I. Logicism and normativism and their disconnects
Norms play a special role in mental processing- reasoning, judgment, and decision making- and direct us in how we ought to behavior. There are two types of normativism: empirical and prescriptive (234).
–Empirical normativism: Thinking reflects S
–Prescriptive normativism: Rational thinking should be measured against
S as a normative system, and ought to conform to it.
*S represents any type of normative system including logic, Bayesian
probability, or decision theory.
*”normativism” can be substituted with with other formal normative
systems such as logicism or Bayesianism.
These two tenets make normativism a system of varying degrees (diagram on 235). Researchers vary in where they stand in across both the prescriptive and empirical spectrum, however, tend to adhere to high prescriptive norms. Interestingly, there are no individuals who adhere to high empirical norms and low prescriptive norms simultaneously. Many factors, including the role of a priori knowledge in normativism or whether or not a normative system is.
E&E’s main problem is with prescriptive normativism, arguing that it is a problematic system and unnecessary in scientific studies regarding human thinking (235). In their article, they touch on what they mean by normativism, the problem of arbitration, the is-ought inference and its role in two research programs in human thinking, how normativism creates negative bias in the study of human thinking, and why normativism is unnecessary. In conclusion, they suggest that a descriptive approach should be taken when addressing mental processes.
II. Normativism, rationality, and the three senses of ought
There are a number of different types of rationality including instrumental, bounded, ecological, and evolutionary rationality. Normative rationality is yet another form of rationality and is unique because it implies what we ought to do. There are three main meanings for ought (236):
- Directive Deontic: Selection-for and functional analysis. You must turn left at the light.
- Evaluative Deontic: Normative. You should not steal.
- Epistemic: Expressing belief of probability – He should be able to catch his flight.
The normative ought is evaluative. The distinction between different forms of ought have aided in the controversy over instrumental rationality (acting in a way to achieve one’s goals). Some philosophers, like Oaksford and Chater (O&C), don’t see the distinction between the evaluative and directive ought. Instead, they view instrumental rationality as something that should be justified through norms, thus blurring the lines between instrumental and normative rationality. However, E&E disagree with this and believe that there should be a clear distinction between these two types of rationality. They also take the stance that normativism isn’t necessary or useful when discussing function, adaptation, and ecological and instrumental rationality: “if behavior is typically adapted and we typically achieve personal goals, we should be rational without the use of normativism” (236).
III. Normative systems and the problem of arbitration
Each paradigm requires a particular normative system, and only the one right and appropriate norm can be applied.
Despite the need for one right system, there is no universal “clear-cut norm,” and this weakens normativism (237). Normativism is weakened further if there happens to be multiple norms that fit into a paradigm. This phenomenon is called the normative system problem or inappropriate norm argument.
There are three norm paradigms: single, alternative, and multiple (237).
–Single: Only one norm can be applied. Examples include signal detection
task and conditional elimination inference. No conflict.
–Alternative: One standard norm and at least one alternative can be applied. Examples include conditional induction inference and the Wason selection Task. Conflict.
–Multiple: There are several, equally standard norms that can be applied. Examples include metadeduction. Conflict.
Single norm paradigms are common in situations such as memory task, however, they are rare in reasoning and decision making scenarios. This paired with the frequency of alternative and multiple norm conflict pose a major challenge for normativism.
IV. The computational, the competent, and the normative
E&E’s main argument is not a complete rejection of the formal systems in exchange for processing ones. Instead, they reject the use of these formal systems as normative ones and reject the deontic, evaluative ought. E&E draw a distinction between normative theory and competence theory in order to highlight the distinction between ought and is. The competence theory includes Chompsky’s and Marr’s parallel definitions of competence and computational levels of analysis. For Chompsky, competence is the “structural description of abstract knowledge that is value free,” or rather looks to answer the question ‘what is…? (239). Likewise, Marr’s definition of computational levels of analysis is something that describes what is being computed and why, or rather answer the question ‘how is…?’ Both of these stances help make up the computational/competence theory (descriptive theories), while the question of what ought to be makes up the normative theory. E&E believe it is critical to discern between these two theories and between is and ought. Without a clear distinction between descriptive theories and normative theories, people fall into a controversial type of inferences: inferring ought from is.
V. Inferring ought from is
Normativism functions selectively and and there is one “appropriate” norm to use for a given scenario. However, this becomes increasingly difficult in alternative and multiple norm scenarios where there can be one or many alternative norms. Choosing the correct norm is difficult but also extremely crucial for normativism to function properly.
Challenging normative theories are competence theories. Competence theories are descriptive and supported by descriptive evidence. E&E and other researchers believe that descriptive evidence cannot be used in normative instances. However, when people derive a normative conclusion from descriptive premises, they are said to follow the is-ought inference. Often times, the is-ought inference includes an implicit normative premise. The implicit normative premise is an internal belief that “we should act in line with our natural instincts” (240). The issue with this is that if this premise is not made explicit, the argument becomes fallacious. Similar to the is-ought inference, the naturalistic fallacy draws evaluative conclusions from natural events. Specifically, the naturalistic fallacy occurs when ethical norms are inferred from natural phenomena such as evolution.
V.1 Oaksford and Chater’s (O&C) Bayesian rational analysis: O&C proposed that logicism, both empirical and prescriptive, should be rejected and replaced by Bayesianism. Bayesianism suggests that human thinking is based on Bayesian probability and normatively justified by it. However, E&E oppose O&C on the level that they do not separate is from ought. O&C support the circle of normativity, where everyday rationality (successful behavior, instrumental) is justified by formal rationality (logic, Bayesian probability, etc). Furthermore, everyday rationality provides empirical evidence to chose the formal normative system. However, the empirical evidence does not clearly state which normative system to use. E&E have difficulty with O&C’s complex model as it uses a number of different oughts and uses the is-ought inference.
V.2 The individual differences programme of Stanovich and West: S&W’s earlier work also follows the is-ought inference by connecting normative and computational-level analysis. S&W suggests that correct reasoning is due to higher quality reasoning and cognitive capacity, as higher ability patients gave better answers to particular tasks in past studies. Therefore, the system the higher ability people endorse is the correct system and should become the norm. However, this falls into the trap of the is-ought inference. The is in this case is that higher ability people chose more correct answers and the ought is that the norm they utilized is the correct one.
V.3 Evaluative ought versus directive ought: O&C rational analysis and S&W’s earlier work both incorporate the is-ought inference, however, they draw different normative conclusions. O&C focuses on adaptationist learning and suggests that ‘gene-directed behavior’ is rational. On the other hand, S&W focuses on the self-described Meliorist approach and suggests that people are not innately rational but can learn to be rational through education and training (242). This distinction can be seen in O&C’s and S&W’s interpretation of the Wason selection task. S&W suggest that logic is the best normative system for the task whereas O&C suggest that information theory is the best norm to use. S&W chose logic because higher ability individuals solve the problem through logic, and O&C chose information theory because the majority of individuals use it during the task.
VI. Normativist research biases
E&E argue that normativism has triggered three types of research bias in psychologists’ approach to studying human reasoning, thinking, and JDM (Table 3). First, they use a logic and deduction paradigm and Bayesian rationality to introduce the prior rule bias. E&E show that after untrained individuals are instructed to accept a new normative system of logic, their thinking will reflect this “built-in” normative system (empirical normativism). This built-in system ultimately constrains reasoning and may permit participants to rationally get answers wrong (243). Secondly, they introduce interpretation bias, which suggest that normativism has negatively influenced the way results are recorded and interpreted. Evans suggests that to avoid bias we should record exactly what people do without interpreting their logical accuracy or concern of what they ought to do. The ought-is fallacy is an interpretation bias involving the normative account of dual-process theories of reasoning. The ought-is fallacy assumes that System 2 is responsible for correct normative responding, while System 1 (ie. heuristics) is associated with cognitive bias. This a situation where System 2 (i.e. analytical) is involved in inferring is from ought. Some authors suggest that System 2 is “necessary” for normative rationality while E&E suggest this “rule-based reasoning” may actually result in normative error (245). Thirdly, the clear norms bias proposes that psychologists are biased to select research questions involving single-norm paradigm even though they are rare and largely inapplicable to questions regarding JDM. In response to these problems, E&E suggest that adopting a descriptivist approach in place of a normativist approach would help eliminate these biases.
VII. Can we manage without a normative theory?
The previous sections of this article, E&E have identified the problems of normativism, however, they acknowledge the fact that normative based formal systems have motivated several valuable and productive psychological research paradigms (i.e. Wason selection, 2-4-6 task, etc.). These formal theories have a range of important relations to psychological theories shown in Fig. 2. Given the “heuristic value” of formal theories, E&E argue that descriptivism is a viable alternative to normativism because it can maintain these important relations to psychological theories, without problematic inferences and research biases (246).This may be achieved by a dual-process framework dubbed hypothetical thinking theory (HTT). HTT extract the aspects of subjectivity, belief, and uncertainty from Bayesian theory and proposes that System 2 is capable of hypothetical thinking using epistemic models.
Conclusions
E&E conclude that a normativist approach to the psychology of reasoning and JDM is both probabilistic and unnecessary. Instead we should utilize a descriptivist approach as an alternative to normativism in order to avoid research biases and circular is-ought inferences. However, it should be noted that norms can play a role in applied sciences and research regarding planning, policy, and development.
Discussion Questions:
- In section II E&E discuss the question regarding function and normativism (heart example). Do you agree with E&E that function falls under a different type of ought than normativism, or do you think that function should be classified with normativism?
- If E&E warn against inferring ought from is, where does the concept of ought originate from?
- E&E highlight the arbitration problem as something that weakens normativism, especially because of the limited application of the single-norm paradigm. Can you think of an instance (not mentioned in the article) in which single-norm paradigm can be useful?
- Although E&E do not suggest the complete elimination of normativism, do you think it is possible to approach reasoning and JDM without a normative theory?
First of all, I need to say that I agree with E&E most out of everyone we read in class thus far. I have struggled with the idea of normativism and the idea of having only one “right” way to do something (which E&E mention with their three types of normative conflict). Normativism implies that by not conforming to the normative model that humans were irrational, which I never really could buy into. In class we’ve talked about how the “ought” can be defined, but we have never really managed to come up with a definitive answer. Maybe, then, as E&E point out, we should not rely on prescriptive normativism in order to study the way humans think! There is too much variation and too much uncertainty with how we use normative models.
I am intrigued by E&E’s hypothetical thinking theory, which “uses formal theories as a source of inspiration… without, accepting their normative role” (247). I appreciate that HTT uses the Bayesian theory for “subjectivity, belief, (and) uncertainty” to describe the way we form beliefs about the world (unlike O&C, who use it as a normative model) because I think I do think those are important aspects of human cognition. I would have liked to see a more thorough description of HTT, though, because I think it could definitely work but I am not sure about all of its details.
My main question is: What is the role we think normativism should play in how we approach human reasoning? I agree with E&E that is should not be a metric used to judge human behavior – especially considering all of the research biases that come with assuming the normativist model. It seems that what we’ve read focuses a lot on when humans make mistakes (are “irrational”) rather than highlighting how remarkable human cognition is. This is where I think the descriptive model is crucial (although this too, seems to only describe when we are making mistakes). As E&E point out, though, norms should be used for scientific research in fields other than human reasoning, which I agree with. Is that where we think their use ends?
The “ought” way of thinking that normativism provides must have come from somewhere. Perhaps it is by being social animals and constantly comparing our actions to those of others that we developed this idea of a universal norm for the way we should act (is this sense of “should” an evolutionary concept?). Like Alex said in our class, maybe the reason we use normative models (and even think about rationality in general) is because we are desperate to understand the people around us. Where does that curiosity/drive come from? Also, how does this sense of “ought” relate to the development of our moral code? Again, I agree with E&E that we should not use normativism to judge human thinking, but norms and the sense of “ought” are also an important part of societal functioning… where do we draw the line?
Even though Elqayam and Evans propose a descriptive approach to theoretical research of rationality, they suggest that normative approaches are useful in applied research such as treatment of “problem gamblers.” I’m curious about the phrase “problem gambler”—is the individual a problem because they are not clearly acting in accordance with instrumentalism? Or does this individual present a larger issue to society as a whole? Who gets to decide what is defined as “problem behavior”?
They present education as the “solution” to these problem behaviors, but is this only because our society holds up education as producing the most “rational” individuals? Is education not just us trying to train each other how to behave in an agreed upon “rational” way (so that we can understand and predict each others’ behavior)?
I’m also not certain that people are not always acting in accordance with the “default behavior” of instrumentalism as they mention at the end of the article. Couldn’t the more interesting “converse behavior” still be motivated by goals (instrumentalism) that are simply not consciously acknowledged?
Given the class’ criticism of the normative model, I think several people will agree that some of the concerns that E&E address in their article are valid. My main concern with the normative model was that many authors (like S&W) call the gaps between the normative and prescriptive models deficiencies in human cognition. I agree with E&E that the normative model will likely never be able to fully encompass the way humans reason and by employing the ought that the normative model does we are inserting biases of how the developer of the model believes humans should think, rather than observing human cognition and creating a descriptive model. Ought cannot come from anywhere but human biases because we are the ones developing the normative model and determining which form of logic is considered ideal and “normative” in the first place.
One point that I found to be interesting was when they addressed ought in terms of function. I don’t consider function in the same lens that I considered ought as it relates to decision making. In function there is a clear optimal way to operate and more often than not a malfunction is not a choice. Ought to me can only apply when you have a choice and even then what you should do is influenced by cultural, personal, and societal factors that don’t necessarily affect everyone in the same way. The way something “ought” to function is very different from the decision someone “ought” to make. One is objective (function) and the other is subjective.
Questions:
-Could ought originate from anywhere other than human bias? Other than in the case of function?
-Is there a way to develop a normative theory that is free from biases and the is-ought issue? If there isn’t should we even be worrying about the normative model considering that there will always be deficiencies in human rationality with the normative lens?
-E&E seem to want to eliminate ought, but what implications would that have for morality and ethics? (sorry big question i know)
I’m a little unclear on how Elqayam and Evans imagine the ideal interaction between normative and descriptive concerns. While they claim that theories of higher mental processing should be “freed from normative considerations (233),” E&E also write that “Evaluative normative considerations are just one way in which formal theories can be useful for psychological theorizing (246).” They also write that such theories can constrain psychological theorizing. If logic is considered to be a formal system, I’m a little unclear on how considerations of logic constraining psychological theorizing is not normative in some way. E&E also claim that formal systems should be used in psychology as long as they are purely descriptive. But I wondered if formal systems can be used in purely descriptive ways.
Given that I’m unclear on how normative and descriptive considerations interact, if at all in theories of higher mental processing, I have one more question in this vein:
Are E&E arguing for Quinean style replacement form of naturalized epistemology?
On Page 236, E&E write that Oaksford and Chater believe that instrumental rationality needs to be justified and that requires a normative justification meaning that there can be no real divide between instrumental and normative rationality (or the directive and evaluative ought as E&E phrase it). E&E recognize the difference of opinion but do not address the issue. I was wondering if there is more to what Oaksford and Chater have in mind then E&E are willing to admit.
E&E write “Our task as scientists is to observe what people do and to construct and test theories of how they do it (236).” Is this an accurate characterization of the scientist’s task?
This article came at a perfect time, as we just started to address the usage of the normative model in the last class (Marissa’s comment). Overall, I think the authors proposed interesting and important distinctions and observations that served them well in their rejection of normative rationality as the “correct” model of rationality. At the beginning of the article, the authors’ mention of logic and rationality caught my eye. I know much of our discussion centers around logic and rationality, but I’m still perplexed by their relationship. Do logic and rationality always go hand-in-hand? If one is illogical, is he or she bound for irrationality? Can we extract classical logic from the discussion of rationality and instead refer to a more “everyday” logic that I think fits better in the context of our discussion about rationality?
Previously, I hadn’t fully considered the application of different norms in various situations. In the case of perfectly rational people following classical logic, it seems that there is one normative system that prevails, no matter what the situation (this even seems to be the case in Bayesian rationality). Do others think this is the case? Or is it that within these systems, there are a variety of norms that can be applied to a certain situation? (Meaning, is there one right normative system or different normative solutions for specific tasks?…do the normative solutions fall under, or have to fall under, one system?). I do think that having several norms that apply to one situation somewhat weakens the idea of normativism itself, as there isn’t just one “correct” model.
I agree with E&E that functional ought falls under a different category than normativism. I think using ought in the context of what an organ like the heart “ought” to do is completely different than how we “ought” to reason. The authors make several significant distinctions in this article as an effort to support and strengthen their argument. I can definitely sympathize with many/most of the distinctions they make in regards to different types of rationality, different oughts, etc., but fear that some authors may take issue with so many divisions and call them out on this in order to weaken their argument.
I think it’s important to consider how we’re looking at rationality, and in what context. It appears (the article addresses this directly), that there are many types of rationality, and our degree of rationality can depend on the situation. Sometimes it feels that normative rationality is quite constrained, and is not applicable to the myriad of situations that we face everyday. Instead, it is rationality in a bubble devoid of goals, environment, etc. The sole point is to be rational.
Why are we so caught up with the idea of correctness (and the correct way to reason, make judgments, etc.)? I think deciding whether to take on a more descriptivist approach depends on what we’re after: As the authors proposed, are we more interested in improving thinking or understanding thinking (242)? Or both?
I wish they had expanded a little more on a future descriptivist approach and how the hypothetical thinking theory may play into that. To me, it felt like they argued against a normative model, but didn’t promote the descriptivist model quite enough.
As an aside, I’m wondering about the idea that conformity to a normative system is considered both necessary and sufficient for rationality, or only necessary. It seems from our discussions that conformity to a normative system is thought to be necessary for rationality. In terms of conformity to a normative system being sufficient for rationality… I’m not quite sure how one could conform to a normative system and not be considered rational. So it seems that when one conforms to a normative system, that will always be more than sufficient for rationality. Something about this idea is tripping me up!
I think the the concept of “ought” is a necessary one. As the three types are laid out, I see very different meanings from each. My interpretation is that in the directive deontic “ought = must,” in the evaluative deontic “ought = shall,” and lastly epistemically “ought = should.” All of these are used in different ways – whether it be laws, morals, probability, etc. Yes it is certainly dangerous to infer ought from is, but I do not believe that implies we should do away with all forms of “ought” in certain contexts.
Similarly to E&E, I struggle with the prescriptive normativism as I did in the last class. Given the 7 billion unique people on earth, how do we decide which S we should conform to? What works for one may not work for another, but more importantly – who determines what the optimal prescriptive norm is, and how? E&E perhaps make this even more complex by acknowledging the existence of multiple appropriate norms for one scenario.
Elqayam and Evans (2011) argue against prescriptive normativism because they think it is unnecessary in studies that involve human thinking and invokes the “ought” into human behavior instead of what human behavior actually “is” (235). In section two, E&E say that prescriptive normativism survive longer than empirical normativism and is therefore more difficult to eliminate (236). This notion of time makes me think about the relationship between time and the ability a type normativism to serve as a rational system of thought. If prescriptive can survive longer, does that indicate it is more applicable or representative of what it means to be rational than E&E ascertain? Similarly, E&E argue that conformity to normative system is considered most likely necessary for rationality over both necessary and sufficient (235), but how do we know whether it is considered sufficient for rationality? In other words, do we have proper guidelines to even determine whether or not these normative systems or systems that aren’t based on norms, like Gigerenzer’s fast and frugal heuristics, are sufficient for rationality?
I agree with E&E that function falls under a different type of ought than normativism in that there is no normative obligation for nature to select hearts for pumping (236). However, I don’t believe you can completely separate competence from normative theories. Can we choose what is rational based entirely on competence theories? I think that normative theories are useful in the implementation of whether you can do something, which is decided by competence theories. I think that ought statements are connected to competence theories because it may be possible for both to be sufficient for rationality (239). Ought statements appear to be connected to competence because you ought to not to grasp the door handle if your hand is in a cast. Even if you were to grasp the door handle you wouldn’t be able to. Ought stems from the fact that you cant move your hand and from the fact that the doctor told you not to move it- you shouldn’t move your hand and you cant. What about situations in which you can move your hand, but you “ought not too” because the handle is hot? In an everyday life, normative theories could be considered rational in this instance to evaluate whether or not to touch the handle. Is the element of evaluation in normative theory really that bad? This connects to the question of whether we need a universal set of norms? If not, couldn’t normative theories still have weight in rationality? E&E seem to infer that if the “ought” is removed, they may be able to.
Concerning alternative, single, and multiple norm paradigms, the main problem is removing cognitive biases. Is fast and frugal heuristics less biased than any of these paradigms? Which system minimizes clear norms bias? Do we have criterion for establishing what the biases are? In the Watson card task, Oaksford and Chater believe you select the optimal information in order to decide whether q depends on p or not, therefore you are normatively rational in terms of gaining information (238). However, something we have talked a lot about in class is that acquiring more information doesn’t exactly mean that information is rational.