Peer Commentary:
Arguing, reasoning, and the interpersonal (cultural) functions of human consciousness”
Baumeister, Masicampo, and DeWall agree with M&S that reasoning is an interpersonal rather than individual exercise, and that reasoning was evolutionarily advantageous for humans. The purpose for reasoning, they posit, was to advance culture – individuals that could reason well (and thus propagate culture by creating interpersonal connections) were selected for. B, M, & D also argue that thinking and consciousness exists in order for us to share it with others – “much of thinking is for talking” (74).
Regret and justification as a link from argumentation to consequentialism
Connolly & Reb support M&S’s ideas on the evolutionary role of argumentation, but believe that emotions can be a critical link between argument making and consequential decision making. The phenomena of regret, regret avoidance, and justification are not obstacles to good reasoning but can actually facilitate decision making. The attraction effect is the phenomenon in which an option is seen as more attractive when compared to a separate, irrelevant option (75). External accountability can exacerbate the attraction effect, while regret priming – demanding to justify one’s decision to oneself – can eliminate this effect as the goal is to arrive at a conclusion that aligns with one’s values rather than just persuade others.
The freak in all of us: logical truth seeking without argumentation
De Neys attacks M&S’s presentation of peoples’ performance on classical, non-argumentative logical tasks. De Neys concedes that people do perform poorly in non-argumentative tasks, but people reason better in argumentative contexts doesn’t mean that they don’t try to reason logically outside of this context. Citing a number of psychology and neuroscience studies, De Neys presents data showing better reasoning by people in the classical reasoning tasks. He argues that even thought they are wrong, there is at least evidence that they are trying to be logical. In pointing this out, De Neys argues that classical reasoning tasks are less artificial than M&S suggest (76).
Reasoning as a lie detection device
Dessalles argues against the biological function of argumentation presented by M&S. M&S argue that the optimization of communication derived from argumentation occurs at a group level, but Dessalles points out that evolution works at the individual level rather than the group level. Reasoning, then, is for lie detection and aims to restore consistency to communication – remarkably similar to M&S’s proposed function of reasoning. According to Dessalles, the social benefit to the individual of exposing inconsistencies and restoring consistency allows the individual to compete well with their peers. There are side effects to this model of reasoning for social benefit, including invoking evidence that cannot be verified.
Reasoning is for thinking, not just arguing
Evans argues that while reasoning may have evolved primarily for argumentation, that it is now used for other functions. He states that M&S have been dismissive and limited when addressing the dual process theories, overlooking the importance of general, heritable intelligence in solving novel reasoning and decision making. To support this Evans provides evidence that the ability to solve novel problems is related to intelligence and the ability to reason, contrasting M&S’s argument that intuition is better. Evans disagrees with M&S’s ideas about the evolution of reasoning, pointing out that the evolution of higher cognitive abilities was not driven by Darwinian pressures, otherwise other animals would have evolved them as well.
Artificial cognitive systems: where does argumentation fit?
Fox brings findings from research with artificial intelligence systems into the discussion of the mechanisms and functions of argumentation in social interactions. He argues that reflective reasoning has more than just social benefits for the cognitive agent (human or artificial), and uses a formal model to further clarify M&S’s distinction between intuition and reasoning. He also argue that the argumentative theory is what is meant by evidence by determining what kinds of statements can and cannot be used in argumentation.
Reasoning, argumentation, and cognition
Frankish agrees with M&S that arguments enhance communication, but that this is perhaps primarily for enhancing collective cognition and that other social functions of arguing exist such as finding a mate. Reasoning, he argues, may have evolved for public use, but has been co-opted to serve individual cognition, in which there are more than just epistemic motives at play but also social motives. Individualized reasoning is just an internalized version of public argument that precedes individual reasoning. M&S’s theory of personal-level reasoning, Frankish argues, requires intuition regarding the rules of inference which can be either abstract (requires explicit learning) or linguistic (learned by exposure to arguments of others).
Reasoning as a deliberative function but dialogic in structure and origin.
Godfrey-Smith and Yegnashankaran argue that reasoning is an internalized form of interpersonal exchange of ideas, and has several functions but is primarily for deliberation. As a persuasive tool, reasoning in the form of dialogue is more adept at reaching conclusions and justifications. G-S & Y also find tension in M&S’s claims that people are poor individual reasoners but function well in groups, but concede that M&S’s theory better explains the existence of confirmation bias.
Understand, evaluating, and producing arguments: training is necessary for reasoning skills
Harrell refutes the claim by M&S that people are good arguers by citing experimental evidence to the contrary, including some of the same studies cited by M&S. She argues that the evidence presented by M&S only vaguely defines argumentation skills and provides poor evidence that people can understand, evaluate, and produce arguments. The literature, according to Harrell, actually shows that these skills are poor in untrained people, but that following formal argumentation training performance improves.
The argumentative theory of reasoning applies to scientists and philosophers, too
Johnson explores what the implications of M&S’s theory of argumentation are on the roles of professional reasoners such as scientists and philosophers. If the function of reasoning is the same for every person in society, as M&S implicitly state, does this mean that scientists and philosophers are in the business of persuasive argumentation – convincing people of their ideas – rather than seeking the truth? This must include M&S themselves as well in order to avoid the non-reflexive fallacy. M&S challenge the idea of scientists and philosophers as “elite thinkers”, so does every human have this capacity? Additionally, does this mean that scientists and philosophers are only governed by confirmation biases like the rest of us? “Research does not begin dispassionately” (81-82), and Johnson believes they should accept this as a reality of their profession.
True to the power of one? Cognition, argument, and reasoning
Khlentzos and Stevenson support the argumentative theory of reasoning presented by M&S, but question the way M&S have divided functions between systems 1 and 2, specifically how system 2 is a “backup” for system 1. K&S propose an alternative role for S2, as a reasoner that filters S1 outputs and independently produces conclusions that are subject to revision given new evidence. They concede that S2 plays some kind of regulatory role because S1 is both probabilistic and deductive. K&S disagree with M&S that confirmation bias is not a flaw and state that it can polarize conversation and dissuade argumentation.
What people may do versus can do
Kuhn seeks to expand on the power of human reasoning supported by the argumentative theory. She states that while can reason fairly well under ordinary conditions, numerous studies involved in the training of adolescents has shown that in supportive environments, people can reason can show much stronger argument skills. This supportive environment is “sustained engagement of adolescents in dialogic argumentation” (83), akin to a longitudinal study rather than the more cross-sectional studies cited by M&S. With this sustained training, over a few months argumentation improves greatly in participants. Kuhn is hopeful about applications of this and the possibility for universal improvement of argumentation with formalized training programs, and the establishment of a new norm of argumentative skills.
The need for a broad and developmental study of reasoning
Narvaez argues that M&S’ by focusing purely on a rhetorical use, they overlook the practical uses of reasoning, and therefore have too narrow of a view of the uses of reasoning. She notes that M&S overlook sociopolitical reasoning used to design laws, everyday reasoning used to take appropriate courses of action, and goal-motivated reasoning used to plan and reflect on failure and success. Her other main point takes issues with most of M&S’ research findings supplied by college students, noting that older adult subjects may have developed better inductive reasoning, while also pointing out the issue in generalizing human nature from the Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic (WEIRD) population.
Putting reasoning and judgment in their proper argumentative place
Oaksford generally argues with the thesis provided by M&S, but would like to see a more probabilistic analysis when judging the strength of an argument. They use the denying the antecedent fallacy to provide an example where the change in the degree of belief brought by an argument is useful in the judgment of the argument.
On the design and function of rational arguments
Opfer and Sloutsky propose three obstacles to reasoning as an argumentative tool. The first is that changing beliefs and attitudes would not be affected by solid reasoned argumentation, citing studies that show those that are less confident in their beliefs often yield to their more confident peers. The second is that emotionally charged examples often persuade more than reason, which takes up more cognitive resources. The final is their distinction between linguistic and argumentative “operators” and “receivers.” They contend that a more proficient language user (operator) can aid the lesser (receiver) to a better use of language, but not in the case of more and less reasoned argumenters.
What is argument for? An adaptationist approach to argument and debate
Pietraszewski agrees with M&S’ thesis but wishes to answer what argument serves a purpose for if it is so that reasoning serves argument. They stray away from the classical conclusion of seeking truth and accuracy and instead propose that argument and communication exists to affect behavior, which will then alter the future actions of others in regards to the communication. This leads to 2 classes of argument psych: to deal with conflicts of interest and to socially coordinate. They follow the second class to be the evaluation of argument as “who is arguing should be just as important as what they are saying when considering the ‘goodness’ of the argument” (87).
The importance of utilities in theories of reasoning
Poletiek proposes that M&S’ theory does not properly address different reasoning contexts outside of an argumentative one. She uses the example of a hypothesis testing experiment where participants came up with different outcomes when in an argumentative motive versus other motives (other than determining the truth) to highlight the need of other utilities, such as signal-detection theory, to reason in a variety of contexts.
When Reasoning is persuasive but wrong
Sternberg takes issue with M&S’ claim that reasoning could have evolved out of a function to argue. They use an example 2 individuals arguing of the existence of a threat to, independent of who was correct, their reasoning was purely argumentative, but the correct individual survived. Put in the context of global warming, Sternberg contends that this model of reasoning will doom human survival and that reasoning should function to serve “veridicality” (89).
The chronometrics of confirmation bias: Evidence for the inhibition of intuitive judgments
Stupple and Ball use chronometric data of participants in reasoning tasks to disprove this idea brought forth by M&S that people first try to reason to serve their existing beliefs. They found participants spent most time reasoning through a believable but invalid proposition, resisting their intuitive judgments. With this evidence they conclude participants actually could reason in search of the truth while inhibiting their intuitions.
Spontaneous inferences provide intuitive beliefs on which reasoning proper depends
Uleman, Kressel, and Rim take issue with the over simplification of the M&S’ intuitive beliefs and provide evidence for the spontaneous inferences existing as what M&S think to be intuitive beliefs. They provide evidence for these spontaneous, unconscious inferences leading to the formation of conscious reasoning with an experiment in which participants familiarized themselves with the sentence “John returned the wallet with all the money in it” and in other tasks always associated John with honesty (90).
Query Theory: Knowing what we want by arguing with ourselves
Weber and Johnson see query theory oversimplified in M&S’ article as only an example of reason based choice, where they see it as evidence for the retrieval of implicit memories to evaluate choices leading to decisions and implement into arguments. Ultimately the processes shown by QT imply that argumentation is not only interpersonal but also leads to intrapersonal implicit preference construction. Both seem to have implications in argumentative contexts.
Reasoning, robots, and navigation: Dual roles for deductive and abductive reasoning
Wiles explores another aspect of cognition in regards to reasoning and argues for the existence of a more primitive function shared with other animals and modeled in robots and mice which is navigation. They find systems that navigate well to be abductive reasoners adding another aspect of reasoning not accounted for when viewing reasoning only as argumentative.
Some empirical qualifications to the arguments for an argumentative theory
Wolfe sees that data not accounted for by M&S actually indicate people aren’t actually as good at evaluating arguments at M&S say they are, citing several studies that went overlooked by M&S. They then point out a very key distinction not made by M&S: “confirmation bias typically refers to a biased search for or weighing of evidence, whereas myside bias refers to biases in generating reasons or arguments” (93). They have shown myside biases can actually be reduced with training. They ultimately propose that we actually do have the resources to form reasoned arguments on our own otherwise argumentation would not work.
Deliberative democracy and epistemic humility
Chien-Chang Wu wishes to apply M&S’ ideas into a political framework called deliberative democracy in order to apply group reasoning into public policy decision. He notes that M&S’ theory of reasoning fits well with deliberative democracy and focuses on an epistemic aspect, pointing out that there are complicated issues embedded in applying M&S’ theory that they don’t address. He lays out three conditions that he sees as necessary in order for deliberative democracy to produce epistemic good: considerations of ethics, a “deflationist” definition of truth (noting realist truth unlikely achievable), and considerations of the framing powers.
Author’s Response. Argumentation: Its adaptiveness and efficacy
R1. Different Definitions of Reasoning
M&S explain how reasoning, as they describe it, is a form of higher-order intuitive inference with a specialized domain and task, which contrasts with ordinary intuitive inference. Some commentaries defend a different definition of reasoning. Khlentzos & Stevenson suggest that some type of system 2 reasoning must have evolved to arbitrate between contradictory system 1 outputs (for instance when perception contradicts memory). They argue that reasoning is specifically geared toward this end, which M&S argee would be true with a much broader definition of reasoning. Poletiek and Narvaez both argue that reasoning guides strategy and action choice, which M&S argue is a function of intuitions and falls outside the scope of their definition of reasoning. A few commentaries raise additional mechanisms in System 2 (hypothetical thinking, elaborative planning, and avoiding decisions we would regret) that they argue directly lead to good outcomes without involving argumentation. M&S again argue that these mechanisms do not qualify as reasoning under their definition. They do think it would be interesting for researchers to consider System 2 as comprising several different mechanisms other than reasoning because it could explain the covariation of traits measured by various measures of cognitive ability. M&S end this section by saying that offering another reasonable and useful definition of reasoning is not enough to object to their definition.
R2. Evolution and function of reasoning
M&S argue that a number of objections were based on a misunderstanding of their hypothesis on the evolution and function of reasoning. They assert that they never argued that reasoning is designed only to find arguments to persuade others, or that epistemic goals should be poorly served by reasoning, or that mere rhetoric is all it takes to influence people, or that people hardly ever change their mind, as many authors believed. M&S apologize for devoting more space in their article to the production of arguments by communicators (rhetoric) than to the evaluation of arguments by the audience (epistemic). They say the argumentative theory would not make evolutionary sense if arguments were addressed to people who were wholly unable to evaluate them from a sound epistemic perspective
R2.1. The double sided argumentative function of reasoning
M&S argue that communication has evolved to be advantageous to both communicators and receivers. Receivers receive rich info that they could not have obtained on their own, and communication allows communicators to achieve some desirable effect from receivers. M&S assert that they argue the main function of reasoning is social but is meant to serve the social needs of the individual in response to Dessalles’s concerns. M&S argue that receivers need to use epistemic vigilance to benefit from communication and agree with Opfer & Sloutsky that the main heuristic consists of assessing a communicator’s trustworthiness. M&S argue, however, that this is not the only heuristic used. Coherence checking is also important for receivers but can also be exploited by communicators. M&S concede that argumentation can be misused and abused to serve the interests of the communicator. This does not work, however, with receivers who care to be well informed. When people are motivated to reason, they do a better job accepting only sound arguments.
R2.2 Other functions of reasoning?
Many commentaries agree with argumentation but suggest that it may serve additional social functions or functions contributing to individual cognition. M&S recognize this possibility and explain their claim was that argumentation was the main function of reasoning but any evolved mechanism can be put to a variety of uses. Dessalles and Frankish suggest argumentation could have evolved as a means to display one’s intellectual skills. M&S agree argumentation could be put to such use but only occasionally, usually in academic milieus, and has actually evolved to be efficient rather than impressive. Pietraszewski distinguishes two classes of reasoning that show argumentation is not used just in the defense of factual claims but also of claims that are matters of choice or social alignment. M&S welcome this observation but argue it simply highlights that communication involves a mix of means and goals. Baumeister et al. draw attention to consciousness and culture. M&S acknowledge the need for more research on the connection between consciousness and reasoning but are not convinced culture contributes to the function of reasoning. Godfrey-Smith & Yegnashankaran suggest that reasoning is individualistic in function but dialogic in structure. Evans and Frankish also argue that reasoning has evolved to serve individual cognitive goals, including anticipating the future and strengthening resolve. M&S do not dispute these claims but dispute that individual cognition is the main function of reasoning. They argue that the main contribution of reasoning to individual cognition is in helping people evaluate other people’s arguments, and that argumentation is therefore the main function.
R3. Strength and biases of reasoning and argumentation
R3.1. Are we really good at argumentation?
In this section, M&S address commentaries that argue that argumentative skills can be improved with training and critique the data used by M&S as evidence of people’s basic argumentative abilities. Overall, M&S concede that spontaneous argumentation skills are imperfect and can be improved by teaching (which is linked to the variable importance given to argumentation in different cultures and institutions) but maintain that they display a “remarkable superiority” to the reasoning skill elicited in non-argumentative contexts.
R3.2. How efficient is group reasoning?
This questions elicited contrary opinions from commentators. M&S stress that the argumentative theory does not predict that groups will always make better decisions, but merely that reasoning should work better in context of a genuine debate. They agree that many aspects other than reasoning can impact the outcome of a discussion and that reasoning in a group can bring poor outcomes when there is no genuine deliberation. They also concede that sometimes the best arguments will point in the wrong direction.
R3.3. The strength of confirmation bias
M&S argue when we look for arguments in a debate, we are mostly interested in arguments for our side or against the other side, which is why they say confirmation bias is a feature of reasoning. Poletiek questions the evidence from hypothesis testing, which M&S understand, but emphasize that reasoning is still unable to correct our own intuitions even though it can easily try and correct those of others. Wolfe present studies on myside bias, which M&S argue merely reflects a belief that it is better to provide arguments for one’s side rather than also for the other side. DeNeys and Stupple & Ball critique M&S’s interpretation of the belief bias data because some people engage in logical reasoning when faced with such problems. M&S agree that in reasoning tasks people try to provide the correct, logically valid answer, but it is interesting that most of them fail. They argue this indicates that reasoning is not geared towards pure logical validity.
R4. On the working reasoning
R4.1. The algorithmic level
M&S acknowledge that their theory has a limitation in that it does not address the implications on the algorithmic implementation of reasoning (Khlentzos & Stevenson). They appreciate the contributions made by commentators on this issue. Most notably, Weber & Johnson offer a process-level specification of how reasoning works in decision making. M&S argue that this theory predicts reason-based choice and confirmation bias. M&S believe this theory does not compete with argumentative theory because it is based on the workings, rather than the function, of reasoning.
R4.2. Reasoning outside the lab
M&S applaud Narvaez for pointing out the limitations of the target article’s focus on experiments carried out in the laboratory. Many argue that WEIRD people (Western educated industrialized rich democratic) behave differently than the rest of the world. But M&S argue that the available data do not show that a culture would be deprived of reasoning and argumentative skills. Even illiterate societies can solve logical problems in the proper contexts. M&S address the importance of developmental data in the study of argumentative theory but did not focus on it. Narvaez and Wu provide further support for the argumentative theory by drawing attention to the political sphere. M&S argue that their theory can explain both the successes and failures of political debates. M&S concede that their theory applies to scientists and philosophers, including themselves (Johnson). Finally, M&S argue that people should be somewhat receptive to moral arguments while evaluating them on the basis of their own moral intuitions.
R5. Conclusion
M&S explain that the commentaries have not led them to revise their theory in any major way, but have pointed to fascinating directions for future research. They concede that more needs to be done to link their ultimate theory with process theories of reasoning. M&S suggest that other mechanisms besides reasoning might benefit from being viewed as having a social function and hope their contribution contributes to the growing body of research that shows that the human mind is a social mind.
Discussion Questions:
- Are M&S not accommodating enough to other functions of reasoning, independent of whether or not the argument is the true main function?
- Do you agree with Johnson that argumentative theory should also be applied to professional reasoners like scientists and philosophers? Are they “seeking truth” or merely building their own arguments?
- De Neys asserts that just because people reason well in argumentative contexts doesn’t mean that they don’t try to reason logically outside of this context. How well, if at all, do you think people reason outside of an argumentative context?
- Do you accept M&S’s dismissal of Narvaez’s concern with their focus on WEIRD people? How do you think testing non-WEIRD people’s argumentative skills would be different and how would the results impact M&S’s theory?
For me, the most significant takeaway from the aforementioned collection of responses to M & S’ argument is Dessalles’ notion that the primary evolutionary function of reasoning cannot be to merely optimize the process of sharing knowledge (77). Baumeister, Masicampo, and DeWall argue, however, that the purpose of reasoning and logical argumentation is primarily to advance and acrue culturual wealth, positing that evolutionary processes work against indiviudals who cannot reasons well and who are thus less capable of advancing culturual capital and knowledge.
As Arianna noted, sharing knowledge is not often thought of as directly beneficial to an individual’s fitness, especially in the context of culture. It is true, however, that many species in nature, including human beings, have been known to exhibit altruistic behavior, an evolutionarily counterintuitive phenomenon that seems to defy the rules of fitness in the short term. Could it be, however, that the selfless sharing of knowledge has the capacity to indirectly improve one’s own fitness–or, for that matter, the fitness of the larger group/society on which one depends for survival–by improving cultural capital? This seems to be the implication in Dessalles’ argument.
My issue with this implication is that culture and survival do not intuitively go hand-in-hand. What purpose, in the greater context of evolutionary fitness, could culture and knowledge serve? Could it be that societies with more advanced culture and knowledge are more likely to develop technologies (and even attitudes, as per religion, philosophy, cultural norms, etc.) that better facilitate reproduction and life-expectancy? Or do Dessalles, M & S posit that there is more to evolution than survival and reproduction?
Essentially, this boils down to a larger question about evolution: is the purpose of fitness simply for us to produce in the greatest numbers possible and to live as long as possible, or is there also a component of cultural advancement and epistemic wealth? Is the most advanced society the one with the greatest capacity to reproduce, or the one with the most cultural capital? Do these two necessarily go hand-in-hand?
M&S paint a pretty bleak picture of the functionality of reasoning by suggesting that people can only employ logical reasoning in an argumentative context not to seek truth but in order to formulate arguments that further prove their own views, thus resulting in confirmation bias. Likewise as everyone else, I think that’s why I found De Neys commentary interesting because it seems that based on neuroscientific research, people do employ logical reasoning processes in non-argumentative contexts.
Harrell argues that untrained people are the ones who perform poorly in using logical reasoning in non-argumentative contexts and that argumentation skills can be improved with training. If asked, would Harrell and M&S disagree on the role of education in society?
I found that many of the responses addressed questions and objections that I had while initially reading the target article. First and foremost is the new distinction M&S make between system 1 and 2 reasoning, and the integral role of intuition in both. I found the revised objection that Khlentzos and Stevenson (83) raise to M&S’s dual processing system compelling. Their response addressed a question I was interested in pursuing: Does system 2 reasoning requires either more supporting information or simply good arguments to generate a system 2 conclusion? Is the role of system 1 intuition sufficient to generate these more complex claims?
I also thought that many of the responses brought up some good points with respect to the evolutionary aspect of the argumentative theory. Dessalles (76) brought up a similar objection to something that I puzzled through in class, which was the nature of the selection pressures that M&S seem to envision. Dessalles argues that the argumentative model works in a group setting, but less so on an individual level, seeming to contradict classical notions of Darwinian evolution. I would argue, however, that this distinction between individual and group selection is not a strong argument against M&S’s hypothesis, as the individual benefits of having a reliable “lie detection device” would be strongly selected for on an individual level. I am still (annoyingly, I admit) stuck on finding further examples of selection pressures that would cause this reasoning ability to become so prevalent in the population. Is the “lie detection” argument strong enough to support such a widespread trait?
Finally, I do think that M&S leave out some other aspects of reasoning from their analysis, as Narvaez points out (84). Her examples of sociopolitical and everyday levels of reasoning are compelling, and I think that M&S could have included these types of reasoning processes in their initial analysis. The everyday reasoning aspect that Narvaez brings up seems to get at a more reflective and internal reasoning process, that does not necessarily include argumentation. Is there a place for this kind of internal reasoning process in the M&S argumentation based model of reasoning? Could these kinds of everyday cognitive processes (ex: What did I do during that presentation that I could do better next time? What should I do to make sure that this water is pure enough to drink?) be based on a different evolutionary system, separate from reasoning? Are we simply arguing with ourselves?
I appreciated Dessalles’s discussion of reasoning as a lie detection device, especially since I was intrigued by Emily’s question on the blog last time about how groups coming to the best conclusions could serve individual fitness in a competitive environment, and therefore how argumentation could make sense as the evolutionary function of reasoning. Ultimately, I do agree with M&S’s characterization, as opposed to Desalles’s, especially given M&S’s assertion that if people produced arguments primarily to advertise their reasoning ability, they would tend toward more impressive arguments rather than ones which suffice, which is not empirically supported. However, I feel the commentators’ criticisms, combined with M&S’s response, helped to clarify M&S’s view of the function of reasoning, as a form of epistemic vigilance which benefits both communicator and receiver, and not as an ability geared toward shared knowledge optimization, as one commentator had interpreted it.
Also, a friend of mine posted this article from the NY Times on facebook, and I found it to be quite interesting and relevant to this article: Called “A Confession of Liberal Intolerance,” it discusses the current underrepresentation of (and it argues, the discrimination against) conservatives and Evangelicals in higher education. The article proposes that ideological diversity is perhaps the most important type of diversity in fostering a truth-seeking environment and making debates as epistemically sound as possible (my terms). The article quotes a psychologist at NYU: “Universities are unlike other institutions in that they absolutely require that people challenge each other so that the truth can emerge from limited, biased, flawed individuals,” he says. “If they lose intellectual diversity, or if they develop norms of ‘safety’ that trump challenge, they die. And this is what has been happening since the 1990s.” Given the intense animosity that seems to be present toward anyone who identifies as conservative in the context of higher education, do we believe that even ideological diversity we consider so distasteful could be necessary to coming to sound conclusions? Can we overcome our personal biases in group-member selection in an effort to maintain a genuinely diverse group for deliberative processes?
Sorry, all. I managed to post without including the link to the article: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/08/opinion/sunday/a-confession-of-liberal-intolerance.html?smid=fb-share&_r=1
De Neys argues that while people obviously reason in argumentative contexts, they also do so in non-argumentative contexts. One of the discussion questions is whether this is the case, and I had the same question. De Neys points out that yes, people in more artificial classic reasoning tasks often do not choose the correct (logical) response (76), but that they do engage in logical reasoning. In tasks where the norms conflict with intuitive beliefs, subjects take longer to come to a conclusion which suggests that they are carefully weighing both sides.
However, is this ‘good enough’? Even if people do use logical reasoning in artificial situations, does this matter, if they come to the wrong conclusion? And how is it possible that they do come to the wrong conclusion if they are engaging both sides of the argument? Why are people so much more likely to come to the right conclusion if they are in an argumentative context? Do we care so much more about proving ourselves to each other than finding the right answer for ourselves?
Dessalles states that “[t]he biological function of human reasoning abilities cannot be to improve shared knowledge” (76). I assume this claim is based on Dessalles’ understanding that individuals act in their own self-interest to increase their ability to survive and reproduce. While I agree with this phenomenon, there are many examples of animals (honeybees, ants, naked mole-rats) that exhibit seemingly selfless, or “altruistic,” behavior. In biology, altruism occurs when an individual exhibits helpful behavior that decreases the individual’s fitness and increases another’s fitness. This behavior seems absurd! However, altruism can actually increases an individual’s indirect fitness, or the propagation of genes through nondescendant kin. My first question is: do you agree with Dessalles’ statement that the biological advantage of human reasoning “cannot be to improve shared knowledge”? Second, from an evolutionary perspective, do you think the only way to explain reasoning is by Dessalles’ lie detection mechanism?
It is clear to me how honest communication and accurate detection of threats, warning signals, sexual advances and other survival/reproduction related communications could be evolutionary advantageous. However, it is not clear to me how the ability to form strong arguments about interpretations of a movie, for example, are evolutionarily advantageous. Along these lines, Baumeister, Mascicampo and DeWall commend M&S. The three authors sate that M&S’s “theory sheds light on what has made human beings such a successful species in using culture as an advanced form of social life to improve survival and reproduction” (74). My third question is: do you think that culture is a bi-product of humans exercising evolutionarily significant communication and interpretation skills?
Mercier and Sperber mention that people often purposefully argue above the head of their audience, resulting in a lack of access to the information presented and a barrier to group understanding (96). In addition, M&S say that “when people are motivated to reason, they do a better job at accepting only sound arguments, which is quite generally to their advantage” (96). What types of motivators do people use to reason? Is it simply that people only reason when it benefits their argument? Can we train people to reason more often even if it conflicts with their personal views?
Evans disagrees with M&S about the origin of the ability to solve novel problems. Evans believes that this ability can be attributed to intelligence and the ability to reason, while M&S us intuition and the evolutionary process as explanations. It seems to me that perhaps both explanations could be partially true. There are many examples in life where you have a predisposition for something, but its presentation is reliant on your environment. Could it be that perhaps the ability to solve novel problems is driven by Darwinian pressures, but only prevalent in those who have conducive environments (i.e. brain capacity, mental processes, etc.)? This would address Evans’ point about many animals not having higher cognitive processes. Perhaps evolutionary pressures would drive them to have these reasoning capabilities if they had the appropriate means (environment).
M&S talk a lot about the role of reasoning in respect to communication. They deduce that while communication has evolved to be advantageous to both communicators and receivers, there is a chance that receivers can be manipulated. While I can understand how it is easier for communicators to manipulate argumentation in their own favor, I wonder if there are any examples of the receivers doing the same. If receivers purposefully accept an unsound argument, could the communicator be hindered by the inherent confirmation bias? In other words, could the receiver’s response negatively affect the communicator’s justification of their argument?
In Johnson’s critique, he elaborates on M&S’s idea that argumentation applies to scientists and philosophers as well as lay people. All parties “challenge the idea that scientists and philosophers are motivated in an unbiased way by pure curiosity about what is true” (81). I can accept this as a descriptive account of human reasoning because I think that all scientists and philosophers are inevitably affected by their biases. The fact that they are affected by their biases does not mean that they are no longer seeking the truth. It’s hard to believe that these professionals are purely building their own arguments, regardless of truth. Even if the truth that they are seeking has a deep connection with their biases, they are still seeking some form of truth.
Baumeister et al. reviews William James’s theory that thinking is for doing while the rival hypothesis states that much of thinking is for talking. This is in regards to conscious thought, which distinguishes humans from animals. Many investigators define conscious thought as thoughts a person can report to others, while few believe that the purpose of conscious thought is to enable people to tell their thoughts to others (74). Of these ideas, do you side more with William James’s theory or with the rival hypothesis? Do you think that conscious thoughts are solely intended to be shared with others?
Connolly and Reb discuss the roles of regret, regret avoidance and justification and its role in argumentative behavior and consequential decision making. Is it possible to have evolutionary benefit if individuals are solely focusing on regret aversion (75)? (i.e. scolded for saying the wrong thing or asking a “stupid” question)
Dessalles discusses the benefits to listeners and speakers and how this could relate to evolution and natural selection. She explains how when reasoning and producing arguments, speakers follow a more selfish agenda to show off their competence for dealing with anomalies in information (76). Would this be evolutionarily beneficial if this individual does not have the intention of spreading knowledge or building on knowledge?
Harrell suggests that the general population has much less reasoning skill than M&S claim. She also explores the differences between argument structure and argument content (81). If the public does not have the necessary reasoning skills, what would be the best way to teach or enforce these skills?
Sternberg explains that M&S are wrong in arguing that the relationship between reasoning and argumentation is evolutionarily adaptive. For example, in the case of global warming, deniers risk the lives of everyone on the planet as well as any future replication of the species’ genes or survival. Reasoning is used in the service of argumentation, but not always for evolutionarily adaptive purposes (88). If we are purely concerned with evolution when reasoning, should we always be skeptical and worrying throughout life?