Suppose that we have two explanations of the same phenomenon (or at least related phenomena).

Then there are four broad ways of characterizing their relationship:

1. The two explanations are competitors. If one explanation is correct, then the other one is not. (Maybe Goel talking about neuroscientific and cognitive/computational explanations? Most cognitive psychologists talking about logical explanations.)
2. The two explanations are independent of each other. Both explanations are correct, neither explanation is inherently better than the other, but facts about either one of the explanations do not bear on the other. (Weiskopf on computational/functional/cognitive explanations vs. mechanistic explanations)
3. The two explanations are mutually reinforcing of each other. Both explanations are correct, neither explanation is inherently better than the other, and facts about each of the explanations bears on the other. (Marr, Bermudez, and Oaksford; some mechanists; also see Sandra Mitchell’s article, “Integrative Pluralism.”)
4. One of the explanations is in the driver’s seat. Both explanations are correct, but one of the explanations is clearly better (more fundamental, deeper) than the other. (All reductionists and some mechanists, e.g., Piccinini and Craver).