Haslanger makes three central claims in this chapter:
A. She argues for a weakly gendered rationality (WGR): Some norms of rationality are weakly gendered.
B. She argues against strongly gendered rationality (SGR): All norms of rationality are strongly gendered.
C. She argues for contextually grounded rationality (CGR): Some norms of rationality are contextually grounded in a non-gendered social role that collaborates in sexual objectification.
A. Weakly Gendered Rationality
Haslanger argues for WGR as follows:
P1. Assumed Objectivity (AO) is a norm of rationality.
P2. AO is weakly gendered.
WGR. So, some norms of rationality are weakly gendered.
Premise 1: AO is a norm of rationality
Let AO denote the following conjunction of principles:
- Epistemic neutrality: take a “genuine” regularity in the behavior of something to be a consequence of its nature.
- Practical neutrality: constrain your decision making (and so your action) to accommodate things’ natures.
- Absolute aperspectivity: count observed regularities as “genuine” regularities just in case:
- the observations occur under normal circumstances (for example, by normal observers),
- the observations are not conditioned by the observer’s social position, and
- the observer has not influenced the behavior of the items under observation.
- Assumed aperspectivity: if a regularity is observed, then assume that:
- the circumstances are normal,
- the observations are not conditioned by the observers’ social position, and
- the observer has not influenced the behavior of the items under observation.
The conjunction of the first three principles—what Haslanger calls “absolute objectivity”—certainly figures in much scientific inquiry—one of our paradigmatic forms of rational activity. Consequently, absolute objectivity is a norm of rationality. Assumed aperspectivity, on the other hand, makes all observed regularities “genuine,” and thereby a consequence of its nature. That almost certainly is too strong. After all, most rational people recognize that some correlations are spurious. So, why should we actually think that AO is a norm of rationality?
Premise 2: AO is weakly gendered.
Haslanger offers a lengthier argument for this premise:
W1. A norm is weakly gendered iff it is appropriate to a gender role.
W2. A norm is appropriate to a social role iff satisfying the norm would significantly contribute to reliable success in that role.
W3. A sexual objectifier is a gender role.
W4. Satisfying AO would significantly contribute to reliable “success” in sexual objectification.
P2. So, AO is weakly gendered.
W1 and W2 are stipulated as definitions. I won’t discuss these, but do you agree or disagree with their central consequence?
A norm is weakly gendered iff satisfying the norm would significantly contribute to reliable success in a gender role.
Can you think of other senses in which norms can be “weakly gendered”? (You should ask yourself analogous questions for anything else I label as a “stipulation” or “definition.”)
Let’s turn to W3: Following MacKinnon, Haslanger defines a sexual objectifier as someone who stands in a position of eroticized dominance over others. An eroticized submissive participant is both viewed and treated as object of an objectifier’s desire, and is also viewed as for the satisfaction of the objectifier’s desire (i.e. instrumentally). Traditionally, men have been objectifiers; women have been objectified. Hence, being sexual objectifier is a gender role.
Turn now to W4: Satisfying AO would significantly contribute to one’s ability to “succeed” as an objectifier, as preexisting inequalities between objectifiers (men) and the individuals they objectify (women) will be observed, and hence treated as “genuine” or “natural.” This, of course, reinforces the power asymmetry between men and women. Indeed, since AO treats all observed regularities as consequences of the “natural” order, it will significantly contribute to the success of any beneficiary of the status quo (gendered or otherwise).
B. Against Strongly Gendered Rationality
Some feminists argue that there is something inherently gendered about purporting to be rational or objective. One of the leading arguments to this effect comes from Catharine MacKinnon. Haslanger disagrees. Her objection to MacKinnon is as follows:
P1. Assumed objectivity (AO) is a norm of rationality.
P2. A norm is strongly gendered iff it is grounded (either constitutively or contextually) in a gender role.
P3. A sexual objectifier is a gender role. (W3, above)
P4. AO is neither constitutively nor contextually grounded in sexual
~SGR. So, some norms of rationality are not strongly gendered.
We’ve already discussed P1 and P3. As with WGR, P2 is simply a stipulation. So, most of our attention should go towards P4. However, before proceeding, it’s worth noting a dialectical space that Haslanger does not explore. I’ve defined SGR in a way that renders Haslanger’s argument valid, though in the chapter, there would appear to be room for an intermediate position that she doesn’t discuss, viz.
SGR*. Some norms of rationality are strongly gendered.
The negation of this is much stronger than ~SGR, and hence much harder to establish:
~SGR*. No norms of rationality are strongly gendered.
Consequently, the fact that AO is not strongly gendered doesn’t say much against SGR*, unless AO is the most promising candidate for a strongly gendered norm of rationality. Thoughts?
Let’s go back to P4. Haslanger argues for this thusly:
S1. A norm is constitutively grounded in a social role iff satisfying the norm entails one’s participation in a particular social role.
S2. A norm is contextually grounded in a social role iff, given background conditions, satisfying that norm is or would be sufficient for functioning in that role.
S3. For all norms n, satisfying n entails participation in sexual objectification only if satisfying n entails eroticized dominance over others.
S4. Under no background conditions would satisfying AO entail eroticized dominance over others.
P4. So, AO is neither constitutively nor contextually grounded in sexual objectification.
As before S1 and S2 are stipulations. S3 follows from MacKinnon’s definition of objectification (discussed above). S4 is highly plausible, as AO says nothing about power or desire. (Indeed, it points to a weakness in Haslanger’s formulation of contextually grounded norms, for one can gerrymander background conditions so that anything entails anything else. Consequently, everything contextually grounds everything, so the concept is trivial without a more precise account of “background conditions.”)
C. Contextually Grounded Rationality
Finally, Haslanger argues that while AO is not grounded in sexual objectification, it is contextually grounded in another social role that is quite common and that enables or “collaborates” in sexual objectification.
C1. A norm is contextually grounded in a social role iff, given background conditions, satisfying that norm is or would be sufficient for functioning in that role.
C2. For all norms n, satisfying n entails participation in collaboration only if satisfying n entails treating observed regularities as consequences of a group’s nature.
C3. Under some background conditions, satisfying AO entails treating observed regularities as consequences of a group’s nature.
C4. AO is a norm of rationality.
CGR. So, some norms of rationality are contextually grounded in a non-gendered social role that collaborates in sexual objectification.
Very roughly, this collaborator has the same “projective beliefs” about women as an objectifier, but lacks either the desire and/or the power characteristic of an objectifier. Hence, women who see themselves and other women as “naturally submissive” can be collaborators.