Category Archives: Polling

Demographically, that is.

Gallup has released a random survey of those who support the Tea Party movement and the findings help dispel the notion propagated on some web sites that the group consists largely of Chevy-driving bitter white males who can’t spell. In fact, as this Gallup table indicates, Tea Partiers are, in terms of age, education, employment and race, almost indistinguishable from a cross-section of all Americans.

They are slightly more male, and slightly more affluent, than a comparable sample of Americans.  But what really distinguish the Tea Partiers are their political views.  As the following table shows, they are more likely to be Republican, and more likely to hold conservative views, than the comparison group.  Interestingly, however, about half of the movement’s support comes from non-Republicans (assuming we treat independents as true independents.)  So this is clearly not a purely partisan movement.

All told, some 28% of those surveyed say they support the Tea Party movement, making it as, or more, popular, right now, than the Republican Party, according to some polls.  Interestingly, the number of independents who support the movement are about the same proportion as in the population at large.

Now, there are a couple of caveats to keep in mind in interpreting these results.  First, these are people who claim to support the movement.  It may not reflect the more activist element that actually shows up to Tea Party rallies.  Second, as with any poll, question wording can skew results.  In this case, Gallup asks about Tea Partiers’ views on abortion. However, by limiting the choice to either “pro-life” or “pro-choice”, Gallup fails to tap into the more nuanced views most Americans, including I’m guessing Tea Partiers, have regarding abortion.  Few Americans characterize themselves as purely “prochoice” or “prolife” if given a broader range of options.

Nonetheless, the survey is a welcome first step in trying to understand an increasingly influential political movement, one that may be in a position to shape results in the upcoming midterm elections.  To this point, media opinion pieces (as in New York Times‘ columns here and here) have tended to portray the movement as agglomeration of right-wing antigovernment types mingling with the bitter bible thumping crowd.  But, as the Gallup data indicates, it’s clear that the movement is more widely-based.  It appears to be tapping into a deep-seated unease that cuts across economic and educational lines, one predicated on worries about the economy and about “bigness” – big banks, big corporate bailouts, big government health programs and, most worrisome – big debt in general.  At this point it is unclear to me whether this loose and as yet unfocused social movement will translate into an effective political force that influences the 2010 midterm elections, and the following presidential election.

Historically, the Tea Party movement fits well with a long American tradition of anti ”bigness”-based social movements dating back to Jacksonian democracy and opposition to a U.S.-chartered bank during the 1830’s through the agrarian-based populist movement of the 1890’s and the “share-the-wealth” Townsend movement of the 1930’s and up to the anti-tax revolution of the late 1970’s.  Perhaps the most recent comparable movement was that led by Ross Perot who, as the head of the Reform Party,  used voter outrage over government spending and budget deficits to win nearly 20% of the popular presidential vote in 1992.  In this respect, the Tea Party movement is certainly not new, and indeed is distinctly American.

The problem with sustaining such movements is that their antigovernment sentiment makes it difficult for members to take the steps, such as organizing to run candidates, which are required to transform a movement fueled by voter outrage into an institutionalized party or make sustained policy changes. In this respect, the antitax movement spawned by property tax rollbacks in California and Massachusetts is an exception to the rule; it resulted in an enduring shift in how states raised revenue, and helped lay the basis for the Reagan era.   History suggests, however, that if the Tea Party movement continues to grow, the passions that fuel it will likely be coopted, perhaps in watered-down form, by one of the two existing parties.  At this point, Democrats have to worry that the anti-incumbent, anti-government sentiment driving Tea Party activism will most directly target them in 2010. For Democrats, the best way to defuse that anger, and weaken the movement, is to hope that the early signs of economic recovery are a harbinger of better things to come.

If conditions do not improve, however – if the economy remains mired in slow growth and high unemployment, I expect the next phase in the Tea Party movement will be to coalesce around a figurehead who can embrace its ideals and compete in the 2012 presidential elections.

And who might that be?  I can’t see the future.   But I can see, when I look out my back door in Ripton, the distant shores of Alaska.

The full impact of the recently passed health care legislation will not be felt for a number of years, with most of the provisions not kicking in until 2014, but in the short term opposition to the legislation can be found among three broad ideological groups: those on the Right, those on the Left – and those in the Center.  As I noted in earlier blog posts, during the year long run-up to passage of the bill, public support for health care reform gradually dropped.  Today, according to most polls I’ve seen, the public continues to oppose the newly-minted law, despite the campaign-style effort by Democrats and Obama to rally support for it. Thus, pollster.com’s latest composite poll of the polls lists 51.6% against reform with 40.2% supporting, a margin that has slightly widened since health care passed.

That those on both the Left and the Right remain opposed to the bill ought not to be surprising.  When this debate first began last summer, I gave several talks in which I predicted that rather than fundamental health care reform, Congress was far more likely to pass insurance reform.  In many respects, this is exactly what occurred; this is a very conservative piece of legislation. Essentially, it expands health care coverage to an additional 30 million people, and pays for that through a series of tax hikes, mainly by taxing investment income on the highest income earners and by taxing health care plans that offer extensive benefits. Combined with a projected decrease in spending on Medicare (more on that below), the CBO projects that it will be costly, but largely revenue neutral, if not a deficit reducer.   Rather than restructure how health care is provided in the United States by, for example, expanding government-run programs or creating a public option, the legislation maintains the existing fee-for services, employer-based system now in place.  Not surprisingly, conservatives oppose what they see as essentially a costly redistributive program, funded by tax increases, designed to expand health care coverage. Liberals, on the other hand, see this as essentially a giant subsidy for insurance companies, hospitals and doctors who stand to reap millions in profits because of the insurance mandate and increased demand for services.  According to projections, private insurance plans could see enrollment jump by 16 million, with the rest of the newly-insured eligible for coverage through state-run Medicaid programs.

To be sure, it is not clear that insurance companies will make out as well as liberals fear.  The provisions for state-supervised “exchanges”, through which some insurers would be required to sell policies to individuals and small businesses, means that the insurance industry will be far more heavily regulated than before. (Consumers who are not insured through their employer can make use of these exchanges.) The worry, for insurance companies, is that if healthy people opt to pay a penalty, rather than sign up for health insurance, companies will be left paying out much higher benefits because of a higher risk pool. This is precisely what happened in Massachusetts – many healthy people opted to pay the minimal penalty rather than pay for health insurance, and insurance companies sought to raise rates in response. Hence the mandates in the federal bill requiring most people to purchase health care insurance.

Those mandates, however, while perhaps economically necessary, run against the grain of American political culture and may pose a legal difficulty as well (although I suspect the courts will stay out of this area entirely.)  Simply put, Americans do not like to be told by the government to do something, especially when it is to benefit a portion of the electorate – largely low-income workers – who lack political clout.

But there is a bigger problem with the legislation, in my view, one that primarily accounts for the lack of support among centrists as well.  Most economists that I have read believe that the legislation will expand demand for health care services, but without putting a huge dent in escalating health care costs. I have noted repeatedly in this blog that the vast majority of Americans – over 80% by most polls – are satisfied with their current health care coverage. Support for reform was largely predicated on the assumption that reform legislation would contain escalating health care premiums and expenses.  The big question is whether this current legislation will do so.  Most economists don’t think it will – and that’s why many moderates oppose it. The biggest unknown centers on whether the government can achieve the reduction in Medicare payments and costs that formed the basis of the CBO projection that this bill will be revenue neutral.  Even the CBO qualified its assessment, by noting: “It is unclear whether such a reduction in the growth rate of [Medicare] spending could be achieved, and if so, whether it would be accomplished through greater efficiencies in the delivery of health care or through reductions in access to care or the quality of care.” 

If seniors perceive that the savings come through a reduction in Medicare services, opposition to this plan is likely to grow.  Similarly, if hospitals calculate that a reduction in government reimbursements for Medicare services make their participation in the program unprofitable, they may opt out of the program entirely.  Both spell bad news for the future of this legislation.

My broader point is that most of the public – even many who support the expansion in coverage – don’t believe this bill will control costs, as this recent Gallup Poll indicates:

At this point, I don’t see these numbers changing until voters see health care costs going down.

Of course, it is impossible to fully discuss all the permutations of this bill in a single blog post, particularly when its most important provisions won’t go into force – if at all! – for several years.  (This site is one of several that provides a good overview.) But in my next post, I want to address five issues related to health care that I think have been underplayed in the media coverage so far, but which will go a long way toward determining whether Obama and the Democrats get any political mileage from this bill.

Ok, I’m going to take a short break and see if I can get some snowshoeing in before settling in to watch returns.  Polls close at 8.  We’ll see how soon after that the race is called.  I think it will be some time. You can look for results as they come at the Massachusetts election results page (assuming it doesn’t crash!).

In the meantime, following up on my earlier post, I’ve pasted in a somewhat useful graphic that shows the relative support for McCain and Obama in 2008 across the state (source: Swing State Project.)

Having lived in the state most of my life and covered politics there, I have a decent idea of what you should be looking for as polls close.  Moving from west to east (left to right on the map), it goes like this:

Western Mass is sparsely populated in much of the Berkshires, but there’s a big population center in Springfield at the southern portion of the Connecticut River Valley.  Brown needs to do well with low-income, ethnic voters here who typically go Democratic but can vote Republican.  In the northern Connecticut River valley, expect Coakley to wrack up big numbers (places like Amherst and Northhampton.)

Brown has to win big in central mass – lots of former mill towns here just south of Worcester, as well as some bucolic rural areas in the Quabbin area and north of Worcester that tend to be fiscally conservative.  Coakley has to hope she can hold onto Democratic ethnic vote in Worcester proper, as well as in the Lowell area.

Brown’s support should extend east to rte. 495 and even toward 128. As you move east, however, communities become more affluent and support for Coakley will pick up particularly in the Lexington/Concord northern Rte. 128/95 area.  From Cambridge in, Coakley has to wrack up big margins, particularly in the Democratic base in Boston.

I see the areas southeast toward the Cape as potential bellwethers – they often vote Republican, but the Kennedy name is strong here too. Meanwhile, Brown will try to steal some votes in the more Catholic regions near the Rhode Island border.

Ok, that’s the lay of the land.  Put the beer on ice, make sure the popcorn is ready, set the cable to your favorite station (remember, we don’t get the cable here) and stay at this site.  I’ll be back on after some fresh air, and will stay until the  race is called or the scotch runs dry, whichever comes first.

So much so that I’m having trouble believing them.   We now have another full day’s worth of polls, most of which were in the field at least partly during Obama’s visit, and – keeping in mind all the caveats I mentioned about polling a special election – they indicate that Scott Brown is poised to win this race.  If so, it will be the biggest political upset of my lifetime.

First, let’s summarize today’s polls, including two that came since my last posting.  The first is by Insider Advantage, and it has Brown up by 9%, 52%-43%, with Kennedy taking about 2% and no opinion polling 3%.   The second is by ARG, and it has Brown up by 7%, 52%-45%. Four days ago ARG only had Brown up by 3%, 48%-45%, so Brown has picked up 4% in the last three days by this poll.  Five of the last six polls now have Brown above 50%, with the only exception coming from the Daily Kos poll.

In parsing the details of these polls, there are some rather extraordinary results. Let me start with the InsiderAdvantage poll.  In it, Brown is winning in all age groups except those over 65, with his biggest margin coming in the youngest, 18-29 year old cohort. He’s winning almost 25% of Democrats, and he’s beating Coakley among women (53% of the sample) by 49.5%-46.1% and is clobbering her among independents (37% of the sample) 68.7%-28.5%.  Indeed, some of the results I find difficult to swallow, although in Insider’s defense, results for smaller subsamples can often be all over the map.  Nonetheless, Insider would have one believe that Brown is winning 27% of the black vote and 77% of the Hispanic vote. I suppose it’s possible.

The ARG telephone poll of likely voters was in the field from Friday through Sunday and also has Brown dominating among independents 64%-32%, and winning 23% of Democrats.  However, it shows Coakley with a slim lead among women, 50%-46%. Once again, Brown gets strong support with younger voters, leading 53%-43% among those under 50 and by a smaller 51%-46% advantage among those over 49 years old.

Both the InsiderAdvantage and ARG polls were, at least in part, in the field yesterday, and presumably should have picked up any surge toward Coakley inspired by Obama’s visit.  All told there have been five polls that were at least partially in the field yesterday, and two that exclusively polled on the day of Obama’s visit. None show evidence of any surge toward Coakley – indeed, reaction has been in the opposite direction, toward Brown.   I am not going to say that this reflects opposition to Obama, since these polls include days before Obama’s visit and even for Sunday’s  polls the timing is in question.  But clearly his visit hasn’t – yet – had the impact for which Coakley hoped.

So what are we left with?  One can still construct an argument for Coakley winning this race, and indeed you can find that argument on other websites.  It usually is based on a combination of extraordinary turnout by Democrats tomorrow combined with a response bias in the polling that leads them to collectively underestimate support for Coakley.   For what it’s worth, I’ve made the argument that the response bias may work in the other direction, in Brown’s favor.   Note that the InsideAdvantage poll was still another one using automated polling that gave Brown a larger than expected lead.

Let us assume for the moment that the survey data is correct, and that Brown is poised to pull off the biggest political upset in recent memory.  The question becomes: why?

I’ve been giving this a lot of thought and – not surprisingly to long time readers – I don’t think the standard explanation posited in most major news outlets that this is a reaction to some combination of opposition to health care and to Obama is correct.  Instead, I want in my next post to offer a different explanation for why Brown is winning.  But before I do, I want to give you a chance to chime in.  I know this election has attracted extraordinary interest, because I’m getting more hits today than on any previous topic, save for Election Night 2008.  But most of you are giving me your views through private emails, rather than through the comments section.  This leaves everyone else out of the discussion.  So go ahead – tell me what you are hearing, or seeing, or reading that might explain why Scott Brown is on the verge of pulling the greatest upset since the Red Sox came from three down to beat the Evil Empire.