This page will allow for a free-form discussion. Students should feel free to post whatever they like here: questions, comments, musings, &c.
This page will allow for a free-form discussion. Students should feel free to post whatever they like here: questions, comments, musings, &c.
I think that when examining the relationship between urbanization and globalization one must be very careful. The fact that generally urbanization and globalization are positively correlated does suggest a relationship, but the direction of that relationship is not clear. One can hypothesize, as many do, that globalization increases urbanization. The growth of urban centers increases as markets become more globally integrated. It can also be said that urbanization increases globalization. As more people move to cities, the ability of the country to operate in a globalized market is increased. As we discussed in class, correlation is not causation and this is a very solid example of this classic concept.
Aseem and Andrew,
The rise of huge industrial cities in China following integration with the global economy validates Aseem’s theory that industrialization is the driver behind the correlation of globalization and urbanization. I would argue that industrialization is the proximate cause for urbanization, and the correlation between globalization and urbanization is due only to the effect of globalization on industrialization. If this is correct, then nations whose role in the globalized economy is based on natural resource or agricultural exports would not see a rise in urbanization because there would not be a grown in industry.
In response to the second part of Aseem’s question, it would seem that integration with the global economy has a regional effect on urbanization by shifting the growth of cities towards coastal regions with easy access to overseas markets. This is evidenced by the migration in China away from the inaccessible interior towards the coast and navigable waterways.
http://www.unesco.org/courier/1999_06/uk/dossier/txt18.htm
Above is a link to an article I found interesting regarding the topic of urbanization and globalization. The article accepts that globalization and urbanization are both increasing, and appears to take the side of correlation without definite causation. It asserts that two extremes could happen. The first is that as uncertainty will begin to occur, as well as deregulation. This would result in tensions that lead to lack of infrastructure and violence, creating problems. The second is that markets and the state will work together to form a prosperous society with a better quality of life. It is interesting to think that urbanization could result in two different extremes, and it seems that an interactive approach taken by the state would end in better result.
@ Maddie and Sweatshops
That’s an interesting point. From the perspective of economic growth (and not considering the moral arguments against sweatshops–work conditions, etc.), sweatshops could potentially be seen as a stepping stone for economic growth. One example is China. There has been manufacturing outsourcing to China for quite a while, and because of this–along with certain government policies to help steer economic growth, such as devalued currency–China has consistently maintained high growth rates. Their economic strategy is based on utilizing ultra cheap labor to produce goods and sell them abroad, and in turn keeping exports high. As a result of its increasing standard of living, suddenly China is adapting to use slightly more skilled labor to produce different products. In turn, the lower wage manufacturing jobs are starting to be shipped abroad to other east Asian countries such as Vietnam.
However, this is a really difficult question to answer because there is a strong moral side to it. It reminds me of the quote we discussed in class by the population theorist (Malthus?). His claims that death and famine are just equalizers, and in effect can help control populations may be true from a geographical perspective, but from a moral standpoint it’s hard to admit. The same thing goes for sweatshops.
@Betsy
that editorial about Haiti was very interesting and I agree it brought up some interesting points about the effects of globalization. if we assume that there is a link between globalization and urbanization (although the above conversation starting with Aseem shows that such a link should not be assumed lightly) then we can start asking the normative question of whether more urbanization is a good thing. Krugman mentioned that industrial/urban life is an improvement over the “previous, less visible rural poverty.” and certainly in the West there is some feeling that urban societies are better, maybe more advanced, etc. because our societies tend to be highly urbanized and urban life can give one better access to goods, services, and education. however, Stiglitz would argue that modern globalization (dominated by a West imposing its interest) forces developing countries to follow an artificial and rapid path of development and I would argue that this tragedy illustrates this point. The 1906 and 1989 San Fran earthquakes measured approximately the same on the Richter Scale as the Haiti one. However the death toll in those earthquakes was a few thousand at most. the feared death toll in Haiti is upwards of 50,000. rapid globalization and urbanization has created urban centers devoid of many of the safety mechanisms taken for granted in the States, such as adequate building codes and fire/medical teams. so bringing developing countries quickly along into the industrial world may be seen as humanitarian or good but forcing this process may create new problems and crises.
In class, we’ve talked more than once about the proximity of those in need and how that affects the aid we give. In a philosophy class I took last semester, we read an article by Peter Singer advocating for an altruistic outlook that completely disregards proximity. He suggests that we are morally obliged to give money to those who are the absolute worst off, location aside. To some extent, I see his point. Perhaps our nationality shouldn’t matter. Perhaps we should focus, not on the man in Chicago living off of $40 a day, but on the man in Rwanda earning $5 a day. In one way, this greatly appeals to my economic nature. In a country like Rwanda, we could help many more people with the same amount of money relative to in the U.S. Theoretically, that is. The issue with merely throwing money at Third World countries is that the high level of corruption in their governments means that much of the aid given to such countries goes straight into the pockets of their leaders. Maybe, then, our focus should be on giving aid to countries where the largest percentage of our money actually reaches those in need. That way, none of our money is wasted. However, we would still have the issue of poor countries with flawed governments and no solution as to how to fix them. The issue is complex, and I see no easy decision. As we’ve said before, there are always going to be both winners and losers in globalization. The question is, who are we going to choose to win?
While researching for the Vermont project I found this article titled “Vermont Economist Calls Farm Subsidies Pork”( http://www.wcax.com/Global/story.asp?S=8341507 )
In a classic critique of farm subsidies he argues that subsidization comes at the direct expense of taxpayers and consumers. Additionally, he argues that subsidies benefits are skewed toward the largest farms, and agriculture is only a small part of Vermont’s economy. Another downside to subsidization is that by encouraging agriculture, subsidization can sometimes create a surplus of agricultural produce. This surplus reduces the price of agricultural goods and the profitability of farms, and therefore reinforces the need for subsidization.
The USDA page detailing subsidies showed that the largest component of Vermont subsidies was in milk production, and disaster relief was the second largest. The milk subsidy operates by setting a floor for the price of milk, therefore it is highly volatile year to year with is almost no subsidization in high price years. In 2006 Vermont received $16,612,769 in total subsidies, with $10,437,081 in the dairy program. (http://farm.ewg.org/farm/regiondetail.php?fips=50000&summlevel=2)
Bill McKibben brings up some interesting points, particularly the relationship between economic growth and happiness. He claims that increased economic growth leads to increased happiness only up to the pinnacle point of 10,000 dollars/year salary, and after that it plateaus–maybe even declines. However, he hints that we shouldn’t strive for consistent economic growth (in fact, he argues our thirst for money and bigger stuff is indirectly killing the environment), and instead of putting in the extra hours to buy that new red Chevy or big screen TV, we should accept a low but livable salary, only spend $ 100 for family Christmas gifts, and just sniff some fresh Vermont air.
Like I said, he makes some interesting points, but McKibben’s ideas seem impractical. Regardless of how content some people might be by maintaining modest salaries, buying that car you’ve always wanted or finally affording that plasma TV to watch football is always going to have its appeal. It’s the way the capitalist system is set up–the harder you work the better your ability to get what you want. And as long as under our economic system people have that ability, the majority of the population isn’t going to hit 10,000 dollars/year salary and suddenly not want to get any richer. It’s built into the capitalist system–to always be striving and climbing. It’s Darwinist: to try to stay alive, survive, and become the strongest.
I wouldn’t have such a problem with this idea if McKibben just said “the world would be a better place if more people didn’t go crazy about always having bigger and better things,” but he indirectly presents it as a solution for global warming. He includes statistics representing all the unnecessary use of plastic, oil, and other harmful products that goes into producing things like iPods and televisions, and hints that if we all just lived simpler the environment would be better off.
Bill McKibben is clearly not an economist, and when he tries to be his writing is at its weakest. What he and many left-wing, non-economist scholars is turned off by, however, is a tendency of our contemporary world for all normative social questions to be answered in terms of economic considerations: will this increase efficiency, output, GNP, etc. As we discussed in the first part of class today, this is a relatively new development of our modern world, yet to some (myself included) it seems a limited metric on which to measure all social goals.
Nevertheless, questions of norms aside, our global economy will very soon have to come to terms with the fact of scarcity of resources. This is the third point of McKibben’s argument and is not about ideals, but about the cold, hard fact of unsustainable levels of consumption. Even if we take issue with his other two points, this last one continues to seem problematic.
Did anyone find Schmaller’s piece even vaguely reminiscent of current debates on Global Warming and decreasing carbon footprints in the developing world?
Schmaller argument of “historical irony” (Britain’s encouragement of trade liberalization only *after* a long period of trade tariffs and protectionism) is just like that of developing countries (like India and China) today – the US (and the rest of the now-developed world) clamors for the Kyoto Protocol and the reduction of industrial practices (on the part of the newly-developing countries) that increase the risks of global warming…yet these same developed countries are only developed because they have spent years pumping carbon into the earth’s atmosphere. If Schmaller has any point in convincing Bismark to employ ‘the stick’ in the unification and future prosperity of Germany, then carbon-neutrality in the developed world counts for naught, as it will be offset by increased industrial practices by the developing countries. Does the developed world, then, have any right to stop them?
Really interesting article in today’s NY Times that is extremely relevant to globalization and much of what we have talked about in class. It is about the glassmaking industry and how production in the United States has fallen steadily since the 1990’s and particularly after the 2008-09 recession. The author uses an example of the World Trade Center to illustrate his point. The original Twin Towers were constructed without any imported glass while the new towers will be created using Chinese glass. As a result, “So, in an argument likely to be repeated if unemployment persists at record high levels, some are pressing the Obama administration to offer protection for the nation’s glassworkers by raising existing tariffs on imported glass, particularly from China, as is happening on steel and tires.” However, Obama seemingly has surrounded himself with free-trade minded economists therefore it will be interesting to see his response as unemployment continues to hover at 10 percent. You can see the article at the following link. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/19/business/19glass.html?ref=business
We talked a little bit about Disney Vermont the other day in class and how it will solve all of Vermont’s problems. Interestingly, Destiny U.S.A. aims to do just that (but not in Vermont). The company is run by a group of investors who create massive malls to stimulate business for depressed areas. It’s supposed to employ all local workers for the building process and then as mall workers. However, there has been a lot of controversy surrounding the most recent mall in Syracuse. The building plans are so elaborate that they’ve had trouble adequately training local workers. The attempt to outsource as little as possible is ruining the project. Overall I think the impending failure of Destiny U.S.A. is a pretty strong argument in favor of globalization.
http://www.destinyusa.com/destiny/story.php
Greg, I’m not quite sure what to make of Destiny USA yet… But I just want to say that it reminds me of Jose Saramago’s The Cave.
Also, I want to comment on the Keohane and Nye reading for tonight. I really like the way they conceptualize globalization. Globalization, as they define it, is an increase in globalism. Globalism is intercontinental network interdependence and it is split into various dimensions (economic, military, social and military). This organized, systematic conceptualization of the too loosely used word “globalization” makes me happy. Keohane’s and Nye’s clear conceptualization makes comparing over time globalism (and the relationships between its dimensions) so much easier. Maybe we could have read this earlier on.
To follow up on today’s discussion: this post on Slashdot (http://tinyurl.com/yl4zumu) expands the debate over… *ahem* what I call the Great Google-China Meltdown of 2010 to include China’s vast cell phone market. This is something we completely overlooked in class, and could make a Google withdrawal potentially more painful than we originally thought.
Google’s recent entry into mobile computing, with its Android operating system and the newly unveiled Nexus One, underscores the company’s long-term ambition to shape the way consumers use the Web on handheld devices. (See this NYT story for more: http://tinyurl.com/ybdm2tc) Pulling out of China, then, would mean losing access not only to Chinese Web surfers RIGHT NOW, but down the road, the millions of people there who are buying up cell phones at an amazing rate, as well.
During yesterday’s class we continued our consideration of Angell’s position that economic integration makes war more costly and applied his theories to the current global situation. It would seem that economic integration, as Angell and Friedman’s MacDonald’s theory suggest, does make war between globalized countries more costly. However, we should be skeptical of the assertion that further globalization will make wars between developed, globalized powers impossible. The threat of nuclear devastation and the incredible human cost of a conventional war between developed powers- as WWII showed us- may very well be more important than economic factors in keeping nations’ fingers off of the triggers. That is not to suggest that war between developed nations will never happen; as human beings we have a disturbing tendency to overlook reason in favor of emotionalism and greed. Another Hitler, another set of circumstances which allows him or her into the cradle of power, and the world may very well be plunged into WWIII. The possibility of another Hitler is a good reason for us to disregard Angell’s advice to disarm totally and an even better reason for us to push for nuclear disarmament.
Sorry, this didn’t post before now, strangely…
I found Ben Barber’s “Jihad vs. McWorld” weird to read. On the one hand, BB is acknowledging and stepping back from – if often oversimplifying – what I see as two major sociopolitical memes: sociocentrism and worldcentrism, what Jean Gebser calls the Mythic and Rational worldviews. BB had some excellent points, which I’ll note:
– Capitalism doesn’t require democracy, though they go well together
– Resources PUSH towards integration, whereas markets PULL
– A global confederation should be considered prior to a global Constitution (dating before marriage…?)
– Democracy can’t be imposed structurally; it grows bottom-up, with demographic and sociocultural readiness as a prerequisite
On the other hand, several of BB’s comments irked me. (Some of these are factual, which knowing me means that they’re at least partially un-factual, in which case feel free to shout at me and/or ignore them.)
1) When overviewing our ecological imperative, BB’s main example of an ecological threat was 3rd world farmers burning down whole forests in an attempt to modernize. This might be true in select cases, but I think it’s a pretty misleading example to use in isolation. In Human Ecology last spring, our class focused heavily on ecological narratives used in the Sahel belt of Africa: “Stupid traditional farmers overpopulating and slashing/burning down the forests, exacerbating the growth of the Sahara region”. When looked at in more depth, these narratives had absolutely no factual basis behind them, and this turned out to be a very common myth among development workers throughout Africa. (But that’s just one continent.)
2) BB suggests that McWorld as a main political structure will not sustain democracy. I don’t know about that. Per BB’s technological imperative, we are increasingly aware of events happening all around the globe as they happen. Plain old human beings (often college students) have demonstrated that they’re perfectly willing to buck whatever shopping spree they might have that weekend, and go out and protest for something happening 2K miles away.
My point: political structure doesn’t define democracy. People will engage in community and push their values even in a McWorld. As McKibben readily demonstrates, a globalized and integrated world doesn’t need to forget the local priority or human values; in fact, it may even facilitate those priorities.
3) Greg, please forgive me if I’m mangling this. But wasn’t Indira Gandhi involved in arousing a good deal of nationalist and partialist sentiment? Wasn’t it she who declared a national state of emergency in India and held it there for years, enjoying grossly overcentralized control without any clear ongoing need for this? BB lumps her with other Gandhis as paradigms of democratic virtue, and I’m skeptical that she belongs that lumpage. Not that this compromises his point in any way…
Globalization means the world is getting smaller, more interconnected; a change in variable X means a more immediate change in variable Y. A recent XKCD comic exemplefies this:
http://xkcd.com/687/
If confederal representative democracy is the solution to globalization’s destructive tendencies, i am curious how closely our evolving international organization may come to managing global governance. The UN has come under a lot of criticism recently for numerous shortcomings: inefficiency, cases of corruption, and lack of executive authority. Nevertheless, this may be the best, albeit currently flawed system to manage inter-state relations.
Furthermore, with the creation of the EU, the world is moving in the direction of regional power groupings as well. This model seems to be spreading too, with the creation of SAARC in South Asia, ASEAN in South East Asia, the African Union, The Organization of American States, and the Arab League, though these are admittedly many steps behind. Yet, were regionalism to take hold across the globe, the effects on global governance would be profound: any single African state is unlikely to be able to get its voice heard, yet as a block they could become a powerful political force. The result may indeed begin to approximate Barber’s confederalism, with a global hierarchic political structure ascending from the national to the regional to the international.
@Brian
also following up on the Google v China discussion and maybe we will cover this more as we move into the last week…does Google and the US by extension (as we noted in class the State Dept has stepped up in support of Google) have the right to condemn human rights abuses by China? I know that China jails and executes political dissidents and maybe that is more of a black and white issue but how about freedom to information? In Schmoller we talked about how sometimes being despotic and reducing freedoms, while hindering economic integration and possibly growth, may serve a different (higher?) purpose of political and social unity. China growing at over 8% may be able to afford a little economic slowdown by censoring the internet if it creates political unity. US values may be different. A democracy in large part depends on free information flow, single party politics don’t necessarily. Aren’t US objections to this censorship just hypocrisy and double standards similar to what Stiglitz talked about with rich countries, already powerful, writing the rules at the expense of the less powerful developing countries?
This comment comes a couple days late, but for those still interested in the implications of the Chinese Government vs. Google issue this article seems extremely relevant. (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/20/opinion/20friedman.html?ref=opinion )
Friedman regards this as a defining issue in China’s development. In his view, a decision to kick Google out of China would show that the Communist party is strangling access to knowledge that is essential for growth in today’s economy. As China upgrades from simple manufacturing, access to information will become more vital for success. Therefore government censorship of information, exemplified by banning Google, will hinder the growth of a new Chinese economy based on information. In his trademark style, Friedman coins some catchy new terms to frame the debate, describing this as a struggle between “Command China” and “Network China”.
My reaction is that Friedman overemphasizes the impact of censorship has on the economy. While flows of knowledge are undoubtedly important for growth, censorship in China is directed at a specific set of politically sensitive topics and does not interfere with access to the vast majority of information. Censorship by the party stifles freedom of speech and political development, but the censorship filter does not affect transfers of technology or business networking in the way Friedman imagines.
To go back to Andrew’s discussion of Angell, I agree. It does seem likely that countries that depend heavily on each other for trade will not want to go to war. However, even if globalization does make war less likely, it doesn’t make it impossible. If all of the world’s most powerful and globalized countries disarm, it would take just one aggressor to tear our world apart. Furthermore, it’s very unlikely that crazy egomaniacal rulers are ever going to totally go out of style. History shows that power always has the potential to corrupt. We should not expect every skirmish to turn into war, but we also should not leave ourselves unable to effectively react to such a situation, should it occur.
@Nolan: I find the sovereignty argument decrying U.S. involvement in the Google/China spat a little less convincing than the practicality argument.
Absolutely, nobody’s got the right to tell China what to do within its own borders. But that still won’t stop the White House from condemning the PRC for its censorship tactics. What *might* give the United States pause — and I think the President has been astute about this until now — is if it comes to realize that prodding China generally produces this unproductive and typical response: http://tinyurl.com/yhoczvn.
Whether you believe that U.S. criticism of China ought to continue seems to depend on whether you think a body of symbolic protests can ultimately overturn the status quo. I’m skeptical, but I know a lot of people who believe in the power of symbolism at the international diplomatic level.
@ Nolan and Brian,
I wouldn’t say that nobody has any right to tell China what to do within it’s borders. While it may be paternalistic for the U.S. and friends to demand developing countries adhere to a certain development policy, I think it is far from imperialism to demand that China respect the human rights of its own people. Sovereignty does not confer the right to do whatever one wants within one’s own borders; the international community has a certain responsibility to speak out against violations of human rights. That being said, it’s a fair question as to whether or not U.S. protests over censorship will actually do more good than harm in the sphere of international relations and whether or not the White House’s protests are sincere and prudent. These considerations however do not undercut the basic premise that it is human dignity, and not state sovereignty, that should be inviolable.
Just wondering if everyone could post their groups topic on here. My group, with Brooks, Nolan, and Lily, is doing Urbanization. There are also similar topics out there so it would be helpful to know what others are doing so we can avoid doing similar projects.
Having taken a class about American federalism last year, I was really interested in the issue that Barber brings up about “confederal union[s] of semi-autonomous communities” being the wave of the future and was particularly interested in the issue of how we decide and determine what issues are addressed on what scale. As the world begins to organize itself on this broader scale, this issue becomes increasingly salient. While Barber roughly outlines the system of confederations as “participatory and self-determining in local matters at the bottom, representative and accountable at the top,” I found myself wishing he would have gone in to greater detail about how, in his mind, this system would actually look. Furthermore, James brought up the really great point that by organizing themselves into regional coalitions, countries that tend to lack political clout can, by joining together, increase their political influence and power on a global scale. While we have already seen these types of regional associations begin to emerge, and they appear to have many benefits, are there any downsides that this sort of power shift from the national to the regional scale can have?
Going back to Maddie and Andrew’s comments about decreased likelihood of war with increased dependence on trade, I wonder what happens when countries become overly dependent. As globalization increases and increases, and specialization due to comparative advantage occurs, what happens when a country, for some reason, stops producing. In a world of total dependence, it would seem like everyone would suffer. Could the tension from this actually make large scale war more likely? An example I can think of would be if oil becomes extremely scarce. Saudi Arabia is going to hold onto that last bit of oil they have, and everyone else is going to want it so they can drive their cars.
I think that this idea of over-dependence is an interesting topic especially when looked at from the point of the producer. An economy that relies almost exclusively on foreign trade will be very vulnerable to any shocks in its trading partners’ demand making the producing country’s economy very unstable. China is currently experiencing this first hand as the demand for Chinese products has fallen significantly since the onset of the financial crisis in America and Europe. There is not even close to enough demand on the part of domestic consumers to make up for the deficit caused by the change in consumer demand overseas. The aggressive export led model that Asian countries have followed for years is now responsible for a major deceleration in growth rates, whereas before it was the main driver of the uncharacteristically high rates. This is an example of how increasingly integrated the global economy is and the issues that can arise due to globalization.
I agree with Lilly that China has certainly seen a slow decline in growth rates, but at the same time, with an impressive 8.7% growth rate for 2009, they are one of the quickest countries to bounce back from the global recession, elevating it to the second largest economy later this year. Driving this modest, yet certainly adequate growth is domestic consumption. China may have been dependent on its exports industry, but unique watershed moments like this past recession, in a sense, a by-product of globalization, recenters a country’s priorities. Evidence of that would be the $586 billion stimulus bill China passed in late 2008, which has ambitions to provide universal health care, improve education and transportation– overall demonstrating how the Chinese government has already recognized the need to improve its infrastructure, rebuild its economy, all while looking inward.
To comment on Lilly and Diana’s posts. The decline in China’s growth rate shows that increased integration may lead to globalization but globalization doesn’t necessarily lead to growth. Growth has become the ultimate goal and measure of economic success. However, we know that this is not necessarily the case. I think that while growth correlates with globalization it isn’t the sole effect. In fact, increased integration could facilitate economic declines. Take for instance the tumble of the Dow Jones Industrial Average this week. It was largely due to the instant information available about Obama’s intended overhaul of financial regulations regarding speculation.
I’d like to go back to James’ and Betsey’s discussion of confederal unions and regional power coalitions. Betsey asked about the downsides to a shift in power from national to regional. I think that the main downside is compromise and that this may make such coalitions unsustainable. In order to form huge regional power groups, the individual groups will have to make compromises. There’s no way that every country in the EU agrees on every issue. However, to make the EU work, there must be give and take. How long will it be before some weaker countries with smaller economies realize that they are forced to give much more than they are permitted to take? The larger the union, the larger the minority that loses out. 30% of 100 people is not a significant population; 30% of 5 million is a lot of discontented people. The issue, though, is that operating on too small a scale is also impractical, as it allows tiny minorities to be completely oppressed. I believe there is some balance in between that is most desirable, but finding such a precise balance would be difficult, if not impossible.
Coming back to the Google in China issue, I watched a video on CNN.com this morning that was a nice illustration of the fact that in many ways China has developed its own counterparts to many popular, westernized websites and services. These include their own versions of Facebook, YouTube, and EBay. It appears that in many cases China has been able to effectively adapt to its situation in this manner. I think the major issue comes down to whether or not it worth it for China to let Google stay, and as is suggested in this video, it appears that China would not really miss the presence of Google, as substitutes have already emerged and its presence is rather minimal anyway.
Here’s the link to the video: http://www.cnn.com/video/#/video/tech/2010/01/22/ctw.anderson.han.china.cnn?iref=allsearch
As Diana points out, China has managed to maintain a growth rate of 8.7% in 2009, which is remarkably high as compared to other economies of the world. An interesting question that has been raised by many economists including Mckibben, is what if consumption in China increased at the same rate that the country grew? What if Chinese consumers started to consume at the same rate as Americans? I feel that this question is even more relevant now that other economies are slowing while the Chinese have managed to rebound rather quickly from the crisis. Bill Mckibben’s main concern with an increase in Chinese consumption is, of course, the impact it would have on the environment. He highlights the massive increase in CO2 emissions, even considering the fact that most cars would probably be “clean” and the rate of extinction in fisheries. I am more curious what the economic ramifications of such an increase in consumerism would be and how the current level of global integration would cause changes in the world economy.
@ Betsy
You’re right, China has its own replacements for Facebook (http://www.renren.com), Youtube (I forget the address/can’t find it), and Google (http://www.baidu.com). I agree with you that China wouldn’t really miss Google, but I don’t think that’s the government’s biggest concern. It’s more about the bad/good publicity. I can see this whole situation going one of two ways: 1) bringing China’s poor human rights policies to the front of the world stage, and in turn giving China bad publicity, or 2) it’s a chance for China to stand strong on its policies, to flex some muscles and show it isn’t going to cave under international pressures.
Last class we talked about possible turning points for the current wave of globalization–IE, what could cause it to slow down or reverse itself–and this whole Google situation probably won’t cause any major changes, but it’s something to think about. China’s influence and economic power has been consistently growing, and this sort of forces it into standing up or standing down.
In “McWorld vs. Jihad”, Barber mentions something that I have kind of accepted as simply true: McWorld is a homogenizing force (and implies that Jihad is the locally rooted resistance to this homogenization). McWorld is defined by a certain “uniformity” or a “commercially homogenous global network: one McWorld tied together by technology, ecology, communications, and commerce.” But I wonder if an increasingly commercially Connected world must necessarily be a commercially Homogenous world? And if that’s true… then is a commercially homogenous world necessarily a culturally homogeneous world?
I wonder if consumerism (a culture?) necessarily conflicts with other cultural values like religion. I was reading a book review in the NY Times (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/24/books/review/Totten-t.html?ref=world). The author of the book argues that consumerism is, in fact, compatible with mainstream Muslims, that “globalization, free trade and market economics aren’t a threat to Islam.”
@Aseem: I agree with you – Barber definitely seemed to see commercial integration as not only leading to commercial homogeneity, but also compelling cultural homogeneity on top of it. In a global world, Barber sees “culture” as reducible to economics: integration will iron out any cultural differences and thus lead to homogeneity. Distinct cultures, thus, can only be preserved in a pre-global world (namely, Jihad).
This is demonstrably not the case. The most globally integrated countries certainly “cross-pollinate” their cultural assets; but these cultural distinctions are preserved as often as they are drowned out. As much as it’s painful to see, say, Michigan sportsteams banners plastering the walls of a bar in Madrid, it’s heartening to see American college students abroad greeting a friend with two kisses on the cheek. Cultural spread does to some extent follow economic power, as exemplified by the spread of the English language. But this is by no means an absolute; and in any case, the “dominant” culture is never left untouched but always evolves in response to contact with other cultures.
BB doesn’t really acknowledge any of this. For him, it seems, if you’re economically integrated, you’re going to act in the most rational way possible and follow the global masses towards one uniform consumption pattern – this being determinant of culture. A little simplistic in my eyes.
@Maddie
I agree that supranational governments and “confederal unions” will force larger compromises. Such a system seems to entail coalition governance where in order to get anything done the tent of power has to be made very large and encompass a wide variety of interests, thus diluting power and efficacy. That is my biggest concern with such coalitions. They may become paralyzed and unable to act because in order to maintain a majority, a wide number (and often competing) interests will have to be satisfied, which in many instances will be impossible (just look at the Democrats, a party rent by competing interests, unable to pass healthcare reform even with a supermajority). Yes, the larger the sphere the larger the number of discontents, but potentially the larger the number who get what they want (even if they do have to compromise). However, i think the larger problem will be general government inaction and it seems to me that problems that make it to the global/regional scale are probably the ones that will demand quick and decisive action (i.e. climate change).
Nolan, I completely agree with your argument about the inefficiencies of these coalitions, such as the EU. Having spent the fall studying in the Czech Republic and learning about the European Union, I learned how bureaucratic and inefficient the EU can be. There are a seemingly unlimited number of committees, chambers, and councils (Council of Ministers, European Commission, European Council and European Parliament, just to name the big ones) that represent so many different interests, it is nearly impossible to get legislation passed in a timely fashion. It forces so much compromise from all the participating parties that the diluted results of the legislation rarely are sufficient to address the problem at hand, in effect “paralyzing” the coalition as Nolan argues.
A major problem for me with political coalitions like this, and also large governments such as the US government, is that the politicians who are elected seem to care a lot about getting reelected, and thus conform to party policy. With the new Supreme Court decision eases restrictions on campaign spending by big businesses, there is even more incentive to stay on the good side of the companies that can support candidates in elections. Campaign finance differences between candidates can definitely play a large role in elections, and with the new ruling, it will likely play more of a role. Special interest groups and lobbyists will have more power than before, which doesn’t seem to be in the best interest of the American people.
In her recent Internet freedom speech, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton calls Internet freedom “21st century statecraft.” (http://tinyurl.com/ydrnzxc). This reminded me of our recent class discussion about the power of the Internet and the information age, and the challenges it poses to the sovereignty and power of states. We discussed how a few individuals with computer skills can threaten an entire state through a cyber attack or breach of classified information, and that with the current wave of globalization, individuals hold more power than ever before. Because information and ideas can now spread instantaneously, and attacks can be launched from a single personal computer instead of behind a state-purchased tank or m16 rifle, some of the influence of states has been transferred to individuals and special interest groups.
In response to Lilly’s questions on the environmental consequences of Chinese growth, I would say that the Chinese economic miracle has come with a steep environmental price. Aside from exacerbating global warming with skyrocketing CO2 emissions, China’s growth has caused environmental destruction on a local level that is unthinkable in this country. Air pollution in Chinese cities is a well known problem, but the gravest form of pollution in China is in fact water pollution. Heavy metals from smelting and heavy manufacturing pollute rivers with mercury and lead levels hundreds of times above safety standards. Along these rivers, “Cancer Villages” have developed with an abnormal prevalence of many forms of cancer. The Chinese government has only recently ( in the past 5 years) realized that it must address the environmental consequences of growth, and is struggling to implement environmental policies at a local level.
Environmental degradation within China is caused at least in part by economic integration. A direct example of this is the movement of the consumer electronics recycling industry to China. Factories in southern China take advantage of global integration by extracting valuable silicon from electronics discarded in America. This profitable industry comes with the negative externality of other heavy metals polluting water supplies from the electronic garbage imported from America. This case is a compelling example of the need for regulation to counteract negative externalities of profitable but potentially harmful enterprise.
Political coalitions and big governments can only work well if there are checks and balances within the system that allow the people some kind of autonomy or freedom to make decisions on a smaller level. There needs to be balance in the mechanisms of the government. Looking at the EU, for example, and returning to a point in the discussion on Thursday, many of the economic policies put forth by the coalition caused some of the smaller states to become even weaker in the recession. Decision-making on this sort of issue needs to come from a central body within the coalition if there is to be any sort of legitimacy, but at the same time, if it is clear that the policies will hurt places like Greece or Ireland, as the EU economic policies have, there needs to be some kind of escape valve in place to allow these states to operate within the coalition and for their own good. This is an extremely complex problem, and one that is hard to put into real terms. Autonomous decisions on the local level can undermine the decisions of the coalition as a whole, just as the failure of one of the smaller players in the system can cause a failure of the entire coalition. The question becomes who gets the short end of the stick in these sorts of situations, and what can be done to distribute both the positive and negative effects of these sorts of programs efficiently.
I was really intrigued by our conversation today toward the end of class about solidarity and how it relates to the larger issue of globalization. I think that the ease of communication and advents in technology that in so many ways characterize the current era of globalization have had, as we discussed, many positive side effects (e.g. I think there is legitimate value in being able to communicate along common interests with people all over the world). However, what I really worry about is the, I think, noticeable decrease in face-to-face interactions that has also come to increasingly characterize our world today. As people have come to rely more and more on technological innovations such as email, Facebook, and Skype, which arguably make communication easier, the personal touch and connection, it seems to me, is withering away. I’m curious as to if there is actual literature and statistics to back up this possibility and about what kinds of implications this phenomenon might have on our society.
@ Betsy: It seems to me that the concern over the digitization of our social life is but the most recent example of the complex relationship between technology and society. Once its achievements were allowed to percolate throughout society, the technological leaps of the industrial revolution vastly improved the living standards of the western world, yet they simultaneously brought about fears of the mechanization and alienation of the individual. Mass media had a perceived cheapening effect on intellectual high culture, yet it also allowed for new, radically innovative forms of art. Just so, as our lives become increasingly digitized, the effect is simultaneously the cheapening of certain ideas of social contact and, arguably, the democratization of information. It is not insignificant that new media conduits like Twitter played a roll in the recent Iranian protests.
Betsy and James,
The argument that technology diminishes genuine personal contact between people seems to be one of the strongest arguments against its spread in recent popular culture and discussion. It seems that we are in the midst of a technological revolution that could very well be looked at one hundred years from now the same way the Industrial Revolution is seen today. With the incredible growth of the use of technology and its increasing incorporation into our everyday lives, as well as some of the dehumanizing effects it presents, there will inevitably be literature that may mirror Marx and others in its call for change. One important distinction I feel will be made is not that technology should be overthrown by the oppressed in favor of smoke signals and carrier pigeons. For better or worse, technology has become so incorporated into daily life that it will be impossible to escape barring some unforeseen catastrophe or change. There will always be those who try to escape the spread, whether it is on a state level like North Korea, or on a much more individual level, with people choosing not to use the internet or cell phones. However, these personal or state restrictions on technology pose a much higher level of alienation, for not only do these people live in a world with fewer human interactions, these people will also have less in common with the people who do embrace and use technology.
At the end of class today we were talking about China’s explanation for Internet censorship. Here’s what I found. The state-run news agency Xinhua claims:
“[China]is regulating the Internet legally to build a more reliable, helpful information network that is beneficial to economic and social development.”
(From http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2010/01/25/rights-sites-report-more-cyber-attacks-from-china/)
along the line of whether or not the internet is changing society i found this interesting piece from newsweek.
http://www.newsweek.com/id/229843
“Scholars who study the mind and the brain shoot down the popular claim that the Internet alters thought.”
however, it does go on to give the positions of many scholars who feel that the Internet creates dystopian “shallowness, credulity, and distraction”
On a different thought, we talked about how specialization in culture creates new solidarity, but i am concerned with increasing specialization in academia. Students and professors are praised for writing 200 page theses on minute aspects of an academic field. While there is something to be said about gaining in depth analysis of a subject, shouldn’t the system also attempt to foster wide reaching interdepartmental projects that “stand on the shoulders of giants” and bring in a broad outlook? A liberal education gives us some of this broad base but in many other countries (and many universities in the states) students must pick a career track very early and hardly make any outside connections.
Awesome link, Nolan. The Newsweek piece, “Your Brain Online” was intriguing on several fronts. First, apparently Begley had incorrectly skewed one scholar’s opinion. Going on to read Rheingold’s complete article “Attention is the Fundamental Literacy,” Rheingold comments that it’s easy to drift into “shallowness, credulity, and distraction… but those mental temptations pose dangers only for the untrained mind.” The internet and information revolution that has swept the late 21st century certainly has made individuals adapt faster than ever and focus on the next moment, the future they have a chance in creating, commenting on. In the end, it is up to us to wade through and understand how to safeguard our own privacy, to challenge our minds and synthesize bits of readily, sometimes inaccurate information.
In terms of the evolution of the forms of solidarity, I would say the Internet has transformed into a sort of warped organic solidarity so that we are all wearing several types of hats. Not only are we miners from 9am-5pm, who can bond with other miners in Germany and Thailand, but we are also stock traders with our very own Bloomberg terminals at home, avid Apple fans who stay up on forums, utterly disappointed the Mac Tablet hasn’t been released yet. In the end, creating multiple identities within an individual.
@Nolan: I like your comment on the trend towards obscene hyperspecialization where academics get locked in to their narrow fields. One effect of this trend in my mind, me speaking from the standpoint of Integral Theory, is that a narrow focus makes you overly committed to the academic supremacy of your pet theory or approach. So if you have 3 camps of theorists having a cat-fight with each camp trying to prove that their theory of, say, political causality is the most accurate, none of the camps involved will be open to a 4th party coming in and saying “Hey, all of these perspectives are true but partial – each theory is right in a different context, and they can be fit together in this way and this way.”
The thing is, the global problems we face today aren’t of the type that demand highly specialized and narrow solutions. They’re of the type that demand complex syntheses and dialogue between lots of different fields, and certainly require researchers a given field (such as any of the 12, deeply divided sub-fields of psychology) to at the very least have a good broad overview of the different perspectives in their field.
Depth and breadth are both important. But if the goal of education is to prepare citizens to effectively attack real-world problems in a spirit of collaboration, as I think we can say it is, breadth should take priority OVER depth.
We talked today in class, and throughout the entire course, about the approaches that various disciplines take to the issue globalization, and this got me thinking about the impacts of globalization on my primary discipline, the environment. A few of our readings have touched on issues of the environment, but at this point at the end of the course, I feel as though I have a much better understanding of how these two issues really tie together. One of the issues that I find most interesting, which ties into the larger issues of inequalities that we have discussed, is that of who should shoulder the burden of pollution reduction activities in light of global climate change. I can’t recall if it was one of our readings that mentioned this or an article I read elsewhere, but in many cases much emphasis is put on the countries that are currently undergoing rapid expansion and development (China comes to mind for me) to take on the majority of pollution reduction measures. This is ironic because countries like the United States and Great Brittan went through these same processes at one time too, just a number of years ago. Is it fair then for the countries that are only now rapidly expanding to compensate for more than their share of pollution? I think this is a really provocative issue that will only continue to play out more and more in the coming years.