreements under the UNFCCC – just on the basis of numbers – it will be far easier to create a binding regime focusing on the top 12 emitters (which combined, emit 80% of the world’s GHGs) than to try to convince close to 200 countries to agree on something.  Of course, doing so would mean breaking down the G-77 bloc on this issue.  The thought, at this point, of global consensus on binding obligations, is mind-boggling.

Brazil, the EU Road Map, and Financing

Some of the delegates themselves seem, already, to be somewhat disillusioned.  In discussing the EU Durban Road Map today, the Brazilian delegate, ambassador André Corrêa do Lago stated with some resignation, “Well, we have to talk about the same subjects, basically, every day.”  No kidding.  Anyway, Corrêa do Lago indicates that there may be some confusion among the principals about what the proposal is.  While expressing support for a binding regime, strengthening the UNFCCC and KP he states some concern about textual ambiguity in the EU proposal: “The issue is that, in these negotiations, a little word can make a lot of difference.  We have to see which elements Brazil can be comfortable with.”  Finally, reiterating the position of the G-77 + China bloc, “we are not agreeing with the idea of the world, in this road map, as a whole.”

Corrêa do Lago also makes an important, and potentially sobering observation.  One of the mechanisms through which the KP was being implemented is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).  In short, Parties with Annex B commitments could get credits for cutting emissions by funding low-cost projects in less developed countries (LDCs).  Potentially a win-win situation, this theoretically would allow richer countries to cut emissions cheaply (since the atmosphere doesn’t care where carbon comes from), while fostering technological transfer to LDCs.  Without binding commitments, there will be no incentive to invest in the CDM.  This also raises a similar question about the Green Climate Fund (GCF).  While the Montreal Multilateral Fund was an important element in obtaining LDC support for phasing out Ozone Depleting Substances (ODSs), it was created pursuant to a binding agreement.  Without that, it’s not immediately clear what kind of institutional support there will be to transfer the technology needed to China, India, Brazil, etc., to allow them to ‘leapfrog’ over the path of dirty industrialization, particularly as there would be no agreed-upon standard of cuts to which the provided funds would apply.

Japan

Japan has an interesting approach here, which may be comparable to that of the US.  Japan has already stated that, like Canada (and effectively the US), it has no interest in ratifying a second commitment to the KP.  At the same time, they’ve not withdrawn from the KP, and are in fact going to “…continue our efforts towards GHG reduction, and would like the improve the CDMs and so on.”  Moreover, they want to adopt “…a single legal document that establishes a fair and effective framework with which all the major economies will cooperate” in the future.  On this approach, they state they will stand “hand in hand with the EU” in lobbying for a binding regime – but one which does away with the KP’s limited approach, incorporating rules for a small majority of GHG emissions.

In addition, they’ve  been promoting their multilateral aid program on climate change, stating that “…it is necessary for both developed and developing countries to achieve low carbon growth all over the world.”  Under this plan, Japan is pledging to transfer policymaking expertise and technological know-how to LDCs through “concrete measures” intended to go right up until Rio + 20 next year.  At present, Japan has provided $12.5 billion dollars, primarily to the poorest countries, and is planning to develop technological transfers in goods such as solar cells.

Take it away, Climate Action Network!

CAN

Well, right off the bat, Kelly Dent from Oxfam states that the world will need $200 billion a year to get the action necessary to meet our climate goals.  I’m not sure what she’s basing these numbers on, but if she’s right, I’m buying beachfront property in Montana right now.  The rest of their press conference is too depressing to cover.

Overview: Are We Talking About the KP, or Something Else?

One thing that seems to be muddled in the discussion right now, is: what kind of a binding agreement are people talking about?  The NGOs, particularly CAN-I, as well as developing countries in the G-77 + China (if Argentina is to be believed) are primarily interested in creating a second commitment period to the KP.  The Umbrella Group is ostensibly interested in a binding agreement, but are explicit in saying that it should NOT be reification of the KP – again, for pretty valid reasons.  Now, the NGOs claimed today that the EU is on board for an extension of the KP, but based on the EU’s earlier pronouncements that LDCs should be held to binding obligations, it’s not clear that that is correct.

What would be the benefit of extending the horrid, horrid institution of the KP in a second commitment period?  It is doubtful that it would necessarily lead to decreased global emissions, particularly since the countries responsible for about half of the current GHG emissions (US and China) are not under the regime.  However, it would create incentives for continuing the CDM and, given the repeated interest in institutionalizing the GCF, may create the institutional support for the Fund.

Well, we’ll see.  At the moment, I’m primarily curious about the creation of the GCF.  At present, that remains my best hope for a positive outcome this year.  Again, I’m not sure how that will play out absent some kind of related regime, but, eh, couldn’t hurt.

Indigenous Protestors against REDD

So, where are we at now?  The statements coming from various delegates indicate that states are, more or less, going with their various representative blocs.  The Umbrella Group wants LDCs to commit to something binding and meaningful; the G-77 wants HICs to take the lead (especially the US), and to actually pay for the costs of transition; the US is not particularly interested in a binding agreement – and wouldn’t be able to commit to one anyway; the EU is trying to get people on board a binding commitment; the NGOs are mad at everybody.

The Green Climate Fund and the Financial Mechanism?

On the plus side, there does seem to be movement towards creating a meaningful Green Climate Fund.  One of the more cited decisions of COP-16 in Cancún was Decision 1/CP.16 (PDF), which pledged the creation of a financial mechanism – modeled on the Multilateral Fund of the Montreal Protocol – to build the capacity and will among poor countries to transition away from high emissions practices.  The EU has been vocally supportive of the idea, and it’s certainly one appreciated by the G-77 + China, as well as the NGO community.

Among some of the issues being discussed by the Transitional Committee on the GCF include a submission by Malawi that the fund consider gender issues (PDF) in allocating resources, observing that women are disproportionately affected by environmental vulnerability.  Very good.  As discussed in the Millennium Development Goals, women are disproportionately affected (PDF) by poverty, which is exacerbated by the land degradation, erosion, and unstable agricultural conditions that will mark the changing climate.

In the interest of improving the link between local community needs and climate financing, Climate Action Network (CAN) also issued a recommendation to the Transitional Committee that the proposed GCF Board include, as non voting-observers, representatives from affected communities, civil society organizations, and the private sector.  This may be ambitious, but perhaps institutionalized financing may be one saving grace of COP-17.

Proposals and Changes?

Something potentially interesting: Papua New Guinea and Mexico have issued a proposal to the COP to change the voting rules.  In short, the proposal would allow amendments to the Convention to be adopted by a 3/4ths majority vote (PDF), if all attempts to achieve consensus have failed.  Intended to avoid the gridlock that characterizes international regime creation, this proposal is currently being debated in informal consultations under the COP.

At the COP: Science, Hot Air, and the CDM

Rajendra Pachauri, head of the IPCC, starts off the 3rd meeting of the COP, observing that 20 – 30% of observed plant and animal species are likely to be negatively affected by climate change.  A further downer – melting ice-caps threaten low lying islands (so, what we already knew), but notes that in some places, things aren’t so bad: “…[In] some regions, droughts have become less intense, or shorter,” particularly in Central and Northwest America, and coastal Australia.  Moreover, Pachauri emphasizes that climate change is primarily a problem for developing countries – measured as loss in GDP, loss of life, and other metrics.

Poland, speaking on behalf of the EU, promotes the further utilization of the CDM, such that LDCs can “leapfrog” over dirty industrialization, but calls for greater top-down methodologies in calculating emissions reductions – ideally, this would reduce the capacity for states and corporate actors to cheat, gaining credits for minimal or no action.

Kazakhstan proposed an amendment to Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol, which would effectively give the country a binding obligation to hold its GHG emissions to 100% of its 1992 levels (PDF).  While keeping emissions at 1992 levels would probably be a good thing for, say, the US and Canada, Kazakhstan is currently  emitting slightly below its 1992 levels, thus 1) encoding activity in which Kazakhstan is engaging anyway; 2) allowing that country to participate in Joint Implementation projects, or selling its ‘excess’ emissions, thereby gaining access to potentially lucrative investment and markets, while doing nothing to curb overall emissions.  This, of course, illustrates the ongoing problem with creating regimes – legal rules that violate the entire spirit of the endeavor.

The Civil Society Speaks

To highlight concerns associated with environmental injustice, Conrad Feather from the Forest People’s Programme raised the specter of disenfranchisement caused by the application of REDD projects. While using forests to curb global carbon may be a worthwhile goal in the abstract, it is decidedly not, if doing so requires the coerced relocation of rural and agricultural peoples.

Roberto Espinoza, an indigenous Peruvian from an indigenous rights advocacy organization and Jorge Payaba from the Madre de Diós federation discuss the problem of afforestation policies as a climate change strategy.  Espinoza, in a presentation on the “…piracy, abuses, and scams against indigenous people under the name of the REDD program,” argues that it is a piracy that is a “…design of the REDD program in its entirety.”  In short, the concern is that international assistance to the state of Peru is not translated into concern and well-being for local populations – the state benefits from hundreds of millions of dollars in international and financial capital, but it is a state that engages in land grabs, forced relocation, and the centralization over land tenure.  Thus, strengthening the state in the name of environmental green behavior obscures local injustice and unsustainable practices.

So, yes, OK, somewhat depressing.  Nevertheless!  Will there be meaningful financial commitment at the end of it all?  Will indigenous concerns be taken seriously?  We’ll see…