Patricia Churchland — Epistemology in the Age of Neuroscience
Churchland presents the idea that the framework in which we consider how humans perceive, learn, and understand must be re-contextualized in the age of neuroscience (Figure 1; Churchland p. 545). This new framework calls for the alteration of the question how is it possible for us to represent reality to how does the brain work, by her assertion, and she details three factors to elucidate why contemplating naturalizing epistemology is relevant now. The author postulates that 1) technological developments within the last twenty years have allowed for an understanding of neural systems to such a degree that theorizing about how macro effects, such as human behavior, stem from our neural underpinnings; 2) inexpensive and accessible computing technology allows for investigation of properties at a circuit level (i.e., neural nets); and 3) clinical neurology, biology and psychology are continuously yielding information about the capacity of neural systems, which allows for a segue into considering contemplation of brain, learning, and consciousness with respect to our understanding of evolution. Evolution, according to the author, is critical to consider for three reasons; 1) as the human brain is similar in structure, organization, and componentry to other primate brains, we must anticipate that how we learn, see, hear, and remember does not fundamentally diverge from these processes in other organisms; 2) cognition cannot be removed and considered separately from an organism’s niche and evolutionary goals, and exists in relation to the organism’s necessity to feed, fight, flee, and mate. It therefore cannot be considered in isolation, as though existing for its own sake, and sensorimotor advancements are in place to enhance an organism’s chance of survival; and finally, 3) as the human brain is a product of evolution, which works by modifying existing structures rather than by rewriting the basics, we cannot expect engineering perfection in its design. Churchland then presents a connectionist model as an alternative to the “grand old paradigm” in order to explain our cognitive processes. Connectionist models are constructed to mimic the biology of neural networks, with processing units (neurons), connections between these units (axons and dendrites), and relative weights (strength of synapses). The complexity and dynamism possible in these models, such as the NETtalk model that converts written text to speech, indicate that it may be possible to one day model exactly how our representations are formed and how we reason on a neurobiological level, namely through distinct patterns of activation. Churchland concludes by indicating that progress in this respect will require the efforts of researchers from a variety of disciplines.
Robert Almeder — On Naturalizing Epistemology
In this paper, Robert Almeder grapples with Quine’s argument for naturalized epistemology and concludes that there is ultimately no sound argument in favor of his position. On a Quinean account, naturalized epistemology is a branch of natural science and the only legitimate questions about human knowledge are those answerable through natural science. This version of naturalized epistemology therefore supplants “first philosophy” traditional epistemology—that we can have a notion of whether or not our scientific knowledge satisfies a philosophical analysis of justification or knowledge. Accordingly, we only have scientific knowledge and knowledge of the mechanisms productive of successful practice of natural science.
The most interesting question to keep in mind during the article is raised by Almeder in his conclusion: “is there something fundamentally incoherent about arguing philosophically for naturalized epistemology… that denies philosophical arguments will count when it comes to answering questions about the nature of epistemology (278).”
Quine’s Argument
According to Quine, traditional epistemology is concerned with showing how the foundations of knowledge—natural science or mathematics—reduce to certainty. Quine essentially understands traditional epistemology to be the pursuit of refuting the Cartesian sceptic. However, Quine believes traditional epistemology has failed its fundamental pursuit. As examples he points to the reduction of mathematics to the axioms of set theory which do not show how mathematical certainty is possible. Furthermore, Quine points to the Humean issue of induction which holds that no foundation of certainty can be associated with sense impressions or physical objects (natural science). Therefore traditional epistemology is dead and all questions and doubts are scientific in nature, answered by scientists through the natural sciences.
Response to Quine’s Argument
In this section Almeder raises objections by Stroud and Sosa and raises three issues with Quine’s argument. First, Quine is accused of incoherency by employing a philosophical argument to argue against the idea of traditional epistemology. Secondly, a further incoherency is found in the fact that the thesis for naturalized epistemology rests on two premises that are only sound if philosophical arguments about human knowledge are sound. These premises are that 1. Hume’s skepticism is established and 2. There is no analytic/synthetic distinction. Finally, Quine’s argument is accused of mischaracterizing traditional epistemology as being primarily concerned with establishing certainty when it is just as concerned with defining concepts of knowledge. i.e. what it means to know.
Philosophy is Science Argument
This section presents Lycan’s defense of Quine’s argument. Lycan, unlike Quine, believes in the analytic (apriori)/synthetic (empirical) distinction—therefore he does not adopt the Humean argument and face the same criticism as Quine. By Lycan’s account, classical philosophy assumes a deductive model in which indisputable truths are arrived at by deductive reasoning. However, he claims the premises for the deductively reached conclusions must be rooted in non-deductively gained, putative knowledge. Therefore premises are evaluated on their plausibility much like scientific theories. According to Lycan this means that 1. philosophy is in fact a high-level science and 2. proper philosophical methods cannot differ from scientific methods.
Ultimately, Almeder argues that Lycan’s position is untenable for a number of reasons.
Most significantly, philosophy is very different from science in that “in science, but not in philosophy, a necessary condition for any explanation being even remotely plausible is that it be in principle empirically testable” (270).
Traditional Epistemology Will Become Irrelevant Argument
Next, Almeder considers arguments in favor of naturalized epistemology from the eliminitivist position which claims that traditional philosophy will be revealed to be “folk psychology” and eliminated in favor of future neuroscientific accounts of cognitive functioning. Such arguments are favored by the Churchlands and Giere. Almeder believes that while the argument is possible there is really no way to justify such optimism a new model of inquiry. Later he offers objections to Giere, but given the weakness of Gyre’s argument, this section is relatively insignificant.
The Argument From Evolutionary Theory
Here, Lycan addresses two arguments that claim the only valid questions about the nature of human knowledge are those that can be answered in biological science by appeal to evolutionary theory. However, only Kornblith’s argument is even evolutionary in nature and her argument is readily dismissed by Lycan for its false premise P2, which claims that humans have a predisposition for believing truths.
The Impossibility of Defining Justification Argument
Lycan considers Richard Ketchum’s argument to be the most interesting argument in favor of naturalized epistemology. Essentially, Ketchum argues that traditional epistemology must include an acceptable definition of the concept of justification. However, given that the question, “are you justified in accepting this definition of justification” can only be answered in terms of the acceptable definition, there is no non-question begging way of defining the concept justification.
The best response Lycan musters is to say that the question “are you justified in accepting this definition of justification,” is in itself meaningless. This is the case because if there is no definition of justification in mind when the question is asked, then it cannot be known what counts as an answer to the question. Given Ketchum’s argument, however, there is no non-question begging way for a definition of justification to be given.
Questions:
As I asked at the beginning of the summary and as Lycan wonders in his conclusion, do we think that it is fundamentally incoherent to give a philosophical argument in favor of naturalized epistemology?
Does Lycan’s final rejection of Ketchum’s argument that I summarized seem strange at all? Is there a way to defend Ketchum’s argument against Lycan’s critique?
Almeder draws a clear distinction between traditional and naturalized epistemology, namely by outlining three distinguishing characteristics of the former: 1) naturalized epistemology insists that only questions that can be investigated and answered by the natural sciences; 2) Traditional epistemology is sought not to be discarded by natural epistemologists, but rather transformed to be more empirical and, in a sense, productive in the pursuit of understanding our own cognition; and 3) questions posed in the natural sciences are the only legitimate questions we can ask in order to understand the physical nature of our universe.
I find Almeder’s last point to be particularly provocative for its implications concerning the origin of the universe and, moreover, the origin of existence. Is this to say that philosophical and religious questions are obsolete for understanding our origins?
Almeder brings up claims made by Giere and the Churchlands which suggest that the theory of natural epistemology will eventually trump traditional epistemology making it “irrelevant” (pg. 271). Almeder recognizes that the scientific approach to knowledge is testable while the traditional approach is not, which is why the naturalistic approach seems more concrete and favorable to most people. If there is no way to empirically rule in/out traditional epistemology, is it legitimate to disregard its theories? Hannah makes a good point when questioning whether or not the traditional, philosophical approach to epistemology should be viewed separately from the naturalistic, scientifically approach.
Churchland introduces the relationship of human knowledge with the concept of connectionism (pg. 550) by suggesting that our ability to obtain, store, and recall information is linked to our neuronal physiology and function. However, does she, or any other natural epistemologist, validate how connectionism explains our to form beliefs, opinions and conclusions?
Like a handful of others, I’m wondering whether natural and traditional epistemology can even be taken together, at least right now. My confusion stems from two issues I can’t seem to get past. For one – Bridget and Olivia definitely hit on this in their discussions of connectionism – it doesn’t seem like our understanding of the brain at this point is that close to uncovering how we make decisions, contrary to what Churchland seems to imply in her intro (544). We can design neural representations that solve specific problems, but that’s really different from uncovering how our brains are capable of rational thought and novel insights. In fact, examples like NETtalk seem more like ways for people to apply reason and logic to a very crude understanding of the brain and less like “testable” ways of studying how our brains actually work.
Additionally, it just seems to me like these two types of epistemology are trying to answer two subtly different questions – one is how we, as humans, actually think and know. The other is how, in a perfect world, we would. I don’t see how either of these questions is useless, as Churchland seems to think (545). While any overlap between them is interesting to think about, why would recent advances in natural epistemology require fundamentally changing traditional epistemology?
Expanding on Ryan Peer’s question regarding evolution – on pg. 549 Churchland offers the idea that if “we approach the problems of nervous-system function as strictly engineering problems…we may find cunning engineering solution which is nothing like the solution the brain has found.” Is Churchland proposing that unlike evolution, which “has to achieve improved organization by managing with what is there, not by going back to redesign the basics” and from which “we cannot expect engineering perfection” (pg. 549), human-engineering methods provide an alternative method to reach such “engineering perfection”? With our brains involving the entire nervous system of our body, is it possible to isolate the brain as one system and control for all possible variables outside the brain in order to, as Churchland writes, “[set] our goals in terms of how a task could in principle be done” (549)?
In Almeder’s closing remarks, he acknowledges the tension and, perhaps, contradictions that persist in the exercise of “arguing philosophically for such a naturalized epistemology” (pg. 278). Almeder explores the collision between science and philosophy and in previous comments, questions about whether these two approaches can mutually exist were raised. Building off of Katie McCluskey’s last question (“Would they [philosophical methods] provide truth in the same way that the methods of the natural sciences do”), I ask: what is truth? Does the presence of “evidence/proof” from deductive reasoning constitute something from plausible to certain? From not true to true?
Maddie brought up the point of the third form of natural epistemology potentially being the favored position due to its combination of the prior two forms. As I understand it, the third form focuses on how the method used by the natural sciences is the only true method of understanding the universe. How would Lycan’s argument that philosophy and science have the same method while differing in subject matter (Almeder p. 268) impact that view?
If philosophy and science do not use the same method, then, by the evolutionary standpoint, why have the philosophical methods come about? Would they also provide truth in the same way that the methods of the natural sciences do?
Quine’s argument that we cannot be certain of anything and that the only questions we may ask are those of the natural sciences (pg. 264) seems very contradictory and circular, as explained by Almeder. I find this also to be confusing when taking into account Churchland’s argument. Churchland argues that we need to change the field of epistemology due to advances in neuroscience and related fields based on advances in technology and new research on animal behavior (pg. 547), yet Quine argues that we can never be sure of anything. If we cannot be sure of the new research in neuroscience and technology that allows us to infer information, how can we answer the “questions that are scientific in nature” that Quine argues are the only types we should be answering? We can use research to answer questions, but if we are never sure of anything, all of the answers we find are based on uncertain facts. This problem seems very contradictory, and Almeder suggests not to give up on traditional epistemology. Is it better to keep philosophical questions separate from those of natural sciences, or is it better to use advancements in science to help us answer philosophical questions, as proposed by Churchland?
I had difficultly with the distinction between scientific and philosophical theses, explained on pg. 270 of the Almeder article: scientific hypothesis are plausible if they are testable, and they are only testable if they fall under specific conditions, while philosophical theses are more or less plausible independently if they are testable or confirmable. Isn’t the whole point of a thesis is to explain a phenomenon, but if the explanation to the phenomenon cannot be testable, how can it be supported and accepted? It would appear that with out any criteria for philosophical theses, a wide array of claims that can be made that could neither be proven nor denied. What happens then?
In Churchland’s discuss of connectionism (pg. 550), she does a good job of laying out the biological framework of the network (processing unites, connections between processing units, and weights), but does not go further in describing how this system allows us to gain knowledge. I agree with Maddie, as she also highlights a missing link in the connectionist model. I see his explanation of NETtalk, which converts written text to speech, as a good example of how connectionism falls short, as it is an intricate network, like the brain, but it only produces speech and does not convey meaning, or in the case of the brain, knowledge. Connectionism appears to be one of the main cornerstones for Churchland’s natural epistemology argument, but I disagree with her that understanding the fundamental principles that control brain function leads to the understanding the nature of representing and reasoning (pg. 553). Where does she make the connection between the two? Is there a connection?
Churchland emphasizes the importance of evolution when considering epistemology in the age of neuroscience with the basic point that “the human brain is a product of evolution” (Churchland, 548). She uses evolution to support the notion that traditional epistemology will inevitably shift and eventually be eliminated as our understandings of neural pathways and brain functioning progress. Where would she stand in terms of the argument from evolutionary theory to justify naturalized epistemology as described by Almeder in section VI (274-275)? Would Churchland support the premises relating evolution/natural selection and knowledge, that Almeder and others have called into question?
In looking at humans from a strictly neuro-biological aspect, the first reason you presented from Churchland was “as the human brain is similar in structure, organization, and componentry to other primate brains, we must anticipate that how we learn, see, hear, and remember does not fundamentally diverge from these processes in other organisms”.
My questions may lean more towards thought-provoking rather than looking for a direct answer. With regards to the recent advancement in technology to fully map the neuronal pathway of c. elegans, there must be some difference between their species and ours- how do we examine our own cognitive function? How can we truly rationalize our own behaviors and how we interpret the situations we are in?
Quine brings up naturalized epistemology to replace the traditional and arguably hopeless theory of knowledge. How do we as humans form our beliefs? Is this fundamentally “better” than thinking about the justification behind forming beliefs? What could possibly be different in our brains that allows us to process our own understanding, morals, reasoning, etc.?
It appears that natural epistemology and traditional epistemology both have their merits and their faults. Could it be that the third form of natural epistemology (as described on p. 263 by Almeder) should be the favored position because it combines the merits of both?
What is the analytic/synthetic distinction (Almeder p. 267) and how does it play a central role in the argument about natural versus traditional epistemology?
Could Churchland’s discussion of the connectionist model (p. 549-553) be missing the mark? Could it be that traditional epistemology would be useful to evaluate information gathered by these scientific methods?
Does Churchland’s discussion of evolution (p. 548-549) offer any insight or explanation for not only how we think and reason, but also how we ought to think and reason in comparison to closely and distantly related organisms driven by selective pressures and the niches they occupy? How does this pertain to ‘naturalized epistemology’? Must these older topics of evolution also be re-contextualized to follow our growing understanding of the brain?