The Mediator-In-Chief Says: “Split Your Peas!”

The headline of today’s David Ignatius column in the Washington Post reads: “Obama’s Communications Gap.”  In the column Ignatius repeats a now common media theme: that Obama has lost his communications mojo.  Echoing the sentiments of a former Bush adviser, Ignatius asks, “[W]hy isn’t he projecting his goals and philosophy more clearly to the country? Why does he so often seem to react rather than lead?”  Whether it is the budget talks, or his Mideast policy, Obama’s policies “are pretty solid” but his ability to implement them is hampered by a “communications gap.”

Ignatius’ complaint strikes me as reversing the problem. The President’s difficulties are not caused by a failure to communicate his policies, it’s that the policy agenda he adopts seems not to be driven by any unifying or overarching principle or theme.  He is, as I have stressed since before his election, a pragmatist, one who is uncomfortable with extremes, and one who is by nature a splitter-of-differences.  His lawyerly approach to leadership inclines him to want to settle disputes.

He is the Mediator-in-Chief.

And, if you read Ignatius carefully, he actually recognizes this, even if he does not seem to fully grasp its implications for perceptions regarding Obama’s leadership. Consider the debt limit controversy. It is not the case that Obama has gone into radio silence while the Congress debates the issues. In fact, Obama has held two press conferences within a week to lay out his views regarding the current impasse. Given his disdain for holding press conferences, this counts as a media blitz. But if you watched the press conferences, or read the transcripts (see here and here) two observations stand out.  First, he is as articulate, measured, and unflappable as always.  It is the same no-drama Obama that wowed the chattering class on the campaign trail.  When the press conferences were over, however, one struggles to remember what his policy positions were, exactly. He spoke in themes, but without making choices.  For example, Obama opened yesterday’s conference by reiterating the reasons why a debt default would be disastrous, and emphasizing the need for both parties to make sacrifices, in both spending and regarding revenue, in order to strike a budget deal. “If we take that approach, then I am confident that we can not only impress the financial markets, but more importantly, we can actually impress the American people that this town can actually get something done once in a while.”

It’s hard to take issue with this sentiment – but that’s all it is: a sentiment. Obama is emphasizing process here, not policy choices. Consider his last comment before taking questions: “The last point I’ll make and then I’ll take questions — we are obviously running out of time.  And so what I’ve said to the members of Congress is that you need, over the next 24 to 36 hours, to give me some sense of what your plan is to get the debt ceiling raised through whatever mechanisms they can think about, and show me a plan in terms of what you’re doing for deficit and debt reduction.

If they show me a serious plan, I’m ready to move, even if requires some tough decisions on my part.”

This raises the obvious question: does he also have a plan? Is there a policy option he is pushing, behind the scenes?  If so, it’s not coming through in the press conference. Both sides clearly recognize the need to sacrifice by making hard choices, but what are those sacrifices, exactly? I did not see Obama lay down any policy markers; he didn’t stake out a negotiating position – instead, he explicitly looked to Congress for direction.  And that may in fact be a wise decision – why lock oneself publicly into a position that in the end will be negotiated away?  But then why hold a press conference if one is only going to state the obvious?   Neither conference, as far as I can see, did anything to explain to the public how Obama proposed to move the negotiating process along.  Instead, he laid it all on Congress’ shoulders.

When pressed to be more specific, Obama demurred.  For example, Jake Tapper pressed him on entitlement reform, noting “[B]ut we don’t yet know what you specifically are willing to do when it comes to entitlement spending.  In the interest of transparency, leadership, and also showing the American people that you have been negotiating in good faith, can you tell us one structural reform that you are willing to make to one of these entitlement programs that would have a major impact on the deficit?  Would you be willing to raise the retirement age?  Would you be willing to means test Social Security or Medicare?”

Obama’s answer? He begins with: “We’ve said that we are willing to look at all those approaches.  I’ve laid out some criteria in terms of what would be acceptable.  So, for example, I’ve said very clearly that we should make sure that current beneficiaries as much as possible are not affected.  But we should look at what can we do in the out-years, so that over time some of these programs are more sustainable.” He then goes on to suggest a number of  “modest modifications” to make these programs sustainable, but does not clearly endorse any of them.   This happens repeatedly throughout the conference – a reporter pushes for specifics, Obama lays out potential options, but doesn’t publicly throw his weight behind any of them.

This decision not to decide, at least publicly, is not just apparent in the budget debate. As Ignatius notes, in Afghanistan Obama’s preferred strategy was to build up U.S. forces in order to draw them down more quickly.  To be sure, there is a logic to this strategy, but it is not a logic that fits easily into an overarching foreign policy doctrine, or that lends itself to easy explanation to a public trying to understand why we are in Afghanistan. Are we preparing to leave, or are we staying the course?  For that matter, why did we intervene in Libya and why are we still there (or are we)?  What is our policy regarding the Syrian uprising?

In the President’s defense, he may be articulating a much more detailed policy agenda behind close doors and, mindful of what happened to his predecessor’s effort to reform social security, he believes it more efficacious to hold his negotiating cards very close to his chest.  He said as much when rebuffing a reporter during Monday’s press conference who pressed him to be more specific regarding his preferred policy options. And he has put down one marker of sorts: during Monday’s conference he said he will not accept another short-term raise in the debt limit.

But this strategy has potential costs.  It can create the impression that there is a leadership vacuum in this debate. And, by failing to signal a focal point or end game, it may actually hinder negotiations, rather than move them forward.

My broader point, however, is that many of the qualities that supporters found so admirable in Obama on the campaign trail are now viewed as evidence that he has a communications problem.  I disagree.  Instead, what we are seeing is that in some ways Obama’s preferred mode of leading, with its emphasis on process and mediation, carries its own risks that cannot be alleviated by better communication. This does not mean it’s an ineffective strategy.  Indeed, one can argue that it has led to significant policies,  including health care legislation and a stimulus bill.  It remains to be seen whether it will also produce a solution to the debt impasse, and on what terms.

Does Obama want Republicans and Democrats to “eat their peas”, or is he content to split them?  In either case, no one yet seems willing to bite.