Monthly Archives: November 2015

The Critique of Impure Reason: Foucault and the Frankfurt School

In “The Critique of Impure Reason: Foucault and the Frankfurt School,” Thomas McCarthy compares the critical philosophy of Michel Foucault and the Frankfurt School thinkers (represented in the essay by Jürgen Habermas) before tracing the evolution of Foucault’s thought. Since our principle aim in reading this essay was to get a sense of a couple of schools of ideology critique, I will focus my summary mainly on those components of the work, leaving McCarthy’s argument unchallenged. Regardless of whether his claims are true, he gives a clear concise, introduction to the goals and methods of two major strains of ideology critique. Further, there are many interesting theoretical points that I will have to leave undeveloped in this paper, in order to focus more fully on the points most pertinent to ideology critique. I invite you to explore those points in your questions and in class discussion, if they interest you.

I. A Comparison of Foucault and the Frankfurt School

 McCarthy’s main goal in this section is to show that the critical philosophy espoused by Foucault actually has a fair amount of its content in common with that of the Frankfurt thinkers. He goes on to argue, essentially, that the points at which Foucault’s critique is inadequate are those at which it diverges from Habermas’.

Both theoretical approaches follow from the Kantian tradition, but they seek to alter and radicalize it. These changes are necessitated by what McCarthy calls the “impurity” of reason—it is sociohistoricaly located, embodied, and sensuous, and cannot, therefore, be adequately assessed through the introspective methods used by Kant (437). These analyses, then, blur the distinction between theory and practice. Since reason is no longer the faculty of a universal, autonomous subject, but rather of people, in the world, it is just as intimately a part of what we do as it is of what we know. Thus, to criticize a manner of thinking is, in part, to criticize a manner of acting (438). Of course, both schools need to get create a certain distance between themselves and the practices that they take as their subjects, which they do through genetic and functional accounts of the birth of practices that we currently take for granted (439). This latter point is the beating heart of an ideology critique. Ideology critique seeks to the flaws and contingencies in the conceptual background against which we think and act. This can, as McCarthy points out, lead us to see ways in which things that we have taken for granted came into being contingently, and are used to prop up existing power structures, a realization which can lead to social change—the goal of the critiques put forth by both Foucault and the Frankfurt theorists (440).

This seems like a good point at which to put forth a question about the point of ideology critique: is the goal of the critique to make societal institutions more reasonable, in the classical sense, or to amend our concept of reason? Both Foucault and Habermas opt for the latter, while certain strains of Marxist thought (so, hardly regressive or conservative theories) have taken the former approach.

We turn now to the two major points of disagreement that McCarthy identifies between Foucault and Habermas.

A) Power

McCarthy’s claim here is that Foucault grants power ontological primacy in his critique. We are all situated, always, everywhere, and forever, in networks of power relations that shape the ways in which we think and determines what is right, as well as the ways in which we determine what is true (445-446). This claim is typical of the early writings of Foucault, and in his later career he grants more explanatory weight to individual action. The view that McCarthy attacks here is insufficient (as we will see at greater length is section II of this paper) in that it abstracts the empirical individual from the picture entirely, turning all actions into undifferentiable exercises of power, when other concepts might serve to explain them better.

B) The Subject

Continuing the theme of the previous subsection, Foucault replaces the idea of the autonomous subject with that of a holistic network of power relations (447-448). We have already, and will again evoke the problems with this line of thinking. A notable problem, that I think can be seen in modern political discourse, is that a holistic system like the one that Foucault described early in his career eliminates the possibility of individual (i.e., as an action of an autonomous subject) resistance (449). This has obvious deleterious effects for those who, like us, are interested in instituting reforms. On the other hand, in his genealogy, Foucault does not want to give an exact account of who has power, what they are thinking, their motivations, etc. Rather, he wants to trace the effects of ideas over time, showing how they calcified into our current way of doing things. This seems like a sensible way to avoid such charlatanism as The Secret Relationship. It would seem sensible, then, to do as Foucault did himself and search for a way to balance the explanatory strengths of the genealogical approach with the need to make room for choice.

(To be clear, the Frankfurt theorists leave more room for resistance by the autonomous subject—which is partly why McCarthy prefers them)

II. From ontology of power to aesthetic life

In the second half of the essay, McCarthy sketches two more moderate theories advanced by Foucault later in his career that offer potential ways out of the ontological quagmire we discussed above.

A) Power v. Domination

Under the first of these conceptions, Foucault makes a distinction between power and domination. The latter of these concepts is (somewhat confusingly) what we would ordinarily call “power;” that is, asymmetrical, irreversible societal advantages given to certain people. The former he defines as “’…strategic games between liberties’ in which ‘some people try to determine the conduct of others’” (455). The role of ideology critique is to dismantle and eliminate dominance relations—power relationships are simply a fact of social life. Our goal as critical theorists is to guarantee a level playing field. I was pretty astonished by this particular passage, not on the basis of the above distinction but because I couldn’t believe that Michel Foucault would be using game theory. Maybe that says more about my stereotypes of French critical philosophy than it does about Foucault. Of course, not all of our relations are strategic—as Habermas writes, through “communicative action,” cooperation, rather than competition, can guide our actions (456). I am with Foucault on this one—can we actually achieve this sort of mutual understanding, and, if so, who’s to say that it isn’t merely a tactic in a larger strategy? Indeed, cooperation itself can be a strategic goal.

B) The Aesthetic Life

In the final stage of his development, Foucault turned to what he calls ethics: the proper relationship with oneself (“care of the self”), which is in turn an indispensible condition for caring for others or, what is the same thing, governing (458). Foucault places this system of ethics in opposition with what he saw as the quasi-juridical form of modern morality. In this way, the care of the self is a technique for escaping from externally imposed constraints. More than that, it is a technique for living a life that is beautiful, a work of art in itself (463). It is hard to say if we are still in the confines of an ideology critique at this point. There does seem to be a work of demystification and emancipation involved in the care of the self, but it is completely individualistic—each of us, in our autonomy, finds a way to live well in our given sociohistorical context. This self-construction is limited, nevertheless, by concerns of justice. In caring for ourselves, we cannot prevent others from doing the same. It does not seem like this needs to reach the same level of formality as Kant’s categorical imperative—a virtue ethical notion would be sufficient.

(I have not had time to really develop Habermas’ points in this paper, so I would encourage you to ask questions about it, if you have them.)

In following the course of Foucault’s development, I was reminded of a passage of “Self-Reliance,” in which Emerson writes, “All men plume themselves on the improvement of society, and no man improves” (82 in the Houghton, Mifflin edition of Essays: First Series). Most pertinently to the discussion at hand, what good are just institutions and concepts if the people using them are immoral? What is the role of self-improvement in societal reform? Or, from the other side, can one live an aesthetic life without an understanding of the sociohistorical moment? Is an ideology critique an essential stage on the road to self-actualization?

Haslanger (p. 365-405), “Social Kinds: Semantics and Philosophical Analysis”

INTRODUCTION

Haslanger begins this chapter by restating her social constructionist view of gender and race. Plainly, she summarizes:​

“I believe that races and genders are real categories to be defined in terms of social positions. I have come to this conclusion by considering what categories we should employ in the quest for social justice” (365)

These social positions are characterized by “interconnected systems of privilege and subordination” that are generated based on assumptions regarding one’s physical makeup, color, and ancestry.

Haslanger’s “quest for social justice” aims to combat these “systems” by explaining the phenomena of race and gender in terms of language and concepts that help achieve this justice. Haslanger’s ultimate goal is to establish a world void of categorizations of race and gender through this commitment to justice.

Haslanger offers the important clarification that her goal “is not to capture the ordinary meanings of ‘race’ or ‘man’ or ‘woman’, nor is it to capture our ordinary race and gender concepts. I’ve cast my inquiry as an analytical—or what I here call an ameliorative—project that seeks to identify what legitimate purposes we might have (if any) in categorizing people on the basis of race or gender, and to develop concepts that would help us achieve these ends” (366). Essentially, Haslanger isn’t concerned with offering normative conceptions of race and gender, but rather classifications of the two that will move us toward justice in both the “theoretical” and “political” realms.

Haslanger’s overarching purpose in this chapter is to unpack the semantics that inform our perceptions of “socially and politically meaningful concepts” (366). Haslanger wants to figure out exactly what is at stake when one embarks on a philosophical analysis of a concept or concepts.

FORMS OF CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

Haslanger sketches the three main pathways of conceptual analysis or, put specifically, how to answer the question: “What is X?”

  • Conceptual – What is our concept of X? Utilizes a priori methods (i.e. introspection, intuition, etc.) to deliver an answer
  • Descriptive – What kinds does X track or refer to? Does the concept of X characterize a natural kind? Relies on empirical or quasi-empirical methods
  • Ameliorative – What is the purpose of the concept of X? Can the concept of X be improved or supplemented in order to better serve its purpose? Is the purpose of the concept of X good and accurate?

In addition to these 3 core approaches, Haslanger offers an additional one:

  • Genealogy – How is the concept of X embedded in social practices?

The genealogical approach to conceptual analysis illuminates two important points. Firstly, our concepts and social practices are significantly interconnected, as our concepts describe and form our social practices, which then evolve and retroactively mold our concepts. Secondly, a large gap between the socially dominant concept and its intended practice often exists, as “developments on one side can get ahead of or stubbornly resist the other” (368).

To help us perceive the different forms of conceptual analysis, Haslanger extends the example of the notion of being deemed tardy within school districts. Essentially, Haslanger shows that there is a complex web of rules and considerations surrounding what it exactly means to be tardy. Haslanger specifies:

“For example, one morning when we were running especially late, my son Isaac reassured me by saying, “Don’t worry Mom, no one is ever tardy on Wednesdays because my teacher doesn’t turn in the attendance sheet on Wednesday until after the first period” (368).

Within this example, Haslanger reveals the disconnect between the local concept of tardy and its institutional meaning – “tardy” on Wednesdays in Isaac’s specific class (local) seems to be defined as arriving after the attendance sheet is turned, whereas the greater school district (institutional) would distinctly define “tardy” as showing up to school after the 8:25am bell. To say that either conception of tardy is the real or true meaning of the concept is to privilege one side, and this is not Haslanger’s goal. Haslanger’s goal is simply to show that our concept of “tardiness” is embedded differently within various social practices and contexts.

Haslanger’s discussion of the contrast in conceptual meanings between local and institutional contexts gives her room to relay “several different axes (contexts) of comparison that might be relevant” (369):

  • institutional uses v. “local” uses
  • public uses v. more idiosyncratic individual uses
  • what is explicit v. what is implicit in the minds of users
  • what is thought (what we take ourselves to be doing with the concept) v. what 
is practiced (what we’re actually doing with it)
  • appropriate v. inappropriate uses.

Haslanger then draws a distinction between the manifest concept and the operative concept. The manifest concept is the “more explicit, public, and ‘intuitive’ one,” classified by the “institutional” use above. The operative concept, on the other hand, is the “more implicit, hidden, and yet practiced one,” or the “local” concept as mentioned previously (370).

FORMS OF GENEALOGY

Haslanger continues her discussion by offering that when conducting conceptual analysis, it is possible to guide or “modify” the three basic approaches with regard to genealogy (371).

Conceptual genealogy – A conceptual genealogy of “tardiness” would require input from English speakers situated in a diverse range of contexts over the course of the concepts history. Important question are: “What are the range of meanings? Whose meanings are dominant and why?” (372)

Ameliorative genealogy – An ameliorative genealogy of “tardiness” would seek to evaluate the purpose of the concept of “tardiness” as it refers to certain social practices that have become structured and varied over time. This analysis would also seek to improve the concept to better fulfill its purpose.

However, Haslanger is most concerned with the idea of descriptive genealogy.

Descriptive genealogy – “explores how a term functions in our evolving practices and manages to pick things out” (375). A descriptive genealogy of “tardiness” would begin by considering a paradigm example of tardiness, like the one Haslanger offers above about her son. The aim is to give an account of what type of social kind such a paradigm falls under. Essentially, the goal is to decipher the interplay between the paradigm case and our continually constructed and reconstructed perception of the meaning of “tardiness.”

Haslanger also includes a quick discussion of semantic externalism and how it relates to her genealogical approach to analyzing concepts. Before drawing the connection, she summarizes three main types of externalism.

Natural kind externalism – A kind which has its meaning determined by adherence or reference to a paradigm, “together with an implicit extension to ‘things of the same kind’” (374)

Social externalism – The meaning or concept attached to a term used by somebody is characterized at least partially by the normative usage and practice of the term in his or her local context

These two conceptions of externalism gave rise to a new type of analysis: objective type externalism.

Objective type externalism – terms or concepts point to an objective type, regardless of whether or not we can explicate the shared “essences” of this type, when these terms or concepts have their meanings determined by adherence to a paradigm which joins them “by virtue of the degree of unity among its members beyond a random or gerrymandered set” (374).

So how is this all connected? In short, a descriptive genealogy aims to elucidate the operative (local, implicit, practiced) concept, whereas a conceptual genealogy reveals the manifest (institutional, widely-recognized, explicit) concept. Haslanger is concerned with instances in which the operative and manifest concepts coincide, as we know exactly what we are talking about in these instances. Rather, Haslanger is interested in exploring situations in which our operative and manifests concept do not align, in other words, instances in which the widely-accepted and recognized meaning of a concept is not reflected accurately in our local practice of that concept.

DESCRIPTIVE GENEALOGIES OF RACE AND GENDER

Although I relayed the various approaches to conceptual analysis in my own words earlier, here is a table of the different approaches as defined by Haslanger (376):

Conceptual analyses elucidate “our” (manifest) concept of F-ness by exploring what “we” take F-ness to be.
Conceptual genealogy: elucidate the variety of understandings and uses of F-ness over time and across individuals differently positioned with respect to practices that employ the notion.

Descriptive analyses elucidate the empirical kinds (the operative concept) into which “our” paradigm cases of F-ness fall.
Descriptive naturalism: elucidate, where possible, the natural (chemical, biological, neurological) kinds that capture “our” paradigm cases of F-ness.
Descriptive genealogy: elucidate the social matrix (history, practices, power relations) within which “we” discriminate between things that are F and those that aren’t.

Ameliorative analyses elucidate “our” legitimate purposes and what concept of F-ness (if any) would serve them best (the target concept). Normative input is needed.

Haslanger notes that we recognize areas for improvement within our concepts when “manifest, operative, and target concepts” come apart (376). Ignorance and ideology can create divisions amongst what we are considering, what we think we’re talking about, and what kinds we think the concept in question tracks. Haslanger is most interested in cases in which our assumptions about what is natural cause us to mishandle discussions regarding certain concepts. Haslanger defends the philosopher’s goal of “talking about what we should be talking about, and being fully aware of what that is” (377). Ultimately, through her discussion of these different approaches, Haslanger wishes to offer modes of analysis that reveal the “complex forces and structures of social life” that create our manifest concepts of race and gender while simultaneously perpetuating a system of injustice (379).

INTRODUCTION

In Chapter 14 Haslanger initially sets out to consider the debate between constructionists and error theorists with regard to the philosophical analysis of the concept of race.

Error Theorist Position
1. The human species can be divided into small groups of races based on essential, heritable characteristics (racial essences) that unify a group while setting them apart from others. Visibly, these include skin color, hair type, physical features, etc.
2. Races are groups with these “common inherited racial essence” (383)
3. There are no such racial essences
4. There are no races; race does not exist

Appiah contends that there exists a similar idea of racial identity that can accurately be appropriated to people because it is simply a chosen label with which a person identifies (383).

Social Constructionist Position
1. Races are racialized groups
2. A group is racialized “if and only if its members are socially positioned as subordinate or privileged along some dimension—economic, political, legal, social, etc.—(in that context), and the group is “marked” as a target for this treatment by observed or imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence of ancestral links to a certain geographical region” (384)

Three questions arise from this discussion and distinction between the two positions:
1. The social constructionist position seems unable to capture what people “have in mind” when they talk about race. Is this troublesome?
2. Does the social constructionist approach make sense for analysis?
3. What are the offshoots of clarifying our concept of race in one way or the other?

KINDS OF ANALYSIS

In this section Haslanger reiterates the different forms of conceptual analysis I detailed earlier within the summary. Again, these different approaches are conceptual (which she renames the internalist approach due to its usage of a priori methods for answer), descriptive, and ameliorative. Amidst the many different inquiries surrounding the classification of “race,” Haslanger is not concerned with nailing down one, normative conception of what race really is. Rather, Haslanger hopes that the concept that we take ourselves to be using, the concept that best classifies the type we are investigating, and the type we should be investigating all align within our analysis (387).

MANIFEST AND OPERATIVE CONCEPTS

Manifest concept – the concept one believes they are applying or attempting to apply to a particular case
Operative concept – the concept that best characterizes the distinction in practice
Target concept – the ideal concept that one should be employing

As mentioned before, we are using our concept correctly when the manifest concept falls in line with our practices. Any gaps amongst the manifest, operative, and target concepts signals a necessary revision of the concepts in relation to the case in question.

To illustrate a situation in which gaps arise amongst our concepts, Haslanger offers the example of “Parent-Teacher Conferences” (389). The manifest concept of the term “parent” is that of a biological mother or father. However, in the context of Parent-Teacher Conferences, “Parent” is meant to be synonymous with the child’s main caretaker. Haslanger offers that a girl named Tara had her grandmother show up for the conferences, as the grandmother was her primary guardian. Tara’s grandmother does not fit the manifest concept of “parent,” as she is not Tara’s biological mother, but the grandmother does satisfy the operative concept of “parent” within the context of school and Parent-Teacher Conferences.

Philosophical inquiry helps us to avoid these gaps amongst our concepts because it “helps us develop more detailed, explicit, and adequate conceptions of our concepts” (391).

Sticking with the “parent” example in terms of Parent-Teacher Conferences, Haslanger details the various approaches we could take to help our manifest concept of “parent” align correctly with our social practices.

  1. Descriptivist Approach – Replace the manifest concept of parent with the operative one by replacing “parent” with “primary caregiver.” This appropriate terminology will allow the new manifest concept to match up with our practices.
  2. Ameliorative Approach – Rethink and retool the concept of “parent” and devise a concept of the term that best suits our purposes and practices
  3. Conceptualist Approach – the gaps between “parent” and “primary caregiver” are meaningless because we are engaging in a futile attempt to align two completely different concepts. The best we can do is invent and employ a new concept altogether.

However, consider how the term “parent” has changed and evolved over time as the dynamics of family life have shifted. What is involved in this evolution of the term? Haslanger offers two ways of considering what might be at stake when a concept evolves alongside a changing social context. Firstly, the term “parent” may simply express an entirely different concept than it did in the past, thus, the change is semantic. Alternatively, the concept of “parent” may remain static while the features that characterize the concept have changed, in other words, our understanding of the concept has changed (394).

Knowledge, Human Interests, and Objectivity in Feminist Epistemology

In this paper, Anderson aims to show that

  • The seeming competition between normative values and evidential values in science is unwarranted.
  • Simply justifying a theory based on evidential truth is not enough; we need a justice model that could bring in the “whole truth.”
  • We should integrate some specific feminist normative value—ontological heterogeneity and complexity of relationship—to all stages of science including discovery, justification, application, and critique of science.
  • Such interaction between normative and evidential value would result in a new phase of science where we apply dual justification for theory choice—significance and truth—instead of a single justification based on truth, as Haack argues. This new phase of science with dual justification, Anderson argues, offers a proper model of objectivity.

A. Longino’s argument for taking values into consideration in science:

Definitions:

Contextual Values:

  • “Political, moral and other values taken from the social context in which science is practiced.” (28)
  • External to science

Epistemic or Cognitive Values:

  • Values that are internal to science, and do not have explicit political or moral content. (29)
  • e.g. “accuracy, consistency, fruitfulness, breadth of scope,and simplicity” (29)

Underdetermination:

  • A situation in which “hypotheses are logically underdetermined by the data cited in their support” (28). So when two sets of hypotheses are equal in logically explaining the datas, our theory choice is underdetermined.
  • Underdetermination happens, such as the dispute between Einsteinian and Newtonian science, and between classical and marginal utility theory in economics (29).

Longino’s argument:

P1 If underdetermination happens in scientific theory choosing, then we resort to background assumptions to justify a certain hypothesis in science. (28)

P2 Underdetermination happens in scientific theory choosing. (28)

C1 We resort to background assumption to justify a certain hypothesis in science.

P3 Values are embedded in background assumptions.

P4 If we resort to background assumptions to justify a certain hypothesis in science, and values are embedded in background assumptions, then values play a role in science. (29)

C Values play a role in science.

“When the data run out, values legitimately step in to take up the “slack” between observation and theory” (29).

Some scientists are willing to accept Longino’s argument, but they only permit epistemic or cognitive values and refuse to consider contextual ones as important to science (29).

Longino’s response to that: the binary between epistemic and contextual interests break down when we focus attention on the grounds for supporting our theories, “we see that epistemic, metaphysical and practical interests” all contribute into the play (30). She especially focuses on practical interests, because she thinks that we all have practical interests in predicting and controlling phenomena (30).

My question about this: Longino goes on to distinguish the contemporary quantitative vs. the Aristotelian qualitative approach to characteristics of objects of study, and claims that the former represents a practical interest in predicting and controlling phenomena, and the latter represents a practical interest in self-understanding and successful communication. For me, Longino creates this practical interest language and puts both approaches in terms of this language, and then claims that every approach has a practical interest. I’m to some extent sympathetic to her, but language creating game still looks like cheating to me, since this argument is very similar to people’s reasons about how everything is political—once we create a political language, then everything is political, even apolitical becomes a political stance.

Now Longino can say that practical interests, which are highly connected with political and moral values, play a role in science. She then defines two specific feminist theoretical virtues that are representative of the contextual values we need to take into consideration:

  • Ontological Heterogeneity: “a preference for ‘splitting’ over ‘lumping’—for emphasizing the qualitative diversity and individuality of subjects of study and the distinctions among properties commonly classified together” (30)
  • Complexity of Relationship: “a preference for dynamic, interactive causal models that emphasize multiple causes of phenomena over single-factor linear or reductionist models” (31)

Longino further argues that if anything, taking political and moral values into consideration would only strengthen the conception of objectivity in science because our new values make inquirers accountable to others’ observations and criticisms while maintaining the empiricist adequacy standard of the theory. (32)

My question about this: as we advocate for the need to take heterogeneity and complexity into consideration, will these values become the new epistemic (constitutive) values in science over time? In that case, will they acquire a position of power that would supposedly obscure other values?

B. Haack’s Critique of Politically Value-Laden Science

Basically, Haack believes that values and evidences are competitive to each other. “Either theory choice is guided by the facts, by observation and evidence, or it is guided by moral values and social influences, construed as wishes, desires or social-political demands” (33). Therefore, she thinks that politically value-laden science is dangerous and dishonest because it lets value totalize theory choice.

Haack’s argument:

  1. Significant truth is the sole aim of theoretical inquiry.
  2. Whether a theory is justified depends only on features indicative of its truth, not its significance.
  3. One shows that a theory is (most probably) true by showing that it is (best) supported by the evidence.
  4. A theoretical proposition is supported by the evidence only if there is some valid inference from the evidence (in conjunction with background information) to it.
  5. Value judgements take the form “P ought to be the case.”
  6. There is no valid inference from “P ought to be the case” to “P is the case” (or any other factual truths).
  7. There is no valid inference fro value judgements to factual truths (5,6).
  8. Value judgements can provide no evidential support for theories (4,7).
  9. Value judgements can play no role in indicating the truth of theories (3,8).
  10. Value judgements can play no role in justifying theories (1,2,9).

C. Anderson’s Defense of a Longinoian Value-Laden Theory against Haack’s Critique

Anderson starts by recognizing that before her, critiques of Haack’s argument have been taking issues with premise (6), claiming that Haack’s argument “covertly relies on a background metaphysical assumption that the universe is not governed by teleological laws” and that “ought” might be interpreted as “can” which implies capabilities (34).

However, Anderson believes that a stronger criticism of Haack’s argument could be achieved by poking holes at premises (1) and (2). She claims that the justification of a theory depends on both its truth and significance. Moreover, she argues that not all values are totalitarian values that conflict with truth-seeking. Feminists only try to incorporate important moral and political values that would not interfere with evidential truth and would function as a second axis of theory justification. Haack’s worry about dishonesty would not happen because dishonesty is simply not an important moral value.

My question would be: so then do we get to choose what moral and political values are important? So who do “we” represent? Will these values be universal? Anderson clearly has heterogeneity and complexity in mind because they offer the most potentials (as we’ll see in a second), but I’m also wary of the tremendous authority that “we” claim to have. Thoughts?

D. Anderson on How Values Play a Role in Justification of Science

Anderson starts by noting that many scientists are willing to concede that values play a role in discovery and application of science, but refuse to admit that values influence the justification of science. Anderson then shows that values are important in justification of science for two reasons: first, a true theory might well be biased, so we need a justice model to ensure impartiality; second, contextual values in scientific inquiry guide theoretical classification, so we justify a theory by choosing a theoretical classification that corresponds with our contextual values.

I. Justice and Justification

Anderson distinguishes between telling some truth and telling the “whole” truth, and argues that a theory that tells some truth satisfies the truth criteria but can still easily be biased or distorted because it is not telling the “whole” truth. We need to incorporate the value of justice into standards of theory choice to ensure impartiality. (Example of the Jewish Slave Owner) (37-38)

Anderson further distinguishes between impartiality with value-neutrality. She claims that value-neutrality is not desired because it might present every small fact about the phenomenon in question and “bury the significant truths in a mass of irrelevant and trivial details” (39). On the other hand, impartiality makes sure that we present the evidence according to the goals and context of our theoretical inquiry. The whole truth under impartial lens “consists of a representative enough sample of such truths that the addition of the rest would not make the answer turn out differently” (40).

Question: This is sort of vague, how do we make sure that the truth in front of us is indeed the whole truth? Maybe we need to be fallibilistic?

II. Contextual Values Guide Theoretical Classification

Anderson argues that we classify our objects of scientific study differently according to our contextual values in our theoretical inquiry, in turn, we choose the theory that uses the specific theoretical classification related to our contextual values.

She gives an example about medicine: We classify organisms based on whether they cause disease in human or not. This classification is tremendously connected to our interest in human health.

She gives another example about gender test: The Terman-Miles M-F test only allows two options “masculine” and “feminine,” which reveals a gender binary value at the background. In contrast, the BSRI test does that more open choices: besides male and female, it has androgyny and gender undifferentiated as choices. The classification in BSRI test reveals a value for heterogeneity.

These examples show that the specific contextual values that we adhere to influence drastically our theoretical classification. If we subscribe to feminist virtues, every step in science will look differently.

Small question for this section: at some point she talks about pure vs. applied science, and blurs the line between them. I’m wondering if pure science is really illusory though. As a math major who hangs out with pure math, I am kind of reluctant to think that all math inquiries are interest-laden. It’s just fun!

E. What The Two Feminist Theoretical Virtues Can Do in Science?

Anderson recognizes that the two virtues: Ontological Heterogeneity and Complexity in Relationship are clearly feminist but are not exclusively feminist because other disciplines share these virtues also. These virtues would drastically change how we approach science from classification to method, and allow us to criticize science in a powerful way.

First of all, these virtues provide us concrete standards of good science, to name a few:

1. “[H]eterogeneity and complexity represent a desirability of human flexibility, autonomy, and creativity…[B]ecause these are valuable potentialities, it is important that our conceptual schemes be able to represent us as having them, if indeed we do” (50). In other words, it is important that we leave room for potentialities in our conceptual scheme (for example, classification) in case that empirical facts fill the gap.

2. The virtues of heterogeneity and complexity require a more qualitative research method that values open-ended, face-to-face interviews rather than a restrictive and distanced one. (51)

Secondly, the above-mentioned standards of good science allow us to criticize science in a more powerful way. If a certain scientific theory does not match the above standards, we can push for a more significant revision.

F. Conclusion

In short, Anderson argues for taking value into consideration in science, and specifically provides two feminist virtues as candidates of important moral and political value that science needs to incorporate. She envisions a revision of scientific justification which requires dual standards—significance and truth.

Race: Normative, Not Metaphysical or Semantic

“The semantic strategy makes discussions over the correct account of race hostage to issues in the philosophy of language and metaphysics about which there is little agreement.” (p. 548)

 

With his article, ‘Race’: Normative, Not Metaphysical or Semantic, Ron Mallon makes the case that the dominating philosophical conversations concerning race have been limited in their fruitfulness by the involvement of the semantic strategy. While the semantic strategy “seems to offer an avenue by which to settle disputes between skeptics, naturalists, and constructionists,” Mallon argues that it is ultimately “obfuscating and ineffective.” By his account, the semantic strategy is problematic because it creates the illusion that there is great metaphysical disagreement amongst the primary approaches to understanding race when in fact the positions of skepticism, constructionism, and naturalism agree on many metaphysical points. Furthermore, the acceptance of the semantic strategy impedes the ability of our philosophical inquiry to “resolve the question of how we ought to use ‘race’ talk.” Mallon goes about his criticism of the semantic strategy and endorsement of a normative one by first illuminating the defining premises of each primary approach to race theory so as to make clear the extent of their shared metaphysical foundations. Having accomplished this he goes on to argue why metaphysical and semantic concerns should take a back seat if we are to succeed in arriving at a useful conclusion regarding the manner in which we ought to treat race and race talk.

 

Mallon first establishes the arguments of the semantic strategy:

  1. “First, there is the metaphysical assumption that the world has such and such metaphysical features”
  2. “Then, there is the semantic assumption that some or another particular theory of reference is correct for racial terms or concepts”
  3. “Finally, it is concluded that racial terms or concepts appropriately refer (or fail to refer) to some or other metaphysical features of the world.” (p. 527)

 

He then identifies the three conclusions that he will argue for:

  1. That much of the apparent metaphysical disagreement over race is an illusion. “Skeptics, constructionists, and naturalists share a broad base of agreement regarding the metaphysical facts surrounding racial or racialized phenomena that suggests their views are complementary parts of a complex view incorporating biological, social, and psychological facts.”
  2. That the illusion of metaphysical disagreement is “sustained by the use of the semantic strategy” – specifically by “different assumptions about the appropriate theory of reference for race terms or concepts.”
  3. That the semantic strategy is problematic, and that race theory “ought not to rely on finding the correct theory of reference to determine the appropriate use of ‘race’ talk.” (527-528)

 

Having done this he then presents the structure of his remaining project:

  1. Discuss racialism, the “widely rejected view that there are racial essences.”
  2. Discuss Racial Skepticism
  • Discuss Racial Constructionism
  1. Discuss Racial Population Naturalism
  2. Argue for and sketch out the broad basis of agreement that these views share, which make them “compatible parts of a single metaphysical picture of racialized phenomena.”
  3. Argue that the semantic strategy should be abandoned in race theory and replaced by “a complex evaluation of a host of practical, normative considerations.” (528)

 

The Ontological Consensus

This is the term that Mallon uses to describe the shared assumption of all the theories he is examining that racial essences do not exist. The belief in racial essences and in race existing as a natural kind is referred to as racialism and its rejection is “nearly universal among academic racial theorists.” While he notes that there is disagreement about whether racial classifications might be useful, “there is widespread agreement that races to not share such biobehavioral essences.”

Mallon’s example of a potential case in which racial classifications could be useful is in “medical diagnosis.” We discussed this possibility in our last class. Can we think of other cases in which racial classifications could be useful? Can we get rid of ‘race’ while still recognizing medical tendencies that we currently describe as existing along racial lines?

Racial Skepticism

Racial Skepticism holds that the Ontological Consensus that racial essences do not exist entails the further conclusion that race does not exist. This conclusion is based on the argument that because racial essences don’t exist, ‘race’ fails to refer. The two dominant philosophical traditions of understanding reference are:

  • Ideational account
  • Referential account

The ideational account groups together descriptivist theories of reference, which hold that:

  1. A term or concept is associated with a description
  2. The term of concept refers to the unique thing that satisfies the elements of the description
  3. If no unique thing satisfies the elements of the description, then the term or concept does not refer.

Descriptivist theories are now believed by many to be mistaken. The alternative is a causal-historical theory (referential account):

  1. A kind term is introduced to pick out some unified kind of thing.
  2. If the term successfully picks out a kind when introduced, it continues to pick out that same kind as the term is passed on to others (regardless of whether or not the thing satisfies the description associated with the term.)
  3. If there is no single kind of thing successfully picked out by the term, then the term does not refer.

In this case, causal-historical theories “refer in virtue of a causal-historical link between the original use of the term to identify a kind and later uses.” (531) This opens the possibility that “racial terms might refer to something other than a biological essence, even if people once believed races were characterized by biological essences.” (532)

 

What should serve as the referents of racial terms and concepts, if this is correct?

  • Biological populations

Such biological populations are critically dependent on reproductive isolation.

 

Is reproductive isolation a satisfactory way to define biological populations? Do we think that such isolation exists or has existed? What degree of isolation is sufficient in order for us to identify a biological population? (Zack insists that the isolation must be absolutely complete.)

 

Mismatch arguments:

A mismatch argument holds that a true extension of a term or concept would be very different from what is expected about the extension.

If we accept that reproductive isolation constitutes biological populations, but such reproductive isolation does not exist among what we ordinarily identify as racial groups, then these groups would not count as races. However other communities (Amish) might satisfy the condition and thus should be considered races.

In addition to such an extensional mismatch, there is also an argument of import mismatch. This claims that ordinary use of racial terms “implies the social and psychological importance” of the group picked out and that there is no reason to expect biological populations to carry this sort of importance.

The essential point is that there is a mismatch between what “ordinary users expect out of racial concepts and what they get.”(533)

 

Racial Constructionism

Constructionists typically worry that racial skepticism neglects to incorporate certain things that are causally or socially important. Mallon also notes that racial skepticism in the hands of political conservatives can be used in supporting an agenda that prevents racial justice.

This is a very interesting notion. Does racial skepticism present a way to seemingly engage in thoughtful race discourse, while really avoiding getting one’s hands dirty so to speak? Does racial skepticism offer the privileged white male, for example, a tidy way to avoid the guilt or burden or his privilege so that he might continue enjoying it?

 

Mallon discusses three sorts of constructionism:

  1. Thin constructionism (Mills)
  2. Interactive kind constructionism (Hacking)
  3. Institutional constructionism (Root)

 

Which of these do we think offers the best account of the way in which race might be socially constructed? How would a constructionist best respond to the semantic strategy employed by racial skeptics?

Mallon notes the response of Paul Taylor, that racial descriptions “associated with racial terms may be satisfied by the objects produced by the causal interaction of persons and racial labels.” (537) Mallon provides a quote that nicely sums this up:

“Why cant we just say that the processes of racial identification and ascription bring races into being?” (quoting Taylor, pg. 537)

 

Racial Population Naturalism

Theorists who support this account of race hold that “from the fact that there are no racial essences, it does not follow that race is not a natural kind.” The main claim of the sort of population naturalism that Mallon examines is that “races may be biological populations characterized by at least some important degree of reproductive isolation.” (538)

 

This position defends a certain possibility, but not without due consideration that it is not at all clear if any contemporary population exhibits “the appropriate reproductive isolation” that is demanded by the theory.

 

What do we deem appropriate reproductive isolation, and what must be its evolutionary significance?

 

Andreasen’s model is more tightly constrained by evolutionary significance, and thus less hopeful for application in the contemporary setting. As Mallon describes, Andreasen thinks human races once existed, but she “is agnostic” about whether or not they still do. Kitcher on the other hand, permits that races might exist as populations that exist in reproductive isolation only in the present. Because Kitcher does not bind himself to evolutionary relevance, or duration of time during which a population must be reproductively isolated, he “is far more optimistic that contemporary racial groups comprise biological populations.” (540)

 

Mallon posits that the dispute between racial skeptics and population naturalists is best understood as “a dispute over whether whatever human populations there were or are should be labeled by ‘race’ talk.” (543) Thus the dispute seems to be a semantic issue.

The strength or weakness of these population naturalist positions aside, did anyone else find it slightly uncomfortable to be considering human races with the same mechanisms used to describe animal species? As Mallon warns at the start of this section, there is a history of the premise of a biological basis of race being employed in arguments that have served to create or preserve oppressive social practices. Does this history present any obstacle to one who wishes to argue for the legitimacy of racial population naturalism?

 

Expanding the Ontological Consensus

In this section Mallon divorces the metaphysical facts from questions about ‘race’ talk in order to make clear the wide agreement amongst the race theories at hand. He draws up quite the laundry list of common positions. Do you agree that there is clear agreement on all 8 of the points he lists?

 

Mallon goes on to insist that if this metaphysical agreement is correct, disputes between constructionists, naturalists, and skeptics should be seen not as primarily metaphysical but primarily semantic. This finally leads Mallon to his ultimate conclusion, that the semantic strategy should be abandoned in race theory if we are to make progress in understanding the way we do and the way we ought to engage in ‘race’ talk. It seems Mallon is of the opinion that the use of the semantic strategy has created a confusing commotion and a stage of philosophical race discussion in which there is much ado about nothing. By removing the semantic strategy and putting metaphysical concerns on the back burner, instead approaching the issue of race and ‘race’ talk from a practical, normative position, we create an environment in which these important discussions are more likely to be fruitful.

 

Mallon concludes with a refrain that by this point is familiar: metaphysical and semantic concerns are both best left behind. Instead, one ought “to acknowledge the widespread metaphysical agreement and ask, with Sally Haslanger, what do we want our racial concepts, terms, and practices to do?” (551)

 

How might we answer this final concluding query? What do we want our racial concepts, terms, and practices to do?

 

Other questions to consider:

What if any are the points of metaphysical disagreement amongst naturalists, constructionists, and skeptics?

 

Much is made of “reproductive isolation.” Should reproductive isolation be treated as an “all or nothing” affair, or should it be permitting of degrees as Kitcher suggests?

 

Do we agree that our philosophical interests are best served by adopting a normative approach to theory of race and ‘race’ talk?