Chapter One: Understanding the Political Democratisation at the Beginning of the Twenty-first Century
In Chapter One, Volpi considers various approaches to the question of Islam in democracy and, in an effort to avoid common pitfalls — employing Western definitions political development and revolution, failing to identify ideological bias, focusing on state structures and institutions, and so forth — he decides to examine the practical motivations of actions taken in Algeria through the lens of ideology and culture. He emphasizes the examination of political actors’ use of existing systems and persuasive rhetoric to gain power, as well as the narrative in which Islam and democracy are dichotomized. He attributes the success of Islamic fundamentalists to the strategic employment of this dichotomy and a genuine desire for an Islamic democracy. Volpi points to the conflict between the public consensus and the current secular authoritarian regimes as a roadblock on the path to democracy. He then discusses the role of states in transnational ideological movements. He notes that, unlike previous groups, contemporary international terrorist organizations are financed primarily through a decentralized network rather than traditional states. Moreover, they use the West’s support of secular authoritarian regimes — a short-term solution to security threats — to radicalize oppressed citizens living at home or abroad. Thus, all actors have found themselves within a vicious cycle.
Chapter Two: Political Ideas and Practices in Historical Perspective
In Chapter Two, Volpi examines the origin of authoritarian governance in Algeria, starting with colonialism. Because the state of Algeria was initially a French colonial conception, the protectorate adopted a hierarchical governance structure based in the mission civilisatrice. After Algeria gained Independence, the National Liberation Front (FLN) established a similar hierarchical structure based in post-colonial movements. The FLN solidified its power through repressive tactics and nepotism, leading to conflict between the purported principle of governance as benefiting the people and the actual implementation of governance as only benefiting the elite — a phenomenon Volpi relates to assabiyya during the “classical Islamic period.” He then examines the rise of political Islam, focusing on the primary ideologies that led to the rise of contemporary Islamic fundamentalism, beginning in the early 20th century. Jamal al-Afghani’s call for a rational Western approach to Islamic reform inspired the salafiyya movement, reform based in the “Golden Age of Islam” that was politicized by its followers. Sayyib Qutb eventually broke from the salafiyya movement and argued for reform based in morality. He called for the “enlightenment of the masses” and, Volpi notes, placed political Islam in direct opposition to post-colonial MENA regimes.
Chapter Three: The Algerian Political Transition: Democratic Symbols and Authoritarian Practices (1988-91)
In Chapter Three, Volpi discusses the attempted democratization of Algeria from 1988-1991 by exploring the roles of civil society, political Islam, and the Algerian regime. He begins by describing the grassroots creation of civil society that finally began to gain traction in 1980 due to pervasive economic hardship. Algerians took to the streets in protest of the increased cost of food and education, as well as the decreased quality in work conditions and benefits. President Chadli responded by declaring a state of emergency and implementing military rule. Islamic fundamentalism embedded itself in protest efforts and worked to organize and focus this expression of civil power. Heinous acts of oppression by the regime eventually led protesters to demand a regime change. President Chadli thus began to promote long-term democratic reform, which appeased the protesters. Elections for a new President, constitutional reform – leading to the creation of the FIS party –, and other efforts to incorporate the will of the people into governance were initially promising, but a lack of trust still permeated the political sphere. After the FIS’s success in the 1990s elections, the regime implemented more regressive practices and showed its true colors following the contentious FIS victory in the 1991 elections.
Chapter Four: The 1992 Coup d’État and Beyond: War as Politics Through Other Means (1992-94)
In Chapter Four, Volpi recounts the eruption of violence that marked the 1990s as a brutal and dark decade. Unrest – led by the FIS – began with President Chadli’s unexpected resignation in 1992 after secretly dissolving of Parliament. The High Security Council (HSC) initially took over, but quickly transferred its power to the State High Committee (HCE) due to claims of illegitimacy. Though the HCE gained international legitimacy from the Maghreb and Egypt, it lacked domestic support was met with a violent uprising on February 8th. Volpi then reveals the military coup’s role in President Chadli’s resignation and dissolving of Parliament. He describes the military’s consolidation of power through the HCE – a puppet government –, noting their efforts to disenfranchise and de-legitimize the FIS in particular. The HCE, led by Boudiaf before his assassination, did not enact meaningful reform and the military grew even more repressive. In an attempt at peace, the HCE establishes the “National Commission for Dialogue” (CND), but this effort failed. Violence grew increasingly widespread due to the undemocratic appointment of Liamin Zeroula to the Presidency and the rise of guerrilla groups – notably the Armed Islamic Movement (MIA), the Armed Islamic Group (GIA)., and the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS).
Chapter Five: A New Authoritarianism: Guided Democracy Versus Radical Islam (1995-2000)
In Chapter Five, Volpi considers the regime’s attempts to restore trust in pursuit of peace. First, President Zeroual attempts to establish dialogue with FIS in 1994, but is unsuccessful. He then implements democratic reform, notably the Presidential and Parliamentary elections, and reconciliation through amnesty. However, his continued use of repressive measures led to mistrust of the elections. In fact, Zeroual won the Presidential election, in what many claim was a ploy to gain legitimacy. Zeroual lost even more support as a result of his undemocratic efforts to remain in power, as evidenced by the allegedly rigged 1997 elections – leading to mass protests. Despite his successful negotiation of a FIS ceasefire, Zeroula resigned in 1998 – likely due to military pressure – prompting an election. This election was later proven to be rigged, ensuring Bouteflika’s victory. Bouteflika made strides in establishing peace through the “law on civil concord” and an amnesty deal in 1999. However, Bouteflika and the military – led by Lamari – continued to conspire together in search of power. Guerilla groups lost much of their influence in the late 1990s, but (as of 2003) continue to push their agenda.
Chapter Six: A Civil Society in Transition: Survivalist Strategies and Social Protest
In Chapter Six, Volpi highlights the difficulties that civil society faced, as many Algerians considered violence to be the only way to truly enact change. In rural areas, communities were ravaged by violence and crippling economic conditions, leading many rural Algerians to either join a guerilla group or the state-sponsored militias. This decision was pragmatic and based on family and clan loyalty. Urban communities, on the other hand, were more focused in the regime’s economic and social policy, most notably the poorly managed resource of oil. Moreover, an influx or rural Algerians in urban areas, due to the horrible conditions of rural life, introduced additional social issues in urban areas, such as lack of housing and job loss. Volpi notes that the black market became a source of civil society, as it provided job opportunities and reduced the state’s control of the economy by decentralizing currency. Civil society was also present in the Islamic and Berber groups who supported vulnerable Algerians. These groups worked through networks and joined forces against the common enemy of the state in spite of ideological differences. However, Volpi highlights the case of Kabyle as an example of how easily civil society is radicalized.
Chapter Seven: The New International Arena: Strengths and Weaknesses of the New World Order
In Chapter Seven, Volpi examines the events of the dark decade in an international context. Algeria as a state was doing well economically due to foreign investment and oil production. Average Algerians were still suffering, though, in spite of regime efforts to offer economic relief. After Boudiaf’s assassination, socialist practices and were reintroduced and additional money was printed, but inflation increased as a result of these practices, exacerbating already dire economic conditions. Algeria reached out to international community for assistance and the economy was subsequently liberalized. As “stability” returned to Algeria in 1995 – at least from an international perspective –, so did foreign investments. Despite economic setbacks in the late 1990s, Algeria was an attractive investment opportunity and essential ally in the war on terror in the 2000s. Volpi notes that the international community’s failure to “promote democracy” led to the radicalization of many Algerians, at home and abroad, who sought justice through any means – even violence. He concludes by considering if democracy has a place in Algeria – military personnel argue that the type of governance will not remedy systemic issues – and, if so, what democracy in Algeria would look like, noting the Turkish Republic’s “quasi-democracy” as a potential example.
Chapter Eight: Conclusion: Learning and Unlearning to be Democratic
Volpi concludes by revisiting his main points and offering measures that can be taken to facilitate the success democratization of Algeria. He highlights the main reasons why Algeria failed to democratize in the 1990s, underscoring the focus on institutional debate, despite ongoing economic and social issues, the speed of the transition process, and the lack of effective non-partisan civil power. He continues by noting that all parties are all responsible for the current situation, a nuanced understanding that stems from considering the “practical” decisions involved in the conflict. Volpi subsequently considers the fundamental flaws of each actor’s response to the situation: he notes that international community exacerbated the radicalization of Algerians through short-term solutions to economic and security issues; the regime suffered due to an absence of trust; and Islamic fundamentalists lacked political experience, moderation, and a clear hierarchy that could have preserved the ethos of the organization. Moving forward, Volpi notes obstacles to democratization, including a precedence of violence and the prioritization of stability, but also tools – notably the Kabyle community’s expression of civil power. Volpi believes re-education is key to fostering an informed populous and peaceful democratization process, but admits that situation is pretty bleak.
Overall Review
In Islam in Democracy: The Failure of Dialogue in Algeria, Frédéric Volpi provides a nuanced analysis of Algeria’s attempt at democratization and avoids vilifying the Islamic actors, as other accounts of the Dark Decade and political Islam often do. As a European academic, Volpi approaches the Algerian events exogenously and is thus able to construct a relatively objective analysis. His practical approach is very successful and does, in fact, allow him to consider the merits and flaws of each actor’s decisions. While Volpi does examine these aspects of each distinct actor, he does not examine the role of women during the democratization process, the Dark Decade, or the aftermath. Women, in fact, were deliberately targeted by guerrilla and state-sponsored violence and have led the effort to establish transitional justice in Algeria. Furthermore, Volpi did not consider how women fit into the ideological shaping of political Islam over the 20th century, despite the fact that women’s rights were central to the secular versus Islamic debate. Finally, as nearly half of Algerians are women, they would be a critical group to consider in the event of democratization. Volpi’s analysis remains nuanced despite this decision to exclude the women’s rights issue, but is ultimately not comprehensive.
(Text by Claiborne Beary)