Open Peer Commentary:
Throwing the normative baby out with the prescriptivist bath water
Achourioti, Fugard, & Stenning agree with E & E that it would be foolish to say there is one formal model of rationality, but they disagree with the argument that descriptivism is the answer. These authors argue that there are two norms that are integral to the process of human reasoning:
Constitutive norms: These norms answer the question of “what the reasoning is”
Regulative norms: These norms answer the question of “why the reasoning is the one that it is”
These authors argue that “thoroughgoing descriptivism” is not enough to explain how people reason and the level of people’s understanding, and normative concepts cannot be extricated from discussions about human reasoning.
Norms for reasoning about decisions
Bonnefon addresses the new “trend” in philosophy to look at how reasoning intersects with decision-making. Bonnefon shows three different examples of how this new intersection provides an opportunity for both normativist and descriptivist approaches. Bonnefon argues that although these two branches of philosophy (decision-making and reasoning) rely on mostly normativism as independent subjects, when these subjects are combined a strict normativist approach is weaker.
The unbearable lightness of “Thinking”: Moving beyond simple concepts of thinking, rationality, and hypothesis testing
Brase & Shanteau argue that the HTT is not sufficient to solve the problems posited by E & E and instead the focus should be on “a better conception of how theories are constructed and evaluated” (250). The method of “strong inference” in which tests are used to compare many “viable” hypotheses to see which can be excluded should be preferred. There should not be one model that encompasses how thinking works. Rather, Brase & Shanteau argue that there should be an emphasis on the “domain-specificity” of reasoning, or the concept that there are many different types of “thinking.”
Competence, reflective equilibrium, and dual-system theories
Buckwalter & Stich agree with E & E on the merits of descriptivism, but these authors argue that the distinction between competence theory and normative theory is not well defended. John Rawls posits the idea of a “reflective equilibrium” in which moral principles and moral judgments align. Cohen furthers this concept with respect to reasoning and says that if there are normative and descriptive models of reasoning, these models must “coincide” (252). Buckwalter & Stich argue that if the dual process model of reasoning is correct, it is unlikely that a normative model could ever be correct. System 2 seems to be a system that could vary individual to individual and therefore cannot be encompassed by one model.
A role for normativism
Douven argues that there are merits to both normativism and descriptivism in conversations about human reasoning. Douven argues that “long-run accuracy” is a priori our “epistemic goal,” and that E&E completely miss this point in their argument (252). Douven also disagrees with E & E’s argument that empirical research is not helpful in order to distinguish between models of reasoning. Douven argues that empirical research is helpful in the case when there is no known model for a type of reasoning. Douven believes that E&E’s argument is not strong enough to entirely throw out normativism.
The historical and philosophical origins of normativism
Novaes is interested in the question “is thinking a normative affair at all?” (253). Novaes points to the history of the thought that thinking falls into the category of normativism and that logic should be the normative system used. Novaes draws the connection to Kant’s philosophy, a perspective that is defined by “transcendental idealism” (254). Novaes states that if we reject transcendental idealism, then we can also reject the concept that thinking is normativist.
Just the facts, and only the facts, about human rationality?
Foss is in agreement with E&E that there should be greater emphasis on scientific facts. However, Foss argues that they failed to give a definition of rationality in their argument. In addition, Foss argues that competency theory is a type of normativism, and so it may be that normativism cannot be entirely rejected in psychological studies.
Overselling the case against normativism
Fuller & Samuels agree with E&E’s argument but find flaws in two aspects of their argument. Firstly, Fuller & Samuels think that researchers will end up falling into “normative interpretations” even if they rely on formal theories (255). Secondly, Fuller & Samuels argue that E&E have a too narrow definition of normativism.
Undisputed norms and normal errors in human thinking
E&E state that there seem to be multiple norms for any given task of human reasoning and therefore it cannot be determined which norm is correct. Girotto disagrees with this argument and states that there often can be one norm, and that norms are useful in providing guidance for individuals. Therefore, norms are necessary in conversations about human thinking.
Normative theory in decision making and human reasoning
Gold, Colman, & Pulford argue that the is-ought problem is not significant enough to reject normativism. Rather normative theories can be used in “generating powerful descriptive theories” (257). In conversations about moral reasoning and morals in general, norms are incredibly useful. Therefore, normativism should not be completely thrown out.
Why rational norms are indispensable
Hahn argues that norms are important because they provide standards that can be used as “interpretative tools”, with respect to evaluation and prediction of behavior (257). Hahn argues that these normative models would be well complemented by descriptivism. Hahn also argues that the “is-ought” distinction has nothing to do with normativity whatsoever. Therefore, normativism is a crucial model and should not be rejected.
Defending normativism
Hrotic, an anthropologist, shares his concern that “in practice, the distinction between ‘oughts’ is fuzzy” (258). He raises an important question on how necessary, if at all, it is to be fully aware of when you are using an directive ought vs. an evaluative ought. He goes on to discuss how biases are relevant to and, perhaps, also useful in understanding academic methods/human reasoning despite our lack of ability to articulate the reasons for our biases.
Cultural and individual differences in the generalization of theories regarding human thinking
Kim & Park agree with E&E’s argument in favor of descriptivism over normativism, but argue that the current form of descriptivism is still limited in allowing us to fully comprehend human cognitive processes. Kim & Park offer us a way to address this limitation. They emphasize the importance of including cultural differences when conducting descriptivism research, suggesting that individual differences across different cultures influence behaviors unique to a particular group or culture. Kim & Park also suggest that while cognitive goals may differ across cultures, the motivational system (goal activation) by which the goals are pursued and achieved may be universal (pg 259-260).
Norms and high-level cognition: Consequences, trends, and antidotes
Though McNair & Feeney agree with E&E, they are less critical in their objections towards normativism. The authors have three main points. 1) Normativism is not uniformly disastrous as normativism has enabled us to understand behaviors that are based in normative models (Bayesian). 2) Normativism in the debate on human reasoning will continue to be increasingly relevant. 3) Primarily focusing on expert reasoners in studying human cognition is limiting and problematic. McNair & Feeney note that it is imperative for us to find a way to study human reasoning processes across both naive and expert reasoners.
Norms, goals, and the study of thinking
Nickerson argues that there is a need to find balance between normativism and descriptivism. Though he gives merit to E&E’s efforts to challenge normativism and their suggestion that research should focus on “how thinking is actually done” (261), Nickerson finds is less persuaded by E&E’s attempt to dismiss normativism completely from the field. Nickerson proposes that a middle ground must be established between the two different approaches. He suggests that descriptivism is used to learn how reasoning is done in order to understand how we ought to reason.
The “is-ought fallacy” fallacy
Oaksford and Chater claim that E&E’s “application of the “is-ought” fallacy is itself fallacious” (262). O&C clarify that their original argument in their paper did not claim that the Bayesian probability ought be the normative system by which we follow – a claim they say E&E assume O&C made. O&C also discuss how certain statements of explanation do not directly lead to an “ought” statement, but rather derive what “is” – stating descriptive facts by means of normative theories.
Systematic rationality norms provide research roadmaps and clarity
Pfeifer argues that normative theories should not be eliminated from cognitive research. Pfeifer claims that E&E’s argument that “conditional elimination inferences are single-norm paradigms” (263) fails to be free of conflict in the context of probability logic. The author suggests that instead of doing without normativism entirely in psychological research, as E&E proposes, possible improvements/changes to current normative theories should be considered.
A case for limited prescriptive normativism
Pothos and Busemeyer argue that identifying when a certain cognitive process was successfully applied is strictly contextual. They go on to explore Quantum probability and how some researchers have claimed that this model is a foundation for understanding human reasoning/thinking. P&B conclude that it is quite impossible to conduct valuable research on cognitive processes in the absence of formal frameworks and that such use of formal frameworks “inevitably… lead to some limited prescriptive normativism” (265).
Epistemic normativity from the reasoner’s viewpoint
Proust argues that E&E did not attempt to fully consider how an individual’s ability to assess his or her own reasoning performance impacts how he or she carries out first-order reasoning tasks. Proust suggests that there is variability in the way one person approaches a particular task than another person does, establishing that reasoners each interact with tasks differently due to his/her own respective set of experiences.
Naturalizing the normative and the bridges between “is” and “ought”
Quintelier and Fessier draw attention to the negative consequences that can possibly result from applying E&E’s approach to fields of scientific research beyond the cognitive sciences. They note that the meaning of a normative term very much depends on “one’s epistemological or meta-ethical views” (266). Q&F offer us two naturalistic ethics examples that walk us through ways in which “ought” is used in proper context to address a particular and relevant conclusion to a particular task.
Truth-conduciveness as the primary epistemic justification of normative systems of reasoning
Schurz appreciates E&E’s efforts to challenge normativism, but identify that E&E’s argument falls short. Schurz bases his response to E&E on two main points: 1) that formality is not synonymous to normativism and 2) that evaluative norms are in no need of justification. Schurz emphasizes the importance of recognizing that a form of prescriptive normativism is necessary in our understanding of the human rational and psychology.
Reason is normative, and should be studied accordingly
Spurrett rejects E&E’s argument and claims that it is “always appropriate” to assess whether an individual’s reasoning reflects “truth” (268). He demonstrates how people can and do reason poorly, ultimately concluding that it is “nonsensical” to define these processes as reasoning in the way that a purely descriptive approach would require, and criticizes the authors of the target article for their vague and seemingly contradictory definition of normativism.
Normative models in psychology are here to stay
At the heart of Stanovich’s argument is the idea that normative theory has been, and continues to be, a useful metric in the study of human reasoning (268). He rips into what he sees as an artificial division between Bayesian theories and instrumental rationality, which is essential to E&E’s model but contradicts the prevailing idea that the latter incorporates the former. Stanovich also emphasizes the fact that people tend to be able to recognize that a normative strategy is a superior solution to a problem (269).
Understanding reasoning: Let’s describe what we really think about
Sternberg appreciates the underlying motivation behind the target article and expands on it, arguing that normative models have caused psychologists to focus on a “narrow sliver” of the problems and decisions that people commonly face (270).
Normative benchmarks are useful for studying individual differences in reasoning
Stupple and Ball are sympathetic to E&E’s point that matching reasoning decisions to seemingly consistent normative strategies can lead to an incorrect diagnosis of the “underlying analytic process” (270). However, they ultimately argue that such “normative responses” can be incredibly useful to researchers, as demonstrated by their proposed methodological triangulation approach (271), and that normativism and descriptivism are on a continuum with no clear division.
Probability theory and perception of randomness: Bridging “ought” and “is”
Sun and Wang are skeptical of E&E’s call to abandon normativism, which they claim to be as valuable as descriptivism to the study of streak patterns in Bernoulli trials (271), but agree that researchers should not throw around “ought inferences.”
Normativism versus mechanism
Thompson defends E&E’s position on the role of normative models in psychology, emphasizing that normativism is misleading and limited (272). Her main point is that it causes researchers to focus on whether reasoning is “good” or “bad” rather than explore the complicated processes that dictate reasoning.
Neurath’s ship: The constitutive relation between normative and descriptive theories of rationality
Waldmann acknowledges that it would problematic to overstate how well a normative model fits empirical results, but thinks that normativism is very relevant to theoretical, causal, and practical rationality when used correctly (273).
What is evaluative normativity, that we (maybe) should avoid it?
Weinberg takes issue with E&E’s assertion that psychological theory should not “substantively” incorporate evaluative normativity, arguing that normativism is already too well incorporated into current psychology (274).
Authors’ Response: Towards a descriptivist psychology of reasoning and decision making
R1. Introduction
E&E reiterate two of their underlying arguments: that “is-ought” inferences based on normative theories are not reliable and that approaching psychological theory from a normativist viewpoint leads to “systematic biases” in current research (275).
R2: Between normativism and descriptivism: Definitions and boundaries
Instrumental rationality is not normative, and there is no clear line between the “ought”s of evaluative and instrumental. If formal theories are seen as simply computational, then we only give up evaluation when dismissing normativism. An alternative to descriptivism could be “soft normativism”, with normative evaluations in addition to goals of descriptive research. We need to distinguish normative and competence theory but still value why they are linked. Formal theories are levels relating to computational analysis (descriptive). Only used HTT as an example of descriptive theory that uses formal theories, so assumption of ought to adapting behavior to environment can be seen as normative. Bounded rationality cannot really fit with radical types of normativism.
R3: Epistemic rationality and self-knowledge
Psychological science should not focus on norms—they should spend time on conducting research. Constitutive rules are not normative, as they define the system (think chess rules) and what it is, not what it ought. Regulative rules regulate behavior (think table manners). The authors believe that we do not need a normative account of belief (think ranges in memory and vision). We can have descriptivist view on people’s own interpretations of their epistemic goals and norms, but what they deem as correct does not necessarily need to be normative, only plausible. Fast intuition leads to confidence in righteous behavior, which can be separate from it being normatively accurate. Justification does not equate to rationale: no one acknowledges previous biases in the reasoning for their actions.
R4: Normativism and descriptivism in dual-process research
Two minds theory: old (intuition, reinforcement of behavior) and new (reflective, goal oriented) mind both have control over our brain, sometimes cooperatively, sometimes competing. Abstract/normative does not equal Type 2 thinking, contextual/cognitive biases do not equal Type 1. There cannot be a normative reasoning with two separate systems, especially when the second one varies based on a person’s environment and identity.
R5: The new paradigm psychology of reasoning
The deduction paradigm has been changing through a Kuhnian revolution and paradigm shift as there is more of a push towards the integration of reasoning and decision making theories. The “new” paradigm psychology of reasoning removes truth and deduction as constraints, focusing more on probabilistic and Bayesian approaches, pragmatic factors, and degrees of belief. However, the new paradigm is divided on support for versus against the use of a normative framework, so the most popular alternative is Bayesianism.
Bayesianism allows for inferences on beliefs with varying degrees of certainty as has a direct connection between reason and decision. The question then is whether it is a prescriptive normative account or descriptive. The authors see Bayesianism as an accurate descriptive account. Beliefs and utilities are more apt to be subjective based on individual accounts, making descriptive Bayesianism hard to disprove. Researchers have leaned toward alternative descriptive accounts because of changes in belief in the beginning compared to the end, unlike the Bayesian view of belief not changing simply based on sequence (example of evidence presented in a courtroom).
R6: Cognitive variability
Individual differences tend to be associated with normativist, and cultural differences with moderate relativism. There are individual and cultural differences in reasoning, e.g. age, IQ, working memory, Western vs eastern culture. Language is cognitively variable, making cultural norms of rationality based on language more apt. Cross cultural research is important in order to rid of previous researcher cultural biases. Assessment of normative behavior shows change in what people do, whereas interpretation of the correctness of that behavior varies. Descriptivist approach tends to show qualitative differences. “Can” vs “cannot” has unclear boundaries, as ought and can cannot imply each other as well as Kant may have originally thought.
R7: Descriptivism versus normativism in conduct of empirical research on thinking
Normativism and descriptivism can play roles in research, but despite biases, normativism can also be valuable. There is support for looking at how we reason AND how we should. There is a difference between what we expect to be normative and what the behavior actually is. The authors are not sure if some of the arguments are based on normative accounts or competence/computation.
R8: Conclusions
The authors suggest any researcher take a step back before evaluating what they are doing. Regardless of whether there is progression towards a more descriptivist approach, the authors hope that they have at least provided a space for thought about reasoning and decision making, which have had normative theory in them, and conversation acknowledging normativism along the way.
Discussion questions:
- Do you agree with Hahn that normativism has nothing to do with the is-ought distinction?
- Sternberg argues that normative models are not applicable to the vast majority of everyday decisions. Is this an accurate assessment, and does it change how you feel about E&E’s argument?
- How are Oaksford & Chater proposing the process of iteration? Do you think this is rational when looking at behavior and what is versus what ought?
- Is it possible to find a middle-ground/balance between normativism and descriptivism when trying to understand how it is we think and how we ought to think? Nickerson suggests that the “truth is somewhere in between” the two methods. Do you agree?
I agree with Brase & Shanteu’s assertion that there should be an emphasis on the “domain-specificity” of reasoning, based on the many different types of thinking, and I’m also curious about Novaes’ commentary on the historical and philosophical origins of normativism. Reading this article made me wonder about the neural underpinnings of decision making, and I can’t help but keep tying all of this back to evolution; is it that different ways of making decisions can be triggered in response to certain stimuli or scenarios, in much the same way that different behaviors and patterns are triggered by different stimuli? To illustrate what I’m asking with an example: if driving to work triggers the habit of stopping for coffee, but driving the same route at night does not trigger the same desire to stop and purchase it (i.e. daytime versus nighttime triggering a different response to what could be construed as the same stimulus, which is driving the route to work), could it be that a similar neural mechanism is responsible for a wide variety of ‘legitimate’ reasoning and different (but equally ‘rational’ or reasonable) responses to what we perceive to be the same stimulus? I’m still grappling to form my perspective on where the line lies between something that can be classified as wholly irrational versus “domain-specifically correct reasoning”–especially based on the conversation we’ve been having over and over in class since ECHO, which is “who even gets to decide what constitutes irrational versus rational normative reasoning?” Doven’s argument, that empirical research is helpful in the case when there is no known model for a type of reasoning, re-highlights to me that there are still unmodeled types of reasoning and leads me to wonder about how much of what we classify as anything other than rational reasoning might just fall into a domain-specific category that we haven’t come to understand or sufficiently analyze yet.
I think that I differ from much of the class and comments here by saying that to some extent, I agree with normativism and feel that it has a necessary role in society. I fully understand the viewpoint from which many of the neuroscience students come from, and I agree that it is difficult to define a norm in, say, psychological testing or mapping of the brain. However, as an economics student, I have been using probability and mathematics to ascertain the “logical” or correct ways of thinking for the past four years.
E&E lay out on page 238 of the original paper the basic types of conditional inferences, and mention the card/vowel game. Personally, I believe that a person is acting irrational if they do not know the correct cards to flip, or if they believe something contradicting modus ponens. While I understand that with fast and frugal heuristics it is often that they may not come to the correct conclusion, I see no issue in stating that there, F&F heuristics are imperfect. I also see the value in highlighting the positives instead of the mistakes and irrational actions of humans, that Audrey emphasized. However, if there is no set of standards, how do we measure intelligence- who gets into which schools, who would perform better in a job over another? There are different types of intelligence and perhaps there is not ONE single optimal, but I believe that there are necessary standards we must set in different facets of society.
Some of the responses seems, for me, to have slightly misunderstood E&E as they attacked them for rejecting normativism completely. This, as we have seen, if not the case as E&E do think that normative ideas do have a part to play in the world, but simply none in psychology; the study of how man thinks should be a pure descriptive process that can be misleading, a position that Thompson and Buckwalter & Stich would agree.
I find Achourioti, Fugard, & Stenning’s model interesting as the the idea that a descriptivist approach is then filed under a specific type of norm. I am somewhat ambivalent about its validity as for me there are no norms involved in the act of describing what is happening, compared to what ought to happen. However I feel like that the inclusion of the fact that when we think we often do take into consideration normative thoughts will force E&E to adjust their model to account for this, since then the normative will be linked with the descriptive, and both systems will be necessary to explain the full scope of human reasoning.
Given the topic of normativism, I am currently drawn towards an ecological/tool box approach that acknowledges many different kinds of norms with respect to different situations and was wondering whether anyone else has any thoughts on this
Although many interesting issues were discussed by these authors, I was most intrigued by E&E’s response to Stanovich and Kim & Park’s comments on individual and cultural differences in reasoning. Is there any form of normativity that is not a direct product of culture and learning (i.e. using a privileged set of values that are (I would say somewhat arbitrarily) decided to be a measure of “competence”)? Does normativity arise only as a product of social interaction and the co-existence of individuals? For example, if an individual were raised isolated on an island, would there be any standard by which to measure this person’s decision making other than instrumental rationality?
While E&E agree with Kim & Park that a descriptivist approach could best identify cultural differences, is it necessary to use norms to study within a culture (to explore individual difference)? I appreciated what E&E said, in agreement with Thompson, that it is equally as important to understand non-normative (“wrong”) responses as it is to understand the origins of those who respond “correctly.” I’ve had a problem throughout many of these articles with the idea that some people have “higher cognitive ability” than others. Is it fair to say that “higher cognitive ability” means “better trained in cultural norms”?
It seems like Hahn and Oaksford and Chater provide similar solutions to the “problem” of normativity although E&E claim that Hahn makes a much a more direct defense of normative theories then do Oaksford and Chater. I’m a little unclear, however, on how their explanations might be different and whether or not this is a significant point of departure.
Hahn claims that in the work of Oaksford and Chater, they do not use an is-ought inference but rather their normative theory provides interpretation and explanation; whether probability theory provides the standard that renders participants’ behavior “sensible” and “intelligible.” Additionally, Hahn claims that the language of functional explanation must refer to “maximization” of a “desirable criterion” as a result of a behavior.
Similarly, Oaksford and Chater claim that the foraging patterns of a bee are explained as “maximizing” food intake. Oaksford and Chater, claim that this language
“[harnesses] normative theories to explain descriptive facts (262).”
At this point, both responses to E&E sound pretty similar in regard to their stances that normative theories explain descriptive facts. They seem to differ in the sense that Hahn’s discussion of normative theory refers to a certain standard that renders behavior sensible. However, doesn’t the formal model and the optimal behavioral function developed in Steps 2 and 4 of Oaksford and Chater’s iterative process approximate a similar standard by which behavior can be judged as sensible and intelligible?
How is it that normative theories are still normative theories if they are simply interpreting and explaining descriptive facts? At this point normative theories simply seem to be something like the formal theories coupled with optimal behavior function (which seem to be descriptively normative).
Evans and Elqayam write on 281 that they see Bayesianism as a “broadly correct descriptive account,” by which they mean that “broadly speaking, the evidence indicates that people do represent degrees of belief, revise these beliefs in the light of evidence, and apply them in their decision making.” Perhaps this isn’t an interesting question at this point—given that we have spent a great deal of time of Bayesian rationality—but is this really an interesting account? What function is Bayesian rationality really playing when it seems to merely account for an intuitive (obvious) explanation of how we reason.
Like most of my classmates, I find the idea of a universal normative model tough to swallow, so when I read E&E’s article and their attempt to move away from the normative view I immediately jumped on board. Reading the peer commentaries, however, I realized that the normative model can be useful and should not be blindly disregarded.
Girotto argues that norms can be a useful tool for providing guidance to individuals. Gold, Colman, & Pulford seem to believe that they are particularly useful in moral situations. Reading their arguments I see the merits that a normative view provides. However, I still do not believe that thinking can be normative. As Brase & Shanteau, and as most of us probably realize, there are many different ways and types of thinking. This is supported by the fact that single norm paradigms rarely, if at all, exist for reasoning and decision making scenarios. E&E stated that because there are multiple norms for any given task of human reasoning the ‘correct’ norm cannot be determined. I question whether there even has to be a ‘correct’ one. Novaes also brings up this question in her review. She reviews the history of logic and wonders when logic moved from providing the norms of debating, a public affair, to the private situations of thinking. I think it’s obvious that thinking a private process that varies from individual-to-individual, and so I wonder how this could possibly be considered normative. There are several ways to look at and think about a problem/situation and still arrive at the ‘correct’ or normative answer, if there is one. Novaes also states that “public actions typically have practical consequences”, and that the thinking “only has practical consequences once translated into actions.” This made me wonder whether something has to have a practical consequence in order for a normative model to be applied.
Like Emily G., I am also intrigued by Kim and Park’s proposal that their may be universal motivational mechanisms. I think that although goals definitely differ across individuals and cultures, these goals may be motivated by the same thing such as our survival instincts, the need to protect our families, and the pursuit of happiness. I’m curious as to what the rest of the class thinks of this and if we could come up with more universal motivations.
Many of the peer commentators in response to E&E’s article call in to question whether or not descriptivism is a viable alternative to normativism. Many see the problems with using a normative model but don’t necessarily believe E&E’s view on a descriptive model (for example Schurz). One issue raised with descriptivism that I found most compelling was the idea of a middle ground between normativism and descriptivism. Many peers respond in accordance with E&E but are able to see the advantages of the normative model.How are we supposed to find a medium between the two theories? Are there certain situations when we use the normative model and other situations where we use descriptive? Is there a way to weigh the value of each model and access which would be best? Is human reason truly a mediation of the two theories or, because we are inside the situation and unable to step outside of our own thinking, is there a clear right answer that we are unable to see given our cognitive capacities/situation?
Questions:
-As my mom would say “just because everyone else is doing it doesn’t mean it’s right”; how does descriptivism interact with morality? (similar to my question from last class) Does the combination of normative and descriptive ideas solve the is-ought issue and allow us to redefine “ought” in terms of morality so we know how to act?
-Another argument I appreciated, as Audrey also commented on, was the value of culture as it plays into our rationality. Does descriptivism provide a better framework for the integration of culture and reason? Is rationality meant to be relative to culture/environment/experience in the first place?
I also found E&E’s argument quite compelling on the first read, especially as it fit into our class discussion so well (should we even have norms?). However, as I thought about it more, I did have some reservations about the many distinctions that E&E make throughout their article (including but not limited to the oughts). Some of the commentators certainly picked up on this, but I was surprised by the relative lack of commentary on the substance of E&E’s argument in this respect.
E&E propose soft normativism as a middle-ground position, combining aspects of normativism and descriptivism, which I think is very appealing. Specifically, “according to this view, (a) normativism inspires research questions or whole paradigms that provide important descriptive findings, while (b) such findings feedback into the design and construction of normative theories” (276). I think there could certainly be merits to this model. However, I question the feasibility and usefulness of (b). At first glance, it seems useful to have a system in which empirical evidence can feed back and inform norms, but when I think more about it, I wonder if this a useless endeavor. How exactly could descriptive findings feed back to alter the normative model? It seems that the two exist in separate spheres, and altering the normative models based on descriptive findings would not make them normative anymore (or perhaps would give them a much different “normative quality”). Perhaps I just don’t see the role of descriptive feedback into normative theories, because I’m still stuck thinking that the two cannot necessarily “communicate.” I’m just not quite sure what the relationship between descriptivism and normativism can/should be in this respect. I wonder what other people think about this aspect of “soft normativism.”
Related to (b), I didn’t quite understand the concept of bridging solutions to the is-ought problem and how the solutions would be executed. In the Jones and Smith example provided, the authors cite that, “We cannot infer “ought” from pure “is,” but we can infer “ought” from “is-with-ought,” and bridge constructs supply us with the latter” (276). I think it’s more the wording that’s tripping me up than the actual concepts, but I would love some clarification here.
I do agree that normativism has its merits, but it’s still hard for me to say that people should be adhering to certain norms when there are so many factors at play. Sometimes, it seems that normative models are established in a vacuum, devoid of many environmental and internal factors that come into play when we are reasoning and making decisions everyday. This partly gets to the argument that many tasks that are used to test people’s reasoning, judgment and decision making, are not “real world” tasks, and people would not normally encounter them in their everyday life. Getting back to the first point, internal rules, goals, “feelings” (emotions, intuitions, etc.), and other biases routinely influence our thinking, yet one is hard-pressed to find normative models that take into account any of this information (or perhaps don’t on purpose). Thus, if they don’t consider of all of these important factors that influence us, how can it be valid that we are comparing our actual behavior to these unrealistic ideals? In addition, I think Kim and Park’s point about the role of cultural differences in influencing our thinking is yet another significant factor in the normativism/descriptivism debate.
Lastly, I may be off base here, but the idea proposed by Schurz to accept a small number of fundamental norms (with extra-scientific status) has an oddly fundamentalist-like feeling to it. Further, it was proposed that empirical evidence could provide derived norms for psychology. I question the idea of having fundamental norms, because of our previous experience with fundamentalism, but I wonder what others think about this. It seems that the authors have no qualms about, as they want norms to be separate from empirical evidence.
As someone who was skeptical of the seemingly futile idea of the need to have a normative system, I initially appreciated E&E’s attempt to stray from this dominating theory and to propose that descriptive computational-level analysis may be the best approach to studying theories of reasoning, judgment, and decision-making. However, upon reading the peer commentary, it seems to me that E&E’s attempt to move away from a normative mode of operation was ironically just an attempt to alter the norms. As Hrotic argues (259), E&E are identifying the way that we should be thinking about research; that “good” research involves “understanding human behavior, and specifically understanding it in a particular way” (namely, descriptivism). Furthermore, as Nickerson states (262), “even to say that normativism is wrong is to imply the existence of some norm that justifies that assessment.” Just as a normative research bias effects the way that researchers design experiments and record data, doesn’t saying descriptivism should be the mode of research do the exact same thing? Is there a way to conduct research without conforming to some sort of norm?
Like Audrey, I found Kim and Park’s idea of descriptivism focusing on the roles of culture and individual difference refreshing (259-260). They proposed that the result of this type of descriptivism approach to research would lead to the observation that “while the content of people’s goals clearly differs across cultures, the motivational system’s mechanisms of operation might be universal”. What might these universal motivational mechanisms of operation be? If our goals differ, it is possible for our motivation mechanisms be the same? Also, do factors such as gender, socioeconomic status, and age affect this process in the same way that culture does?
Buckwalter and Stitch’s arguments (251) reference the idea of “reflective equilibrium,” in which moral rules and moral inferences are amended and updated based on each other. However, E&E criticize this argument (276), as they claim that this assumes that behaviors and norms are coherent and comparable. Are norms not just ideal behaviors? To me, the “virtuous cycle” seems imperative and probably the best way to think about human thinking and behavior.
Although I was initially compelled by E&E’s article last class, reading the peer responses has definitely caused me to reconsider my earlier enthusiasm. The strongest critiques, for me, were the authors who pointed out that competence itself is a normative idea. Of those, I found Foss’ argument most interesting: “Competences come in many degrees and forms: whether or not something counts as a competence always comes down to whether or not it provides some good for the organism. But the very concept of good is normative. Therefore, no account of intelligence can be entirely descriptive” (254-255). I think there is some truth in this, especially if we consider an evolutionary approach to intelligence, and I am not convinced by E&E’s rebuttal that it is only theorists who “insist on equating norm with competence” (277). Do we think that competence theory and normative theory come hand in hand, or do we accept the way that E&E pull them apart?
Despite these competence = normative arguments, I still do think there is value in lessening the role that we allow normativism to play in our psychological testing and theorizing for many of the initial reasons that E&E proposed. There is a lot of value in having an entirely descriptivist focus, especially when we consider cross-cultural and individual differences in reasoning. Kim and Park were in favor E&E’s descriptivist approach, but called for more research into cultural and individual differences. I really appreciated their desire to explore this, because it is something that I have been thinking a lot about in class. They point out: “if every culture or group requires its own explanatory story, then there probably isn’t any way to find generalizations about human cognition and behavior” (260). It is for this very reason that I have had a hard time “buying” normativism theories and the idea that there are universal normative models for thinking. That being said, perhaps this is too relativist an approach to rationality. What do people think about that?
Based on all of the peer responses, I have had a harder time completely supporting E&E. Again, I think they pose a lot of really important concerns for having an entirely normative approach to psychological studies. Yet not all of E&E’s responses to their critiques were entirely convincing to me. Perhaps as Weinberg points out, “The sort of normativity that E&E want to set aside is simply too tightly wound around our psychological theorizing to be disentangled and discarded.” (274). Do we think it is possible to entirely separate normativism and psychological theorizing, as E&E propose?
Commentators raise several viable questions about E&E’s argument against normativism and for descriptivism. The first problem that I had with E&E is the boundary between different oughts. If you have more types of oughts, it seems to me that there is more opportunity for arguments or situations to be placed in one of these categories and therefore be classified as normativism. This notion makes it more likely that descriptivism could not be separated from normativism because the boundaries between oughts are too fuzzy to clearly separate what is an ought phrase and what isn’t. E&E argue to remove the dubious is ought references in order to decide the right normative system (275). However, I think that ought is a linguistic term that could be replaced with another way of defining what behavior lies within the normative system. Everything that lies outside the system would be considered irrational. If we remove the is-ought, what do normative systems look like? Do normative systems require ought references, like a map that indicates what is irrational and what is rational? If normativism takes on a descriptive lens, will E&E be more inclined to accept it?
Gold et al. argues that ought references are an essential component of moral reasoning. They present the Trolley problem and the footbridge problem in which people consider it more morally accepted to kill one person and save five when you can operate the trolley lever, rather than push the man off of the bridge. These different responses illustrate that emotions are involved in moral reasoning and judgment. I am certain that in the research project, participants asked themselves what they “should” or “ought” to do. This example shows that “ought” can also change depending on the moral situation. Gold et al. ask, “How could moral problems possibly be freed from normative considerations?” (257)
I was also interested by E&E’s response to commentary that raised concerns about descriptivism. E&E claim that descriptivists are focused on what people do and provide an account for what they do (276). However, if all you need to do is focus on what people do and record it to be rational, how is this a reliable system? Can descriptivism really work? Achourioti et al. argues that it cant because individuals switch their norms according to their goals (249). Are we searching for a single norm or a set of norms to base our reasoning and behavior off of? Instead of descriptivism over normativism, as E&E argue, I think the solution lies in being able to measure goals that people base their reasoning off of- but this seems impossible. Not only do people have different goals, but they also will go to different lengths to achieve them in terms of whether their actions are rational or not.
Summary by: Max White, Canary Ly, Maddie Hoar, and Eunice Kim