Chapter 1: The Rise of ISIS
This chapter documents the rapid takeover of ISIS and compares its size and influence to that of Al- Qaeda. This comparison allows for the reader to understand why ISIS gained territory, support, and power in a way that Al- Qaeda did not. This chapter discussed the effects of the Arab Spring on the political and defense mechanism and their response to the hostile takeover of cities by the group. It also discussed the effect of the Sunni and Shi’a conflict in the region and the effect of arming anti-Assad militants had in indirectly aiding ISIS in its terror campaign over the region. This chapter also discussed the importance of International Politics
Chapter 2: “The Battle of Mosul”
This chapter depicts the four-day assault on Mosul –the second largest city in Iraq– that began June 6th, 2014. It discusses the effect of corruption on the state level that left the city unprotected and also discussed the history of Al-Qaeda’s forces in the region and their evolution into ISIS. The chapter describes the effective tactics used by the group on the city and the surrounding areas and the effect that taking this city had on the rest of the country as from there the rumors of an attack on Baghdad became a very real fear as it would grant the group historical legitimacy, as they would claim the historical site of a former caliphate. It also continues to depict the effect of Sunni and Shi’a conflict fueling the fear of the Sunni minority and the conflict amongst the people of Mosul on how to respond to the ISIS campaign when the alternative was the corrupt government. It also discusses the effect of allies in responding to the invasion.
Chapter 3: “In Denial”
The chapter begins with a critique of the U.S. and Western and their use of force through a “bombast” to deal with ISIS. It discusses the effect of media coverage on the group’s campaign and how when there was no imminent attack on Baghdad then and how coverage shifting to other conflicts (Malaysian aircraft over Ukraine shot down by Russia) it cleared a path for the group into Syria. This chapter also critiques the effectiveness of going after oil and monetary influx into the group and relating the ineffectiveness of fighting violence with violence to the lack of faith by the people of the region for a forceful solution. It also continues on to discuss the anti-Assad sentiment used by ISIS to gain ground in Syria. It also continues to talk about the way that the influx of jihadis from abroad into the group further entrenched the group’s strength in the region (disillusionment in their countries post “Arab Spring” pushing them toward extremism).
Chapter 4: Jihadis on the March
This chapter begins by illustrating the actions and practices of individuals in order to demonstrate their loyalty to the cause of jihad. Furthermore, Patrick Cockburn spends a significant amount of time portraying the burning of passports to signify that once joining the ranks of jihadism, members vow to uphold its practices and never return to their home country. From here, Cockburn moves to outline the campaigns of the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda in Iraq and Syria in order to provide readers with a rudimentary understanding of their advances in recent years. He marks the captures of Mosul and Tikirit as quintessential gains representing the Islamic States’ territorial expansion, as an example. Here, the author identifies “Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi” as the group’s leader and raises issue with attempting to quantify his involvement in the security and military actions of the Islamic State as it is a multifaceted entity. Cockburn argues that while groups such as ISIS and other jihadist organizations capitalize on a similar ideology to that of al-Qaeda, they are separate and distinct functioning individually on different levels. In this light, Cockburn remains skeptical of the western practice which tends to lump these groups together and takes issue with reserving active intervention for those which reflect similarities to al-Qaeda in particular. In doing so, countries such as the United States remained uninterested in the work of ISIS, for example, until it was able to capture significant territory (Mosul).
Chapter 5: The Sunni Resurgence in Iraq
In this chapter, Patrick Cockburn focuses on the events in Iraq which contributed to advances made by the Islamic State. He begins by providing an account of ISIS’ capture of Fallujah and Tikrit, both of which he regards as revealing “an important political truth about contemporary Iraq” (81). Cockburn states that in these instances, “neither the government nor any of the constitutional political movements were as strong as they pretended to be,” which left the door open for ISIS to emerge faster than expected in the country (81). The author additionally blames the Iraqi military for the cause of defeat in that it lacked the morale and discipline to silence the opposition. With regards to American aid, Cockburn reports that financial corruption on the part of the Iraqi forces was also a point of contention. In doing so, he further moves to focus on corruption as the main component which saturated Iraq and caused many of its inhabitants to lose faith. Corrupt practices, as the author believes it, were both inevitable and historically rooted in the folds of Iraqi society–leading ISIS to exploit its disgruntled Sunni population. Thus, this introduces Cockburn’s argument that sectarian conflict inherently catered to the Islamic State.
Chapter 6: Jihadists Hijack the Syria Uprising
Patrick Cockburn, in this chapter, moves his work to concern conditions in Syria which allowed for jihadist activity in the region. To begin, he uses primary sources to give an account of human and civil rights infractions which led to the Syrian uprising. However, according to Cockburn, such popular movement was unsuccessful in replacing tyranny with a secular and democratic state–leading it to be silenced by a sectarian civil war. Furthermore, he writes that “Syrians [were forced] to choose between a violent dictatorship” or an “opposition that shoots children in the face for minor blasphemy and sends pictures of decapitated soldiers to the parents of their victims” (97). Cockburn equates modern Syria to Lebanon two or three decades ago which has been diminished to abandoned buildings and infrastructure “smashed by shellfire” (97). Aleppo today reflects many of these same characteristics and what Patrick Cockburn calls “government successes” only contributed to the jihadist cause in the end. [Note for our class: this chapter is interesting in that it credits the Syrian uprising to the “Arab Spring” in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Bahrain (99)].
Chapter 7: Saudi Arabia Tries to Pull Back
The chapter details the jihadi salifist movements in Iraq and how Saudi Arabia has responded to the radicalization of some of their own people. Cockburn calls into question the intentions of the Saudi regime. Cockburn also indicts Western governments for failing to care about Shia deaths in Syria, Iraq, and Pakistan, and reiterates the narrative that the West operates in a security mindset concerned with stopping ideology. Saudi Wahhabism, recognized in the educational and judicial system, is quite similar to al-Qaeda and Salafi jihadist groups and has contributed ideologically and financially to the violent Sunni-Shia violence. Saudi rulers who aided jihadis in the overthrow of Assad Syria now likely regret their action, evidenced through a 2014 invitation to the Iranian foreign minister to Saudi Arabia.
Chapter 8: If it Bleeds it Leads
Cockburn argues that media coverage of Syria, as well as ISIS, has been profoundly influenced by a history of foreign intervention in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria over the past 12+ years. No local powers to date have been successful in the state-building process. This history of armed struggle has been also a history of propaganda wars that have mislead and sensationalized. Cockburn tries to set the record straight and explain why misperceptions have lead to poor strategy, predictions, and outcomes. The Taliban’s rise in 2006 can be partly explained through the misleading narrative that they had been largely defeated and were no longer significant. War reporters were given the lion’s share of news platforms, but missed the bigger picture, solely focusing on military combat. Oversimplification, the idea that “If it bleeds it leads”, deceived the world especially when paired with political propaganda.
Chapter 9: Shock and War
Shock and War begins with the fall of Mosul in June of 2014 and the failure of the Iraqi army. Stories about Iraqi army corruption where commanders bought posts and received benefits from kickbacks and embezzlement turned out to be true. ISIS, on the other hand, was run with “a chilling blend of ideological fanaticism and military efficiency.” Western governments again missed the mark. In reality the Mosul fall, Cockburn says, happened due to the war across Iraq’s border. The West’s failure dates back to 9/11 when the US targeted Afghanistan and Iraq and gave Saudi Arabia and Pakistan a free pass even though their ideologies and regimes were most involved in supporting al-Qaeda and the attacks. Until the role of these regimes is properly addressed, no real progress will be made in combating Islamic extremism. In addition to governmental missteps, revolutionaries overestimated the effects of the 2011 Arab Spring. Years later, democracy has retreated and the narrative is quite different. Even still, problems will not disappear if democracies are installed successfully. The failure of many areas has left the Middle East vulnerable and unprepared for events, and the result is likely a “long period of ferment in which counterrevolution may prove as difficult to consolidate as the revolution itself.”
Review
As a Westerner in Iraq, Cockburn is uniquely positioned to critique the region and the West’s intervention. However, it is important to note that to understand much of what Cockburn’s analysis in his book one must have a good background understanding the Sunni versus Shi’a religious conflict in the region. In focusing in on some of the key areas that the west went wrong, such as media narratives, failure to properly characterize regime relationships such as the relationship between al-Qaeda and Saudi Arabia detailed in chapter 9, and the failure of revolutionaries as well, Cockburn paints a discouraging but realistic picture of what went terribly wrong. The Middle East and the West moving forward must understand how these failures can be remedied in a destabilized region. The big question that Cockburn asks, again and again, is, why did the West miss these events? The division and civil war in Syria is ultimately a tale of multiple opposition parties having different views of strength and success. Cockburn does well to explain why there is so much conflict, but like everyone else does not know how to resolve it.
It is important to note, however, that while Patrick Cockburn’s work does provide a unique perspective as a westerner, his writing is a bit contradictory at times. For example, he argues for taking into account jihadist organizations with a narrow lens–demonizing the work of Western forces which view them all as one in the same. While this may seem inherently contextualist on the surface, his use of sweeping statements in anecdotal account remains inherently essentialist. For example, in chapter 4 concerning jihadis burning their passports, he claims that they are “most likely in Syria” leaving the reader to question accuracy and legitimacy (61). Thus, the inferring done on the part of the author at times inadvertently detracts from the work’s overall academic value to some extent.
By Emily, Jake, and John