Jutta Weldes argues that “The Soviet missile deployment in Cuba was constituted as a crisis” (48); in other words, its status as “the Cuban missile crisis” was neither self-evident nor inevitable. The Soviets framed the events of October 1962 as part of “the Caribbean crisis,” while the Cubans narrated those same events as “the October crisis” (38). What do we learn from comparing and contrasting these competing narratives of the Soviet missile deployment in Cuba?
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I found the descriptions of the three versions of the “crisis” very interesting. It shows how history and our understanding of it is so dependent on perspective. Each of the three crises was totally valid from the given perspective. For Cuba this was the “October crisis.” I mention Cuba first because I think the crisis was probably more of an actual crisis for Cuba: a small country sandwiched between these two warring world powers. For Cuba, the main issue was sovereignty and self-determination. Cuba felt aggression from the US (Bay of Pigs) and wanted to protect itself. Cuba would have befriended the US after Castro took power, but the US was not interested. How could it not accept the friendship of the Soviet Union, which was helping Cuba protect itself from the US, which had proven itself totally unfriendly? For the Soviet Union, the crisis was known as the “Caribbean crisis” because it was making a move to support a socialist movement in the Caribbean. It was demonstrating its role as leader of the “socialist world.” This was a new territory for the Soviet Union, and the fact that it was in the Caribbean, in the Americas, was likely very significant, and exciting for them. The Soviet Union was taking a very big step in its quest for power and leadership and so this was important for their image and overall agenda. And for the US, this was known as the “Cuban missile crisis.” The secretly placed missiles were a real focus of attention and the fact that this was happening in Cuba, right next door was important. As leader of the “free world,” how could the US allow the Soviet Union create such a threat in its back yard? The threat was more about image than the fear of war (given the US out-missiled the Soviet Union 50 to 3), but that threat was threat enough. The US could not keep its image as leader of the “free world” if it allowed the leader of the “socialist world” to have missiles on its turf. It is interesting to think about how the crisis was a different kind of crisis for the three different actors.