GLOBAL READER

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Karlo Škarica '17
Program and Outreach Fellow
Rohatyn Center for Global Affairs

Middlebury College
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Foreword

After the success of last year's inaugural edition, the Global Reader is back! This academic journal continues to provide a platform for exceptional student works in the field of global affairs. We are committed to the production and dissemination of knowledge about international and global issues, across languages, borders, and disciplines.

Our students produce high-quality work on a daily basis, but the opportunity to share it remains scarce. With the Global Reader, we seek to fill this void. The topics discussed in this volume range from international security, linguistics and environmental work to humanitarian and sociological research. Nonetheless, the authors share the understanding of the importance of a global perspective in an increasingly complex international system.

I would like to thank the Rohatyn Student Advisory Board, as well as our volunteer editors and authors for their immense help with this second volume of the Global Reader. Additionally, I am grateful for the generous input by Carolyn Kuebler of the New England Review, whose guidance helped us immensely. Finally, an important thank you goes out to Charlotte Tate, RCGA's Associate Director, and Tamar Mayer, RCGA's director, for their constant support and empowerment of students' academic lives at Middlebury and beyond.

I hope you enjoy it, criticize it, love it, or hate it - but most importantly that you fully engage with it!

Sincerely,

Karlo Skarica
RCGA Program and Outreach Fellow
Middlebury College '17

On the Edge of Hope: Internally Displaced Peoples and Urban Humanitarianism

by Esteban Arenas-Pino, *class of 2018*

Abstract:

Although the United Nations and other multilateral treaties have established a chain of protocols to address the issues of refugee flows and the rights of refugees, states have increasingly become wary of the impacts of international migration policies on domestic policies. States have tightened their borders and created multilateral organizations of their own to bypass previously signed commitments to refugees. Those persecuted by violence find it harder to flee and instead vote to seek refuge in urban centers within the borders of their nations. Even when cities may provisionally relieve the plight of displacement, urban IDPs find it hard to access the formal economy and must face structural, personal, and gender and race-based challenges. States must adopt greater legal measures to grant IDPs institutional rights and access to greater opportunities for the improvement of their livelihoods.

Introduction

Urban centers have become important actors in the ever-growing fight for the rights of displaced peoples around the world. In a world where invisible borders become walls, the rights of Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs) should remain center-forward in the humanitarian agenda. However, political discourse around IDPs remains as bleak as that around refugees. The unwillingness of the international community to confront its responsibilities towards refugees, in fears of diminishing state sovereignty by international conventions, has prompted governments to create frameworks that limit global migration and force displaced peoples to relocate within national borders. This political act places a disproportionate burden on urban actors that do not have the capacity to meet the needs of an ever more transient world. This paper recounts the origins of IDP governance, discusses common challenges for IDPs in urban centers, presents urban Colombia as a case study, and finalizes with a set of recommendations on the adaptation of IDP coping systems in cities.

The Birth of IDP Governance

The formation of governance around IDP issues originates in the aversion of states to the responsibilities outlined in refugee law. Michael Barnett argues that even though the efforts to find solutions to the root causes of displacement have grown over the years, these efforts have in turn created policies that limit refugee flow between states. In order to understand governance around IDP issues, one must first explore the mechanisms and ideologies that gave birth to refugee laws and the multilateral bodies born to regulate migration.

      The atrocities of World War II prompted states to shift their focus on the rights of individuals and formalize these commitments through legal mechanisms. International commitments on human rights such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and treaties on global migration such as the 1951 Refugee Convention, hold states accountable to provide asylum, aid, and economic opportunities for refugees when within their borders (Betts 54). The collapse of the Soviet Union ended the political gridlock at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The UNSC accelerated its involvement in domestic state affairs, expanded its oversight on global refugee issues, and promoted the principle of 'responsibility to protect' (R2P) as a governing ideology (Cohen 35-59). R2P is a mandate rooted in the principle of popular sovereignty in which authority resides in the people and not in the states (Barnett 246).

      Since the end of the Cold War the United Nations has forgone its historical noninterference stance and has since used the language of R2P and the UN Charter to make advances in domestic affairs in the name of humanitarianism (Barnett 246). States, once accustomed to an international state of anarchy, now seek alternatives within their domestic politics to preserve their sovereignty.

      Host countries concerned with the obligation of refugee law and their impact on the domestic political establishment have leveraged nationalist sentiments to shape domestic policies to place limits on refugee flows. The UN charter ensures

that "The [UN] is based on the principle of sovereign equality of all its Members." To a state, the principle of sovereignty signifies self-preservation, security, autonomy, and "an obstacle to the ambitious and intrusive designs of more powerful and aggressive states" (Barnett 248). Threatened by sovereignty encroachment by the UNSC, nation-states found that encouraging legal frameworks for IDPs would allow them to curb refugee flows and bypass their previous commitments without damaging their reputation as humanitarian actors (Betts 53-58).

States encouraged the proliferation of global migration institutions, such as Europe's Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and the International Migration Organization (IOM), to impose regulations on global migration flows (Betts 54). On the other hand, the push for an IDP framework had a two-fold effect: (1) create the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (GPID) and mobilize resources for the previously ignored issues of IDPs, and (2) standardize the "internal flight alternative" to limit the transnational mobility of refugees (Betts 53-55). The case of Bosnia exemplifies the flaws of this two-fold effect. UNCHR's push for 'Safe Heavens' in Bosnia not only provided inadequate aid and protection to those fleeing violence and prosecution, but also limited the flow of refugees seeking asylum in other countries (Betts, 56). Barnett claims that "states decided to sanction IDPs because they wanted to be released from other obligations under international refugee law" (Barnett 267). In short, states selfishly imposed barriers for refugees but at the same time advocated for the rights of IDPs. The new rhetoric around migration cemented the metaphorical fortresses that keep displaced peoples out of the North and confined within their own states.

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Principle in the IDP Regime

The new IDP regime promised to address issues of human rights abuses under the guise of R2P; however, the R2P mandate does not effectively address IDP issues. Roberta Cohen argues that the narrow and limited scope of the R2P mandate fails to uphold IDP guiding principles in an humanitarian crisis (Cohen 41-49). Cohen claims that the international community does not effectively promote the enforcement of the IDP Guiding Principles within R2P as some do not consider them 'hard law' and only a few states, such as Colombia, have adopted constitutional or other legal measures for the protection of IDPs (Cohen 42). Additionally, unless the international community receives consent from the government in crisis or the UN Security Council has allowed for an intervention or sanctions under the guidance of the UN Charter, the UN and other bodies will find it more difficult to intervene in a domestic situation of IDPs (Cohen 42) In 2009 the UN did not take action to address the abuses by the Sri Lankan military to Tamil IDPs, and in the 2007 Burmese displacement crisis China and Russia opposed any intervention (Cohen 42-43). China and Russia, as permanent members of the UNSC with veto power, have promoted the principle of nonintervention and in turn prevented effective interventions under a R2P mandate (Cohen 42). Additionally, Cohen also argues that in practice R2P often fails to include an international 'responsibility to rebuild' (Cohen 44). Such was the case of Kenya where the international community failed to create sustainable peace and safety for people displaced by the post-election ethnic clashes of 2008. In other words, unless the international community fully embraces R2P as on operative factor in the implementation of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the current IDP

framework hides behind a vail of deception because it fails to proactively act on its commitments to displaced peoples.

Urban IDP Challenges: A Case Study on Colombia

The half-a-century internal conflict in Colombia has created one of the largest crises of internally displaced peoples in history. Colombian left-winged guerrillas and para-military groups have instated a reign of terror over rural Colombia that has displaced around 7 million as of 2016. Armed groups prevent collective opposition and gain socioeconomic and political power when they intimidate civilians, destroy social networks, and drive people off their lands (Carrillo 528). Colombia, a country where most displaced people sought refuge in urban centers, provides great insight into the challenges that IDPs/refugees face in urban settings.

   Even in a flawed global migration system that forces displaced peoples to remain within their national borders, prospects of a better life in cities do provide hope for those forced from their homes. In cities IDPs can find safety, independence, anonymity, and self-reliance in access to livelihood opportunities (education, employment) (Crisp et al. S23-S27). IDPs may also turn to urban centers due to their geographical proximity, cultural empathy, level of acquaintance, family/friends in the area, and the greater institutional capacity of cities to provide aid and services (Carrillo 529). Despite the great prospects of hope that a city may offer to a displaced family, cities sometimes do not have the capacity to help alleviate the personal and structural challenges that IDPs may face.

IDP personal Challenges

For many IDPs the urban setting may become a place where many of their personal problems worsen. Displacement due to violence creates for the victims trauma, loss of social capital and of support networks, and destitution (Crisp S24). The profile of IDPs in Colombia is the following: 60% come from rural areas, half are women, about half are underage, only 22% completed primary education, 99% live in poverty, 85% live in extreme poverty, 39% of families are single headed (mostly by women), more than 8% are of African descent, and more than 2% are indigenous (Carrillo 535). Since there are no IDP camps in Colombia, many IDPs choose to flee to urban centers hoping to find refuge. In the case of indigenous and Afro-Colombian IDPs displacement causes a separation from their customs, language, communities, social structures, and overall culture (Carrillo 542-543). In cities, IDPs are often the victims of crime and extortion by people in their host communities or by local authorities (Carrillo 537). Without the proper documentation, many find it difficult to access services (i.e. education, health care, and social services), and also to do paperwork (i.e. sign a lease, become employed, cash checks, obtain credit, and travel) (Crisp, S28-S29). Women IDPs find themselves particularly vulnerable to sexual and gender-based violence, harassment, and intimidation (Crisp S29-S30). Although urban IDP women find it easier to get a job than men as maids or waitresses in Colombia, IDP and refugee women in places such as Nairobi, Damascus, Kathmandu, and Accra often find work through survival and transactional sex (Crisp S30). In some patriarchal societies the switch of gender roles where women become the principal income-earner can lead to increases of domestic violence (Crisp S30).

City Structural Challenges

Jeff Crisp argues that some city governments see their role as hosts temporary and do not welcome assistance initiatives in fears that it will attract more displaced peoples (Crisp S26). In Colombia, cities often cite the influx of IDPs as contributors to the growth of the poverty belt (Carrillo S28). Since many IDPS are poor, houseless, and uneducated, they must resort to begging in the streets (Carrillo S28). Urban refugees often build shacks with waste materials in marginal/unhealthy informal settlements in the outskirts of the cities where they are exposed to extortion by landlords and utility services, and higher risks of eviction by city authorities when in public or private land (Crisp 31; Carrillo 539).

Aid Challenges

Unlike in the controlled space of refugee camps, aid agencies have found it difficult to gather data on IDPs and dictate an effective division of food, shelter, and services. Many IDPs do not carry proper documentation, blend in with migrants and other urban poor, and cannot readily access local UNCHR offices (Crisp S25, S28). In the eyes of the world, urban humanitarian aid resembles development more than just aid provision; an activity that the global refugee system has not yet adapted (Crisp S25). Some governments even hinder the data collection around IDPs in fear of violations to national sovereignty (Crisp S35).

Recommendations

The severe situation of IDPs in Colombia does not exist for a lack of institutional support; legal frameworks around the protection of IDPs in Colombia do exist but the implementation needs more efficient and rigorous methods to cater to the needs of IDPs. Again, Urban Colombia presents a great learning opportunity to assess how different actions have benefited IDPs and what next steps could further help disenfranchised IDPs. The Law 387 of 1997 establishes the framework for IDP assistance in Colombia which demands immediate assistance by the government to IDPs, especially to displaced women, children, indigenous peoples and Afro-Colombians (Carrillo 534-536). For IDPs to receive assistance, they must first have the proper documentation and then sign up under the national registry for IDPs. Registered IDPs receive essential aid during a three-month emergency period, after which, aid comes in the form of education, health, and training (Carrillo 536). Unregistered IDPs, who were perhaps denied or did not have proper documentation, then compete for aid with other urban poor.

Since a majority of IDPs want to permanently resettle in cities, about 80% in the case of Colombia (Carrillo 537), aid should refocus on integrating and creating livelihoods for IDPs in cities. In Colombia, cities have started to consider the relocation of IDPs to nearby municipalities to tackle the housing crisis (Carrillo 539). Cities should create greater action to ensure counseling, legal, or medical support to survivors of sexual and gender violence (Crisp S30). UNHCR needs to work with education ministries, UNICEF, and global education movements to address the education needs of IDPs children (Crisp S29). Since health care access is limited and temporary, UNCHR advocacy around access to health services could support existing capacities,

and monitor delivery of services to urban IDPs (Crisp S31). A fair and deliberate inclusion of IDPs into the formal economy could stimulate urban economies and innovations, allowing IDPs to generate personal income and no longer rely on aid for survival (Crisp S33). These initiatives could effectively address some key challenges for IDPs in urban settings and allow cities to expand their coping mechanisms to address future migration flows.

Conclusion

The international community, especially richer northern states, have shut their doors to displaced peoples and neglected them. Barnett well summarizes the new dynamics around global migration: "States slowly approved the concept of IDPs not because of abundance of humanitarianism but because of its very absence" (Barnett 267). If states indeed prefer the 'internal flight alternative,' then they should also support global efforts to address the needs of displaced peoples.

Not explored in this paper is the plight of those displaced by natural disasters and those who will be displaced by Climate Change. Koko Warner et al. claim that environmental induced displacement can be a threat to human security as well as political and state security when it threatens livelihoods and challenges government's capacities to alleviate the social pressures of migration flows (Warner 692). Warner et al. point out that in cases of environmental change, migration may become a survival mechanism of last resort (Warner 692), and a driver of resettlement policies for displaced populations (Warner 696). The inherently political implications of climate and environmental change induced displacement on domestic affairs should prompt governments to seek action and new policy innovations.

In a world amid a moral bankruptcy, cities can advocate for cooperation between national and local governments, excel some sovereignty of their own, and lead the world to act and aid the needs of displaced peoples. The international body must then in response actively support urban actors to provide aid to IDPs and address the shortcomings to aid provision of this landscape. Stuck in a political and socioeconomic limbo that prevents from access to better livelihoods, IDPs look towards cities as beacon of hope in a sea of despair.

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Understanding Sino-Indian Relations: Can China and India Rise Peacefully?

by Naing Tant Phyo, *class of 2018*

Abstract:

China and India, the two neighboring Great Powers, have had a historically turbulent relationship. Whether or not they can rise peacefully is a question of great importance for international stability and peace. This paper examines the historical border disputes between the two countries, their military and naval rivalry, their competition for regional influence, and the implications of their status as nuclear states. By considering both the military and economic aspects of their relationship, this paper assesses the security dilemma that results from their historically volatile relations and regional competition. Stability is predicted as the asymmetrical balance of power, nuclear deterrence, and strong economic ties reduce the chances of conflict between China and India.

Introduction

Great Powers rarely emerge in geographical proximity. This is not the case with China and India, two of the most significant Great Powers of the 21st century that share a sprawling border along the Himalayas. With their one billion plus populations, tremendous economic growth rates, and increasingly powerful militaries, China and India are beginning to play important roles in the global arena, and their relationship will have a profound impact on international stability in the 21st century. The questions that guide this research paper are:

· What are the challenges of China and India's peaceful rise and coexistence?
· How likely is an armed conflict between the two countries in the near future?

China and India have previously had turbulent relations primarily due to border disputes; and today, they face a security dilemma stemming from military and naval rivalry and the competition for regional influence in South Asia. Since the turn of the 21st century, they have developed strong economic ties (Zhu 4). The fact that both countries are nuclear-armed also deters direct military clashes. Therefore, while China and India may not rise together as perfect allies, chances of armed conflict are reduced due to multi-level deterrence and economic interdependence.

Border Disputes and 1962 War

The primary source of tension in Sino-Indian relations remains to be border disputes. With China's occupation of Tibet in 1950, India and China came to share a common border along the Himalayas (Joshi 560). India's borders are a legacy of British colonial rule, and its uncritical acceptance of inherited colonial borders led to a confrontation with China, whose leaders questioned their legitimacy (Ganguly 105). There are two on-going borders disputes between India and China today: the Aksai Chin region in the West and the state of Arunachal Pradesh in the East.

The Aksai Chin region lies between the Indian region of Ladakh and China-occupied Tibet. It was demarcated as British Colonial territory by the Ardagh-Johnson line between 1865 and 1867 (Ganguly 106). Although India accepted this border as its frontier with China after independence, it failed to secure a Chinese endorsement of this border claim. When India accepted China's sovereignty over Tibet in 1954, India's Prime Minister Nehru did not push for a formal agreement as India was pursuing a policy of benign neglect with China (Ganguly 109). However, India's failure to formally establish its borders posed grave problems for it later. In 1958, the Chinese government constructed a highway through Aksai Chin, connecting Tibet and the northern Chinese province of Xinjiang. When India confronted China about this transgression, China simply replied that it had built the road in its own territory (Ganguly 112).

In 1960, when Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai visited Delhi for border negotiations, he informally offered to swap the occupied Aksai Chin region with the state of Arunachal Pradesh in the east, claiming that it too was a part of Tibet (Ganguly 112). This was unacceptable to Indian decision-makers. Unable to resolve the disagreements through diplomatic means, India sent a small number of troops into the disputed areas to reinforce its claims. China then retaliated with a full-blown attack, which took the unprepared Indian army by surprise. This escalated to the Sino-Indian border war in October 1962 (Ganguly 114).

India suffered a decisive defeat after only a month of armed confrontation with China in both the western Ladakh region and eastern Arunachal Pradesh region (Southerland et al, 38). The war was a blow to India's national pride, and it made it obvious that the militarily superior China was not reluctant to use force with India when it came to solving disputes. As a commentator noted, "the conflict dispelled any lingering illusions in the official Indian circles regarding Chinese inhibitions about employing force against India" (Ganguly 115). The war left a scar on the Sino-Indian relations, with their border claims remaining unsettled till today.

Although a resolution regarding the border disputes has not been reached, both sides have made attempts to repair their scarred relationship. India and China have embarked on a series of Confidence-Building measures. In 1993, they established the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to demarcate the regions where troops of the two countries can exercise effective control (Bhattacharya, 679). In 1996, the two countries inked an agreement that included the withdrawal of offensive weapons, prohibiting military exercises that involve more than one division, and banning combat aircrafts within a distance of 10km from the LAC (Holslag 816).

Security Dilemma

Despite the Confidence-Building Measures, India and China still face a classic security dilemma. A security dilemma is determined by two factors: shifts in the balance of power and mutual perceptions (Holslag 814). China and India each compete for the upper hand in the balance of power by improving their infrastructure for military mobilization along the border and increasing their naval presence in the Indian Ocean. As of now, the security dilemma is uneven as India perceives a greater threat from China and strives to gain parity.

Aware of the gap between China's military capabilities and its own, India has taken on a massive program of military modernization since the 1962 war. This includes increasing military mountain divisions, upgrading their air force, and creating a million-man army (Ganguly 116). India is also strengthening its military readiness for China-related contingencies by increasing the number of its forward-deployed ground and air forces, and improving the military and transportation infrastructure along the disputed border (Southerland et al. 40). These measures are specifically designed to counter the Chinese build-up of military infrastructure in Tibet and South China. China's transportation infrastructure allows two divisions of PLA (People's Liberation Army) troops to mobilize as quickly as 20 days in the case of Indian contingencies (Holslag 823). Therefore, although Confidence-Building Measures prevent them from keeping strong military presence along the borders, it is evident that maintenance of the balance of power in the border areas still plays a huge role in both China and India's national strategies (Holslag 824).

Naval competition in the Indian Ocean also factors into their security dilemma. The Indian Ocean is a significant economic lifeline for both China and India. For India, 95 percent of their exports are shipped through the ocean and 70 percent of its hydrocarbons are drilled from its offshore blocks (Holslag 825). As for China, about 62 percent of their exports and 90 percent of their oil imports are shipped through the ocean (Holslag 829). Therefore, both countries have good reasons to secure their economic interests by protecting the South Asian seas. India has strived to achieve the upper hand in this naval rivalry by two means: naval modernization and security arrangements with third parties. It has increased its naval budget from $1.3 billion in 2001 to $3.5 billion in 2006, aiming to achieve a fleet of 130 warships and three aircraft carrier battle groups by 2020 (Holslag 825). As part of its 'Look-East' policy, India has made naval defense cooperation agreements over the last decade with Southeast and East Asian countries (Malik). As one Indian official at the Ministry of Defense stated, India is making "a permanent effort to increase [their] soft power via comprehensive cooperation with as many countries as possible from the Rim" (Holslag 825). Therefore, through naval modernization and security cooperation, India aims to pursue strategies of "sea denial" and "sea control": the ability to block other states (particularly China's) path into the Indian Ocean and projecting power into littoral states (Holslag 827).

At the same time, China has been financing and constructing port infrastructure in the Indian Ocean, including the civilian ports of Colombo and Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Gwadar Port in Pakistan. These investments and Chinese naval diplomacy with regional countries will improve the PLA navy's abilities to replenish supplies and fuel using regional ports (Southerland et al. 38). In fact, China is planning to build a chain of naval hubs referred to as "string of pearls" along the sea-lanes of communication. In addition, China began to patrol its sea-lanes in the Indian Ocean as part of its counter-piracy measures, and this marked the first operational deployment of Chinese naval forces outside of its regional waters (Southerland et al. 40). Although China's ports appear to be for commercial ventures rather than military stepping-stones, India perceives China's naval activities as a threat to its role as the primary security guarantor in the Indian Ocean (Holslag 829).

The security dilemma between China and India is not even, as India currently perceives a greater threat from China. Despite the fact that China has not made any major transgressions across the LAC in accordance with the Confidence-Building Measures, India keeps a keen eye on its neighbor's military and infrastructure developments. India also worries about China's growing presence in the South Asian seas, although China's naval influence there is mostly non-fungible and India's navy is far more preeminent in the Indian Ocean (Joshi 566). This security dilemma continues as India seeks to catch up with China on infrastructure and troop deployment, and China increases its naval presence in the Indian Ocean to protect its trade routes.

Third Parties and Competition for Regional Influence

Third parties also play a role in the Sino-Indian security dilemma. China's growing relationship with Pakistan has been a source of insecurity for India due to its turbulent history and bitter military rivalry with Pakistan. China and Pakistan established diplomatic ties in 1951, declaring each other as "all-weather friends." Their economic ties have deepened, and China is expanding its investment in Pakistan's transportation and energy-related infrastructure (Southerland et al. 42). However, it is China's

increasing military support for Pakistan, specifically nuclear-related assistance, which is particularly threatening to India. Since the 1960s, China has been an arms provider for Pakistan, supplying complete weapons systems such as knock-offs of Chinese ballistic missiles and warhead designs. It is also helping Pakistan accelerate its nuclear program by providing weapons-grade uranium and assistance with Plutonium production since the 1970s (Joshi 564). Moreover, China has assisted Pakistan heavily in the civilian nuclear arena; it helped complete Pakistan's first nuclear power plant in Chashma in 1999, and it is currently engaged in a project to build another one in the same region (Lal 141). China's assistance with Pakistan's nuclearization has a fundamentally distressing affect on India's security relations with Pakistan, as India's superior conventional military is deterred by Pakistan's nuclear capabilities (Southerland et al. 44).

It is no secret that China's relations with Pakistan have the primary purpose of containing India's regional influence. "For China, Pakistan is a low-cost secondary deterrent to India," noted the Pakistani ambassador to the US (Joshi 564). China believes that only Pakistan can restrain India in a serious manner. Therefore, it aims to "perpetuate parity between India and Pakistan," which will ensure that India will be too preoccupied with Pakistan to pose any security threat to China (Bhattacharya 680).

To make matters worse for India, China is not only deepening its relationship with Pakistan, but it is also projecting its regional influence in South Asia through institutional and economic means. China has made concrete efforts to gain membership in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). In 2005, China was officially conferred the status of observer in SAARC (Singh 163). China has also made a contribution of $300 million to the SAARC Development Fund, hoping to buy its way into membership (Singh 163). India fears that China will become a member state in the SAARC, marginalizing India and turning the region from the Indian sub-continent into "the Chinese sub-continent', as one Pakistani newspaper provocatively predicted (Bhattacharya 680).

China also has the upper hand in the economic influence in the region. In 2008, despite India's discomfort, China proposed a free trade area (FTA) between itself and SAARC member states. Even in the absence of a FTA, China's bilateral trades with Pakistan and Bangladesh surpass India's bilateral trade with these two countries. Moreover, in 2010, China surpassed India as the top investor in Nepal (Singh 164). Although China's activities in other South Asian nations (apart from Pakistan) are mostly economic in nature, India sees them as intrusions and "aggressive regionalism," primarily aimed at "eroding its predominance in the region and eventually usurping the leadership of South Asia" (Bhattacharya 680).

While India may fret about China's security relations with Pakistan and its expanding influence in South Asia, China does not see India as the primary threat to achieving its ambitions in Asia. China is more wary of India's cooperation with other Asian powers and the United States, as it sees them as strategic alliances made to contain Chinese power. For example, China has protested India's joint naval exercises with the US, Japan, Vietnam and Singapore in the East China and South China seas, convinced that they were encouraged by the US to contain China's influence (Malik 2). China also sees the US-India nuclear cooperation as driven by "a shared agenda of limiting, if not containing, Chinese power in Asia" (Zhu 9). Therefore, although India perceives China as its main regional opponent, India alone does not pose major security concerns to China. The United States is still China's main strategic competitor,

and it is the alliance between the US and India that worries China (Zhu 11).

Economic Ties and the Trade Imbalance

While there may be competition between the two countries for regional influence, India and China have been developing strong economic ties during the last two decades. In 2000, their bilateral trade only amounted to $3 billion, and ten years later, it has grown twenty-times to $61.7 billion. China has since surpassed the United States as India's largest trading partner (Singh 159). However, there is a growing trade imbalance between the two countries; China imports natural resources from India much more than it exports its products to India (Southerland et al. 45).

India and China's trade deficit is not only quantitative; there are qualitative differences as well. India primarily exports its raw materials to China. In the year 2014, India's top exports to China were cotton (26%), copper (12.4%), ores (10.6%) and mineral fuels (7%). While India is also a major exporter of IT products (amounting to $75.8 billion in 2013), China is not a significant customer of India's IT products (Southerland et al. 46). Therefore, while China has absorbed much of India's natural resources and raw materials, Sino-Indian trade has not enhanced India's manufacturing and technological capacity. On the other hand, India has been importing a large portion of China's machinery, nuclear reactors and vehicles (Southerland et al. 46). Therefore, although trade ties have increased tremendously between the two countries in the recent years, some Indian scholars argue that the overall composition of Sino-Indian trade could have harmful effects on India, going so far as to claim that it is "reminiscent of the colonial exploitative relationship" (Bhattacharya 678).

Although India may perceive China as an unfair and exploitative trade partner, in actuality the trade imbalance reflect the two countries' market dynamics and overall economies. The difference in the type of goods that the two countries export reflects their basic production patterns. It is more feasible for India to produce and manufacture labor-intensive goods (such as cotton and ores) due to its large labor endowment, while China can invest in high-capital production of electrical and nuclear machinery (Southerland et al. 46-47). Additionally, India's trade deficit with China reflects its overall trade deficit with the world; India had a 7 percent trade deficit with the world in 2012, while China maintained a surplus of 3 percent in its global trade in the same year (Southerland et al. 47). India's economic problems not only stem from trade relations, but also from its domestic problems. For instance, due to heavy regulations India ranks 142nd in the World Bank's "Ease of Doing Business" index (Southerland et al. 49). The lack of infrastructure also takes a toll on India trade; the World Bank reported that exporting a container of goods from India costs twice as much as exporting a container from China (Southerland et al. 48). Therefore, India cannot blame China alone for its trade imbalance; it would have to pursue domestic improvements in order to counter its disadvantages.

Although India displays dissatisfaction regarding its trade imbalance with China, it is aware of the importance of their bilateral trade. The former Indian Minister of Commerce, Jairam Ramesh, coined the term "Chindia" to denote Sino-Indian economic interdependence. As both China and India are pursuing economic policies that will propel their development, they are aware that tensions must be managed and not be allowed to sabotage their own peaceful development (Singh 165). Although some economic competition is inevitable, India is increasingly coming to the see that their national interests can be compatible, and both countries can focus on

their own development without getting into each other's way. To reassure this point, the former Indian Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh has stated, "There is enough space for both India and China to grow" (Zhu, 13).

Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence

While strong economic ties may reduce the chances of armed conflicts between the two emerging Great Powers, the main deterrence for military confrontation is the mutual presence of nuclear weapons. Both India and China have developed nuclear weapons that can reach each other in the case of a nuclear war. China has been "quietly targeting medium and intermediate-range nuclear-tipped missiles at India since the mid 1970s" (Perkovich 182). As for India, it tested an intermediate-range ballistic missile in 2007, which is the first Indian missile to reach China's entire territory (Holslag 834). However, a nuclear war is unlikely between the two countries for two reasons: each country has a defensive approach to their nuclear development, and there is an asymmetry regarding their nuclear capabilities.

Firstly, both India and China view their nuclear weapons as a means for political deterrence, and they are not likely to use them for military offensive purposes. China's nuclear doctrine was developed as "limited deterrence" – acquiring a minimal nuclear arsenal to deter nuclear blackmail and possible military aggression against Chinese territory (Perkovich 180-181). India too considers nuclear capability in political terms instead of military-security terms; its key political leaders view nuclear weapons as a guarantor of India's strategic autonomy and capacity to resist outside political and military pressures (Perkovich 186).

Secondly, India and China have an asymmetric distribution of nuclear power. China's missiles have had the capability to reach every major Indian city since 2002 (Holslag 834). China is likely to further develop its nuclear weapons to counter the US missile defense program, and thereby further accentuate the asymmetry (Holslag, 835). Therefore, aware of China's nuclear superiority, India is unlikely to provoke China. As for China, its nuclear program has the central purpose of countering perceived nuclear threats from the US. It does not see India as its strategic peer, and has never provoked India with nuclear threats to achieve political gains including in the case of border disputes (Perkovich 182). China has only tried to contain India's nuclear capability by proxy through its nuclear assistance to Pakistan. It is therefore unlikely that China will pose a direct nuclear threat to India in the future.

Conclusion

Although the scar of the 1962 border war generates mistrust and fuels a security dilemma between China and India, armed conflict is unlikely due to their the asymmetrical balance of power, nuclear deterrence and strong economic ties. While India perceives a greater threat from China, China has neither used conventional military nor nuclear means to provoke India since the 1962 war. China does not consider India as a strategic peer, and is more interested in containing India using third parties such as Pakistan. India, aware of the asymmetrical power balance and the strong economic ties between itself and China, will continue to prioritize defense and deterrence. Hence, stability is to be expected as these two emerging Great Powers continue to focus on their own development and economic growth.

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Women's Rights In The Early Days Of Khomeini

by Talia Ruxin, *class of 2020*

Abstract:

Both secular and religious groups launched a campaign of civil resistance that stressed equality in the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The overthrow of the 2,500-year-old Persian monarchy with an Islamic Republic under Ayatollah Khomeini led to many social, economic, and political changes. Despite promises for gender equality during the revolution, Khomeini's policies seemed to curtail rather than expand women's rights. This paper focuses on the contributing factors that led to the Islamic Republic's denial of women's rights. First, I contextualize the change in women's status from the Pahlavi dynasty. Then, I analyze the shift in power from the secular monarchy to an Islamic Republic. Thirdly, I argue that the Islamic Republic's use of Islam rationalized its understanding of women's status. Next, I argue that the Republic's need to denounce the previous regime's Western ties influenced its gender policies. Finally, I conclude by discussing how alternative interpretations of Islam can embrace women's rights.

Introduction

Dressed in chador, the large full body head covering, women took to the streets in the 1979 Iranian Revolution to demand equal rights to men, abolition of laws discriminating against women, and freedom in their choice of clothes. Reza Shah promoted a policy of "unveiling" as part of a modernization campaign, and he passed a law in 1936 that made wearing chador a public offense. This law outraged the clerical establishment and religious families as well as ordinary women who perceived appearing in public without chador equivalent to nakedness (Mir-Husseini 41). Thus, wearing the chador signified a rejection of the current Shah regime. The popular revolution ultimately gave rise to the Iranian Islamic Republic, a hybrid theocracy with democratic institutions elected by the people and a divinely guided faction (Keshavarzian 260).

Although Ayatollah Khomeini was a supposed champion of the people, as Supreme Leader, his policies stressed Islamic values that redefined women's social, familial, and political roles. These policies subjugated women and curtailed rights women had enjoyed during the Reza Shah Pahlavi and Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi regimes. Calling for clearly defined gender roles, Khomeini's government rapidly instituted controls over women's conduct, appearance, and mobility outside of the home that defined rights through interpretations of Shari'a law (Osanloo 2009). The Khomeini government believed that these gender roles were the foundation of a true Islamic society according to a patriarchal understanding of Shi'i values (Osanloo 2009). Can abidance to a traditional form of Islam that is institutionalized by the state alone justify this denial of women's rights? Although strictly Islamic explanations partially explain the post-revolutionary status of women, the Islamic Republic's perception of Western ideologies, institutions, and values also contributed to the government's denial of women's rights

The Pahlavi Dynasty and the White Revolution

Before the revolution, Reza Shah Pahlavi advocated and adopted policies intended to modernize Iran by developing infrastructural, economic, and social reforms based on Western models. These reforms included increased access to education and non-domestic work programs for women (Osanloo 2009). In the 1960s, Mohammad Reza Shah continued his father's modernization program by enacting reforms known as "The White Revolution," that enfranchised women and endowed them the right to serve as members of parliament. The Family Protection Law, central to the modernization program, ended the unilateral right of men to dissolve marriage (Razavi 1225). Overall, these rights elevated the status of women, but it is important to note that upper class women disproportionately benefited from them (Osanloo 2009). Although women voted in the government referendum for an Islamic government, Khomeini severely curtailed their rights in the early days of the Islamic Republic. The Family Protection Law was abolished in 1979 and replaced with Shari'a laws that denied women's rights of marriage and family (Razavi 1225). Additionally, the Islamic Republic enacted repressive measures including forcing female government workers to observe an Islamic dress code (specifically the forced imposition of the veil) and barring women from becoming judges. Married women could not attend school, and beaches, sports, and schools became segregated by sex (Keddie 407).

This transition in government from a secular, monarchical regime to an Islamic Republic based on Sh'ia Islam led to a rapid change in the status of women.

The Formation of an Islamic Republic

Before understanding how the Islamic Republic's interpretations of Shari'a influenced women's status, it is necessary to understand the distribution of power in the Islamic Republic. Because a diverse coalition forced the Shah out of power, the Islamic Republic's structure was not based on a single clerical guardian, as Khomeini initially envisioned (Keshavarzian 259). The 1979 Constitution gives sovereignty to God through the faqih or the Supreme Leader, but sovereignty is also delegated to all humans, as one of the goals of the Constitution is the "participation of the entire people in determining their political, economic, social, and cultural destiny," (Article 3: 8, 57). The Constitution recognizes that Islam is the political, social, and economic guide for the Islamic state. However, it also combines this Islamic theocracy with democratic accountability from elections which provide popular legitimacy to the system. The Supreme Leader has absolute power over the total system and oversees the armed security forces, the media, and the legislative, executive and judicial matters of the state (Keshavarzian 260). The Supreme Leader is selected by the Assembly of Experts, the 86 high-ranking clerics who are popularly elected. Like the Assembly of Experts, the parliament and the president are both elected directly by the people, serving as the democratic pillar of the government. Khomeini aimed to transform Iran from a pro-Western monarchy to a Shia Islamic Republic through state-building that enforced a "thorough re-Islamisation of politics and society," that "purged all opposition to his Islamic vision," (Vakil 2011). The government rapidly implemented an exhaustive Islamization of Iranian society in which changes to the school syllabi, street names, dress codes, and the new legal system reflected a return to Islamic norms (Vakil 2011). It is in this context of Islamisation as the solution to the old regime's grievances and the idea to empower the mosta'zafin (the dispossessed) against the mostakberin (the oppressors) that gave rise to new roles for women.

Traditional Interpretations of Islam and Women's Rights

The Islamic Republic rationalized its understanding of women's status as ordained by God through interpretations of Shari'a law. Since the Islamic government was one sanctioned by God and religious interpretation, Khomeini could frame his policies through a religious agenda that justified his policies. As the Supreme Leader, Khomeini, "became the final human authority with respect to the interpretation of Islamic law," and he argued that the revolution would "pave the way for an Islamic Republic," which in time would lead to what he considered a true Islamic society, one that adheres to lift codes outlined for Muslims in the Qur'an (Osanloo 2009). By merging Shi'a Islam with the populism of the revolution, Khomeini united the country with a strong Iranian nationalism that also allowed him to return Iranians to the authentic Muslim culture that the Pahlavi modernization had suppressed (Vakil 2011). Guided by authoritative interpretations of Islamic texts, Iran's Shi'i 'ulama (guardians and interpreters of religious knowledge) determined that women should be spiritual saviors of the society (Osanloo 2009). Before and during the revolution Khomeini promised women respect in a new government as he sought to mobilize

women for his campaign. He stated, "Islam made women equal with men," and that religion is "opposed to the Shah's declaration that women should only be objects of sexual attraction," (Brumberg 2001).

However, Khomeini backed away from his commitments to women. According to Khomeini's newfound understanding of a "true Islamic society," a woman's most important duty is motherhood, and thus her role centers about the family. A key associate to Khomeini, Morteza Mutahhari chaired the Revolutionary Council, and his views inspired much of the theocracy's stance on the status of women. Although he found that Islam approved of gender equality, he claimed that it did "not agree with identicalness, uniformity and exact similarity," and that the state's policies reflected this understanding (Mutahhari 1981). Under the guise of theological traditions and interpretations of Shi'a Islam that denounced the secular norms of the Pahlavi state, Khomeini instituted policies that denied women rights. The new government "advanced an Islamic model of women as nurturers, mothers and daughters of society," and segregated Iranian society in schools, public spaces, and the workplace (Vakil 2011). Perhaps most evident of women's inequality was their judgment as evidence in court which became worth only half as much as a man's judgment (Vakil 2011). According to the Islamic Republic's laws of Hudud (punishments) and Qisas (retaliation), which arguably belong in pre-modern societies, a woman "is practically considered subhuman," (Tohedi 77). Visibly, these policies changed women's status as they were forced to wear a veil in the workplace. These changes were enshrined in the Constitution which claimed that a woman "is accorded in Islam great value and nobility," through her "momentous and precious function of motherhood," that facilitates the family, the "fundamental unit of society," (Preamble). Women and the family established the foundation for the ideal Islamic society, and therefore pious Muslim women are obligated to serve primarily within the familial sphere rather than the public one (Osanloo 2009). Because religious legitimacy was a cornerstone of the new government, women were connected to and affected by the government through religious conformity but at a cost to their fundamental rights.

Anti-Westernization and the Denial of Women's Rights

While the Islamic Republic may have framed their denial of women's rights as essential for building a true Islamic society, it is necessary to consider other factors that led to these policies. Immediately after the revolution, the Khomeini government's policies towards women aimed to distinguish the new government from the corruption left behind by the Shah's Westernizing programs. Although the diverse coalition responsible for the overthrow of Khomeini disagreed on the structure of the new government, all factions agreed that the government should distinguish itself from the immorality of the Pahlavi dynasty (Osanloo 2009). As discussed earlier, the House of Pahlavi enacted "modernization" programs that were heavily modeled on Western institutions and policies. In fact, Mohammad Reza Shah was largely seen as conspiring with Great Britain and the US. In a military coup in 1953, Reza Shah signed an agreement that forced Mohammad Mosaddegh, the elected Prime Minister committed to nationalizing the Iranian petroleum industry, out of power (Kinzer 8). Thus, the Pahlavi era was largely associated with trying to make Iran artificially "Western," as Euro-American forces enabled Mohammad Reza Shah's rule.

In establishing the Islamic Republic, Khomeini consolidated power and legitimized Islamic rule in part through manipulating Western ideologies (Osanloo 2009). Constructions of rights and equality were rendered not only ineffective, but traitorous as they were connoted with the old regime's corruption and Western influence (Osanloo 2009). The new government understood the "White Revolution," which had given women certain freedoms but was largely unpopular, as "an American conspiracy," (Preamble). This resentment toward the previous regime's conspiracy with the West was enshrined in the preamble of the 1979 Constitution claiming the previous regime plotted with the West in a strategy that "intended to stabilize the foundations of despotic rule and to reinforce the political, cultural, and economic dependence of Iran on world imperialism," (Preamble). That the rage associated with the previous regime's Western influence was enshrined in the Constitution, the most important document of the State, emphasizes the new government's central goal of separating itself from the old regime. In fact, speaking to the public on the eve of the Iranian New Year in 1980, Khomeini described anti-revolutionaries and supporters of the Shah regime. He tells the Iranian populace, "Those who every day create tumult… are your headstrong enemies and wish to turn you away from the path of the revolution. They are dictators, who if they ever come to power will not allow anyone to breathe. You should fight against them in all fields and identify them to the public as your number one enemy and reveal their connection and dependence upon the aggressive East or the colonial West," (Khomeini 1980). This quotation illustrates how Khomeini was determined, even after the revolution, to fight the old regime and the old regime's principles. By viewing supporters of the old regime as "enemies," and traitors connected to the imperialist West, Khomeini ignited his populace against Western ideologies. Condemning the previous regime's influence by the West through tangible policies was crucial to the early reforms of the Khomeini government.

Western Individual Autonomy and Societal Obligations

The redefining of women's status and role was part of a broader agenda to distinguish post-revolutionary Iran from the previous government's excesses and its perceived submission to the US and Europe. To purify Iran from its Western influences that betrayed the authenticity and tradition of Iran, "women, as mothers and wives, and thus the foundation of the family, had to be rehabilitated in order to rehabilitate the family, a microcosm of society," (Osanloo 2009). By presenting the authentic Iranian Muslim woman in opposition to the Western woman, the government manipulated monolithic dichotomies that viewed the West as the source of Iran's problems (Osanloo 2009). It therefore became the moral virtue of women to become this true Iranian woman in order to cleanse the state from Western corruption. Moreover, the new government denied women and other activists "a language of positive rights or rights talk," by claiming that such language was a tool of Western imperialist forces seeking to undermine Iran's commitment to Islam (Osanloo 2009). Women represented the nation's honor, and by purifying themselves visibly through the mandatory re- veiling and sex-segregation policies, the Islamic Republic could be saved from supposed Western exploitation.

Central to the government's policies towards women and its denouncement of Westernization was its presentation of the traditional Iranian-Muslim's moral virtue to familial life as counter to the Western woman's individualism. One way in

which Khomeini and the founders of the new Islamic Republic defended policies that denied women's rights was by claiming that in accordance with their Islamic values, the new system would give priority to the rights of society over those of the individual. Many of the women protesters who demanded rights during the revolution were dressed in Western fashion and were influenced by U.S. feminist, Kate Millet (Algar 1981). By discrediting these protesters as "being 'West'-obsessed," the supporters of the Islamic Republic acted "against what they saw as problematic outside influences, especially ones that advocated individual autonomy over the interests of the community," (Osanloo 2009). While individual autonomy was championed in France and the U.S., the Iranian regime wanted to both distinguish itself from these Western values and institute their interpretation of Shari'a law. By dividing the rights of society and from those of the individual, the new government emphasized a division between social and familial spheres. According to Article 10 of the 1979 Constitution, because the family is "the fundamental unit of Islamic society, all laws, regulations, and pertinent programs must tend to facilitate the formation of a family, and to safeguard its sanctity and the stability of family relations on the basis of the law and the ethics of Islam." The establishment of an Islamic State allowed the development of a civil society, but the laws of this society were checked through Islamic guidance. The predetermined rights and gender roles were founded on a "God-given biological essence," (Osanloo 2009). The government asserted that for societies to function optimally, individuals should subordinate individual autonomy to the greater good, and their roles as interpreted through Islamic texts should be in accordance with their biological and psychological cores (Mutahhari 1981). The natural or biologically determined role of women is serving as mother and wife in the familial sphere. Just as the new government aimed to deflect Western programs of the "White Revolution," so too did it hope to distinguish itself from Western ideologies by using Islamic women's "natural," responsibility to society to defend its denial of women's rights.

Conclusion

While the factors that contributed to the denial of women's rights in the early days of the Islamic Republic seem to center around Islam, it is crucial to understand that Islam is neither monolithic nor static. Islamic principles do not justify denial of women's rights, and many strands of Islamism and interpretations of Islamic law differ in their locations of women's agency. The newly formed Islamic Republic of Iran was clouded in part by its need to cleanse the country from the "conspiracy," of the West. The Islamic Republic in 1979 often used this notion to reinforce gender roles that are not as rooted in Islam as the government presented them to be. In fact, many scholars have pointed towards the renewal of women's agency and expression of individual rights in recent decades, rights that were discredited by the leaders of the revolution. As UN Gender and Social Policy Research Scholar Shahra Razavi argues, "Political Islam is far from homogeneous, and the modernist and reformist currents which have emerged in the many diverse contexts often seek to embrace both human rights and gender equality," thereby debunking the notion that Islam is incompatible with gender equality (Razavi 1223). While in Khomeini's era, traditionalist

Islamic interpretations were central to policy making, Khomeini's death in 1989 ended "the monopoly," of traditionalist Islamic thinking that denied women's rights. Specifically, because ultimate authority is vested in the Supreme Leader, Khomeini could institute reforms based on his understanding of women's rights that equated Westernization with gender equality. However, when President Rafsanjani took office in 1989, his expressions of more moderate views about the need for segregation and veiling appealed to a younger generation of women (Razavi 1226). These moderate views provide evidence that Islamism is not a justification for denial of women's rights.

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Language and Power: Diglossia and the Disempowerment of Guaraní Speakers in Paraguay

by Leah Metzger, *class of 2020*

Abstract:

How do the ways we perceive different languages affect the lives of the people who speak them? In Paraguay, both Spanish and the indigenous language of Guaraní hold status as official languages. Most Paraguayans, however, tend to associate Spanish with education, prestige, and global opportunity while linking Guaraní with rural life and poverty. These attitudes result in an unequal power structure which disadvantages the speakers of Guaraní who have little Spanish proficiency, excluding them from high quality education as well as economic, political, and social opportunities. Here, I will examine how this diglossic relationship between Spanish and Guaraní creates and perpetuates inequality in Paraguayan society. I will also explore the successes and shortcomings of the efforts made thus far by the Paraguayan government to increase the linguistic empowerment of the Guaraní-speaking majority, focusing mainly on the installment of bilingual education.

L anguage is power. Across the globe, however, some languages are associated with more power than others, thus reinforcing the inequality between those who speak powerful languages and those who do not. This situation is especially relevant when it comes to the relationship between indigenous languages and languages of colonization. In many areas of Latin America, indigenous languages have been largely replaced by the languages of the colonizers (Patrinos, Velez, and Psacharopoulos 57). In Paraguay, however, the indigenous language of Guaraní remains spoken by over 80 percent the population, both by the indigenous minority and the mestizo majority (Ito 1). As of 1992 it holds status as an official language alongside Spanish (Mortimer 61). Nonetheless, Spanish remains a privileged language while monolingual Guaraní speakers are continually excluded from educational, political, social, and economic opportunities. This phenomenon is called diglossia, a situation where two languages are used in a society "whereby one has a more privileged function in certain domains" (Ito 3). In Paraguay, Spanish serves as the privileged language while Guaraní lacks such status. (García 332). Here, I will examine how diglossia manifests itself in Paraguay and perpetuates inequalities closely tied to the colonial history of the nation, despite governmental measures intended to linguistically empower Guaraní speakers.

While Paraguay is considered a bilingual nation, the 2002 Paraguayan census "confirms the persistence of monolingualism in Guaraní rather than the prevalence of bilingualism" (Nickson 9). Most Paraguayans speak Guaraní, especially in rural, impoverished areas where 94 percent of the population speaks Guaraní as their primary language (Nickson 19).

Although widely-used languages are often regarded positively, Guaraní carries negative connotations for many Paraguayans (Choi 2003). This contrast in usage and attitude is largely due to the distinct uses of Guaraní and Spanish, which elevate the status of Spanish and undermine the status of Guaraní. While Guaraní is used in the home and in casual interactions, Spanish is mainly used in official spheres including politics, education, mass media, and business (Ito 1). As a result, Spanish is associated with socioeconomic success while Guaraní is associated with "undesirable people" who are "poor, rural, and a subject of shame." The slang term "guarango/a," meaning crude and ignorant, illustrates this attitude. The term is a general insult often used in the context of discouraging the use of Guaraní. When parents encourage their children to speak Spanish, they may add, "No seas guarango/Don't be a guarango" (Mortimer 63), implying that to speak Guaraní is to be crude and ignorant. The negative attitude toward Guaraní is closely tied to the power dynamics constructed during colonial times which favored Spanish as the language of the dominant class and Guaraní as the language of the oppressed, associated with its indigenous roots (Sandoval 142). While today Paraguayans are aware of the role of Guaraní in creating a sense of national unity, many are still "keen to associate themselves through Spanish with their peers in neighboring countries and to distance themselves from the cultural and racial implications of association with an indigenous language" (Nickson 8). While overt labeling of indigenousness as "crude" and "ignorant" is generally associated with Paraguay's historical past rather than its present, these labels persist centuries later through a more subtle manifestation in language attitudes.

Considering the large population of monolingual Guaraní speakers, the near-exclusive use of Spanish in official spheres causes a problematic degree of exclusion (Nickson 9). Guaraní speakers are linguistically disadvantaged in their attempts to advance politically, socially, economically, and most importantly, educationally.

While in recent years speaking Guaraní has nearly become a requirement for running for public office, fluency in Spanish remains more important and negative attitudes towards Guaraní "are often expressed indirectly by mocking political opponents because of their 'poor Spanish'" (Nickson 17). Unsurprisingly, Guaraní speakers from rural areas (where monolingual Guaraní speakers are the most concentrated) remain "extremely underrepresented at all levels of the political system" (Nickson 22). In addition to the political system, the justice system disadvantages Guaraní speakers by conducting all court proceedings in Spanish and prohibiting witness statements in Guaraní. Economically, Guaraní speaking farmers are limited in their success due to their inability to receive information about new technologies, market crops, or apply for credit, all of which is accessible only through Spanish proficiency (Nickson 21). In a study involving almost 2,000 Paraguayan workers, Patrinos et al. (1994) concluded that monolingual Guaraní speakers earn considerably less than both Spanish speakers and bilinguals and remain "at a considerable disadvantage in the labor market." The study also revealed large disparities in education which correlated with language identity. Table 1 reveals that in 1990, no monolingual Guaraní-speaking workers had participated in higher education, while 60 percent of monolingual Spanish-speaking workers had. In all levels of schooling, Guaraní speakers were more likely to repeat grades or drop out (Patrinos et al. 59). The study, which was conducted right before the piloting of a national bilingual education program in 1994 (Gynan 24), pointed to educational disadvantages as the main cause of Guaraní speakers' economic inequalities.

TABLE 1
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND LANGUAGE
(In Percentages)

Language	Population Distribution	Less than Primary	Primary	Secondary	Higher
Guaraní monolingual	8	23	9	2	0
Bilingual	56	63	61	49	40
Spanish monolingual	36	14	30	49	60
Total	100	100	100	100	100

SOURCE: Based on Encuesta de Hogares (Mano de Obra), Paraguay, 1990. These numbers, and those for all tables except tables 5 and 11, were generated by the authors using the computer tapes from the household survey.

Aware of such educational disparities and their far-reaching consequences, the Paraguayan government enacted the Bilingual Education Plan in 1994 which, founded upon "respect for the mother tongue," stated that teachers should instruct students in their native language while gradually introducing the other national language, either Spanish or Guaraní (Corvalán 16). This measure succeeded in destigmatizing Guaraní to a certain degree (Gynan 2005), but its effectiveness remains limited by the very diglossic structure it attempts to dismantle (Ito 2012). Many criticize the program as bilingual in name only because many teachers continue to instruct their students in Spanish (Mortimer 64). One teacher justified her choice, expressing that the "dominance of Spanish in national and international domains leaves Guaraní fewer possibilities" (Ito 7). Many parents agree that to teach children in Guaraní would be to disadvantage them, arguing that "Guaraní […] holds a person

back [...] It is Spanish that opens doors for people" (García 2005). Parents also worry that teaching and even speaking to children in Guaraní would hinder their ability to learn Spanish, a myth dismantled by the Second Language Acquisition Theory which argues that the use of the native language in instruction increases both academic performance and the ability to acquire a second language (Ito 4, 5). Despite the best intentions of teachers and parents, the poor installment of a truly bilingual system has failed to significantly help the reported 88 percent of Paraguayan students who enter school speaking exclusively or mostly Guaraní (Valadez, 2002; Nickson 11), resulting in high repetition and low completion rates (Nickson 14, 15).

Despite its shortcomings, the Bilingual Education Plan appears to have achieved some success in beginning to increase the societal value of Guaraní. Gynan (2005) conducted a longitudinal study which revealed that Paraguayans felt more positively about Guaraní in 2005 than in 2001. He also found that the acceptance of Spanish monolingualism "was dealt a blow by bilingual language policy" (32), representative of the increasing status of Guaraní and its connection to the Paraguayan identity which Mortimer (2016) also found. Other studies (Choi, 2005; García, 2005), suggest, however, that Paraguayans' attitudes have remained consistent with diglossic theory, increasingly in favor of Spanish over Guaraní. These conflicting results indicate that while Spanish may be growing in prestige, bilingual education has still increased Guaraní's status to a significant, albeit lesser, degree (Ito 5).

It appears, overall, that Paraguay's bilingual education efforts have served as the first step in the right direction towards dismantling the diglossic structure which disadvantages Guaraní speakers across a variety of contexts. Nonetheless, the struggles that these measures face, including parent and teacher push back against using Guaraní, suggest that a more direct approach to combating the diglossic elevation of Spanish and undermining of Guaraní may be necessary in order for the programs to be more positively embraced and thus function more effectively. Mortimer (2016) suggests that the Paraguayan government focus on ideological campaigns to disrupt associations between Guaraní and poverty, backwardness, etc., and construct new associations involving "diverse other signs of identity--like being educated, tech-savvy, cosmopolitan, authoritative, and perhaps also traditional or rural" (67). Ito (2012) suggests that the government also educate teachers and parents on the study of language acquisition, especially the fact that initial instruction in the mother tongue can accelerate, rather than hinder, the learning of a second language.

The case of Paraguay serves as an important reminder that language policy, including language officialization, bilingual education programs, and language identity campaigns, must take more prominent roles in efforts to reduce inequality across all aspects of society. Many global efforts, such as the 2004 World Development Report and the World Bank's worldwide governance indicators database, stress the importance of giving political voice to the disadvantaged yet fail to mention the role of language policy in making it possible for such voices to be heard (Nickson 4). Language policy is especially important in contexts such as Paraguay where indigenous peoples have historically been oppressed by colonial forces, including through the imposed dominance of colonial languages, leading to the diglossia which remains prevalent today. Language is indeed a form of power and the

linguistic disparities in Paraguay--as well as the efforts to resolve them--demonstrate that linguistic empowerment is a key component of the educational, economic, political, and social empowerment of disadvantaged people.

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Colonized, Exploited, and Excluded:
Western European Paths to Radicalization and Terrorism in Ethnonationalist and Jihadist Perspective

by Meredith Tulloch, class of 2018

Abstract:

Issues of domestic and international terrorism have captured headlines around the world in recent years, as jihadist actions have begun to more heavily affect wealthy Western nations. This is especially true in Western Europe, which has experienced a dramatic upsurge in rates of jihadism. What this media attention neglects to remember, however, is the continent's earlier history of unrelenting ethnonationalist terror in Northern Ireland, Spain, and many other countries. Disenfranchised groups have long used acts of terror to protest their oppression, with their motivating factors and methods of violence varying widely. This article seeks to examine this variance, tracing trends in terrorism in Western Europe from the later decades of the 20th century to the Islamic-centered headlines of today.

Introduction

Although variations on terrorism have been the tactic of marginalized groups to fight those more powerful for centuries, in recent years, attacks have accelerated, as minority and religious groups throughout the world are increasingly able to grab the attention of millions through mass media in a much more globalized world. In a struggle for policymakers to pin down one outside 'enemy' since the Cold War, insurgent groups abroad filled the gap (Chebel 3). Ethnonationalist groups active on the continent throughout the later part of the 20th century violated this dogma with their internal threat, giving way only in the 2000s to a new form of terrorism that once again allowed citizens to distance themselves from the enemy: jihadism. These groups were united, not in beliefs or causes, but in their strategic use of militarism to achieve specific goals. All in all, intelligence agencies report at least "17 terrorist agencies around the world…have sympathizers or dormant activists in Europe" (Bugarin 3). For the purposes of this paper, terrorism will be defined as "the use or threat of violence with the intention to create fear and influence a government or society in order to accomplish political goals" (Ruiz 41). This paper will discuss the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), and the Front de la Libération Nationale de la Corse (FLNC) as examples of ethnonationalist terror groups, and jihadism perpetrated by Al Qaeda, its affiliates, and ISIS in Europe. The dominant trend of terrorism in Western Europe over the past 45 years has been a shift from ethnonationalism to jihadism, with European colonial history and involvement in the Maghreb and Middle East, current political, social, and economic exclusion of minorities, prison and counterterrorist policy, and the effects of the 9/11 attack contributing to this paradigm shift.

Despite their ideological and tactical differences, members of terrorist groups, ethnonationalist and jihadist, do have some commonalities. They do not think of themselves as terrorists; rather, they view themselves as freedom fighters pursuing a noble goal (Domínguez 126). Somewhat ironically, a second commonality is that the vast majority of terrorist groups do not achieve any of their strategic objectives—to most observers, attacks on civilians cement their belief that no concessions should be given to people committing such atrocities (Ruiz 49). Terrorist groups justify their use of violence by referencing their history and presenting themselves as victims who have been marginalized, ignored by the democratic system, and thus legitimize their armed struggle against the state by positioning themselves as similar to state armies (Ruiz 45). Global pressures from the last fifteen years such as the 'War on Terror' after 9/11, the death of Osama bin Laden, the Arab Spring, and the EU withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan have contributed to the advances of terrorism in the continent today (Díaz 178). Increasing anti-Muslim sentiment has also contributed, creating a cycle of terror attacks, counterterror crackdowns, and incentives to radicalization. It therefore cannot be argued that the rise in both types of terrorism sprung from nowhere: the growth and increasing power of these terror groups can be directly traced to European and Western intervention in the homelands of others: Basque Country, Northern Ireland, Corsica, and many areas of North Africa, the Middle East, and beyond.

Ethnonationalist Terror

Ethnonationalist groups consist of minority groups with a strong grievance against the majority. These groups view defending their ethnic nation as the most authentic act to which they can dedicate their lives, and deny not only the majority values of democracy, equality, and globalization, but also the very "existence of the political state in which they develop their activity" (Conde 11). Ethnonationalist groups point to historical oppression, the rights they feel they have lost, and political exclusion as legitimizing factors to explain their actions and rationalize why they are violent (Conde 7, Choi 51). They therefore argue that the true burden of responsibility for their action falls on the state; for example, the ETA states that Spain "obliged [them] to take steps of violence," by their repressive measures against the Basques and their refusal to grant them autonomy (Domínguez 125). The ETA, IRA, and FLNC have all "justified intense campaigns of killing while in pursuit of their territorial claims against European liberal democracies" (Alonso 3). These motivating reasons are similar to those of jihadist groups, often tracing grievances to European imperialism and searching for the establishment of a land or state in which they can escape the influence of the majority.

Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, the militant Basque nationalist group active in Spain since the Franco regime, launched one of Europe's most deadly and enduring terrorist campaigns that ended permanently only in 2011. Basques have their own language, Euskara, entirely unrelated to any other Romance language, and were incredibly repressed during the Franco dictatorship that lasted almost four decades. Denied the right to autonomy after his fall, the ETA then channeled the minority group's grievances, cohesion, business wealth, and territorial concentration in the País Vasco to amass a large following. Their bombing campaigns, concentrated largely in their own Autonomous Community and in the state capital of Madrid, killed hundreds of Spaniards and terrified and infuriated large sections of the state (MAR).

The IRA has similar historical roots, dating to the colonization of Ireland by the UK with the Plantation of Ulster in 1609. Since then, many Irish Catholics have wished for independence because of the economic repression and inequalities caused by the systematic favoring of Protestant Unionists. These "high levels of group concentration and organization, experience of repression, and a long and active heritage of violent opposition to Protestant domination and British rule" resulted in fervent support for the guerilla tactics of the IRA (MAR). The group supported goals of greater political representation, economic opportunity, power sharing, access to public funds, and protection from militant Protestant groups. Although political divisions often fall on religious lines in this case, this was not religious terrorism: the political divide between the Catholics and Protestants resulted from their varying relationship and view of the UK, and the difference in religion was simply correlational, making the IRA truly an ethnonationalist terrorist group.

On the other side of the continent in Corsica, the Front de la Liberation Nationale de la Corse (FLNC) was the largest militant Corsican nationalist group. France

annexed the island in 1768. The FLNC is an unusual case: it did not have any of the normal causes for ethnonationalist terror, like high group cohesion, government repression, or regime instability. Some think the Corsican bombings were not politically motivated, but more criminal and financial. Their strategy consisted mainly of random bombings of empty French businesses. Corsicans are relatively well politically represented, with their own Assembly and executive council within French government, but suffer economically in a market where the French run most profitable enterprises. They want more autonomy, higher up positions on their own island to be more financially healthy, and more financial aid from France.

The IRA, ETA, and FLNC are all part of this third wave of modern terrorism and started declining in the early 2000s. Ethnonationalist groups sympathize with other minority groups fighting "for their liberation and construction of their own state" (Conde 9). These groups often influence other insurgent groups by their action (Alexander 48). The ETA had a strong supportive relationship with the French Basques just across the border from them, and were inspired by the FLN of Algeria, studying their training camps and receiving Algerian government support until 1989 when negotiations with the Spanish government failed (Alonso 6-7). The PLO in Lebanon and Yemen and affiliated businesses in many Latin American countries were strong contacts of the ETA as well (Alonso 7). The IRA is also active internationally, with support from the Republic of Ireland and the U.S. (MAR, Alonso 8-9). Qaddafi had ties to the ETA, IRA, and FLNC.

These partnerships (whether official or more tangential) can also have deleterious effects on groups' public image and other support. Both the IRA and the ETA quickly lost support after alienating supporters. An ETA attack in the parking garage of a mall in Barcelona in June 1987 killed 21 and wounded 45, making it "the bloodiest attack in the history of the ETA and the second gravest in Spanish history," second only to the March 2004 train attacks in Madrid (Ruiz 48). Before this, the ETA had a high level of support in Catalonia: 9 days before the attack, Batasuna won almost 39 of Catalonian votes (Ruiz 51). In the next election, two years later, Batasuna won only 15.4 votes—61% lower than two years earlier (Ruiz 51). Their bloody attack in the regional capital cost them a large section of their fellow ethnonationalist minority's support, and the influence of similar discontent and violence in Catalonia, a neighboring province, may have also influenced the fate of the Basques. Similarly, in 2001, the U.S. discovered that the Colombian FARC paid the IRA about $2 million to train them in use of mortars and more technologically advanced instruments (Alonso 10). This discovery damaged the IRA and Sinn Fein's reputation in the U.S., because FARC was viewed there unilaterally as a terrorist group, and the timing of the discovery, close to the 9/11 attacks, resonated with a nation reeling from the damage and shock. There was even a U.S. Congressional Committee held to adjudicate the links between IRA and FARC (Alonso 10). In the following months, the IRA lost a substantial portion of its American support.

A Changing Political Climate

The attacks of September 11th, 2001 had a lasting effect on counterterrorism policy, public opinion of militant political action, and the rising numbers of jihadist attacks around the globe. Spain, Northern Ireland, and France did continue experiencing terrorist actions from separatist and ethnonationalist groups afterwards (the ETA was very active with 21 attacks and 7 deaths), but the political cost of terrorism sharply increased (Bugarin 2). Many Basques still want independence, so some experts predict related violence is unlikely to totally end.

In a new political climate of total condemnation of terrorist methods, ethnonationalist groups such as the FLNC, ETA, and IRA found it difficult to retain legitimacy. From 2001 on, ETA used increasing numbers of inexperienced militant fighters, symbolic of a central structure growing continually weaker (Domínguez 126). As mentioned above, the IRA lost critical allies in many Irish Americans who saw IRA actions as terrorism after 9/11, and both the IRA and ETA's political representatives (Sinn Fein and Batasuna) campaigning for their rights and legitimacy were undermined after 9/11 by their newly spotlit terrorist activity (Alonso 4). In 2003, the federal government banned the ETA's affiliated political party, Herri Batasuna (MAR). With this increased political cost came supplemental governmental attempts to arrest group leaders, halt their plans, and negotiate peace settlements to appear tough on terror. After a failed ceasefire in March of 2006, the group successfully negotiated anew with the Spanish government in 2011 and just this year unveiled their secret weapons stores (MAR). Government and police detainment of terrorist members increases the cost of attacks done by the group—this type of political repression has a clear impact on the group organization and operating model, and without strong outside support, can force the terror group to capitulate to government demands.

There are a number of reasons why terrorist groups dissolve. Most groups do not only experience one cause—the IRA and ETA both experienced multiple factors that contributed to their end (Ruiz 49). Although the IRA played a more active role in its own dissolution, with real gains promised from the British government in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, the ETA ended largely because of a strong show of Spanish force and sovereignty. The Basque group experienced an "impotence" of action in 2007 and 2008, with many of its leaders jailed and the others strategically fragmented, eventually leading to the brokering of a permanent ceasefire with the Spanish in 2011 (Domínguez 128). Since the late 1990s, the FLNC, ETA, and IRA have all downgraded their activity, increased cooperation with state governments, and adjusted to a political environment where more decentralized and adaptable groups were dominating the headlines with "a more indiscriminate type of terrorism" (Richards 373, Alonso 4).

While Europe has been accustomed to the threat of ethnonationalist terrorism within countries for many years, the appearance of jihadist groups operating on a supranational level is relatively new: Al Qaeda, ISIS, and other similar groups are now acting "in a theater of global operations in which Europe occupies a key position" (Díaz 177). The 9/11 attacks created a global sense of urgency that caused counterterrorism strategies to develop quickly in Europe and the U.S., hindering ethnonationalist mechanisms and making them unable to garner as much attention as the jihadists. This was accompanied by steeply rising numbers of jihadist attacks and fatalities, taking even more attention away from the IRA, ETA, and Corsicans.

The nature of the EU as a coalition of states, and its more malleable borders contribute to this transnational quality and make responding to these threats more difficult. In 2007, France, Spain, and the UK experienced the most terrorism in the EU, with half of all related arrests linked to jihadism and often involving recently converted and radicalized Europeans (Te-SAT 3). Major jihadist attacks on transit systems in London and Madrid in the early 2000s proved to experts that "the source of the threat is both transnational and domestic in character" (Chebel 3). Along with a rise in jihadist terror in Western Europe came an increase in lethality—although they are committing the minority of all terror attacks internationally, their attacks wound and kill the vast majority of all Europeans affected by terrorism.

Ethnonationalist terror attacks, although often strategically sophisticated, never caused as many casualties as jihadist attacks. The religious aspect of the jihadist group consciousness, framing a suicide attack as an act of faith, "removes some of the basic constraints on incurring mass civilian casualties and facilitates...deadlier, larger-scale attacks addressed to a much broader audience" (Stepanova 192). These groups pursue plans of attack that will incur the maximum casualties in the most symbolically Western location in order to promote their message. Transnational violent jihadist cells inspired by al-Qaeda center around an ideology that "does not make a clear distinction between religion and politics on a global scale" and view society and state as inseparable, thereby placing blame on all citizens for the actions of their state (Stepanova 198). These groups base their "supranational ideology" on a final goal that expects not only victory over the West but also ignores existing national borders and stems from a semi-religious justification of grievance (Stepanova 193). Jihadist groups suggest a new world order in Europe and abroad, based not on states but powerful non-state actors.

Increasing European Jihadism

The jihadist emergence presented a new challenge to the government, police forces, and people of Europe that was relatively unknown before September 2001. Many wonder why this violence came to Europe, and a large part of the answer is the European imperialism of many Muslim-majority countries in the 19th and 20th centuries. Official records show that 19 million Muslims lived in Europe as of 2015; this number has certainly grown since then (Díaz 179). Recent Muslim migrants are often poorly integrated into Western society. They are relegated to economically disadvantaged insular migrant neighborhoods on the outskirts of wealthy cities, unable to find sufficient employment, and socially marginalized. The destabilizing Iranian Revolution, War in Afghanistan, Gulf War, 9/11 attacks, and the Iraq War, along with "the decentralization of Sunni Islamist religious authority" are all part of the reason for the recent increase in radical Islam. This is then exacerbated by economic, political, and social marginalization by the same European countries that colonized their homelands less than 200 years ago (Díaz 179). After these conflicts, "through the decolonizing process, the West took on the responsibility to reconstruct a Muslim country" and utterly failed, leaving little opportunity for those left behind (Díaz 179). The inability to effectively manage this transition and its concurrent demographic changes resulted in unexpected consequences: growing migrant populations increasingly at odds with their new states, societies and governments.

Radicalization

Since the turn of the century, the radicalization process has increasingly concerned European governments. After 9/11, there was a change in the definition of 'radicalization' to mean a more threatening (and potentially terrorist-forming) process, often associated with Islam, where before it meant moving towards extremist, but not necessarily violent, views (Williams 78). It was after this shocking event, too, that the European Council defined terrorism as a "global challenge" and the EU fight against it as a top priority (Pastrana 442). Much of this fight involved preventing and understanding radicalization in the first place.

Those most vulnerable to radicalization are often actively recruited by current members of terrorist networks or sometimes find information on their own through the Internet. Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, a leader of the Islamic State terrorist group channels the idea of the 'caliphate' (unused since 1861) which has proven to be a compelling recruiting tool for a frustrated generation faced with few future opportunities in European society (Díaz 177). Due to residual effects of the international economic crisis of 2008 and the lack of successful immigration and integration policies, these young men feel stuck in a social and economic rut, living in the impoverished suburbs of European cities (Díaz 178). Jihadism can be a rational exit for some of these frustrated youth who are beaten down by a "crisis of identity for which ISIS is offering a solution" (Díaz 180). Experts in radicalization name poverty, religion, and cultural alienation as the three factors essential to successfully radicalizing recruits—and these three are quite readily available to young Muslim populations in much of Western Europe (Díaz 183). Typical psychological antecedents to terrorism include deprivation (either real or perceived), grievances, a sense of injustice, frustration, and a (real or perceived) threat to one's identity (Williams 80). These can result from, or be increased by, carceral and counterterrorism policies that are felt to be unjustifiably or prejudicially targeted at one's ethnic/racial/political group.

Many members of terrorist organizations fit demographics that counterterrorist and judicial policies disproportionally target: young, unemployed, Muslim men. Most ISIS members have prior offenses and have spent time in prison, a hotspot for radicalization and recruitment of new members (Williams 77). National prison population rates are often viewed as an indicator of how punitive the state is and take into account both the number of inmates and the average length of their stay. These are especially high in France, Spain, and the UK, where terrorism is also high, while states with low levels of imprisonment (the Netherlands, Norway) have very low terrorist activity rates. These data give weight to the fact that "imprisonment remains the most intrusive form of social control and should be limited as far as possible" in order to also limit in-state radicalization (Dünkel 632-4). Unfortunately, many states in Europe do not have carceral or counterterrorism policies that effectively protect their citizens while also halting radicalization.

Impacts of Counterterrorism

Counterterrorism is most effective when premised to increase participation costs within the insurgent group, especially when the group is fragmented—this way, the counterterrorist policy can break down the organizational and individual levels. In these cases, the success of the counterterrorism initiative relies on having a "well defined objective, and that the actors that implement them (from police and intel-

ligence services to judges and [fiscal policies]) work in an integrated and coordinated form" (Ruiz 50). Countries in the European Union have tried to coordinate counterterrorism measures, with objectives of preventing Europeans from traveling to ISIS-controlled territories, keeping an eye on people suspected of becoming radicalized (like those returned from ISIS areas), and in the long-term, breaking down jihadist narratives and better integrating young Muslims into European society (Díaz 175). The absence of strong judicial coordination within Europe and with North African and Middle Eastern allies leaves gaps through which past prisoners, vulnerable to radicalization, can slip (Díaz 183-7). For these counterterrorism agencies, terrorism presents a "twofold, interrelated problem"(Chebel 2). It is both a threat to external security and to internal civil order, which together threaten the power and reputation of Western states. Western values of personal liberty, security, and justice impact counterterrorism policy, as well as judicial, carceral, and penal policies, conceptions of human rights and fair trials (Pastrana 440, Zamora 125). Since the 9/11 attacks, state agencies no longer look only for people who have already begun to plan an attack (Williams 78). Instead, they begin much earlier with anyone who appears to have begun the gradual radicalization process.

Overall, the EU counterterror strategy is multidimensional. It is founded on four main goals: preventing terrorism, protecting citizens, pursuing attackers, and finding answers to their questions in each attack (Pastrana 446). The UK Prevent strategy, initiated after the 2007 London Metro attack, targets those the government considers vulnerable to radicalization. Its broad mandate is to "stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism" (Williams 79). This strategy is controversial, often resulting in people being questioned or searched without just cause—this inherent profiling can then cause widespread resentment. Critics say that this strategy has gone beyond counterterrorism and attempts to tackle "ideological threats to the state" (Richards 380). Similarly, expanded counterterrorist strategies in France, combined with an extensive state of emergency, have infringed on the rights of many, mainly Muslims in poor neighborhoods (Zamora 127). Even more radical bills stripping suspects of their rights are being proposed with alarming frequency in France (Schweitzer). Because of this, some experts worry about future repercussions and iterations of these invasive counterterrorist strategies.

The most important problem with counterterror strategies is how they can unfairly target and alienate large portions of the populations vulnerable to radicalization. Policies aimed at preventing acts of terror—pre-emptive and "anticipatory"—are inherently distrustful of those they examine, as they are harmful to ethnic minorities and waver between offering protections and violating personal freedoms (Williams 77-8, Chebel 3). Counterterrorist rhetoric often aims to secure the border "and to expel or incarcerate illegal, criminal, or suspect migrants" and can increase xenophobia and further isolate minorities (Chebel 5, 9). Programs aimed at Muslims that explicitly or implicitly force a change in behavior or dress in order to align more with Western tradition and escape suspicion, reinforce the view that Islam is inherently incompatible with Western society and can further alienate Muslims, pushing them towards radicalization.

The Islamic State (ISIS)

In this environment of increasing hostility towards Islam in Western Europe and abroad, the Islamic State, also known as ISIS, has amassed a growing following. It is often related to a trend in rising numbers of 'lone wolf' attacks throughout the West, when single attackers (largely young Muslim men) claim affiliation with ISIS while executing an attack on their own. The role of ISIS in these attacks can be unclear, but growing numbers of Europeans are known to be affiliated with the extremist group, with more and more Europeans traveling to Syria to join since 2014 (Díaz 176). Foreign fighters are of huge concern to Europol and other European anti-terrorist agencies; Federica Mogherini, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, stated in 2015 that ISIS and its affiliates are a great threat, not only to Europe but also the Middle East and Northern Africa, and possibly "for world peace and stability" (Díaz 176). Some counterterrorism initiatives have aimed to prevent young Europeans from traveling abroad to join ISIS as well to stop radicalization and lone wolf attacks, but it is difficult to find similarities between European ISIS recruits other than their young age to predict who may join.

ISIS is incredibly adaptable and quite ingenious; operating inside fallen states with few checks on its power, it has been able to expand its technological capabilities, Internet presence, and recruiting with incredible speed. In this increasingly globalized world connected by the power of the Internet, there are 50,000 Twitter profiles of ISIS members, all promoting strong messages of propaganda and using "apocalyptic messages" to recruit new members– which many recruits cite as a reason for joining (Díaz 177). A recent New York Times article detailed the sophisticated engineering and adaptation of conventional weapons they have accrued within Syria and Iraq. Developments range from the mind-bogglingly cruel (booby-trapped teddy bears) to frighteningly advanced (improved military-grade explosives and rocket launchers) (Ismay). For the first time in modern history, the Islamic State and its substantial presence in Europe presents a massive problem: it is an armed group dedicated to creating a new world order through "terrorist tactics and a war of traditional conquest" (Díaz 178). This perspective uniquely appeals to young men (and some women) marginalized in European societies that tell them, through economic, social, and carceral policy, that they do not belong there.

In January 2016, the new European Counter Terrorism Center launched. Its main stated concern is "jihadist terrorism and… foreign terrorist fighters who travel to and from conflict zones," focusing primarily on the rapid radicalization of Europeans "who have proven willing and able to act as facilitators and active accomplices in terrorism" (ECTC). The latest Europol Terrorism Trend and Situation Report from 2016 numerates a total of 142 terror attacks, 142 victim fatalities, and 379 injuries. Most of these occurred in the UK, France, and Spain. Jihadism was not the most frequent cause (accounting for 17 of the 142 attacks), but was the most lethal one—135 of the total 142 victims and most of the casualties were results of jihadist attacks. This report also highlights another trend in European terror: the growing role of women. In 2016, 25% of the 1002 arrestees were women, where the year before they only accounted for 18%; still, arrested subjects from outside of the EU were almost all men (Te-SAT 17). The stated concerns of Europol in the 2016 report were ISIS recruitment of locals, female foreign terrorist travelers and their children (a future generation of fighters), ISIS encouragement of lone-actor attacks, right-wing polarization of European asylum policy, and the expansion of PKK into the EU.

Conclusion

Over the course of the past few decades, terrorist threats in Europe have changed and expanded from geographically specific ethnonationalist separatist movements to a rapidly evolving and technologically advanced list of lethal jihadist attacks. Groups such as the ETA, IRA, and FLNC dominated the last few decades of the 20th century, channeling generational grievances and strong group cohesion into violent political activism addressing their past colonization, political and economic exclusion, and repression by majority governments (Choi 50-1). Since the September 11th attacks in New York City, rates of jihadist terror in Europe, committed both by Europeans and visitors, have risen rapidly alongside an increase in foreign fighters and lone wolf attacks. What do these vastly different types of terror have in common? Roots of both types of grievances can be traced to European involvement in colonization (of Ireland, the Basque region, and Corsica many centuries ago, as well as in the 19th century in North Africa and the Middle East), and lack of integration of these populations into the larger economically, politically, and socially active majority populace.

Up until now, ethnonationalist groups have proven unable to compete for attention against jihadist campaigns less discriminating in their violence and lethality. Counterterror campaigns and incarceration of those suspected of terrorism, although painstakingly debated and designed, can often do more to increase participation or radicalization than prevent it, as shown by many experts on the subject concerned by the inherent profiling and unjust targeting it often entails. Both types of terror groups only rarely achieve their political (or religious) goals: in a study by Max Abrahms, only 7% of terrorist campaigns resulted in any positive movement towards their aims (Ruiz 42). The very premise of terrorism, of using violence to intimidate and influence a stronger power, usually decreases public sympathy and legitimacy and increases public fervor against the cause (Ruiz 42). Marginalized groups still turn to this powerful strategy, and new potential threats are cropping up as well: separatists in Catalonia, rising ethnic conflict in the UK after the British exit from the EU. Many scholars see increasing threats from both ethnonationalist and jihadist groups in the future. However, although terror in Europe is not expected to disappear any time in the near future, the vast majority of Europeans and people around the world will continue to condemn terrorist methods, rebel against them by continuing to live nonviolent lives, and keep adapting to the extremely adaptable threat.

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Electronic Waste: Transboundary Movement and Producer Responsibility

by Amelia Pollard, class of 2020.5

Abstract:

This research paper evaluates the externalities that have ensued from the rise in consumption of electronic products. The atrophy of these products in developing countries has led to adverse health effects that disproportionately impact marginalized groups such as people of color, women, and children. The transboundary nature of this environmental problem has resulted in researchers often analyzing the issue within the framework of a stark Global North vs. South dichotomy. I attempt to break down this binary by considering the role of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the effectiveness of major directives such as the Basel and Rotterdam Conventions and the prevalence of non-state actors such as the Basel Action Network. In turn, I restructure the framing of electronic waste disposal in order to place the onus on producers, who have the greatest responsibility and access to resources in order to mediate the environmental degradation caused by the dumping of electronic waste.

Consumption and Sacrifice

Environmental regimes are driven by public outcries that ensue from the discovery of a negative externality in the environment. These externalities often come from powerful industries during the manufacturing process. Increased production and globalization has led to an exponential growth in environmental degradation (Robinson 189). One of the greatest problems that has come from these unchecked industries is the rise in the consumption of electronic products. In the last century, the vast majority of this consumption has come from the Global North. In Bill McKibben's book, *Maybe One*, he argues that after years of gluttonous consumption, the North has to begin practicing sacrifice in order to create space for the South. This is reframing the concept of ecological debt, in which the Global North owes the South for its history of dominating production, thus perpetuating environmental degradation. McKibben argues that there can be more consumption overall as long as there is a shift in which countries are consuming more (McKibben 161). This approach signals maturity, in which there is a shift from a North-centric structure to that of equality. Currently, both producers and consumers in the Western Hemisphere create and dispose of electronic products with little to no consideration of their effect on developing countries.

One key strategy for reigning in the expanse of electronic waste follows the philosophy of Promethean Environmentalism, where technology and innovation help alleviate environmental degradation rather than exacerbate it (Maniates 40). This idea appeals mostly to "societies of comfort," which are countries that are accustomed to a high degree of luxury, and are those unwilling to make drastic changes to their qualities of life for environmental concerns (40). Problems regarding collective action help explain why countries are unwilling to sacrifice luxury goods and technology. For instance, former president George W. Bush pulled out of the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 after citing that it did not hold developing countries accountable for emitting too much CO2. Here, Bush exemplifies the fear of "free-ridership," in which the distribution of economic costs and sacrifice are imbalanced (Svendsen 281). This stands in contrast with McKibben's philosophy that there needs to be collective action defined by trust in order to optimize the balance of sustainability and production.

Health Effects of Electronic Waste

The plight of electronic waste began with the discovery of health hazards linked to chemicals found in products when they began to deteriorate. Electronic waste is extremely toxic, containing lead, mercury and arsenic in high concentrations (Raffael 483). Since these chemicals are not prone to natural degradation in the environment, they have lasting impacts on human health, including poor fetal development and nervous system damage (Raffael 483). Electronic waste health effects primarily enter through the food chain. This occurs through the grazing of livestock and the seeping of toxins found in e-waste into agricultural areas. The toxins then bioaccumulate and biomagnify through the food chain (Borthakur 23). These toxins are often in the form of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons and as persistent organic pollutants (POPs). Methods for disposing of waste involves using highly concentrated acidic solutions to dissolve the metals and mechanically shred the plastics involved (Borthakur 18). In 2014, UNEP deemed electronic waste the fastest growing waste

stream in the world (Wood). Despite increasing health hazards, the growth of production and the drag of substantial, effective legislation led to delayed global awareness.

The Transboundary Movement of Waste and the WTO

In the age of the 'information economy,' it is hard to comprehend the scale of electronic waste that is being transported. NGOs have estimated that between 50 to 80 percent of electronic waste that is consumed in Canada and the United States is processed in socioeconomically marginalized countries, often by hand (Lepawsky et al. 178). However, the troubling component of the transboundary movement of waste is that while it does cause environmental and health hazards, it also has the potential to provide economic opportunities. Developing countries are economically incentivized to accept not only reusable electronic waste, but harmful and toxic waste with no community benefit. There is a direct correlation between decreasing GDP as the rate in which countries import waste increases (Lepawsky et al. 178). In recent years, there's also been a surge of waste transport between developing countries. This form of transportation has fewer regulations, since it does not hold the same saliency of injustice as the Global North to South relationship.

 The World Trade Organization (WTO) plays a major role in the movement of transboundary waste. Through its promotion of free trade, the WTO often encourages the movement of electronic waste with the hope that it will ignite economic opportunities for developing countries. This perspective is short-sighted. Reparation costs of fixing both the environment and impacted individuals will most likely equal, if not surpass, the profits that these developing countries gain by attempting to repurpose electronic waste. However, members of the WTO do have the sovereign right to protect their people and environment if engagement in trade threatens their society. The temptation of economic opportunities from electronic waste often deters developing countries from stagnating trade. The WTO frowns upon any form of trade restriction, though, and keeping this in mind, developing countries may withhold from adopting restrictive policies. As a result, looking towards non-trade-restrictive remedial measures is the favored approach because economic interdependence is optimized and helps to support the GDP of all parties involved (Christian 105).

 In early November 2017, China pitched the "National Sword" campaign against foreign waste being disposed in the country. Through the ban, 24 different grades of waste will be restricted from entering the country. The WTO has yet to ratify the proposal. In its submission for review to the WTO, the government cited significant degrees of environmental degradation as grounds to limit the amount of waste imported (Robertson). Although addressing this issue in the short-term will require redirecting recycling locations, long-term solutions lie in the adoption of Extended Producers' Responsibility. This shifts the onus of waste disposal to the countries that produce it, rather than from the disposal end.

Major Directives

The Basel Convention is the most significant and well-known international transboundary waste management agreement to take place. The convention took place in 1989, and was a multilateral agreement (MEA) with 180 parties that agreed to

regulate the transboundary movement of hazardous waste. Its primary role is to prevent countries from receiving hazardous waste when it does not have an environmentally sound system of processing the material. Exports are allowed when they can be processed in an environmentally sound manner or when used as raw materials (Renckens 142). The Ban Amendment of 1995 prohibits export of all hazardous wastes incorporated in the Convention from Annex VII countries (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] & EU countries) to all others (Renckens 148). After years of legal disagreement, the amendment has ended in a stalemate. However, 74 of the countries in the Convention have ratified it. The Ban Amendment contradicts the ideologies of trade liberalization and globalization of the Washington Consensus. This leads to corporations needing to address their production methods instead. Gaps in the Basel Convention include the United States inability to ratify it, as well as electronic waste not being included in the definition of hazardous waste. The discrepancy in wording leads electronic waste to often go unregulated by the Basel Convention.

The Rotterdam Convention of 1998 also served as a significant step towards managing the international trade of hazardous waste. The Convention stemmed primarily from awareness of the health implications of pesticides on human health. The most significant aspect of the MEA was the inclusion of the legally binding Prior Informed Consent Procedure, which is designated "for certain hazardous chemicals and pesticides in international trade" (Barrios 679). The specificity in wording makes it evident that the Convention was in direct response to specific cases of harm caused by pesticides. The treaty, which was implemented in 2004, planned on improving upon voluntary prior informed consent procedures that were already in place internationally by facilitating information exchange about the chemicals (Ogunseitan 274). Rotterdam primarily built upon the preceding voluntary guidelines instituted by UNEP and FAO in 1989 ("Overview of Rotterdam Convention" 2017). The most recent treaty in the series of international MEAs regarding hazardous waste was the Stockholm Convention, which was ratified in 2001. The treaty targets persistent organic pollutants (POPs) that adversely affect human health and the environment. The Convention substantially limited or banned the use, production, and trade of 12 particularly harmful pollutants, which are often known as the "dirty dozen" (Mulvaney 376). POPs are defined in the Convention as having four key characteristics: bioaccumulation, transport over significant distances, toxicity and environmental persistence. However, brominated flame retardants, which are restricted through the convention, continue to be used in electronic products. As a result, they are still being detected in the global recycling flow, particularly in West African countries such as Nigeria (Babayemi et al. 14503).

The European Union has taken on a more targeted approach to electronic waste regulation. The EU's Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) directive has targets for the recovery and recycling of all electrical products. Along with the WEEE directive, the EU also passed the Restriction on Hazardous Substances Directive (RoHS). Both directives were passed in February 2003 as a means to address electronic waste disposal in Europe ("WEEE"). EU's RoHS was momentous because it restricted the use of six toxic components, including lead, mercury and cadmium, in electronic equipment. Increasingly eco-friendly electronic products are not always financially feasible for developing countries, however. The targeted initiatives by the EU have showed some promise in setting a standard for producers, but they still do not cover the consumption of the United States and other hegemonic states.

Non-State Actors

The inability of the U.S. to ratify the Basel Convention created regulatory gaps that non-state actors were able to fulfill. Often in environmental regimes, non-state actors' main role is in creating public awareness around issues. This took place in the electronic waste regime through the NGO Greenpeace International, which raised awareness about e-waste disposed of in Asia. This formed a basic understanding of how developed countries were dumping waste in a non-environmentally sound manner (Brigden 55). However, other organizations like the Basel Action Network (BAN), took more pointed action at countries as well as producers in remediating environmental waste production and disposal. BAN targeted producers by cornering major corporations through the creation of certification incentives. Among the most prominent of these corporations was Hewlett-Packard, which eventually adopted a producer responsibility framework after being embarrassed and coerced by BAN (Renckens 150). One of the crucial disposal certification programs of BAN is the "Responsible Recycling Practices for Use in Accredited Certification Programs for Electronics Recyclers" (R2). This is an upstream supply chain regulatory target, as it is focused on the post-consumer phase. BAN developed most of these initiatives through its e-Steward program which attempts to legitimize the Basel Convention by incorporating its language into its initiatives (Renckens 150).

Challenges in Enforcement

One of the greatest challenges with electronic waste is the vague wording in the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions. In order to appeal to dozens of countries in the agreements, it became necessary to ignore certain facets of hazardous waste that are innately part of the toxic international flow of disposal. Electronic waste is not inherently considered a hazardous waste, particularly if it is advertised as reusable, raw material. However, electronics clearly encapsulates heavy metals and harmful chemicals that are concealed by their complex manufacturing (Raffaele 483).

      Although substantially more specific, the European Union's WEEE directive also struggles with enforcement. The gap between the regime of electronics and waste management, is distinct. In tackling the electronic waste regime, a holistic approach of equally targeting the production as well as disposal is necessary to effectively reduce the hazards that ensue from e-waste. The directive closely followed the underlying regulatory principle, which is also known as the "cradle-to-grave" approach (McDonough et al. 27). However, this still allowed for producers to include hazardous chemicals in the manufacturing of electronics (Lauridsen et al. 486). This has caused the directive to be inefficient. The significant amount of resources that are spent on remediation are superfluous given that the production could have factored in the disposal from the start. There has also been a conflation of the initiative's success with increasing metal prices, which has encouraged firms to reuse as many precious metals as possible in production. Only 13% of the electronic waste assessed by the WEEE is disposed of in landfills or incinerated, compared to the more than 90% of waste that was disposed of in this way in 2000 (Lauridsen et al. 486). Studies have shown that transported waste is not being documented properly if it contains hazardous materials, which also accounts for the substantial decrease in disposal

percentages (Lauridsen et al. 486). The directive has made an impression on the waste management component of electronic waste, but has yet to outline the exact way of forcing producers into not using hazardous materials.

Reframing the Global North vs. South Narrative

In order to effectively address the electronic waste regime, it is necessary that the international community acknowledges its changing nature in the last decade. In 2012, the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) released a study called "Where are WEEE in Africa?" The report unveiled the status of electronic waste disposal in five different countries. It found that 5% of all European waste is still illegally disposed of on the continent (Lubick 148). The important component is that increased local use of electronic products has caused a jump to 85% of waste being materials that were consumed domestically (Lubick 148). The emerging problem therefore is that there are still no local facilities to process these products. The problem is shifting from a Global North vs. South relationship to one that is insulated within developing countries. This may serve as a disincentive for developed countries to fund recycling facilities for these regions. To show how rare sufficient recycling facilities are, one located in Germany is only one of five in the world which is properly equipped to take apart the components of a circuit board (Lubick 148).

When the Basel Convention was drafted, trade from Annex VII (developed) countries to non-Annex VII countries accounted for 35% of total trade that needed to be monitored (Lepawsky 148). In 2012, it was found that it only accounted for 1% (Lepawsky 148). This reshapes the traditional framing of the problem from being strictly a Global North verses South environmental regime, to being exclusively founded on environmental injustice. Although the disposal of electronic waste is shifting away from one of classical injustice between states, it is evident there is still an imbalance of power at play. The tech industry is now holding the authority that hegemonic states once did. In turn, the tech industry's continual refusal to rethink the design of tech products is perpetuating the horrendous living conditions of developing countries (Rauschenbach 345). Multilateral funding facilitated by the United Nations, or another international institution, could create the capacity and resources for these developing countries to mitigate local environmental damage. Electronic wastes contain predominantly re-workable and re-sellable equipment, and as a result non-Annex VII to Annex VII electronic trade has become much more significant (Rauschenbach 153). This fact makes the main goals of the Basel, Rotterdam and Basel Conventions extraneous as waste streams reshape and require new legal parameters.

The Hope of Producer Responsibility

Within these regime gaps it is evident that complete elimination of hazardous waste and electronic products needs to come from the producers. A variety of tactics, ranging from public harassment of producers to economic incentives, has pushed producers to adopt a greater responsibility in the disposal of hazardous waste. The true irony of the electronic waste regime is that tech companies, who proclaim themselves a "clean industry," are the producers of such a significant proportion of the globe's most toxic waste. A computer monitor alone contains several pounds of highly toxic substances (Pellow 185). The vicious cycle of the increasing efficiency

of electronic devices only leads to an exponential growth of waste as people leap for new gadgets on a regular basis. This is the concept of Moore's Law, in which processing power doubles every eighteen months into the indefinite future. This idea was conceptualized by the founder of the Intel Corporation, Gordon Moore (Pellow 191). This feeds into the strategy of planned obsolescence, in which firms deliberately design their products to deteriorate after a relatively short period of time. Although producer responsibility initiatives have emerged as a tactic in checking electronic waste, planned obsolescence has remained difficult to regulate.

One of the greatest successes of the electronic waste regime has been the Computer TakeBack Campaign. The International Campaign for Responsible Technology (ICRT) includes a substantial number of the environmental groups that have been involved in the global initiative. The conglomerate's main mission is for producers to take responsibility for the entire life cycle of their products through effective MEAs. There have been domestic directives in targeting producers, such as the EPA's National Electronic Products Stewardship Initiative (NEPSI), which in actuality has no true regulatory teeth (Pellow 195). The initiative collapsed as environmentalists and corporations diverged in their visions of what take-back programs would look like. Tech giants often avoid having take-back services in developing countries (such as Apple, Microsoft, Panasonic, Philips, Sharp, Sony and Toshiba) although they have them in place in countries like the United States that hold more social capital (Greenpeace 2008). However, with help from the organization BAN, CBTC managed to investigate, embarrass and force Dell and Hewlett-Packard into adopting a comprehensive pledge of producer responsibility—all within a span of a few years. CBTC operates on the assumption that effective change needs to come from within industries, not governments. Ineffective international governance, coupled with the transboundary nature of the electronic waste regime, has led to the emergence of hegemonic companies rather than states. These firms dominate the industry and therefore need to be coerced as defecting nations traditionally are by NGOs in other environmental regimes.

There have been some attempts at producer responsibility clauses in governance. The European Union's WEEE directive provides a brief suggestion of conscientious electronic goods production. The section on producer responsibility says, "Member states shall encourage the design and production of electrical and electronic equipment which take into account and facilitate dismantling and recovery, in particular the reuse and recycling of WEEE, their components and materials" (EC 2002a). This section provides no clear guidelines as to how states should encourage this type of production, not to mention any repercussions for firms that do not comply with the clause.

With increasing public exposure, companies are starting to have to pay the costs of including harmful chemicals in production. In late November of 2017, DirecTV was required to pay a $9.5 million settlement because the firm had illegally dumped hazardous waste. An investigation conducted by Alameda County found that all 25 facilities in California were improperly dumping batteries, electronic devices and other hazardous wastes in the vicinity (Associated Press 2017). The trend of firms being exposed, and having to pay for the market failure of hazardous externalities, will hopefully begin to convince companies to eliminate the materials from the production process entirely.

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Understanding the Local and International of Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa: Why Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Poses a Larger Threat than Boko Haram and al-Shabaab

by Sarah Corsico, class of 2018

Abstract:

The three largest and most impactful terrorist groups in sub-Saharan Africa include Boko Haram in Nigeria, al-Shabaab in Somalia and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in Mali. While all three are Islamist organizations and have ties to larger international groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIS, ultimately these groups must be understood through their local contexts and nationalist concerns. All three continue to pose a great threat in their respective countries; however, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb can be seen as the largest regional threat to the sub-continent due to its strength, wealth, sub-affiliate spread and wider international network.

Introduction

Poverty, weak governance and failed states are all identified reasons for terrorism (Sanderson; Bushner; Howard; Cummings). While all of these factors play a role in the emergence and the sustained presence of terrorist organizations in sub-Saharan Africa, they do not tell the whole story. A number of countries in the region have high poverty rates, have similar population demographics and are burdened by ethnic conflict, but do not have terrorism (Dowd).[1] Therefore, in failing to be nuanced when discussing the nature, location and varied ideologies that inspire the terrorism that occurs on the sub-continent, many do not address the specific problems enabling certain groups to flourish and survive (Dowd). A handful of terrorist groups exist on the sub-continent, in particular in Western Africa, but three main groups can be identified as having the largest network, support and impact: Boko Haram in Nigeria, al-Shabaab in Somalia and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali ("GTD Global Terrorism Database").[2] In many ways, it is impossible to remove these groups from the local historical, political and economic context in which they developed. This makes it essential to understand the unique impact of colonialism on Nigeria, Mali and Somalia. All three groups can be defined as Islamist terrorist organizations (Strategic Comments), have had connections with al-Qaeda and are seen as having grown more international over time (Ghana Growth 3; African Union Peace and Security Council 1, 2). Ideological as well as physical threads can also be seen between them, including but not limited to financing, training and support (African Union Peace and Security Council 4,5,6; Sanderson 78,79). The rise of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, has only complicated this complex network, and in threatening al-Qaeda's influence in the region, has led to significant organization splintering (Strategic Comments). All three of these groups continue to pose a great threat in their respective countries; however, AQIM can be seen as the largest regional threat to the sub-continent due to its strength, wealth, sub-affiliate spread and wider international network.

Who Are They and What is Their Impact?

Boko Haram developed out of northern Nigeria (Dowd). The group's origins can most clearly be traced back to 2002, under the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf (United States Institute of Peace 3). While thought to have been influenced by the Maitatsine Uprising in Nigeria in the 1980s (Bamidele), more direct lines can be drawn between the current group and the Muslim Youth Organization established in Borno State (United States Institute of Peace 3). The primary concern of this youth group was what they viewed as the failed implementation of Shar'ia law in the historically Muslim dominated North-Eastern part of Nigeria (Bamidele). The group's "non-violent" attempt at change however (Strategic Comments), quickly trans-

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[1] Please refer to chart 1. This chart presents demographic and socio-economic data for each of the countries focused on in this study (Nigeria, Somalia and Mali). For each of these countries a neighboring country, of a similar size and relatively similar political situation, was chosen as a point of comparison (Cameroon, Sudan and Niger respectively). In all of the categories, except unemployment rate, the countries have almost identical percentage breakdowns. However, terrorism in the region is relatively concentrated to Nigeria, Somalia and Mali, which means that it is necessary to look beyond poverty rates, religion, ethnic conflict and or age distribution in order to try to explain terrorism in the region. This, in turn, points to a need to study in greater depth, Somalia, Mali and Nigeria in order to be able to understand why these countries and not others.

[2] An analysis of data from the 1970s through 2016, from the University of Maryland START Database, showed that in Sub-Saharan Africa, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab and AQIM committed the most number of attacks of any terrorist groups in the region. For a better presentation of the concentration and geographical spread of these attacks, please refer to Map 1

formed in 2003 when Yusuf took over and starting using violence as a means of fighting the state (United States Institute of Peace 3). Under Yusuf's leadership, the group was renamed Boko Haram, which means "Western Education is sacrilegious" (Bamidele). Their name represents the group's foundational belief that Western education has created Nigerian leaders who take power "for personal gain" and "rob and oppress the masses" (Looney). As a result, their objective from the beginning has been to overthrow the Nigerian government and implement Shar'ia law – believing this is the only way to establish equality and improve the country (Looney 2014).

A pivotal turning point occurred for the group in 2009 when Nigerian police killed a number of Boko Haram members (United States Institute of Peace 3). This event proved to be critical in the "radicalization" of the group (Kaplan), who reacted with violent attacks across the North (United States Institute of Peace 4). The Nigerian security forces, in turn, simply aggravated the situation and responded by killing 800 Boko Haram members (United States Institute of Peace 4). The human rights violations committed by the Nigerian security forces reinforced the group's distrust of the government and provided them with a larger platform in which to appeal to Nigerians who felt marginalized or neglected by the State (Bamidele). The most critical aspect of this event, however, was the extra-judicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf, who had been arrested during the uprising (Kaplan). Following this, Abubakar Shekau took leadership over the group, growing an incredibly violent movement focused on revenge and fighting the Nigerian government (Looney). Yusuf's death provided the group with a martyr and only reinforced their message (Looney). The group's largest impact can be seen between 2012 and 2015 ("GTD Global Terrorism Database"), when in 2014 they were considered the deadliest terrorist organization in the world (Institute for Economics and Peace 2017 2). Their main targets have consisted of security officers, local politicians, traditional authority figures and civilians; however, over time, they have attacked more symbolically international targets - for example, the UN headquarters in Abuja (Bamidele). While the creation of a Multinational Joint Task Force in 2015 has significantly weakened the organization (Institute for Economics and Peace 2016 20), contributing to an 80% decrease in attacks in 2016, they remain a very powerful force in the region (Institute for Economics and Peace 2017 3).

Similar to Boko Haram, al-Shabaab's emergence can be attributed to a distrust of the central government and is tied, in particular, to the Ethiopian invasion in 2006 (Pham 138,139). Just as Boko Haram is thought to have been influenced by earlier Islamist militant groups, al-Shabaab was also preceded by a number of radical Islamist groups (Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset: SOMALIA 1; "Al Ittihad Al Islamiya"). However, al-Shabaab's rise can really be seen as a result of failed governance and foreign intervention. After the fall of the dictator Siyad Barre in 1991, the Somali State collapsed, leaving a power vacuum and a number of actors vying for authority (Pham 133). The international community's attempt to build a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) can only be seen, however, as having fueled greater animosity between groups in particular those who felt the TFG did not have the larger interests of Somalia in mind (Pham 147,148). This was critical to the parallel creation of the establishment of the Union of Islamic Courts (Pham 138), which soon after established the Council of Islamic Courts and produced al-Shabaab (Strategic Comments).

Al-Shabaab or the Movement of the Striving Youth, is primarily focused on the national Somali fight and is therefore concerned not only with the TFG but also Kenyan and Ethiopian authorities who they view as occupying part of Somali land (Solomon "Somalia's Al Shabaab"). Through 2011, the group has held significant territorial control and remained very focused on creating a unified Somalia under Shar'ia law (Solomon "Somalia's Al Shabaab"). A shift in the group's focus took place in 2012 when the current leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane, held a coup and pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda (Solomon "Somalia's Al Shabaab"). This broadened focus, in some ways, parallels Boko Haram's shift towards a more international agenda. Similar to the way in which foreign control over the creation of the TFG grew animosity, continued foreign intervention – in particular through the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) – has only grown al-Shabaab's international agenda (Hassan). While they have lost territory overtime, they remain a relevant force slowly moving north into less populated areas as well as into North-eastern Kenya where a large Somali refugee community lives (Hassan). The strength of the group was seen earlier this year in October when they killed hundreds of people in an attack in Mogadishu (Hassan, Schmitt & Ibrahim).

Not unlike Boko Haram's violent interaction with the police in 2009 and the Islamic Court takeover that was essential to the emergence of al-Shabaab, AQIM's emergence in the region can also be seen, primarily, as the result of local conflict, the 2012 Tuareg rebellion in Mali.[3] Unlike the other two groups, however, AQIM did not originate from this local conflict, but rather, formed out of the Algerian Civil War (Strategic Comments). When members of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) were unhappy with the violence being perpetrated against civilians, a handful of individuals broke off and formed the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) (Forest 65). Some of these fighters went to Libya, some remained in Algeria and it is thought that some made it to Mali ("Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb"; Zenn). Those in Mali established a base and remained relatively low profile until 2006 (Sehmer, et al. 9). In 2006, the group officially became an affiliate of al-Qaeda and was renamed AQIM ("Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb"). This was critical, as it not only gave AQIM legitimacy and strength but it enabled al-Qaeda to infiltrate into Western Africa (Sehmer, et al. 9). Throughout this period the organization tried to establish itself locally by targeting the Tuareg population[4], which was concentrated in the northern part of the country and "felt discriminated and marginalized by the government in Bamako" (Sehmer et al. 10). This provided them with an important base that they were able to capitalize off of when the Tuareg National Liberation of the Azawad rebelled and took over the northern part of the country (Solomon "The African state and the failure of US"). The instability created by the Tuareg rebellion created space for AQIM along with a number of other Islamist groups, such as Ansar al-Dine, to gain power ("Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb"). The Islamist rise to power was therefore entangled with the unraveling ethnic conflict in Mali.

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[3] In March 2012, a military coup successfully took control over the country. The instability caused by the coup enabled Tuareg rebels, who already had somewhat of a stronghold in the region, to take over the northern part of the country. This conflict created space for Islamist terrorist organizations to further infiltrate the north of Mali and eventually gain power (Lineback, Neal, and Mandy Lineback Gritzner. "Geography in the News: Al Qaeda and Tuareg in Mali.")

[4] In pre-colonial times, the Tuareg inhabited parts of present day Libya, Algeria, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. As a result, they are now a minority population in each of these countries (Lineback, Neal, and Mandy Lineback Gritzner. "Geography in the News: Al Qaeda and Tuareg in Mali.")

Foreign intervention in Mali, similar to US presence in Somalia, has only rein-forced AQIM's message and de-legitimized the central government, in particular in the eyes of various Tuareg communities (Solomon "The African state and the failure of US"). Further, AQIM's presence in this region has contributed to the proliferation of a number of smaller splinter groups, while expanding the trafficking and drug trade that has historically occurred along the border with Algeria and Niger (Zenn; Seh-mer et al. 10). Although pushed out by a French operation in 2013, AQIM has recently re-gained traction (Zenn). As such, although the group has entangled itself in the existing ethnic conflict which has pervaded Malian society for decades, it does not have the same ties that Boko Haram and al-Shabaab have to their countries, making it more flexible and perhaps internationally focused. This has left them in a unique position and therefore perhaps makes them the largest threat.

Localness: How Each Group is Rooted in Unique Grievances

As outlined above, the local context of all three of these groups' emergence and de-velopment is key to their understanding. Scholars point to failed states, ungoverned space, ethnic conflict and poverty to explain the presence of terrorism in Sub-Saha-ran Africa (Sanderson 79; Bushner; Howard; Cummings). While these factors com-bined in different ways and under unique circumstances are important drivers of terrorism, they cannot be individually considered the cause of terrorism (Mair 107, 108). An array of states in sub-Saharan Africa can be defined as failed or collapsed, have ethnic conflict resulting from colonial borders, have similar demographic breakdowns and high poverty levels, and yet they do not all have terrorism (Dowd). In fact, the most impactful terrorist violence can be seen as relatively limited to Mali, Nigeria and Somalia (Sanderson 78). As noted by Stefan Mair, "[t]errorism is found-ed on the interaction of a lack of economic perspectives, social deprivation, a loss of cultural identity, political repression and a dysfunctional state. But these factors alone do not lead inevitably to terrorism," (Mair 107). It is essential therefore to un-derstand the factors at play and the local grievances that exist which have enabled terrorism to emerge, relatively localized in sub-Saharan Africa (Dowd). Terrorism on the sub-continent is not only fairly limited to specific countries Nigeria, Mali, and Somalia – but is also geographically or regionally concentrated within each of these places.[5] In Nigeria, Boko Haram is based out of the North-Eastern corner of the coun-try, in Somalia, al-Shabaab is localized to the Southern Central region of the country, especially along the border with Kenya and in Mali, AQIM and its splinter affiliates work out of the Northern tip, with some expansion into the center of the country.[6] These clear concentrations make it essential to look at a "sub-national level" when trying to understand terrorism in the region (Bushner). Looking only at grievances at a national level fails to explain the somewhat contained nature of terrorism on the sub-continent.

Ultimately, Boko Haram stems from deeply rooted divisions and inequalities, weak governance and corruption in Nigeria. In many ways, it is challenging to under-stand these realities without looking at the country's colonial history. Prior to coloni-

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[5] Please refer to Map 1.

[6] Please refer to Maps 2, 3 and 4. These maps present the number of attacks and the location of each attack committed by al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and AQIM in 2012, 2014 and 2016. Contour lines have been drawn around each data set in order to help visual-ize the spread or containment of the attacks over time.

zation a variety of groups and states controlled the territory which would become Nigeria (Hugon). In the northern part of this region, Islam was accepted by a number of leaders (Hugon). This Islamic presence was however quickly challenged in the 1840s, when the British brought Christianity to the South (Hugon). Christianity was used as a means of educating and creating a "new elite" (Fayola & Heaton xiv). When modern day Nigeria was established in 1914, the "elite" in the south were favored by the colonial powers (Fayola & Heaton 6,7). Britain not only groomed the future leaders of Nigeria and concentrated political power in their hands, but also prioritized the southern economy due to oil reserves in the Niger Delta (Looney). As a result, extreme power, social and economic disparities have existed between the wealthier, more developed south and poorer, less developed north (Kaplan). This marginalization of the Muslims in the north has led to deep grievances, which have created a platform for Boko Haram.

It is essential to understand the distribution of grievances in the country in order to better understand why Boko Haram emerged, as well as why it finds a majority of its support in the northern part of the country, primarily in Borno, Yobe and Kano States (Dowd; "Nigeria: A nation divided"). A study done by Caitrionia Dowd found that "[g]rievances regarding economic and political exclusion are typically higher than average in areas subsequently affected by Islamist violence..." and in Nigeria, "Muslim populations report higher-than-average grievances," (Dowd). Adawama, Yobe and Borno, where Boko Haram is founded and where Nigeria's Muslim population is concentrated, are some of the poorest states in Nigeria (Looney). Poverty levels are close to 60 and 70% in these states; in Borno only 2% of children are vaccinated and 83% of people are illiterate (Looney). Although Nigeria's economy has actually grown over the past five years, unemployment rates have continued to steepen (UNU-WIDER project 1, 5). Oil wealth, in particular, has remained concentrated in the south and the unemployment rate is "much higher in the northern part of the country where two-thirds of the population engages in subsistence agriculture," (UNU-WIDER project 5). This reality is important to note as Boko Haram's membership consists primarily of "disaffected youth", unemployed high school and university graduates, and "destitute children", mostly from Northern Nigeria (Adwoa Offeibea Ansaaku 3). Ultimately, the group calls for the implementation of Shar'ia law across Nigeria, seeing this as a solution to the country's problems and corruption (United States Institute of Peace 3). As such, it has been able to appeal to vulnerable, socially and economically marginalized youth, largely from the north (United States Institute of Peace 7, 9).

Socio-economic marginalization has only been deepened and reinforced through weak governance and corruption, which has enabled Boko Haram to keep its stronghold in the northern part of the country. Political power is fairly concentrated in the south, where a small elite control the wealth of the nation (Looney). It is believed that since 1999, politicians have embezzled 4 to 8 billion dollars annually (Solomon "The African state and the failure of US"). While oil revenues have been up to 74 billion dollars, over one half of Nigerians live on less than a dollar a day (Solomon "The African state and the failure of US"). As noted by Hussein Solomon, "[u]nder these circumstances, it is easy to see why the Nigerian state would enjoy scarcely any legitimacy among its citizens," (Solomon "The African state and the failure of US"). The corruption and lack of trust in the government has contributed to sentiments of "neglect" and only fueled Boko Haram's rhetoric, allowing them to ap-

pear as an appealing option to some (United States Institute of Peace 7). Although a smooth transition took place in 2015, Goodluck Jonathan's breach of the north/south alternation political agreement in 2011 contributed greatly to sentiments of political marginalization in the north, increasing support for Boko Haram (Dowd). In fact, the group saw significant growth from 2012 to 2014 ("GTD Global Terrorism Database"). It should also be noted that Nigerian security force's violent reaction to Boko Haram has played an important role in further radicalizing the group and contributing to its support (Kaplan). In fact, a recent report by the UN noted how, "[d]ozens of cases of rape, sexual violence and sexual exploitation were reported in seven camps in Borno State [in 2016] alone, carried out by guards, camp officials, security officers and members of civilian vigilante groups," (Searcey "They Fled Boko Haram"). Security forces are therefore viewed as perpetrators of violence not protectors, something that, again, has only fueled Boko Haram's messages and support (Kaplan). These local social, political and economic grievances help to explain why Boko Haram emerged and despite setbacks, continues to flourish in northern Nigeria. While the group adheres to a claimed international jihadist ideology, ultimately it is concerned with the corruption, governance and inequalities which pervade Nigeria.

Similarly, al-Shabaab in Somalia emerged from imposed colonial borders which have evoked conflict between clans and neighboring countries, intensified the marginalization of groups and resulted in a weak, de-centralized government. The land that makes up present day Somalia was home to a number of groups in pre-colonial times, one of which was the Somali people (Solomon "Somalia's Al Shabaab"). In the 19th century, "[the] Somali nation [was divided] into five colonial territories" (Solomon "Somalia's Al Shabaab"). Because of these divisions, the primary goal of Somali governments and sub-state actors since independence has been to unify Somalia and bring back lost territory (Solomon "Somalia's Al Shabaab"). In particular, this has resulted in conflict with Ethiopia over the Ogaden region as well as with Kenya over the Northern Frontier District (Solomon "Somalia's Al Shabaab"). This Somali nationalism, which was born out of and has developed since independence, has been an important element of al-Shabaab's messaging and appeal (Solomon "Somalia's Al Shabaab"). As noted by Hussein Solomon, "[t]he dream of 'Greater Somalia' was also to infuse the ranks of the various Islamist formations in the country," (Solomon "Somalia's Al Shabaab"). Strength in Al-Shabaab's messaging has always come from its interest in Somali land, claiming "irredentist" territory in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti (Solomon "Somalia's Al Shabaab"). In a country that has not seen a central political government since 1991, and where foreign forces have tried to establish an authority fourteen times, al-Shabaab presents, for some, a group who prioritizes the interests of the country (Pham 134). Divisions in Somali society, in particular clannism, have caused conflict, dis-unity, and political weakness. However, a unifying factor between Somalis is Islam, as almost 99% of the country identifies as Muslim (Solomon "Somalia's Al Shabaab"). As a result, al-Shabaab has been able to use radical Islam interconnected with Somali nationalism to bring together different clans to fight for a larger cause (Solomon "Somalia's Al Shabaab"). This rhetoric has been especially appealing to marginalized clans who have historically been treated as inferior, such as the Digil and Rahanweyn (Pham 135; Solomon "Somalia's Al Shabaab"). Although not a majority of the group, these clans make up a good portion of al-Shabaab (Hassan) and highlight how al-Shabaab's rise and sustained presence has very local causes.

Furthermore, the persisting civil war and lack of a central government in Somalia has meant that basic services are not provided, people are not protected and economic opportunities are sparse (Armed Conflict Location & Event Database: SOMALIA). Continual fighting for close to two decades has resulted in devastation, leaving no space for investment, development or infrastructure growth. The unemployment rate in Somalia is at almost 50% and just as with Boko Haram, this plays an important role in al-Shabaab's ability to appeal to youth. [7] A study looking at young Somali refugees in Kenya who had been recruited by al-Shabaab showed that "[a]lthough personal poverty is not a reason for joining violent extremism, the cases of these youth show that the effects of poverty, such as idleness and low self-esteem, cannot be ignored in this discussion" (Hassan). Terrorism, in this context, offered a job and an income (Hassan). A similar phenomenon is seen in Nigeria, where due to little economic opportunity terrorism offers a way of providing for one's family (Dowd). The ability to provide for one's self and family has important "self-esteem" implications (Hassan). This is especially true in a society like Somalia where the respect that a man receives is highly dependent on his ability to provide for his family (Hassan). Al-Shabaab therefore offers more than simply a job, it offers the opportunity to become a "defender of country and religion," (Hassan). Ultimately, this all points to the localness of al-Shabaab. Although aligned with al-Qaeda and part of a wider international jihadist network, Al-Shabaab is rooted in Somalia's local conflicts. As summarized by the mentioned study, "[t]he main reasons these youth cite for joining al-Shabaab are not deeply held religious beliefs, but rather factors that revolve around their sense of identity and perceptions of neglect that stem from their frustration with clan politics, lack of opportunities to improve the quality of their lives and other difficulties that come with war," (Hassan). As such, in the same way that it is impossible to remove Boko Haram from the historical, political and economic issues that define Nigeria, it is impossible to remove al-Shabaab from the historical, political and economic issues that define Somalia.

AQIM, although different from the other two groups, must also be understood within the local context that it has established itself and maintained its presence in northern Mali. As it has been seen in Nigeria and Somalia, "Islamist violence is a function of a much deeper crisis of political legitimacy, economic development and inclusive governance," (Armed Conflict Location & Event Database: MALI 10). Although AQIM originated out of Algeria and of the three groups is the most connected to a larger international jihadist network, it has effectively and deeply entangled itself in the larger ethnic conflict which has defined Malian politics and society since independence. The Tuareg are an ethnic group, who in pre-colonial times, inhabited parts of current day Niger, Mali, Algeria, Libya and Mauritania (Lineback & Gritzner). When colonial borders were drawn, no attention was paid to the existing land makeup and the Tuaregs were significantly divided – part of their land becoming current day northern Mali. Since 1997, the Tuaregs have been fighting for a nation state; in fact, until 2009 Tuareg led violence made up 25% of the violence in Mali (Armed Conflict Location & Event Database: MALI 2). The Tuareg were concerned with establishing a homeland, but greatly mistrusted the Bamako government, whom they viewed as favoring the South (Armed Conflict Location & Event Database: MALI 3). Despite promises by the government, little development has occurred in the north and extreme divisions can be seen across ethnic and socio-economic lines (INSTAT, and World Bank 55). This clear division, also seen in Nigeria, is critical to understand-

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[7] Please refer to chart 1.

ing AQIM's ability to establish itself. In fact, the 2012 rebellion, "the fourth since independence in 1960 arose from widespread frustration with the deprivation and marginalization of that part of the country," (Adwoa Offeibea Ansaaku). It was really the 2012 rebellion, which truly destabilized the country and enabled various Islamist groups to gain power and push the Tuareg Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA) aside (Armed Conflict Location & Event Database: MALI 5, 6). Following this, Ansar Dine, a splinter of this group, joined with AQIM to establish control of the north and impose Shar'ia Law (Armed Conflict Location & Event Database: MALI 6). As such, it is possible to see how ethnic conflict and Islamist conflict have become strongly interconnected in the country; while Tuareg violence has decreased since 2009, Islamist violence has increased by almost 20% (Armed Conflict Location & Event Database: MALI 2). Therefore, despite being a more internationally driven group, AQIM emerged in northern Mali and gained support through the existing local ethnic conflict.

Furthermore, similar to both Nigeria and Somalia, weak governance was critical in allowing AQIM to act as an authority for the northern communities who felt neglected by the southern government. AQIM, quickly connected with local elite and established charities to help provide for the mostly Tuareg dominated north (Dowd). Through "inter-marriage, particularly among poorer local lineages, [they]...attempted to bolster their image as a potentially powerful ally to local communities," (Armed Conflict Location & Event Database: MALI 8). By providing services and listening to the needs of these communities, "Islamist militants [were able to transform] this conflict into one mobilized around Islamist ideology and goals," (Dowd). As such, the foundational role of ethnic conflict cannot be overlooked when studying AQIM and its concentrated hold primarily in the north of Mali.

"Internationalization": An Evolution from Local to International Jihad?

Each of these groups stem from and are entangled in local conflicts, however, all three are Islamist terrorist groups connected to a larger international jihadist ideology and network. Overtime, all three groups have broadened their somewhat nationalist goals and placed greater attention on the wider international religious fight preached by groups like al-Qaeda (Sanderson 78). As such, they have placed their local fights, in the greater context of fighting for the "political, social and cultural liberation of the Muslim world," (Litvak 723). This "internationalisation" has manifested itself in different ways: ideological development, financing, attack locations and targets (Bushner). The effect and impact of this wider international focus can most significantly be seen in AQIM who, of the three groups, is the most internationally connected and has the strongest ties to al-Qaeda.

While "attempts to subsume Boko Haram's activity within a global narrative of Islamist terrorism obscure[s] the complexity of the grievances of northern Nigerian populations," (Armed Conflict Location & Event Database: Nigeria 2) the group has, over time, expanded its communication, financing, ideological rhetoric and targets, to reach a wider more international audience as well as to focus its fight against "enemies of Islam across the world," (Hoffman 92, 93). Boko Haram's international jihadist connection was established early on, when the group created "a base they called Afghanistan in Kanamma village in northern Yobe state," (United States Institute of Peace 3) viewing themselves as the Nigerian Taliban (Forest 72). These details, although small, show Boko Haram's knowledge and desired connection to other terrorists, in particular in the Middle East. Despite this, it should be noted that Boko

Haram remained relatively localized throughout its development, focused on the local grievances of Muslims in Nigeria (Looney). Notably, a pivotal point occurred in the group's development when Boko Haram sent members to AQIM to be trained (Solomon "The African state and the failure of US"). The effects of this can be seen ideologically (as noted above, regarding a greater focus on the larger "jihadist" fight) but also physically as the group has moved from fighting with knives, machetes and bows to using suicide car bombings, IEDs, and synchronized assaults, a trademark of al-Qaeda (Solomon "The African state and the failure of US"). Beyond this, the group has, since 2011, targeted more international symbols such as the UN headquarters in Abuja (Forest & Giroux), focusing its attacks on the Nigerian government as well as larger symbols of "western education" and corruption (Searcey "Boko Haram strapped suicide bombs to them.").

Boko Haram's "internationalisation" has resulted from its stronger connections to al-Qaeda, in particular through AQIM, and as of most recently, ISIS (Bushner). In fact, in 2015, Abubakar bin Muhammad Shekau, the current leader of Boko Haram, pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS, and renamed the group Islamic State's West African Province (Strategic Comments). ISIS's impact can be seen directly in Boko Haram's recent communication advancements, which have enabled the group to more effectively reach a larger international audience (Olivier "Terrorism: comment Boko Haram"). Before 2010, all communication was done in Haoussa and with selected journalists (Olivier "Terrorism: comment Boko Haram"). Under the leadership of Abul Qaqa and Shekau, media is more highly prioritized, is published in both Haoussa and Arabic and includes videos (Olivier "Terrorism: comment Boko Haram"). Finally, starting in 2015 and due to ISIS, Boko Haram has reinforced their video production, internationalized their message through Twitter and Youtube, and produced media in Haoussa, Arabic and English (Olivier "Terrorism: comment Boko Haram"). Beyond the media and propaganda support ISIS has provided, it has caused great splintering in the group, weakening Boko Haram (Institute for Economics and Peace 2017 72, 74). In 2016, three splinters were identified (Armed Conflict Location & Event Database: Nigeria 2). The largest threat is Ansaru, a group "[w]hich has targeted western civilian targets and does appear to foster international links and areas of activity beyond Nigeria," (Armed Conflict Location & Event Database: Nigeria 2). However, despite a clear movement towards a more international agenda and increased influence from larger, established groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS, Boko Haram "remains very rooted in local political contexts and economic realities," (Solomon "The African state and the failure of US"). While the group has developed its actions, communication and propaganda, at its core it is concerned with the Nigerian government and the inequalities pervading the country.

Similar to Boko Haram, al-Shabaab has broadened its focus, looking to prioritize a wider international religious fight and establish stronger ties with al-Qaeda and recently, ISIS. These new alignments have, however, caused a great deal of tension within the group and weakened al-Shabaab's support. A critical turning point for the group happened in 2012 when Godane, who took over through a coup, pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda (Strategic Comments; Solomon "Somalia's Al Shabaab"). In doing this, he aimed to broaden the group's goals and called for the implementation of Islamic Shar'ia law in "all continents of the world," (Solomon "Somalia's Al Shabaab"). This ideological shift brought developments in al-Shabaab's methods of attack, including the use of more IEDs and suicide bombs (African Union Peace and Security Council 2). Aligning with al-Qaeda was, however, not welcomed

by all members and has, as of recently, been challenged by other group members who wish to align with ISIS (Solomon "Somalia's Al Shabaab"). In fact, a splinter named Dini ya Kiislamu Super Power has created great tension within the al-Shabaab organization, who has refused up to this point to support ISIS (Sehmer et al 1). In fact, in 2015, al-Shabaab sent fighters into Bari to execute two of the splinter's key leaders (Sehmer et al. 1). These divisions are important, as they highlight the ideological influences that have pushed the group in different directions. Perhaps even more important, however, is that neither aligning with al-Qaeda nor ISIS was a majority decision and ultimately for the group strayed too far from their greater "nationally focused" needs (Bamidele). "Fighting for the liberation of Palestine, in other words, is far removed from those Somalis who joined al-Shabaab to fight off Ethiopians and return the Ogaden to Somali rule," writes Hussein Solomon, a professor at the University of the Free State in South Africa (Solomon "Somalia's Al Shabaab"). Therefore, as much as parts of the group have tried to internationalize al-Shabaab's focus, this has been met with a great deal of pushback and actually resulted in significantly decreased civilian support.

Foreign intervention has also played an important role in pushing some al-Shabaab members towards fighting for a greater international religious fight (Armed Conflict Location & Event Database: SOMALIA 6, 7). Continued intervention led by Kenyan, Ethiopian and American forces has contributed to a greater anti-Western sentiment and helped to shift the group's attention (Solomon "Somalia's Al Shabaab"). This issue is interconnected with the international community's continued attempt to re-establish a central government in Somalia (Pham 140, 141). Since its creation, the TFG has not been able to establish authority and is often regarded as the international community's "puppet" (Solomon "Somalia's Al Shabaab"). This internationally designed government has been at the heart of al-Shabaab's concerns and rhetoric from its inception (Hassan; Pham 134). Therefore, each time the international community attempts to prop the TFG back up, it simply fuels an anti-western sentiment which in turn strengthens al-Shabaab's message (Hassan). Further, counter-terrorism efforts concentrated on establishing one central authority in Somalia have provoked more violence by failing to recognize the country's existing political distribution of power (Pham 147). In fact, in the northern part of the country, Somaliland has become an autonomous region and to the East, Puntland has become a semi-autonomous entity (Pham 143, 144). This is critical because over time, Puntland has more strongly pushed for secession (Pham 143, 144) and such an environment has enabled various sects of al-Shabaab to expand into the north - such as the ISIS faction (Mohamed & Ibrahim). It should also be noted that at times al-Shabaab has relied significantly on funding from Somali pirates who help "smuggle weapons and perhaps even people across the Gulf of Aden," (Kriel & Duggan). This highlights the group's larger international nature – in its network and financing. Ultimately, however, al-Shabaab has remained locally concerned and relatively geographically contained.[8] It has only been more recently that the group has moved further into the center and northern part of the country.[9] The group's fairly concentrated impact, as well as its rejection of ISIS and al-Qaeda show how Somalia's interests are at the heart of al-Shabaab's goals.

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[8] Please refer to Map 2
[9] Please refer to Map 2

AQIM, of the three main groups in the region, has the most internationally focused ideology, the widest financing resources and the biggest spread of splinter groups. From the beginning, AQIM has been more international than the other two groups. It has always aimed to "strik[e] locally with a global impact," (Sehmer et al. 10). Most significantly, AQIM has splintered and established strong partnerships with other Islamist organizations in the region (Zenn). This is important, as through this it has not only helped strengthen smaller movements but has widened the group's impact and geographical reach. An example of this is the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa, which was established in 2011 (Sehmer et al. 9). Recently, the sub-affiliate Macina Liberation Front and its sub-affiliate Ansaroul Islam have expanded into central Mali, establishing outposts in the Mali/Niger border areas and in Burkina Faso (Zenn). This has allowed AQIM to indirectly gain territorial control and influence. A critical turning point came for the group in January 2017 when it became a part of Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (Zenn), a coalition between MLF, Ansar al-Din and AQIM aimed at spreading into eleven different countries in Western Africa and Europe (Zenn). The group however has had to fight for influence in the region as ISIS has taken steps to gain support from groups like Boko Haram and al-Shabaab. It is true, however, that ISIS has been relatively unsuccessful in the region and that while it "loses ground in Iraq and Syria and its regional offshoots weaken, al-Qaeda's groups are trying to capitalize on the situation," (Sehmer et al. 8). This vying for power highlights the perhaps under-acknowledged strength and presence of AQIM in Western Africa.

AQIM has not only widened its focus by developing its complex web of international partnerships but has also diversified its choice of targets and reinforced its role in illicit trade. In fact, it is this aspect of the group its wealth and, therefore, reach which make it perhaps the strongest and most connected of the three main groups in the region. From 2015 to 2016, AQIM claimed attacks in Bamako, Mali; Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, and Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire. Dario Cristiani, an adjunct professor at Vesalius College in Brussels, views this "further Africanization of the operational profile of AQIM and its affiliate [as] the result of its emerging rivalry with IS," (Sehmer et al. 10). While the group's change in targets is noteworthy, AQIM's financial network is perhaps its most important quality. AQIM is thought to be the wealthiest of the Al-Qaeda branches (David). In 2014, it had an estimated budget of $15 million (David). The group primarily makes its money through kidnappings and trafficking (Armed Conflict Location & Event Database: MALI 8; David). By developing its control and influence over the drug trade in this region, as well as expanding its reach through various affiliate and sub-affiliate groups, AQIM has become the largest threat of the three main active terrorist groups in sub-Saharan Africa.

Conclusion

Despite being portrayed as an issue touching the entire sub-continent, terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa is fairly limited to Mali, Somalia and Nigeria. AQIM, al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, respectively, are primarily responsible for the majority of the terrorist violence taking place in the region. While all three are Islamist terrorist groups and have progressively shifted their focus, they ultimately must be understood within their local contexts. Despite influence and physical support from al-Qaeda, and from ISIS for some of the splinter groups of al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, these groups are most greatly concerned with their respective national struggles and only

secondly concerned with the larger international religious fight against the West. Both Boko Haram and al-Shabaab emerged from local issues – weak governance, war, ethnic conflict and socio-economic grievances and see their actions as bettering the country in which they live and base themselves. Islamic law is seen as a means of establishing this better country and assisting the marginalized groups they feel that they represent. In many ways, it is impossible to remove these groups from the circumstances in which they were established. Poverty, ethnic conflict and weak governance alone do not explain why terrorism has emerged where it has as these conditions describe various states across the sub-continent. This therefore highlights the necessity to understand the unique local dynamic of each place, in order to understand why terrorism exists in these locations. It should however be noted that high unemployment rates (in each case higher than neighboring countries) was a common factor for all three countries discussed. This underscores the importance of socio-economic factors in the appeal, development and sustained presence of terrorist groups, in particular in this region.

While all three groups are rooted in their respective local contexts, AQIM is somewhat of an anomaly when looking at the three groups together. Due to the group's differences, it also perhaps presents the largest regional threat. As outlined earlier, AQIM's current organization cannot be understood separately from the Tuareg conflict. It was the Tuareg rebellion in 2012 which truly enabled AQIM to it establish its stronghold in the region and find a home in the northern part of Mali. Further, local grievances in the North felt in particular by the Tuareg population provided AQIM with a platform from which to recruit members. However, it is also true that AQIM has adapted its ideology overtime to fit into the wider al-Qaeda agenda. This internationalization can be seen in the group's growing affiliate network, most notably in Niger and Burkina Faso, as well as its financing and targets. AQIM has quite successfully outlived the spread and weakening of ISIS, in particular in Western Africa. This, coupled with its immense financing operation, leaves it as a growing threat in the region. Boko Haram and al-Shabaab, while having shifted to a more internationally focused ideology, remain very rooted in the political, social and economic issues which pervade their countries. This same connection cannot be found for AQIM, giving it greater flexibility in its approach, targeting and goals. This makes it unique from the other two groups and therefore the largest, most imminent threat.

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Appendix:

Three Major Groups in Sub Saharan Africa

AQIM
Boko Haram
Al Shabaab

Number killed by attack
<10
11-35
35-75
75-150
>150

Map 1: The Number of Attacks Committed by Boko Haram, al-Shabaab and AQIM from the 1970s through 2016 (Made by: Anna Cerf using data from the University of Maryland START database.)

	Nigeria	Cameroon	Somalia	Sudan	Mali	Niger
% population between 0-14 years old	42.54%	42.39%	43.15%	38.70%	48.17%	49%
% population between 15-24 years old	19.61%	19.56%	19.04%	21%	18.84%	19.10%
% population below the poverty line	62%	30%	51%	46.50%	36.10%	45.40%
Religious breakdown	50% Muslim, 40% Christian, 10% indigenous	38.4% Roman Catholic, Protestant 26.3%, 20.9% Muslim	> 99% Sunni Muslim***	Sunni Muslim, Christian minority	94.8% Muslim, 2.4% Christian	80% Muslim, Other 20%
Youth unemployment rate (15-24)	7.70%	6.40%	67% **	20%	11.10%	2.30%
Unemployment rate	23.9%-13.4%	4.30%	54% **	20.60%	8.10%	2.60%

Chart 1: Demographic and Socio-Economic Comparisons Across Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Made by the author and Anna Cerf. Unless otherwise specified, data comes from the CIA World Factbook.)

** UNHCR Somalia Report 2012
(United Nations Development Programme, "Somalia Human Development Report 2012")
*** Pew Center ("Table: Muslim Population by Country.")

Map 2: Number of Attacks in 2012, 2014 and 2016 by al-Shabaab
(Created by Anna Cerf). Maryland START database.)

Map 3: Number of Attacks in 2012, 2014 and 2016 by Boko Haram
(Created by Anna Cerf). Maryland START database.)

Map 4: Number of Attacks in 2012, 2014 and 2016 by AQIM
(Created by Anna Cerf)

Rohatyn Center for Global Affairs
Robert A. Jones '59 House
148 Hillcrest Road
Middlebury College