Please find below the slides of CNS’ Summer Undergraduate Nonproliferation Fellows’ presentations.
Evaluating Russian Strategic Nuclear Deterrence: Russian academics on nuclear-signaling, doctrinal changes, and implications for deterrence as we know it
By Finn Albright, Middlebury College
Since the Russian Federation began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there has been no shortage of conversation around Russian deterrence policy and the capabilities and limitations of deterrence in modern conflict. This research, taking inspiration from the work of past CNS Summer Fellow Emma Scherer, aims to identify Russian academics and assess their shifting opinions on Russian deterrence conduct. By comparing the path taken by the Kremlin over the past three and a half years to the views and recommendations of prominent academics over this period, this project seeks to develop an understanding of Russian nuclear policy and evaluate the role academics play in shaping it.
The WMD Trolley Problem: Examining the Ethics of US and Israeli Counterproliferation Efforts
By Ella Gincherman, Middlebury College
Recent counterproliferation efforts by Israel and the United States targeting Iran’s nuclear program have garnered tremendous attention in international discourse. Despite heavy debate over whether the status of Iran’s nuclear program warranted such urgent “pre-emptive strikes,” Israel and the United States hold the justification that such strikes were necessary considering the inherent moral impermissibility of nuclear weapons proliferation. However if such counterproliferation efforts additionally lead to loss of life and further regional instability–is such a moral justification ultimately validating immoral action? This project will look at the utilitarian justification used by Israel for their recent counterproliferation efforts in Iran, as well as at the similar moral defense used by the United States in their 2003 invasion of Iraq. These case studies will analyze the validity of moral defenses given by Israel and the United States, as well as determine whether such justifications are in accordance with international law under the UN Charter and Geneva Conventions. This research explores the tension between utilitarian and normative ethics in the current non-proliferation regime, and questions the validity of moral justifications in defense of WMD counterproliferation efforts.
An Evolving French Nuclear Debate: Mirage or Reality?
By Thomas Huckans, Williams College
Since the end of the Cold War, it has become customary that the French President delivers one major speech devoted to French nuclear deterrence. In President Emmanuel Macron’s 2020 speech on nuclear policy, he invited European allies to a dialogue “related to deterrence and the role French forces play in the continent’s security” and called for an “awakening” of Europe as an autonomous actor. Nonetheless, the speech was short on specifics, and some observers dismissed it as an attempt to revive a decades-old debate. However, five years later, the European security climate has changed radically, and Macron has responded by expanding the conceptualization of the French nuclear force, opening nuclear exercises to include allies, and signing a landmark nuclear security agreement with the UK. Therefore, the question must be asked: “How has the debate on the French arsenal’s role in European security changed, and what role has President Macron played in its evolution?”
One Man’s Trash Is Another Man’s Treasure: Siting a Permanent Repository in the U.S.
By Hannah Lee, University of Georgia
For years, U.S. legislation on spent fuel storage has faced legal battles and been widely unpopular with state constituents. Literature on the Yucca Mountain repository shows that the siting process fails when affected communities do not have confidence in site testing and research and when the federal government implements its program without state consent. Other countries face similar challenges but have sought to overcome them by developing detailed consent-based siting processes. My project seeks to identify the incentives states and local and tribal communities require to participate in the U.S.’s nuclear waste management program. I will compare the U.S.’s progress with progress in Canada, which has a similar political structure.
Japan’s Path to Nuclear Disarmament: Endorsing US No First Use Without Undermining Security
By Shota Maeda, Soka University of America
This presentation discusses how Japan can endorse a U.S. No First Use (NFU) policy without compromising its national security. Although some U.S. presidents have considered adopting this policy in the past, they have not done so, partly due to opposition from their allies, including Japan, which is concerned that the policy could undermine deterrence against China and North Korea. Such dependence on the U.S. nuclear umbrella has constrained Japan’s support for nuclear disarmament despite the country’s moral responsibility and a strong public voice calling for nuclear abolition. By endorsing NFU, Japan can take a firm step toward a reduced role of nuclear weapons. This presentation examines the benefits and favorable factors for the Japanese government to support this policy, as well as the obstacles and arguments against it. Finally, the presentation examines alternatives to the deterrence provided by the first use, such as enhanced conventional capabilities through partnerships with other countries, and measures against North Korea’s WMDs.
Dual-Use Biotechnologies: The Next Frontier of Regulation
Ananya Mulpur, Middlebury College
At the turn of the century, American scientists Craig Venter and Daniel Cohen argued that “If the 20th century was the century of physics, the 21st century will be the century of biology. While nuclear power defined scientific advance in the last century, the new biology of genome research will define the next”.
In the decades since, American national security officials have slowly begun acknowledging this truth. According to the Department of Defense, “the use of biological weapons or their proliferation by state or nonstate actors presents a significant challenge to our national security… advances in biotechnology, including synthetic biology, make it easier to develop and use biological agents as weapons” (DoD 2023). Add to this the breakneck pace of unregulated AI development, and a dangerous new recipe for illegal biological weapons proliferation emerges.
This research project highlights that unlike previously—when technological savvy, deep understandings of biology, and access to complex and expensive lab equipment were required to create and deploy devastating bioweapons—AI-supported cloud labs offer an easier way to circumvent lab access and tacit knowledge barriers. This project identifies emerging dual-use biotechnologies that pose a risk of being diverted for bioweapons proliferation, and explores how public and private sector actors ought to respond to curb this spread.
Rhetoric Without the Bomb: Proliferation Signaling in U.S. Alliances
By Ayumi Nagatomi, Harvard University
As the only nation to have experienced atomic bombings, Japan is widely believed to possess a “nuclear allergy”. Nonetheless, Japanese politicians have periodically floated the idea of acquiring nuclear weapons, despite the country’s long-standing integration into the international nonproliferation regime. Comparable rhetorical patterns are also observed in other non-nuclear states. Within the literature on alliance politics, extended deterrence, and nonproliferation, the rhetorical behaviors of non-nuclear states remain understudied. This project seeks to answer the following question: Under what conditions does proliferation signaling by non-nuclear states affect security assurances from their nuclear-armed allies? To investigate this, I conduct comparative case studies of Japan and South Korea using process tracing methods. I argue that rhetorical posturing by non-nuclear states is often not a prelude to actual proliferation, but rather a strategic tool used to influence alliance dynamics. The reactions of nuclear-armed allies—whether reassurance, pressure, or indifference—depend on their evaluation of the rhetoric’s credibility.
Always Be Casting: An estimate of Iranian Solid-Propellant Missile Production
By Carl Parkin, Franklin and Marchall College
At the outset of the Operation Rising Lion, Benjamin Netanyahu contextualized Israel’s attack as not only a response to Iran’s nuclear weapons program, but also to its significant missile capabilities, describing the threat that Iran’s missile program posed to Israel as “existential.” Later reporting by the Jerusalem Post revealed specific Israeli estimates of Iran’s missile production, indicating a rough rate of 240 missiles per month. The Post also mentioned that the estimates were contingent on the completion of a mysterious new Iranian facility. In early June, Barak Ravid at Axios published a significantly more conservative estimate of 50 ballistic missiles per month, citing a U.S. intelligence official.
This divergence is dramatic and deserves investigation. While a comprehensive picture of Iranian missile production would include their liquid-fueled missile program and is therefore difficult to paint, I’ve been able to create a methodology to estimate Iran’s rate of production for solid rocket motors, and in the process, explain possible reasons for divergence between U.S. and Israeli assessments. Additionally, I think I’ve identified which of Iran’s recent facility expansions the Israelis thought would serve as a significant boost to its production rate.
Sabotage and Safeguards: Counterproliferation Case Studies and the Erosion of Nuclear Norms
By Liam Purcell, Middlebury College
Various counterproliferation efforts, ranging from airstrikes to cyberattacks, have significantly shaped the global nuclear order over the past few decades. While these actions have achieved tactical successes in delaying or dismantling nuclear programs in states like Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Iran, they have also produced unintended strategic consequences. Through five case studies, this project evaluates how counterproliferation methods have undermined international institutions like the IAEA and the UN, eroded trust in the NPT, and shifted nuclear enforcement from rule-based, collaborative mechanisms to threat-based, unilateral ones. Although often justified on security grounds, these actions often damage the legitimacy and effectiveness of traditional nonproliferation frameworks. This research highlights a central friction in nuclear governance: the short-term appeal of counterproliferation tools vs. their long-term risks to global norms and institutional stability, a tension most recently exemplified by the joint US-Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in June.
From Osirak to Iran: The Evolution of Israeli Preemptive Strategy and Its Impact on Global Nonproliferation Norms
By Helen Shiller, Middlebury College
Since 1981, Israel has pursued a strategy of preemptive action to prevent hostile states from acquiring nuclear weapons, beginning with the bombing of Iraq’s Osirak reactor—a policy later termed the Begin Doctrine. This project traces the evolution of that doctrine through three major cases: the 1981 strike on Iraq, the 2007 strike on Syria, and Israel’s ongoing campaign against Iran from the 2010s to the present. It argues that Israel’s current approach reflects a strategic hybridization: the Begin Doctrine’s logic of existential preemption combined with the continuous, lower-intensity disruption tactics of MABAM (“Campaign Between Wars”). Drawing on rhetorical analysis, securitization theory, and international reactions, the project shows how this fusion has reshaped and eroded global nonproliferation norms through tacit international acceptance of Israel’s unilateral military action. As international responses have shifted from condemnation to quiet tolerance, Israel’s evolving doctrine raises pressing questions about the erosion of diplomatic frameworks and the long-term stability of the Middle East’s security order.
The Evolution of NATO Nuclear Hosting Narratives: Realist and Constructivist Frames in Germany and Belgium
By Kathryn Wilmot, Middlebury College
Host-state narratives surrounding NATO nuclear sharing evolved significantly after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, as elevated security concerns in Europe drove broad acceptance of the arrangement despite past opposition. Using realist and constructivist theory, this project examines how Germany and Belgium have justified their reinvigorated participation in NATO nuclear sharing. Both countries had previously considered removing U.S. nuclear weapons from their territory, with Belgium voicing normative and humanitarian arguments against the arrangement and Germany combining normative concerns with strategic skepticism. Each reaffirmed its commitment post-2022; however, they have employed distinct narratives to validate their continued involvement. Germany has solidified a realist, security-centric framing that emphasizes the importance of strategic deterrence and defense modernization, while Belgium has maintained its constructivist discourse by focusing on alliance solidarity and the symbolism of nuclear hosting. In both cases, historical arguments against nuclear sharing have informed justifications for their reaffirmed participation, demonstrating how states can use narrative framing to balance security interests, domestic pressures, and alliance politics.