Summarized and reviewed by Cole Bortz and Margot Masinter
Summary
CHAPTER I – Maturation of the Idea of National Dialogue After the Revolution
M’rad chronologically discusses the personalities and efforts behind Tunisia’s National Dialogue, partitioning its evolution into 4 distinct phases: after January 14 revolution; after October 2011 elections; after Chokri Belaid’s assassination; after Mohamed Brahmi’s assassination. Within each phase, Hatem describes specific personalities, groups, and distinct events involved. Interesting is his account of President Marzouki’s failed attempt of national dialogue after the assassination of Chokri Belaid – “the rebellious spirit of Marzouki is conducive neither to pragmatism nor to concessions, all necessary for dialogue”
CHAPTER II – The Official Start of the National Dialogue and the Participation of Actors
The National Dialogue was initiated by four civil society organizations: UGTT, Tunisian union group active since colonization; Tunisian League of Human Rights, motivated throughout both dictatorships; Tunisian Bar Association ONAT, serving political and legal roles for victims of injustice; and UTICA employers organization. The convergence of these civil society groups embodies “an enlarged neutrality, a consensus, a balance, and a form of representativeness of civil society”. M’rad emphasizes it is the first time UGTT and UTICA convened for political purposes, not trade union issues. Uniting employers and employees created unprecedented internal dynamics – together they embody Tunisia’s workforce. Cooperation between UTICA and UGTT widened the space for dialogue and gave incentive for many other political parties to participate. Only a small minority of ANC parties -notably the CPR and Wafa Al-Aridha – rejected the National Dialogue; most Tunisian political parties, organizations, foreign states and international organizations were strong proponents of its efforts.
CHAPTER III – The Agreement on the Roadmap
The Quartet, namely UTICA, arranged Tunisia’s roadmap towards recovering and concluding ANC’s work, and terminating and replacing Laarayedh’s government. M’rad discusses the weekly schedule suggested in the roadmap, but stresses its distorted, untimely implementation. While the ANC attempted to follow this roadmap, Ennahda was busy searching for safeguards and guarantees. Ennahda wanted to ensure favorable outcomes from the withdrawal of Laarayedh’s government and the adoption of the constitution. Ultimately, Ennahda succeeded: Houcine Ali Abbasi and Laarayedh reached a secret agreement whereby all of Ennahda’s safeguards were ensured and Ghannouchi was certain he could sign the roadmap.
CHAPTER IV – The question of government
According to M’rad, the “most discussed points between Ennahda and Abbassi” were the resignation of Ali Laarayedh’s government and the appointment of a new Prime Minister. There was no clear consensus among Dialogue participants around either of these issues; however, most parties agreed that the new Prime Minister should be independent, have no connection to the old regime, and have experience ruling. Thus, in the last two days of discussions, Medhi Jemaa–an “independent technocrat” and “former Minister of Industry in Laarayedh’s government” experienced in corporate management–became an appealing option. In the end, while Nidaa Tounes initially balked at the Ennahda-backed proposal, 9 of 11 voting parties chose Jemaa as the Prime Minister, solving the National Dialogue’s first major challenge.
CHAPTER V – The constitutional question
For the most part, participants in the National Dialogue understood that finalizing the constitution was not their responsibility, but rather that of the NCA and its Consensus Committee. That said, while the National Dialogue did not “directly intervene on the content and provisions of the Constitution,” M’rad argues that the Dialogue did influence the trajectory of the constitution, namely its politics and technicalities.
CHAPTER VI – The Election Issue
A particularly divisive issue discussed at the National Dialogue was the order of presidential and parliamentary elections. Dialogue representatives from Nina Tounes, Joumhouri, Al-Moubadra, and the Democratic Alliance wanted presidential elections to come before legislative, while Al-Massar and Afek Tounes wanted the opposite. Ennhada used the issue as a bargaining chip, initially proposing the elections be held simultaneously so they could later “concede” and have the legislative elections first. Ultimately the issue was decided by just one vote– the legislative elections were to be held before the executive.
With regards to the timing of these elections, the government-backed Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE) was clear: as per constitutional provisions, the elections would take place in 2014. ISIE’s president Chafik Sarsar was adamant that a viable democracy could not begin with a blatant constitutional violation. Although the ISIE faced vocal criticism from some Dialogue members, the election was held on Dec. 21, 2014.
CHAPTER VII – The Leadership within the National Dialogue
In this chapter, M’rad highlights four leaders who played a key role in the National Dialogue.
According to M’rad, UGGT Secretary General Houcine Abbassi was the most important leader in the National Dialogue’s compromise process, going so far as to claim “the national dialogue was him.” M’rad argues that the second most important leader was UTICA head Wided Bouchamaoui, as under Bouchamaoui, UTICA accepted a “new role” and “worked in harmony with UGGT.” Fiunally, M’rad states that by virtue of representing major political parties, Rachen Ghannouchi and Beji Caid Essebsi played large parts in the Dialogue negotiations.
VIII – The issue of the institutionalization of the National Dialogue
While some argued that the institutionalization of the National Dialogue could be helpful for conflict resolution in future crises, the majority of Dialogue participants believed otherwise. According to Chafik Sarsar, president of the Supreme Independent Elections Authority in Tunisia, the Dialogue was not meant to exist as a “parallel institution to the state,” but instead help guide the country through a serious political crisis. All actors involved in the Dialogue believed a functioning constitutional democracy would minimize future conflict. Thus, the end result was a temporary, non-institutionalized National Dialogue.
IX – The public’s perception of the National Dialogue
M’rad’s research team interviewed 32 people from four different regions (Tunis, Bizerte, Sfax, and Douz) about their perceptions of civil society, the conduct of the National Dialogue, and the legitimacy of the actors involved. Despite receiving mixed feedback on most issues, all survey participants agreed that the National Dialogue “[changed] the political map” of Tunisia, reconciling the differences between Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes. Perhaps the most revealing result of M’rad’s research is the fact that most interviewees from Douz, Sfax, and Bizerte agreed that the National Dialogue should have placed greater priority on the economic crisis, social justice, and regional development.
X – The teachings of the Tunisian National Dialogue after the revolution
In the book’s final chapter, M’rad summarizes the main achievements of the National Dialogue, stating that he National Dialogue’s compromise was more unimportant than its substance. M’rad believes that creating a culture of cooperation and group discussion deserved merit in and of itself. Most importantly, M’rad argues, the National Dialogue created “peaceful coexistence and mutual recognition…between two culturally hostile political forces,” Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes.
Review
For all the heated discussion, disillusion, and tough political negotiation that characterized the National Dialogue process in Tunisia, Hatem M’rad’s National Dialogue in Tunisia paints a slightly less complex picture. The Dialogue process, argues M’rad, was a “realistic method needed to overcome a difficult phase” in Tunisia’s history. It doesn’t matter whether or not the National Dialogue created a successful roadmap for Tunisia as creating the roadmap itself “was a solution to the crisis.” In broad strokes, M’rad offers a survey of the Tunisian National Dialogue process, its main actors, and a few contentious issues debated by Dialogue leaders.
In this sense, National Dialogue in Tunisia is a worthwhile read for anyone looking to understand the very basics of Tunisia’s National Dialogue process. M’rad gives a detailed timeline of Dialogue negotiations, beginning with UGTT’s grouping initiatives, and enumerating the various Dialogue efforts initiated by actors such as Moncef Marzouki, Hamadi Jebali, and the Joumhouri party. Nearly ten separate efforts towards a national dialogue were made, none of which solidified needs until the National Dialogue in October 2015. While this thorough history of the National Dialogue mentions oft-neglected actors, places, and ideologies; it fails to adequately critique some of the central players. For example, Hatem does not pay homage to the failures of the UGTT and its past, nor does he contextualize the significance of their collaborations with certain political parties. In the early chapters, the reader must imagine a social context and public perception. Chapter 1, in particular, did not sufficiently integrate the role of civil society and public opinion about the major political forces in Tunisia. We learn immense amounts about the internal dynamics and personalities involved, yet external impacts and frustrations were not addressed.
A minor critique, yet potentially major hindrance, was an implicit language barrier and imperfect translation. Of course, any book published in multiple languages is subject to this shortcoming; however, in National Dialogue in Tunisia, the reader is vulnerable to blatant misunderstanding. There are instances where we cannot discern whether M’rad is biased, and other moments where we cannot distinguish objective plot developments (notably in Chapter 3, section D “the search for Guarantees by Ennahda”).
Perhaps the most interesting part of National Dialogue in Tunisia were the results of M’rad’s interviews with Tunisian citizens. Throughout the later chapters, M’rad incorporates statistics collected from interviews with 32 Tunisian citizens, MPs, and civil society leaders from four different regions of Tunisia: Tunis, Bizerte, Sfax, and Douz. As a common grievance driving the revolution was widening inequality between coastal and inland regions, gathering the thoughts of these people gives M’rad’s book a greater sense of legitimacy, and helps to counterbalance the opinions of the political elite with those of (a small sample) of everyday Tunisian citizens.
That said, M’rad does not talk about many of the criticisms and subtleties that surround the National Dialogue. For example, when discussing the role of the Quartet and civil society in the negotiation process, M’rad claims that cooperation between UGGT, LTDH, ONAT, and UTICA was essential to the Dialogue’s success as it implied “the whole society,” not just the political elite, “would be involved in finding a solution to the crisis.” This success narrative of the Tunisian Quartet—maintained by the Nobel Committee and many international news outlets—neglects to tell the full truth; a common criticism of the National Dialogue is that it hijacked a youth-driven social movement and placed decision-making power in the hands of older politicians and civil society leaders like Essebsi, Abbassi, and Ghannouchi.
Additionally, although M’rad does give credit to the NCA’s Consensus Committee for reconciling Islamist and secular thought in the June 1 constitutional draft, he largely overblows the role of the National Dialogue in the drafting process. M’rad specifically states that after the participating parties of the Dar Dhiafa Dialogue shared their deliberations on contentious issues (universal human rights, freedom of conscience, the right to strike, and the role of the opposition) with the NCA’s Consensus Commission, “a new constitution was born.” This is a vast oversimplification of the dynamic between the National Dialogue the NCA. While it’s true that National Dialogue representatives discussed the same issues as the Constituent Assembly, it should be stressed that the Dialogue played no role in the actual drafting of the constitution. M’rad recognizes this; however, his argument that the National Dialogue influenced the “politics and technicalities” of the Tunisian constitution lacks substantial evidence.
In short, National Dialogue in Tunisia is a good introduction for anyone who wants to learn the basics of the Tunisian Dialogue Process. Others who already have foundational knowledge should look elsewhere–the iffy translation and oversimplification make the reading frustrating.