Religious Radicalism after the Arab Uprisings edited by Jon B. Alterman
Reviewed and Summarized by Ella Marks, Jake Simon, Brigid Callahan, Carmen Sanchez Cumming, and Innocent Mpoki
Religious Radicalism after the Arab Uprisings is a short collection of writings about the Arab Spring in 2011. Published in 2015, the book is one of the most recent published analyses of the Arab Spring and its impacts on the Middle East. The essays focus on the relationship between the uprisings and an increase in radicalism in the region. As a whole, the book can be viewed as a warning to readers that the crisis in the Arab world is far from over. Governments have many challenges to face against religiously inspired militants who have only become stronger since the uprisings began in 2011.
Jihadi-Salafi Rebellion and the Crisis of Authority – Haim Malka
This chapter describes the constant struggle between jihadist groups for authentic Muslim leadership and unity in the Middle East. Competition for authority and legitimacy has driven jihadi-salafist groups to take more extreme measures in order to distinguish themselves. The higher the tension is between jihadi-salafist groups, the more unrest there is in the Middle East. Today, both ISIS and al Qaeda operate as jihadi-salafists, creating tension within the ranks of salafism as both groups try to shape strategy and become more legitimate than the other. The chapter also discusses the ideological differences between al Qaeda and the Islamic State and describes how the organizations developed.
Malka writes about the history of jihadi-salafist groups. While victories against foreign nations brought them together against a common enemy, the unity never lasted long because the groups could not decide on how to continue jihad. Some jihadists believe that jihad should focus on anti-colonial struggles and non-Muslim invaders while others have argued that jihad is necessary to take down authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. Islamists, including jihadi-salafists, had aimed to overthrow the authoritarian governments of the middle east. After the uprisings began, they saw an opportunity to capitalize on the new dynamics of the region. A new generation of jihadists found themselves able to promote and engage in new strategies of jihad. Leaders of jihadist movements were released from jail and groups gained legitimacy with many of their leaders finally being free. Instead of uniting into one large group that could have been an effective force in the region, the jihadi-salafists began to challenge the authority of al Qaeda, a jihadi-salafist organization. Militant groups across the region had different goals and acted in different ways against government targets. In particular, in Tunisia, the jihadi-salafists promoted the spread of Islam and spiritual outreach in the political arena.
Key Elements of the Counterterrorist Challenge- Thomas N. Sanderson with Joshua Russakis and Michael Barber
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Terrorist organizations have moved away from reliance on external donations to sustain their agendas and are utilizing territories in their control to tax civilians, extort businesses, kidnap for ransom, trade oil illicitly, and sell government property and antiquities to create long-term viability of a “war economy.” The U.S. Treasury and the G7 established Financial Action Task Force are working to assist governments in combating money laundering and terrorist funding, but the development of terrorist groups generating revenue independently has complicated international intervention.
Funding from the Local War Economy: The Islamic State has procured multiple territories across Iraq and Syria that are frequented roads/ passes needed for citizen travel and they use this to control migration and the taxation of travelers. The majority of the Islamic State’s monetary strength stems from their control of oil and wheat supplies, of which they make millions of dollars daily. If the Islamic State did not have such funds a larger portion of their time would be spent accumulating money, rather than implementing their regime.
Foreign Fighters: According to the director of the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center, there are a total of 15,000 foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq as of September 2014. Fighters have traveled from over 80 countries to join a range of insurgent militias. The Islamic State encourages foreign mujahedeen to join their ranks with promises of wives, wealth, rich accommodations, religious fulfillment, and personal glory. The majority of recruits are young men (although women work for terrorist groups as well) who are struggling in their current situations due to poverty or discrimination. Social media is the main forum for recruitment; terrorist groups have an especially strong Twitter presence.
Safe Havens: Safe havens are areas completely under various insurgent groups’ control where the official government is either unwilling or unable to combat their presence due to corrupt, weak, or inept rulers. The internal strife in Yemen and Afghanistan has created opportunities for Al Qaeda to operate in troubled regions. Whereas in Syria and Iraq, the Islamic State has taken up residence and are being targeted by the U.S. with direct action by Special Operations Forces, CFT measures, aircraft attacks, and drone strikes.
Tunisia: Confronting Extremism – Haim Malka
After the fall of Tunisia’s dictator, Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali, in 2011 jihadi-salafi groups began to thrive in the country. The newfound freedom of expression and religion that came with Tunisia’s transition to democracy, the post-Revolution instability, the history of political fragmentation and oppression, and the unrest in neighboring countries are amongst the most significant factors that have allowed jihadi-salafi groups to gain power.
By the end of 2012 there existed two main strains of jihadi-salafism: Ansar Al Shari’a in Tunisia (which promoted religious outreach to mainstream audiences usually by means of social activism) and Okba ibn Nafaa Brigade (bands of fighters who launched violent attacks against the government).
The response of the post-Revolution Ennahda-led government to these groups was slow, and only became more assertive after political assassinations took place and there was an increase in attacks to security forces. The government then evicted jihadi-salafi preachers from mosques and launched operations against militants, for example. This chapter concludes by highlighting one of Tunisia’s most difficult challenges: to fight violent extremism while moving away from the lack of speech and religious freedoms of the past.
Saudi Arabia: Islamists Rising and Falling – Jon B. Alterman and William McCants
In this Chapter, Alterman and McCants examine the relationship between the Saudi state and different Islamic groups like violent and nonviolent Salafists, Islamists, Reformers, and Jihadists in the country and across the region. The authors argue that, since the foundation of the state, the Saudi regime has defined this relationship in terms of the challenge or support these groups offer to the Saudi regime. This criteria has determined whether one is a friend or enemy of Saudi Arabia as “the state variously accommodates, co-opts, delegitimizes, and represses different political and religious actors at different times.” The Saudi state has accommodated radical militant groups only if they do not directly challenge the state’s legitimacy, and on the other hand suppressed those who go against the state, for example in 1979 when it crushed the militants who laid laid siege to Mecca’s Grand Mosque.
The legitimacy of the Saudi State is founded on the Al Saud family’s alliance with the descendants of Muhammad Ibn Abd al – Wahhab and adherents to the Wahhabi belief – an ultra-conservative bunch of Sunni Islam. The Saudi state would do everything to keep this legitimacy and upholding Wahhabism. Extreme groups like al Qaeda and ISIS rejects the legitimacy of the Saudi State. In response, Saudi Arabia has been successful in suppressing and silencing any internal disloyalty and disobedience.
However, the Arab Spring posed a couple challenges to the Saudi state. One was the electoral success of Muslim Brotherhood in the region after the uprisings. The Saudi rulers feared that the domestic political Islamists in the Kingdom would also demand reforms or even ignite a revolution against the state’s autocratic ruling style. The second challenge stems from the rise of radical militant groups in Syria and Iraq like the self-proclaimed Islamic State. The former challenge posed a political threat to the Saudi regime and the later posed a security threat. The Islamic State is also an ideological concern to the Saudi State because its claim to authentic religions authority over all Muslims threaten the Saudi state’s legitimacy. In response, the Saudi state has treated both challenges as security threat. Saudi Arabia has allied with the US to crack down on the Islamic militants in Syria and Iraq. The Saudis were also against the Muslim Brotherhood whom they called “terrorist organization” Many youths angered by the regime’s stance on the Islamists have gone to fight with Jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq or joined the Islamic State.
The Saudi state condemned the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt as a conspiracy plan to destroy the state’s legitimacy. The anti-autocratic message from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Ennahda in Tunisia was a political threat to the Saudi regime.
Egypt: The Search for Stability, Jon B. Alterman and William McCants
Alterman and McCants succinctly analyze and dissect the problem of radical Islamist movements in Egypt. They provide a backstory to radical Islamist under Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak and their eventual relationship with Al-Quaeda. They then go on to summarize the relationship between the Islamists and government post-revolution, the election of the Muslim Brotherhood and the eventual fall of Morsi. Finally, they discuss the rise of militancy in the Sinai desert region and how it has evolved into a serious issue for the Egyptian government.
Alterman and McCants to a fantastic job delving into and explaining Islamic radicalism in Egypt. Not only do they showcase the current problem, but also search for the history and roots, and explain the evolution. Their analysis is poignant and relevant to understanding the MENA region, the Arab world, and jihadi salafism as a whole. They describe how the Muslim Brotherhood tried to create a new political elite within Egypt, and how Sisi was able to take over and effectively return political power to the old regime. The issue that Sisi faces now – how much should Islamists be included in the political sphere of a Muslim country is a poignant one, that all the Arab countries face, and that Tunisia is still facing. Alterman and McCants showcase the difference between the Muslim Brotherhood, which professes to be nonviolent, and the violent jihadi groups based in the Sinai desert. Their analysis of the various potential futures that Islamist groups hold in Egyptian politics is relevant and important to understand the political system in Egypt, one of the most powerful countries in the MENA region and Arab world.
One flaw in their analysis is that they don’t figure other countries significantly into their thought process, with the exception of mentioning Libya’s failed state status and its potential to harbor violent jihadi fighters and movements. Considering other MENA states, such as Tunisia, which had what some call a very successful combination of Islamist and democratic values to create a functioning democracy. Though it is true that no other country that was involved in the Arab Spring was as successful, it is still relevant and important to any current analysis.
Conclusion:
As a whole, the book provides thorough and thought provoking analysis on the development and changes to Salafi-jihadism post Arab Spring. The various papers showcase different countries and their responses, and what has been successful versus what hasn’t. It discusses potential challenges for policy makers, Islamists and radicals, and what it means for the future of the conflict with radical Islamists and terrorists. This analysis is an important tool to be able to fully understand the overlooked aspect of the conflict in the Middle East: the conflict between local groups to gain legitimacy, influence, and power. The Arab Spring provided the outside world with the perfect lens to analyze this conflict, and the various papers have done it well. Alterman comes to the conclusion that jihadist and other radical movements have ignited since the Arab spring while more liberal movements have been stifled. While the rest of the world has seen the Arab spring as a time of revolutions that will lead to peace, Alterman believes that combating radicalism has only become more difficult after the revolutions.