Category Archives: Political Science

The Politics of Natural Disasters

As natural disasters go, President Obama has – knock on wood – been luckier than his predecessor.  That thought came to me on Monday as I waited for emergency crews to reconnect the power and telephone lines to my house. Both had been severed by a single tree felled during tropical storm Irene’s leisurely jaunt through Vermont at  the tail end of its travels up the eastern seaboard.  I was lucky – the tree only grazed the house, power was restored after a day, and I was spared the flooding that hit much of Vermont, including throughout my town, and which completely cut off communication with at least a dozen nearby Vermont communities.  As of today, helicopters are ferrying supplies to those communities while road crews work around the clock to repair damaged roads. And I have been busy cutting firewood.

Make no mistake – it could have been much worse. It is true that Vermont took a historic beating, with water levels in many rivers and creeks cresting at heights never previously recorded.  And the cleanup is only beginning.  It will be days, and even weeks, before roads are made passable and power restored to many areas. But the loss of life was minimal – four dead in Vermont and less than 50 in total attributed to the storm so far – in no small part because state and local authorities were proactive in requesting federal emergency authority to mobilize emergency response teams, and in issuing mandatory evacuations.  Indeed, the biggest complaint heard in the aftermath of Irene is that authorities overreacted, particularly in ordering the evacuations.  A full evaluation of the civil authorities’ overall response must await the cleanup efforts, of course, but the initial perception is that the coordination between local, state and federal forces has been relatively smooth.  In Vermont, local officials have taken the lead in the initial emergency preparations and responses, under state coordination. The feds are mostly providing resources and, in time, will provide disaster relief money. That partly reflects the decentralized nature of the storm’s impact, at least in Vermont, where authorities have to deal with 250+ communities, many of them containing less than 1,000 people.  Under these circumstances, local control over relief efforts is imperative.

This, of course, is in stark contrast to what happened in 2005, when Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf coast while George W. Bush was president.  To be sure, at Category 5, Katrina was a more powerful storm than Irene, which had been downgraded to a tropical storm by the time it reached New England.  And New Orleans, as the famous National Geographic film watched by every schoolchild of a certain generation reminded us, is a city that is built largely below sea level, in a bowl-shaped depression. The geography alone meant it was a disaster waiting to happen.  The only question was when.

But, as Time Magazine’s Michael Grunwald documents in the end, Katrina was primarily a man-made, and not a natural disaster. And the primary culprit is one almost no one talks about: the Army Corps of Engineers, whose malfeasance in this instance was aided and abetted for years by the local congressional delegation. The immediate failure was the breaching of the system of flood control levees designed by the Army Corps of Engineers to withstand surging waters from hurricanes.  As it turned out, those levees were poorly designed and constructed, and proved not up to the task. But the more deep-rooted cause of the Katrina catastrophe was the Corps’ policy, at the behest of local members of Congress, of building “water control projects”: levees, dams, artificial lakes and irrigation channels that destroyed thousands of acres of wetlands which provided a natural barrier against storm-induced flooding.  The water projects were intended to benefit local businesses, including fisherman as well as the oil industry.   But by destroying the wetlands, the Corps eliminated a natural shock absorber that would have helped minimize flooding in the delta region.  Given this decades-old policy, it was only a matter of time before a Katrina-like event would flood New Orleans.  It was George W. Bush’s bad luck that it happened on his watch.

This is not to absolve Bush of his share of responsibility – he was, as he later admitted, far too respectful of local and state authority in the initial hours after Katrina struck.  When Louisiana Governor Kathleen Bianco proved slow in requesting the federal government to take charge of the emergency response, Bush hesitated rather than federalizing the National Guard on his own and ordering military troops in as well. Eventually he did so, but by then the damage was done. But Bush’s error was only the latest in a sequence of mistakes, beginning with Mayor Nagin’s initial decision to order a “voluntary” evacuation before making it mandatory and a more general lack of coordination between local, state and federal officials in responding to Katrina.  These errors culminated with FEMA’s botched response under the leadership of Mike (Heckuva job, Brownie) Brown.

As Hurricane Irene headed toward the east coast, it was clear that local politicians, particularly the state governors Christie and Cuomo, and New York Mayor Bloomberg – all of whom are rumored to be potential presidential candidates down the road – were not going to make Bianco’s mistake.  Mindful no doubt of the Katrina precedent, they all moved quickly in requesting authority from Obama to declare an emergency, and when the hurricane hits their states, they made sure to visit constituents, on the ground, to show their concern.  Indeed, I could not listen to a news broadcast without seeing a somber-faced elected official, usually with jacket off and shirt sleeves rolled up, listing the disaster preparation steps that were underway.  And that included the President, who cut short his vacation to return to the White House and give a nationwide address warning of the severity of the hurricane, and who thereafter made sure to visit, along with FEMA director Craig Fugate, local and state emergency crews on the ground in affected areas.  There would be no visuals of Obama flying over disaster areas.

To be sure, Obama is not completely clear of political controversy in Irene’s aftermath; already there is grumbling from some officials that FEMA is pulling money out of relief efforts in other regions hit earlier by tornadoes in order to fund the cleanup in areas affected by Irene.  But so far he has escaped the criticism that befell Bush and his FEMA team (and that Obama endured during the Gulf oil spill crisis, another event for which a president took blame although it was largely Congress’ fault.)   The differing perceptions may say less about their respective handling of the two crises and more about the hurricanes themselves, and where they hit.  If so, it is a reminder that disasters choose their presidents, and not vice versa.

Meamwhile, I leave you with a glimpse of Irene’s local impact: the destruction of an iconic covered bridge in the town of Quechee.

 

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What Will The Super Committee Do?

With the membership of the congressional “super committee”  almost finalized, it’s worth asking:  Who do the members  represent?  The answer to that question may provide clues regarding how they plan on devising $1.5 trillion in deficit cuts by November.  One way to think about the answer is to draw on political science theory regarding congressional committees more generally.   That’s what I’ll do in this post.  First some background:

With yesterday’s announcement by Speaker John Boehner, the Republican membership on the joint House-Senate committee is finalized.  Boehner appointed Dave Camp (R-Mich.), Fred Upton (R-Mich.) and Jeb Hensarling (R-Texas) to the panel, where they will join Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell’s picks:  senators  Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.), Rob Portman (R-Ohio), and Pat Toomey (R-Pa.).  Their Democratic counterparts, as announced by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid two days ago,  are  Max Baucus (D-Mont.), John Kerry (D-Mass.) and Patty Murray (D-Wash.).   House Minority leader Nancy Pelosi has until August 16 to announce the final three members of the committee.

 Under the terms of the debt agreement negotiated to end the debt impasse, this super committee has until Nov. 23 to deliver a deficit reduction proposal that has majority support among its members. Assuming it can do so, the committee’s proposal will then go to each chamber for an up-or-down vote by Christmas.  If the committee cannot achieve a majority, or if the full chambers do not approve them, automatic across-the-board spending cuts will be triggered – something most members in both parties do not want to see.

 So, what can we expect from this committee?  The answer depends in part on what you think motivates them. In this vein, political scientists have classified congressional committees as one of three types, according to what is the dominant interest driving committee members’ choices.  These (not necessarily mutually exclusive) categories are:

1. The Committee Autonomy View:  One view is that committee members are largely free agents whose decisions reflect their own individual electoral and policy preferences. From this perspective, committee members are not very responsive to the full chamber or to the party leadership.  Instead constituency and district influences are more important.

2. The Chamber Dominated Perspective:  In this view, committees primarily represent the interests of the full chamber in which they serve, and they use their policy and political expertise to help the full chamber craft effective policy.  That is, the committee members serves primarily in an informational capacity.

3. The Party Dominated Perspective:   The third view sees committee members as primarily responsive to their respective party.  Members pursue the party’s interest because they benefit electorally if the party is able to pass a partisan-based legislative program that enhances the party’s “brand name”.  For this reason the committee members will fight hard in committee for policies that the full party prefers

Before applying these analytic frameworks – individual, chamber or party – to predict what the supercommittee might do, a couple of caveats are in order. To begin, these three perspectives may be more useful for understanding House committees than their Senate counterparts.  Second, they are usually used to explain the motivations of members on  standing, or permanent, committees in a particular chamber.  As a joint committee, it’s not clear how relevant these models are to understanding the super committee.  Nonetheless, they at least offer an initial way of thinking about what is likely to motivate the nine members selected so far.  So, let’s see where they take us.

1. Senate Democrats. Baucus, Kerry and Murray are all liberal members of the Democratic Senate caucus who chair key Senate committees. Kerry heads Foreign Relations, and Baucus chairs the Finance Committee. Murray chairs the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC) charged with furthering the electoral fortunes of Senate Democrats in 2012.  Based on Simon Jackman’s ideological rankings, Murray is the 9th most liberal member of the Senate, Kerry the 20th and Baucus the most moderate at 36. None of them is up for reelection earlier than 2014.  It seems clear that Reid expects these individuals to act on behalf of his leadership team, working for the electoral interests of Senate Democrats. That is, the party-dominated perspective is likely to best explain how they will approach the budget cutting exercise. Remember, Democrats are in grave danger of losing control of the Senate in 2012.  Note that Reid did not appoint any of the three Democrats – Dick Durbin, Kent Conrad, or Mark Warner – who were part of the Gang of Six whose deficit plan included significant entitlement reform. Although Baucus did serve last year on the president’s bipartisan fiscal commission, he opposed the compromise package authored by that panel.  So my expectation is that these individuals were chosen not so much for their budgetary expertise, but instead because  they carry political weight in the Senate, and their proposals are likely to receive party support.  Reid’s counting on them to protect Democrat’s political and policy interests.  My guess is that means the three will link any deficit reduction to an increase in taxes, and will likely resist entitlement reform that is linked to a reduction in benefits or a delay in eligibility.

2. Senate Republicans. In contrast to Reid’s uniform purpose, McConnell’s picks seem to reflect a range of motivations. While it is true that all three have pledged to oppose tax increases, they may be more amenable to tax reform if it is paired with ways to rein in entitlement costs. Toomey, a freshman Senator and former president of the conservative Club for Growth lobbying group, is the most conservative, ranking 9th in Jackman’s ideological rankings for conservatives in the Senate.  He’s on the committee, I think, to protect the interests of the tax cutting conservative wing of the Republican party. In contrast, Portman and Kyl are relatively liberal Republicans, ranking 32 and 41 on the conservative scale.  Kyl, as McConnell’s chief deputy, is the second ranking Republican in the Senate, and has already announced he will not seek reelection in 2012.  He will be the party leadership”s voice in deliberations, ensuring that what comes out will meet the party’s approval. Portman, like Toomey, is also a freshman Senator.  Note that before winning his Senate seat Portman served as OMB director under George W. Bush, so he brings a wealth of budget expertise to the table. Although he opposes tax hikes, he has expressed support for portions of the Gang of Six deficit reduction plan.  In some respects, then, he comes closest to playing an informational role.  Note that neither Toomey nor Portman is up for reelection in 2012, so none of the three Senate Republicans are going to be directly motivated by electoral concerns.

Bottom line?  It seems that McConnell’s picks illustrate all three motivations at work. I think Toomey and Portman may have some freedom to pursue personal preferences, although this autonomy may lead them in different directions during committee deliberations.  Toomey, as a Tea Party favorite, will be dead set against revenue hikes. But I expect Portman to be more open to some type of revenue enhancement linked to tax reform, in return for entitlement changes.   Kyl, meanwhile, will serve as elder statesman tasked with making sure the Republican Party’s broader interests are protected.  I think these three are more likely to go in different directions, and that at least some of them will be amenable to making a deal.

3. House Republicans. Boehner’s team is best viewed as an arm of the party leadership. All three appointees are veteran lawmakers. Significantly, none are members of the Tea Party caucus. Indeed Both Camp and Upton are among the more liberal Republicans in the House, and both chair important House committees – Camp heads Ways and Means, and Upton is chair of Energy and Commerce. So they bring some economic expertise to the table and they are responsive to the party leadership.  Hensarling, although much more conservative, heads the House Republican conference which basically administers the party caucus in that chamber and therefore is also tied closely to Boehner’s leadership team.  By cutting out the Tea Party caucus, Boehner is likely hoping his  team will come back with a proposal closer to the grand bargain he almost signed with President Obama.

So, where does that leave us?  The missing pieces of the puzzle are the three House members Pelosi will appoint.  My guess is that she will come back with three liberal appointees who will be responsive to her leadership, and who will be focused on protecting entitlement programs from significant cuts.  If so, that will make it harder for Democrats to compromise.

There are a couple of additional factors that complicate forecasting the committee’s deliberations.  First, there is significant pressure to make the committee’s deliberations “transparent”.  In my view, this is a mistake, because transparency makes it harder for committee members to make difficult choices. (Do you think we ever would have gotten a Constitution approved in Philadelphia if the delegates’ every move was scrutinized on the evening news and dissected in blog posts?)  So much depends on how deliberations are carried out.  Will there be a gag order imposed?

Committee members also have to anticipate how their choices will be received in their host chambers. In this respect, I think Republicans have more flexibility to give ground than do Democrats.  Keep in mind that this committee only needs a simple majority to vote out a proposal. If a majority can support a deficit reduction package that meets the $1.5 trillion target through a combination of deep spending cuts; entitlement reform that centers on some combination of benefit reductions, eligibility delays and – perhaps – means testing; and revenue enhancement based on the closing of tax loopholes and deductions, and reductions of subsidies, this might be enough for Boehner to push it through the House. He’ll likely lose some Tea Partiers, but he could pick up enough Democrats to get this passed, based on a coalition similar to the one that passed the debt default bill.

The Senate is dicier, in large part because Reid and his fellow Democrats are under tremendous electoral pressure to retain majority control in 2012, which militates against making hard choices. If Senate Democrats torpedo the super committee’s recommendations, then automatic cuts are supposed to kick in.  The problem with the automatic cuts is that they provide a semblance of political cover to Democrats who can say, “I tried to protect your benefits, but the Republicans played hardball and now the decision is out of my hands.”

These committee theories, then, provide one way of trying to frame what the supercommittee might do, but they leave a lot of wiggle room. At this point, my best guess is that we are in for a reprise of the debt default game of chicken, with both sides playing brinkmanship right up until the impending deadlines force them to choose.  I think there is room for a deal, however, along the lines of the “grand bargain” discussed by Boehner and Obama.   The biggest obstacle to that deal in committee, however, may be the Pelosi Democrats.  I’ll return to this topic when she makes her choices known.

Obama and the Debt Deal: I Am Right. You Are Wrong.

Today, as White House officials fan out in an effort to tamp down liberal criticism of the budget deal, the Senate is poised to pass the measure and send it on to President Obama’s desk for his signature.  Yesterday the House, in a bipartisan 269-to-161 vote, easily approved the measure. The nay votes included 66 Republicans and 95 Democrats, most of them from their party’s ideologically extreme wings. Once signed into law by Obama, the legislation will immediately grant the Treasury $400 billion in borrowing authority, preventing a government default. It is the first of three increases in the debt ceiling that should extend borrowing authority through the 2012 election.

I will spend time dissecting the elements of the legislation in the next several posts, but keep in mind that, as with the health care legislation, the full impact of the debt agreement will not be known for months. For starters, no one knows what the joint congressional debt committee will report back in November – heck, we don’t even know who is on the debt committee as yet.  Similarly, the details of the spending cuts must still be worked out through the appropriations process.  So it is somewhat premature to gauge the merits of this bill, although that won’t stop many from doing so.

But, since so many of you took the time to weigh in in response to my last post,  cross listed at Salon, that argued Obama did not cave but instead made a perfectly predictable strategic calculation in agreeing to a debt deal, I want to at least give you the courtesy of a response.  The prevailing tone of your comments is nicely captured in this response: “Does anyone really have an answer for such a pile of garbage? What a bunch of horseshit. Dickinson, to be blunt — you are an idiot.”

To be sure, most of you made more nuanced comments, but the tone was similar. After looking through these, I can safely say:

I am still right. You are still wrong.

Now, having said that, I realize it will change nobody’s mind.  Nor should it. That’s an assertion backed with no evidence. But, let me ask you, before engaging in a point by point rebuttal of your arguments – is there really anything I can say that will persuade you that Obama actually made a very rational choice to negotiate a debt deal on the terms he did, when he did?  I suspect not – and that’s my point.  The reason is because you disagree with the outcome.  And because you disagree, you believe there must have been an alternative strategy he could have embraced that would have achieved your preferred outcome.

I understand the sentiment that is driving that belief. To quote a former president, “I feel your pain”.   I know that many of you feel sincerely, passionately betrayed by this president for his evident failure to fulfill what you saw as the central tenet of his presidential campaign: to transform American politics in a more progressive direction.

To that, I have two responses. First, there was never any real possibility that Obama was going to move politics significantly in the direction you anticipated.  I said as much in my posts immediately after his election. Heck, I said it on election night (several hundred students can attest to that!) – and many times before that.  Don’t take my word for it – read my back posts on this site.

Second, I told you what the outcome of the debt negotiations would be, and when it would occur: not before both sides were on the brink of the abyss.  We can quibble with how accurate my prediction was, but I think it was darn close to what we got.

Now, how was I able to do that?  It’s not clairvoyance.  It’s not even rocket science. It’s political science.  The fact is, presidents operate in an environment that, although fluid, is nonetheless somewhat predictable because of the laws and institutions that largely determine what presidents can do, and how.  The key is to look dispassionately at these fundamentals first, rather than starting with your preferred outcome and then trying to divine ways that presidents could have avoided the fundamentals to get to that point.  That’s what I try to do here.  Note that this is a different goal than what you find on many blog sites: they are designed to allow like minded people who worship from the same hymnal to gather together and react to political events.  They are led by the High Priests of their particular congregation – the Krugmans and Limbaughs.  I get that.  But it’s not what I do.

So, you have a choice: stick to your belief that Obama’s fooled everyone, and that, metaphorically, he lacks the proverbial stones to lead.  Or, perhaps gain a better appreciation of the rules, norms, laws and institutional constraints and incentives that largely determine how much power presidents have.

Note that I’m not discounting Obama’s individual traits as a causal factor here.  But critics are acting like they were duped – that he’s now revealing his true stripes.  In fact, as I’ve posted many, many, many times here since before his election, Obama is not a risk taker.  He is a mediator by nature, a man focused on getting to yes, but not one who is focused on a particular version of yes.  He has always been this way, dating back to his time on the Harvard Law Review.  His behavior these past few days is vintage Obama. You may rail against his evident lack of core convictions, but you should not be surprised.

Look, I’m not asking you to give up on your progressive principles. But don’t let your commitment to them blind you to the realities that dictate what presidents can and cannot do in the American political system.  Except in rare circumstances, presidents are weak.  They have always been weak.  Barring a fundamental change to our system of shared powers, they always will be weak.

Ok, enough of the preaching. Back to analysis.  If I can clear time, I’ll try to respond more directly to some of  the more detailed criticisms and questions you’ve raised.

In the meantime,  keep those comments coming….I think I responded to every one from the Salon/Did Obama Cave posting, but if I missed yours resend it and I’ll try to get back to you.  (Note, since I was late in getting to your comments to the “Did Obama Cave?” post, my responses are stacked up at the bottom.  But don’t worry I did read and respond to you.)

The Debt Deal: Does Obama “Sing Soprano”?

Regular readers know I’ve been posting with unusual frequency during the last several weeks.   That’s what a debt crisis will do for a blog that analyzes  presidential politics.  One byproduct of that frequency (and, I hope, the strength of my analyses) is that readership has picked up. A lot.  Today, thanks in part to the cross posting at Salon of my last post on the debt deal, there are several thousand new readers.

That’s not necessarily a good thing.  While I welcome  a broader audience, it’s clear from the comments that many of you don’t understand what this blog is about.  So I want to take a moment to introduce myself, and the Presidential Power blog site.  (Regular readers bear with me – I’ll return to our regular programming, starting with an analysis of today’s House vote to approve the debt agreement, in a moment).

This blog is situated at the intersection of political science – particularly presidency-related research – journalism and popular opinion.  The focus  is on national institutions, primarily the presidency.  My goal is simple: I use political science to analyze presidential politics.  This is an independent analysis – no one pays me to do this. I don’t solicit advertising. I have no incentive to drive up my audience (I don’t “tweet” my latest post).   I’m not affiliated with any party, institution, group or point of view.   I don’t get paid to do this – I have a day job that (barely)  pays the rent.   So I get to write what I want, when I want.

So why do I post?   My primary goal is to teach my students.  By “students”,  I mean not just those who sit in my classrooms now. I’ve been teaching for more than 25 years, beginning at Harvard and now at Middlebury, and in that time have seen many of my students move on to positions in government, including dozens who have worked in the White House  and in Congress (and a few who are working there now).   They are my primary audience.  Many of them are on the subscriber list to this blog and, while they can’t comment publicly, they do respond privately to these posts. Over time I’ve built up a certain credibility with them.  They expect me to analyze current events, but from the perspective of political science, not political punditry.  That means going beyond what is considered “newsworthy” to explain the fundamentals that drive political events – including debt negotiations.  Journalists, by reasons of economics and training, must focus on the trees. I get to describe the forest first, before analyzing the trees.

This approach also means acknowledging when political science has very little to say about a particular topic; my audience trusts me to tell them when I am venturing into the realm of punditry.  As you shall see, that happens fairly frequently.

But teaching is a two-way street.  That’s where my readers come in.  I learn from them and I use what they teach me not just in my blog posts, but also in my research and classroom teaching.  My inspiration in this regard comes from my dissertation chair at Harvard: Richard Neustadt.  Neustadt, a former White House aide who wrote the preeminent book on presidential power, had no interest in solving puzzles for puzzle’s sake.  He had a more ambitious goal: to explain the sources of presidential power or, as he defined it, “to expose the problem for a President …who seeks to buttress prospects for his future influence while making present choices.”   He did so because that pursuit of power affects not just presidents – “it is crucial for us all.”  That is my goal as well.  I write about the presidents’ pursuit of power because, as Neustadt put it, “Presidents and their staffs seek advice; they need it; they deserve the best the rest of us can offer.”  As do we all.

I do so, however, from no particular political perspective.  Because I focus on the essential problem confronted by all presidents – how to wield  effective influence on governmental outcomes – my advice is as useful to Democrats as it is to Republicans.  In rendering this advice,  I have been fortunate to have been trained by some of the nation’s best scholars – particularly Mo Fiorina, Paul Peterson and Mark Peterson, in addition to the rest of the Harvard Government Department.  (Go ahead – google those names).  Be forewarned – if you meet anyone of them, they will deny knowing me – especially Fiorina.

So, what does this have to do with you?  Simply put, I don’t care if you believe, as one person put it when responding to my most recent  post that “The author’s PHD certainly stands for Piled High and Deep, because he is full of it. Obama didn’t cave, he capitulated. He is in the political trouble he’s in because he’s the weakest leader since Jimmy Carter and probably worse. It’s a wonder he doesn’t sing soprano, because he has no man-package whatsoever.”  What my readers want to know is why do you think this? What evidence do you have to support your assertion?  For example,did you talk to Michelle about the President’s, er, “man-package”?    How do you know if he sings soprano?  And we could extend the discussion.  For instance, if Hillary Clinton had been elected president, presumably she would be lacking a “man-package”.   Should that disqualify her from the presidency?   What if she has perfect political pitch, albeit in the higher octave range?

I hope you see my point.  I’m not interested in debating your political values.  I actually don’t care what they are.  But I don’t want this site to devolve into “Daily Kos” lite where participants enjoy the fellowship of like-minded congregants, and pounce on any apostate “trolls” who dare speak against the holy creed.  Nor do I want to become a “johnny one-note” -a  Paul Krugman who  repeats the same message again, and again, and again. This site aims higher, and so far we’ve been able to carve out a relatively unique niche in the blogosphere.  We have a dedicated readership of students, journalists, government officials – and laypeople. You are welcome to join in but, please, respect the prevailing ethos here.  I’m not interested in debating your values.  But I do want you to confront the assumptions – often wrong assumptions – on which they are based. You never know – you might learn something.  I might too.

A final warning: humor plays a big role here.  You need to pay attention, because it is used to make a broader point.  When I talk about Michele Bachmann’s “hot flashes” – I’m not really talking about hot flashes. But if I have to tell you that, you probably don’t want to lurk here.

Ok?  All ready to have your world view challenged?  Then let’s turn to today’s vote.  That’s the subject of my next post.

(P.S. If you want direct email notification of new posts, send me an email and I’ll put you on the subscriber list.  Your email address remains confidential).

If Moses Polled the Israelites…Why Public Opinion Is Of Little Help In Solving the Debt Crisis

So, when it comes to solving the debt crisis, what do Americans want?  More importantly, are politicians even listening?  Should they be listening – is public opinion, as measured by surveys, even a reliable guide to policymakers? To answer these questions, in this post I want to summarize some survey data dealing with the debt crisis. As I noted in my last post, President Obama cautioned that survey results regarding how to solve the debt impasse differ depending on survey question wording.  He is exactly right.  But, citing surveys, he also claimed that 80% of Americans want the debt crisis solved using a “balanced” approach that presumably involves a mix of tax hikes and spending cuts.  That includes a “clear majority” of Republicans who support tax hikes.  As it turns out, it’s not as simple as that, at least as far as one can tell from the surveys (and the part about a majority of Republicans supporting tax cuts is misleading). It does seem true that Americans support compromise solutions,  at least in general; according to a  poll described in today’s USAToday 67% of those surveyed say they want Obama and the Republicans to compromise, “even if that means policymakers have to accept a plan with provisions they don’t like. Twenty-seven percent say lawmakers should hold out for the plan with everything they want, even if that means the debt ceiling isn’t raised by the Aug. 2 deadline.”

So it seems Americans want compromise.  The problem, however, is that when presented with specific compromise proposals, support drops off. It turns out the public is a lot like politicians – they advocate compromise, but then reject compromise proposals that involve making hard choices.

Let’s begin with a basic overview of where the public stands in the debt debate. Mark Halperin at Pollster.com summarized several surveys asking whether people favored or opposed raising the debt limit.

As you can see, a plurality and sometimes a majority of respondents consistently opposed raising the debt limits. However, two cautions are in order here: first, these polls date back to the beginning of the debt debate, so they may not capture recent changes in attitudes. A more recent CBS polls indicates support for raising the debt limit going up, although a plurality of Americans still oppose doing so.

More importantly, however, when provided a “don’t know enough” option, as is the case with the Gallup and Wall St. Journal polls, fully a third of respondents check this box, indicating  many Americans are not confident they understand the details of the debate.

Now, let’s look at how Americans want to solve the debt crisis.  Here’s where things get interesting.  As Obama indicated, there is support for a balanced approach involving both tax hikes and spending cuts, but of the two, Americans are much more supportive of making spending cuts, as illustrated by this Gallup Poll.

Interestingly, even among Democrats support for focusing on spending cuts is greater than relying on tax increases:

Ok, if Americans support spending cuts, what would they like to see reduced?  Let’s consider the major spending programs, where the most money can be saved.  How about Social Security?  Nope.  Medicare?  Natch.  Medicaid, then?  No.  Military spending?  Probably not.   (For particulars see these polls by the Pew Research Center and ABC/WaPo). About the only programs that voters would like to see cut are the perennial whipping boys: foreign aid and spending on overseas military commitments. (Never mind that the public consistently overestimates how much is spent on these programs.)  Indeed, we find more support in these two polls for targeted tax increases (raising tax rates on those earning more than $250,000, closing tax loopholes, ending subsidies, etc.) than for cutting spending on the major government entitlement programs.

What we see, then, is a public about evenly split on the necessity of raising the debt limit, although as debate goes on support for raising the limit increases. People do want a “balanced’ approach to reducing the deficit – if by balanced one means predominantly focusing on spending cuts as opposed to raising taxes.  However, when offered a choice of specific spending reductions, support drops off while support increases for limited, targeted tax increases.

There is a story, perhaps apocryphal, that Harry Truman once responded to adverse polling results by asking, “How far would Moses have gone if he had taken a poll in Egypt?”  Truman’s point is a reminder that we live in a republic, not a democracy.  The Framers created a representative system of government in which elected officials were largely insulated from direct popular opinion, except for elections.  Leadership meant refining public opinion, not being led by it.  Looking at the polling pertaining to the debt impasse, we can understand the Framers’ reasoning. It is often the case that public opinion is not a reliable guide to making difficult policy choices. The worry today, however, is that in a 24/7 news cycle that feeds on polling data, the insulation protecting elected officials from direct popular opinion that the Framers expected  has been stripped away.  I don’t mean to suggest that politicians blindly follow the polling results – as we see here in examining recent surveys, there is no clear message emerging from polls on how to solve the debt impasse.  Instead, elected officials have become increasingly adept at using polling to provide political cover to do what they want to do anyway.  We see this in the debt crisis debate, with politicians and their activist supporters eagerly citing portions of those polls that they believe buttress their preferred policy options.

In the end, Obama, Republicans and Democrats are going to have to choose a policy option, secure in the knowledge that when they do, a sizable portion of the activist segment of the political community will accuse them of cowardice, treason and moral turpitude. Following the Framers, however, I also believe the public at large will reward leadership – particularly leadership that centers on compromise.  Time will tell if I am right, or if we are destined to remain stuck in our own budgetary Egypt, slaves to rising deficits.