Inside African Politics

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For Eve
—P. E.

For Barrow and Strummer
—K. D.

7

The Shifting Landscape of Conflict and Security

THERE IS A COMMON PERCEPTION THAT AFRICA IS RIFE WITH VIOLENCE and insecurity. While it is true that Africa is not short on armed conflict, it would be a mistake to overgeneralize. For every war-torn country like the Democratic Republic of Congo, there are stable, peaceful countries like Botswana and Tanzania. Even in the DRC, the vast majority of the country is at relative peace and was for most of the years of conflict. Moreover, some countries that were once at war have recovered superbly, like Mozambique. Nevertheless, it is true that political violence is a problem in several parts of Africa. It is also true that once-peaceful countries have been wrecked by political violence, like Côte d'Ivoire. It is thus essential to understand the nature, patterns, and causes of African conflicts, and what liabilities might expose some countries to violent decay.

More than seventy wars have been fought in Africa since the early 1980s. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, sixteen of Africa's fifty-four countries were affected by armed conflict. The average length of African conflicts is twenty-two years, with a median duration of seventeen years (Huggins and Clover 2005:1).[1] Across the continent, armed conflict has heightened insecurity and promoted the militarization of the state, which has often come at great social cost. As of 2006, Eritrea spent 6.3 percent of its GDP on the military, the highest in Africa and ninth in the world, while spending only 1.8 percent on health (CIA 2013). From 2005 to 2010, Angola spent about twice as much of its booming GDP on defense as on health, and Chad three times as much.[2] Some have argued that conflict is among the most important factors in accounting for Africa's economic performance (Bloom, Sachs, and Collier 1998; Addison, le Billon, and Murshed 2001).

What explains the outbreak of conflict in contemporary Africa? How has the nature of armed conflict changed since African independence? What are the different types of conflicts that have affected Africa? What are the

main reasons Africans go to war, and what mechanisms have been developed for conflict resolution and postconflict justice? We explore these questions here. We review the different types of conflict and their evolution over time, survey theories about their onset, and end with a discussion of broader concepts of security in Africa.

A Typology of African Conflicts

National Liberation Wars

Although most of the continent reached independence peacefully, a few of its colonized societies waged war against colonial and white minority rule. The most significant liberation wars were the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya in the 1950s; the wars in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau/Cape Verde against the Portuguese from 1960 to the mid-1970s; the Rhodesian/Zimbabwean war (1965–1980); and the antiapartheid struggle in South Africa, whose violent phase extended from the mid-1960s to 1990.

Many scholars do not regard the Mau Mau uprising as a war of national liberation due to the internecine nature of the violence. The uprising (or "Kenya Emergency," as it was also called at the time) took place from 1952 to 1960. According to some participants, the insurgents never referred to themselves as Mau Mau, but as the Kenya Land and Freedom Army. Predominantly made up of dispossessed Kikuyu, the insurgents operated in the forest areas of the Central Province and in the foothills around Mount Kenya, attacking police stations and government offices, as well as the occasional settler farms. The size of the insurgency remains unclear, but the fighting resulted in over 10,000 African fatalities and the death of thirty-two white settlers. While militarily unsuccessful, the conflict set the stage for Kenyan independence in 1963 by furthering the divisions between the British Home Office and the white settlers in Kenya. London ultimately came to accept moderate African nationalists, such as Jomo Kenyatta, who became independent Kenya's first leader in 1963. There remains substantial scholarly debate about the nature and interpretation of the conflict, particularly given that the uprising was carried out almost exclusively by the Kikuyu, who lived in the agriculturally rich Central and Rift Valley provinces and were the most affected by the colonial government's expropriation of land for white settlement and cultivation. The Kikuyu had resisted colonial conquest, with at least three sustained armed insurrections from 1920 to 1940. Yet Kikuyu society was deeply divided and not everyone supported the armed revolt. Indeed, the movement lacked widespread support among the wider African population in Kenya, with some regarding it as either a Kikuyu-British conflict or an intra-Kikuyu struggle (Branch 2009). Regardless, Mau Mau would go on to serve as a potent symbol of anticolonial resistance across Africa and the third world (Maloba 1998; Branch 2009).

All three of Portugal's continental colonies experienced sustained wars of liberation, primarily because the Portuguese military government refused to participate in European decolonization during the 1950s and 1960s. Instead, the Portuguese regime moved to strengthen its control and extractive economic practices, pretending its colonies were overseas provinces (Bender 1978). In response, Africans in each country launched nationalist struggles for independence. Unlike the Kenyan case, these liberation struggles tended to be multiethnic affairs, drawing in urban and rural participants from across the country, and producing a conflict that was more large-scale and geographically dispersed than the Mau Mau uprising. In Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, the struggle was led by the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), founded and led by Amilcar Cabral. In Mozambique the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) was founded in 1962 as a merger of exiled nationalist movements. FRELIMO succeeded in establishing liberated zones in northern and central Mozambique, which forced it to develop an administrative capacity alongside guerrilla actions (Bowen 2000). Things were more complex in Angola, where the anticolonial struggle was fragmented among several groups, including the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA), and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA). The divisions between the groups derived partly from personal competition, ethnic cleavages (with the MPLA associated with the Mbundu, the FNLA with the Bakongo, and UNITA with the majority Ovimbundu), and interventions by foreign states. Indeed, the anticolonial wars in all three Portuguese colonies must be understood through the prism of the Cold War and the proxy wars carried out by the United States, the Soviet Union, and their allies. Angola's war was particularly susceptible to external interventions as Portugal, the United States, the Soviet Union, China, South Africa, Zaire, and others sought to enhance their interests in the country and region and destabilize the interests of others. It was not until the overthrow of the dictatorship in Lisbon (because of frustrations with the high cost of the colonial wars), in April 1974, that Portugal moved quickly to extract itself from its African colonies. Over a million people associated with the colonial military and administration left for Portugal as the colonies were granted their independence. In Angola and Mozambique, bitter civil wars quickly followed (Marcum 1978; Finnegan 1993).

The national liberation war in Zimbabwe (then Southern Rhodesia) was markedly different because it was not aimed at the colonial power, Britain, but at the white settler population, who had issued a unilateral declaration

of independence in 1965. White settlers' concerns about their future had been growing even before British prime minister Harold Macmillan's speech to the South African parliament in 1960, in which he announced Britain's intention to follow the "wind of change" and grant independence to its African colonies. Led by Ian Smith, the white settler minority, composing less than 5 percent of the entire population, declared Rhodesia independent in November 1965. Though Rhodesia was officially supported only by neighboring white-ruled South Africa and Portuguese-ruled Mozambique, the black African population in the country increasingly believed that armed struggle was the only way to secure genuine independence. The nationalist movement had two factions: the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), led by Joshua Nkomo and supported primarily by the Ndebele, and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), led by Robert Mugabe and largely identified with the Shona. The two groups fought separate struggles against Smith's white minority government, while also occasionally fighting each other. The war was predominantly a rural struggle, though it did become intertwined with the war in neighboring Mozambique and was influenced by the Cold War. By the late 1970s, the war had succeeded in severely disrupting the Rhodesian economy and breaking the morale of the white minority. In the end, the conflict resulted in over 30,000 fatalities, with acts of striking brutality committed by all sides (Martin and Johnson 1981; Bhebe and Ranger 1995). The war ended in 1979 with the Lancaster House Accords, through which power was transferred back to Britain, which then declared the independence of majority-rule Zimbabwe. Robert Mugabe became president in democratic elections the following year, a position he has held ever since.

The final two national liberation wars involved white-ruled South Africa. During World War I, South Africa occupied the neighboring German colony of South West Africa (Namibia). After the end of the war, South Africa administered the colony as a League of Nations mandate territory, formally on behalf of Britain. Though never officially incorporated, South West Africa was treated as a de facto province. With the creation of the United Nations, which superseded the League of Nations, international pressure was placed on South Africa to surrender the territory, which it steadfastly resisted. After the UN General Assembly formally revoked South Africa's mandate and the International Court of Justice declared South Africa's occupation of future Namibia illegal in 1966, the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) launched an armed nationalist struggle. This struggle also became intertwined with the Cold War and the war in neighboring Angola, where Cuban forces had been dispatched to support the MPLA government in 1975 and again in 1988. In one of the clearest and earliest signs of the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States successfully intervened in the wake of the 1988 fighting to help bring about a comprehensive regional plan between South Africa, Angola, and Cuba. In return for Cuba's promise to pull its troops out of southern Angola, South Africa agreed to withdraw from Namibia, which became independent in March 1990 (Crocker 1993).

South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia occurred as the apartheid regime was slowly collapsing. South Africa had been ruled by a white minority since independence in 1910. With the election of the Nationalist Party in 1948, white rule and privilege were further entrenched within a legal system of segregation known as *apartheid* (Clark and Worger 2004), an Afrikaans word meaning "living apart." The primary force of opposition among the black majority population was the African National Congress (ANC), which formed in 1923. In 1961, as white rule became increasingly entrenched and the possibility of ending racial discrimination through legal means became hopeless, the ANC formed a military wing, the Umkhoto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), to engage in a war of liberation. In contrast to more formal liberation armies, the ANC's struggle was limited to sporadic guerrilla strikes (which led the United States to list the ANC as a terrorist organization until 2008), largely due to the vastly superior South African military and police forces. Yet ANC violence and international pressure ultimately led to the dismantling of the apartheid regime in 1991 and the election of ANC leader Nelson Mandela to the country's presidency in 1994.

Interstate Warfare

Interstate wars, involving at least two sovereign states in sustained combat, have been rather rare in Africa. This low incidence has struck many scholars as anomalous, for why should African states be less disposed to interstate conflicts than their European counterparts have proven to be over the past several centuries? While some might celebrate the relative absence of interstate warfare in Africa, Jeffrey Herbst (1990b) has argued that this has negatively affected the continent's development. He notes that interstate warfare has not served the same developmental functions for the state in modern Africa as it did for Europe, because the majority of African states gained their independence without having to resort to combat and have not faced serious national security threats from neighboring states since independence. In Europe, war helped consolidate the developing states in multiple ways: causing the states to become more efficient in their revenue collection, forcing political leaders to improve their administrative capabilities, and creating social rituals and symbols around which a disparate population could unify as a collective (Tilly 1990). For Herbst, because interstate warfare has not been a feature in modern Africa, African development has been "stunted" by the very problems that war helped European countries resolve.

Whether a blessing or a curse, the low incidence of interstate wars in Africa can largely be credited to the general stability of the continent's political boundaries. Recall from Chapter 2 that leaders in Africa after independence largely agreed to maintain the boundaries they inherited from the colonial powers, a principle known as *uti possidetis*. They recognized that redrawing those boundaries would open a Pandora's box of territorial realignments that would be ultimately destructive for existing states and challenge their own hold on power. *Uti possidetis* was formalized with the establishment of the Organization of African Unity in 1963, which reaffirmed on several occasions the integrity of colonial borders and outlawed most attempts to change them.

The fear that territorial restructuring could lead to destabilization proved quite prescient, as the few attempts to substantially alter boundaries resulted in wars. Yet the first major African border restructuring did not take place until 1993, with the carving of the independent state of Eritrea out of Ethiopia. Though the separation was peaceful at the time, the two states had previously been engaged in decades of fighting (both against the regime in Addis) and found themselves in the midst of a horrific war just a few short years later. The conflict that erupted in May 1998 was triggered by unresolved border issues between the two states, particularly regarding the Badme region (Iyob 2000). Attempts to demarcate the precise border relied on colonial-era treaties between Italy and Ethiopia, yet no agreement on interpretation of those treaties could be reached. Without a clear colonially created boundary, tensions increased until the outbreak of armed conflict. The resulting war, which lasted until June 2000, caused an estimated 70,000 deaths and severely crippled both countries' economies (Negash and Tronvoll 2000; Fessehatzion 2003). Thus, the second major restructuring of Africa's international borders, the creation of South Sudan in 2011 (also born out of a successful secessionist struggle over decades), has left many observers pessimistic about peaceful relations between Juba and Khartoum (Natsios 2012).

Universal adoption of the colonial map has also been credited with removing the impetus for wars of territorial conquest. The only two major wars of conquest in Africa have ended in failure: the Libyan invasions of Chad in the 1970s and 1980s, and Somalia's invasion of Ethiopia in the Ogaden War of 1977–1978. In the first case, Libya laid claim to the Aouzou Strip in northern Chad and invaded four times: 1978, 1979, 1980–1981, and 1983–1987. The Libyans were finally routed by a unified Chadian front supported by the French. In 1977, Somalia invaded neighboring Ethiopia in an attempt to secure the disputed Somali-populated Ogaden region. Somalia was initially supported by the Soviet Union, with the United States heavily committed to the Ethiopians. However, in one of the more unusual chapters of the Cold War, the Ethiopian regime was overthrown by a Marxist-Leninist military junta a few months before Somalia's scheduled invasion and the Soviet Union found itself funding both sides of the conflict. After its failure to end the conflict, the Soviet Union shifted its support unequivocally toward Ethiopia, which, alongside Cuban troops, repelled the Somali invaders by March 1978. Tensions between the two states remain high. Ethiopia invaded Somalia in 2006 and again in 2011, not to conquer territory, but in order to back up Somalia's transitional federal government in the ongoing civil war there.

The majority of interstate wars have been primarily motivated by the desire to achieve regime change. For example, Tanzania invaded Uganda in 1979 in order to overthrow Idi Amin. The war actually began in 1978 when Ugandan troops pursued a group of mutinous soldiers to the Tanzanian border. Angry with the fact that Tanzania had been harboring anti-Amin exiles, including deposed president Milton Obote, Amin declared war on Tanzania. With his regime crumbling around him, Amin invaded Tanzania and attempted to annex part of the Kagera region. Tanzania responded by repelling the invading force and then, much to the shock and public outrage of African leaders in the Organization of African Unity, proceeded to invade Uganda itself, resulting in the ousting of Amin and restoration of Obote. Yet Tanzania never expressed any interest in conquering territory, and the existence of the Ugandan state was never in question (Chatterjee 1981). Likewise, apartheid-era South Africa's undeclared war against the so-called Front-Line States (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) from 1976 to 1987 was primarily concerned with destabilizing those neighboring states and disrupting their ability to support the ANC, as opposed to conquering and controlling them.

Secessionist Civil Wars

Secessionist civil wars are waged in order to substantially alter the territorial integrity of an existing state, usually with the goal of achieving independent sovereign status for a particular region. Although there have been a few notable cases of secessionist civil wars in Africa, their number is perhaps surprisingly low. However, the recent successful secessions of Eritrea (1993) and South Sudan (2011) might herald a change of norm.

The first secessionist civil war in Africa occurred in Congo when the provinces of Katanga and South Kasai broke away immediately following independence. Shortly after Congo became independent on 30 June 1960, several units in the Congolese army mutinied, demanding promotions, pay raises, and the removal of white officers. Belgian troops stationed in Congo intervened and actively engaged the Congolese army and civilians. On 11 July, Moïse Tshombe, the regional leader of the southern province of Katanga, who had been denied a seat in the ruling coalition, announced his

region's secession and successfully sought Belgian support. Tshombe framed the secession as a combination of ethnic nationalism and concern that the Congolese prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, was a communist. The secession did not enjoy full support within the region and was largely driven by the desire to preserve both Belgian economic interests and Katanga's comparative wealth. Though Lumumba and Congolese president Joseph Kasavubu succeeded in enlisting UN military assistance, the multinational force that was sent to Congo did not move to dislodge Belgian troops, nor did it initially engage with secessionist Katanga. In fact, Lumumba would eventually be captured by mutinous troops and flown to Katanga, where he was handed over to the secessionist forces, beaten, tortured, and murdered. The Belgian soldiers initially provided direct support for Tshombe's breakaway government, along with French, Rhodesian, and South African mercenaries. These forces were able to repel UN forces until they were finally overcome in January 1963, with Katanga being reintegrated into Congo (Gérard-Libois 1963; Gérard-Libois and Verhaegen 1961; O'Brien 1966).

The neighboring province of South Kasai had also declared its independence shortly after Congolese independence, in part because of a deep rivalry between its leader, Albert Kalonji, and Lumumba. It renamed itself the Great Mining State of South Kasai, with Kalonji proclaiming himself "Mulopwe" (King of the Luba) (Kalonji Mulopwe 2005; Hoskyns 1965). Lacking the level of foreign support that Katanga enjoyed, Kasai fell to the Congolese military at the end of 1961 after a brutal four-month war. Despite the employment of ethnonationalist rhetoric, both secessionist provinces were driven largely by the political and economic interests of Congolese political elites and, in the case of Katanga, their foreign business associates.

While ethnic impetus for the secessionist civil wars in Congo may have been rather limited, it was far more pronounced in Nigeria's civil war, the Nigerian-Biafran War of 1967–1970. Nigeria had become independent in 1960, but regional and ethnic cleavages proved volatile as the country was divided among the more populous Hausa and Fulani in the north, the Yoruba in the southwest, and the Igbo in the southeast. Independence and democracy meant that the north enjoyed a significant advantage over the south, which had been more privileged under British colonialism. In January 1966, a primarily Igbo-led military coup took place, resulting in the deaths of many northern political leaders, including Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. A few months later, northern soldiers staged a countercoup, further fueling ethnic tensions and causing the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians in the following months. The eastern region voted to secede on 26 May 1967 and the regional military government declared itself the Republic of Biafra. Driven in large part by ethnic tensions, the secession was exacerbated by the presence of large amounts of oil in the region.

After a brutal war in which more than a million people died in battle or from starvation and disease, Biafra was defeated in 1970 and reintegrated into Nigeria (see Achebe 2012).

In contrast to Nigeria and Congo, where post-independence secessionist struggles failed, modern South Sudan and Eritrea were both born of successful secessionist civil wars. In both cases, however, it must be borne in mind that the rump state acquiesced to the separation, which provided these secessions with validity in international law. In the case of South Sudan, independence was achieved in 2011 after a series of armed struggles in 1955–1972 and 1983–2005. As part of a comprehensive peace agreement, laboriously negotiated over several years under international patronage, a referendum on independence was held in southern Sudan in January 2011, with over 98 percent voting in favor of secession, which took place in July of the same year. By that time, however, South Sudan was at war with at least seven armed groups within its borders, which heightened interethnic tensions within the new state. Soon after their separation, both Sudans briefly engaged in a shooting war, particularly over the disputed region of Abyei. As of early 2013, the South Sudan administration continued to claim that the north was actively destabilizing it (Rolandsen and Breidlid 2012; Rolandsen 2011; Copnall 2011; Johnson 2003).

An Italian colony since 1890, Eritrea was administered by the British after the 1941 defeat of the Italians. Federated with Ethiopia under a UN mandate in 1951, it was progressively assimilated as a province by Addis. The Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) launched an armed struggle in 1961. It waged a thirty-year civil war, eventually joining with the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) to defeat the Mengistu regime in Addis in exchange for a referendum on independence, which it won handily. Eritreans gained their formal sovereignty in 1993, in what was the first successful secession in modern Africa (Iyob 1997; Pateman 1998).

In addition to Eritrea and South Sudan, recent or ongoing secessionist attempts include the Casamance conflict in Senegal, the Oromo and Ogaden rebellions in Ethiopia, the Azawad movements in Niger and Mali, the struggle over Cabinda in Angola, and the unilateral withdrawal of Somaliland from the rest of Somalia since 1991. This list, however, represents nearly all the instances of secessionist attempts in Africa since independence. As Pierre Englebert and Rebecca Hummel (2005) observe, separatist warfare is relatively rare across the continent. If one were to add all the years of conflict in every country from 1960 to 2002, 27 percent of that total in Africa would have separatist content, compared to 44 percent in the Middle East and North Africa, 47 percent in Asia, and no less than 84 percent in Europe.

There might be several reasons for this scarcity. First, the rules of territorial integrity promoted by the Organization of African Unity might inhibit separatist movements by reducing their chances of recognition (Jackson

and Rosberg 1982). It is also possible that the bonds of nationalist feelings generated through shared colonization and five decades of independence have durably cemented Africa's territories to their populations (Young 2002). A third answer suggests that artificial and heterogeneous African states have been integrated and kept together thanks in large part to the distribution of state resources to group elites, which has brought about their "fusion" (Sklar 1963; Boone 2003b) or "reciprocal assimilation" (Bayart 1993). Finally, it is possible that institutions of sovereign statehood represent a political and material resource for communal elites and populations at large, the benefits of which outweigh the potential returns of separatist nonsovereign alternatives, leading to greater acquiescence with the postcolonial state than one might otherwise expect (Englebert and Hummel 2005; Englebert 2009).

Insurgency Conflicts

Unlike secessions, guerrilla insurgencies are waged largely with the goal of attaining power within the existing state. Over thirty African countries have experienced one or more nonseparatist conflicts since 1960. What explains the persistent existence of these armed guerrillas in Africa? Historically, African insurgencies have recorded a rather poor success rate, at least if measured only by the degree to which they have been able to overthrow and replace existing regimes (which might not always be their goal). With the exception of the anticolonial struggles, no African insurgency was ever successful until Hissène Habré's Forces Armées du Nord (FAN) seized state power in Chad in 1979. The second successful insurgency did not occur until Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA) captured the Ugandan state in 1986. The rate of success improved somewhat afterward with successful insurgencies in Rwanda, Ethiopia, Congo, and Liberia. In his seminal work *African Guerrillas,* Christopher Clapham (1998a) makes a distinction between "reform" and "warlord" insurgencies. In his typology, reform insurgencies were highly disciplined formations, with a clear ideology and structure, which had as their goal the creation of a very different *kind* of state within an existing national territory from that which currently governed. Recent examples include the NRA in Uganda, the RPF in Rwanda, and the TPLF in Ethiopia. In each of these three cases, the movements were successful and their leaders were hailed by some Western observers as "new Africans" who would help initiate democracy and development on the continent (Ottaway 1999). But a few years later, this "new African" ideal had collapsed and the hope that insurgent warfare might lead to a progressive "reform" of the African state was increasingly regarded as bankrupt (Clapham 2007).

In contrast, "warlord insurgencies" are neither reformist, secessionist, nor liberationist. While they tend to lack an ideological structure, they possess a highly personalized leadership. Recent examples include Foday Sankoh's Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), and Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda. By employing the label "warlord," Clapham sought to emphasize the leadership of movements, though the level of actual control varied a good deal from case to case. His contention was that the underlying social and economic conditions were exploited by political entrepreneurs who benefited from the conflict. As will be discussed later, these movements sometimes drew heavily on the spiritual or religious beliefs of the societies in which they operated, as did the LRA and the Holy Spirit Movement in northern Uganda and the various factions in Liberia.

Borrowing from Mancur Olson, Thandika Mkandawire (2002:199–207) has made an interesting distinction between stationary and roving insurgencies. In this typology, stationary guerrillas establish physical enclaves, often building rudimentary structures of governance and control. An example of a stationary insurgency is the Forces Nouvelles, which controlled the northern section of Côte d'Ivoire during the 2001–2011 war. Roving guerrillas, on the other hand, are constantly on the move. Kony's LRA is an example of a roving insurgency, as it has never established any substantial "liberated" zone, but has shifted its activities across northern Uganda, southern Sudan, and increasingly across central Africa. Though no movement completely fits into either category, the distinction between stationary and roving insurgencies illuminates variations in the relationships between guerrillas and locals, as well as providing a way to understand the different methods used by movements to finance their rebellions. Stationary insurgents tend to rely heavily upon the local communities in their "liberated" zones. Pierre Mulele's dependence on the Pende in the Kwilu region of Congo in the 1960s is a case in point. In some cases, however, these insurgents are stationary in order to secure physical control over valuable resources. Angola's UNITA is a good example of a movement that became stationary in order to control the diamond-extraction economy. Roving bands, in contrast, tend to resort to predation and pillaging while they are on the move. Zachariah Mampilly (2010) and Jeremy Weinstein (2006) have both offered a rich investigation of the different forms of governance established by insurgents, and the challenges faced by constructing alternative forms of rule. They argue that the context of rebellion largely constrains the organization and strategies of violence employed by insurgents.

Morten Bøås and Kevin Dunn (2007) suggest a further distinction in focusing on *how* African insurgents roam. Do these groups follow the main roads, as was mainly the case in Liberia? Or do they predominantly roam in the bush, like the LRA in northern Uganda or as the RUF once did (in the periods 1993–1995 and 1998–1999)? The authors suggest that this distinction can have important implications for the organization, structure, and

goals of various armed groups. Road-roaming guerrilla movements tend to engage in a struggle to capture state power (either regionally or nationally), tend to fight using conventional tactics, and are hierarchically organized. Bush-path insurgents tend to be less interested in immediate capture of the central government, tend to employ nonconventional tactics (such as ambushes), and are less hierarchically organized. These are movements that often appear incomprehensible to Western observers, and their seeming lack of a recognizable strategy or political vision is sometimes taken as further proof of their primitivism. However, Paul Richards (2005a) notes that these movements can be understood as "enclave formations," engaged in producing an alternative "world order" based on narratives of betrayal and exile, which are reinforced by their existence in such an enclave formation. As the case of the LRA so vividly shows, these insurgencies can be very hard to defeat.

Composite Conflicts

Sometimes a conflict involves a combination of two or more motivations or strategies. For example, the linked armed conflicts of southern Africa in the 1970s and 1980s combined anticolonial nationalist struggles in Angola, Mozambique, and Namibia with indirect interstate Cold War warfare fought via proxies such as Cuba and Zaire and direct interstate warfare waged by apartheid South Africa (and to a lesser extent Rhodesia) against its neighbors.

Another and perhaps more poignant example is the so-called Africa War One or Great African War that took place in the DRC (formerly Zaire) from 1996 to 2003 (Clark 2002; Prunier 2009; Reyntjens 2009; Stearns 2011; Turner 2007). Ostensibly a struggle for control of the Congolese state, the conflict became the largest war in modern African history. Its immediate roots can be traced back to the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, when some 2 million Rwandans—a mix of civilians, Interahamwe (the militia largely held responsible for the genocide), and members of the defeated Rwandan military (the Forces Armées Rwandaises [FAR])—sought refuge in then-Zaire, after the RPF took power in Kigali. The refugee camps became controlled by the Interahamwe and FAR, which over the next couple of years, with the blessing of Mobutu Sese Seko's central government and regional strongmen, began launching attacks into neighboring Rwanda and against the Tutsi (Banyamulenge) population in South Kivu. Frustrated by international inaction, the Rwandan government and local Banyamulenge launched a multipronged attack in 1996 against the refugee camps, Interahamwe, and Zairian army. Largely orchestrated by the Rwandan and, to a lesser extent, Ugandan governments, the rebels united as the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire (AFDL), led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, a Katangan involved in the "Simba" rebellions of the 1960s who had since lived semiclandestinely and occasionally in exile. The rebels quickly swept westward, gaining control of the country's mineral resources. As they moved toward Kinshasa, Angolan government troops poured across the border to assist them in the overthrow of Mobutu, who fled in May 1997. By the following year, however, Kabila's relations with his Rwandan and Ugandan mentors had soured, and he demanded that they withdraw their troops immediately. More important, various local conflicts concerning land and identity in the east continued to find violent expression. Putting together another group of disenfranchised Congolese (some of whom had ties or were members of Mobutu's former regime), Rwanda and Uganda orchestrated another rebellion in eastern Congo—this time with the goal of deposing the man they had put in power a year earlier. By early August 1998, the rebels were making territorial gains through the east and, leaping across the country in a captured aircraft, deployed in Bas-Congo and threatened Kinshasa. In a desperate attempt to cling to power, Kabila convinced Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Angola to shore his regime up by sending troops (Dunn 2002). This intervention occurred under the guise of Southern African Development Community solidarity, but John Clark (2002) notes that each state was motivated by self-interest. A stalemate ensued and within a few months the rebels in the eastern part of the country had splintered, and eight neighboring countries had been brought into the fray. Although outright military victory proved impossible, Kabila repeatedly thwarted attempts to realize a negotiated settlement, until a lone bodyguard assassinated him on 16 January 2001. His son and successor, Joseph Kabila, eventually signed a series of agreements that removed foreign troops and brought a tentative peace to much of the country. Unresolved tensions and conflicts in parts of eastern Congo continued to erupt afterward, involving a wide array of militias and insurgents. By 2007 it was estimated that over 5.4 million people had died in the conflict (IRC 2007), mostly from disease, starvation, and other conflict-related causes, making it the deadliest war since World War II. While the Congolese war can be characterized as a composite conflict, it should also alert us to be sensitive to *how* conflicts evolve over time, complicating static typologies.

Changing Patterns[3]

The Cold War in Africa

Early African armed guerrilla movements, which took place during the Cold War, were largely characterized by their anticolonial nationalism.

Examples include the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya in 1952–1957, the armed rebellion of the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC) in 1955–1960, and the Kwilu and Simba rebellions in Congo in 1963–1967. There was little outside support for any of these movements. Moreover, although they made broad nationalist claims, these rebellions depended heavily on specific ethnic groups, which limited their eventual influence.

Beyond the commitment to national self-determination, one can question whether insurgents of this early era invoked ideology as a convenient rhetorical cover. Even in the case of the Mau Mau, there is considerable debate about whether the uprising should be understood as a sustained armed revolt born out of anticolonial nationalist sentiments or as a Kikuyu revolt bent on capturing state power (Maloba 1998; Branch 2009). While Amilcar Cabral of Guinea-Bissau was a dedicated Marxist, he stands as something of an exception. Pierre Mulele, who led the Kwilu rebellions in Congo, was also ideologically coherent, trying to implement a simplistic variant of Maoism among local peasants. In contrast, however, the more disparate collection of armed groups that emerged in the northeast section of that country (later known as Simba or Mulele Mai) lacked ideological cohesion. Their leaders had localized agendas, born out of the immediate politics of place fueled by the resentment of those who perceived they were always receiving the short end of the stick. Congo's early eastern rebellions, for example, drew upon the alienation and anger of marginalized youths who directed their violence toward state representatives and other privileged elements of society, such as intellectuals, with deadly results (Weiss 1966; Willame 1972; Hoskyns 1965).

Secessions provided the other main type of conflict at the onset of independence. There was the Katanga and Kasai secession in Congo, followed by Nigeria's brutal Biafran civil war, during which the southeast section of the country attempted to break away. Moreover, armed groups in Western Sahara and Eritrea fought for territorial liberation (or secession, depending on one's perspective) against an annexing African state, Morocco and Ethiopia respectively. The burst of secessionism in the 1960s might have derived from the relative lack of entrenchment at the time of the principle of postcolonial sovereignty. But the UN intervention in Congo and the lack of foreign recognition of the breakaway states affirmed the principle of territorial integrity of African states and doomed these experiments. The secessionist momentum of the early 1960s subsided. It is worth noting, however, that while the main secessionist wars started during the Cold War, the only two successful secessions took place afterward.

By the 1970s, the Cold War context began exerting a notable influence on African armed conflicts, as the participants tended to be more ideologically oriented (at least superficially) and external support became

pronounced. Though most African states had gained independence by the end of the 1960s, those that had not—namely the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau, and white-ruled Rhodesia and South Africa—experienced prolonged wars that were informed by Cold War geopolitical machinations. Likewise, the handful of African interstate conflicts, such as the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia, were often played out against the backdrop of proxy conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union, the two competing superpowers.

Given the ideologically saturated framing of the Cold War by both superpowers, it is not surprising that African armed insurgents increasingly employed revolutionary discourses usually grounded in variations of Marxism-Leninism and Maoism. Taking their cues from contemporary Asian anticolonial insurgencies, as well as Mao Zedong's successful revolution in China, these armed groups drew upon the emerging doctrine of guerrilla warfare. Of course, many armed groups espoused certain ideological commitments in part to secure financial and military aid from like-minded patrons. The rapidity with which many of these leaders dropped their ideological trappings at the end of the Cold War suggests the shallowness with which they embraced their "causes" in the first place. Regardless of their ideological orientation, these armed guerrillas were able to take advantage of external supporters, occasionally from neighboring states but more often from the Cold War superpowers and their allies, which enabled them to fight protracted guerrilla wars regardless of their popularity among the domestic population.

The Cold War also witnessed the increased militarization of many African states. Due to the geopolitical jockeying, weak regimes enjoyed external support that effectively shored up and entrenched neopatrimonial rule across the continent. The superpowers also made it possible for African states to use scarce foreign exchange for weapon purchases (Howe 2001). In many cases, Cold War aid both empowered and circumscribed African states. On the one hand, superpower support provided African leaders with international legitimacy and access to valuable resources, which often meant that their survival was not contingent on domestic legitimacy. Yet these African regimes privileged militarization over economic development to ensure their own survival. Witness the evolution of US aid during the Cold War. In 1973, 78 percent of US bilateral aid to sub-Saharan Africa was for development, and 22 percent for political and strategic purposes. But by 1985 the numbers had almost reversed, with 67 percent of aid going for political and strategic purposes and only 33 percent for development (Spero and Hart 2003:204). This situation probably primed many African societies for the violent domestic collapse that some would experience once the Cold War system ended.

After 1990: The Emergence of "New Wars"?

The structural shift from bipolarity to multipolarity at the end of the Cold War arguably impacted the nature of conflicts around the world. While intrastate wars have always been common, in the twenty-first century they now account for 95 percent of all the world's armed conflicts. Shifts due to globalization have also shaped conflicts through the increased relevance of nonstate actors and emerging markets. Contemporary African armed conflicts are typically intrastate affairs, with civil wars, insurgencies, and the more amorphous manifestation of terrorism being driven in large part by nonstate actors.

The sudden end of the Cold War dramatically altered the ideologically encoded geopolitical landscape, as the existing ideological frameworks, particularly the seemingly discredited leftist ideologies, suddenly seemed irrelevant. As William Reno (2007:72) has noted, armed insurgents now adopt "contemporary-sounding generic labels typical of development and human rights NGOs," such as in Liberia, home to Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). As such, formal political ideas across a left-right dimension seem to be less relevant in Africa's armed struggles than other political motivations.

The end of the Cold War also altered the financial landscape of insurgency. External support virtually vanished overnight. The United States, for example, no longer found it necessary to fund groups like Jonas Savimbi's UNITA in Angola or RENAMO in Mozambique. These groups had to find other sources of funding or seek a negotiated accommodation with their adversaries. Soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, several Cold War–era African conflicts either collapsed or were resolved by diplomatic initiatives. In those cases, the superpower lifelines that kept the conflict alive quickly dried up, making a continuation of the struggle problematic for the parties involved. Yet in other cases, long-running conflicts are entering their second or even third decade. These tend to be struggles that were peripheral to the Cold War, receiving relatively little attention from either the Soviet Union or the United States. For example, northern Uganda has had the unfortunate distinction of suffering almost uninterrupted armed conflict since the mid-1980s between the forces of the Lord's Resistance Army and the central government.

The end of the Cold War also heralded a brief second wave of African secessionist movements, as the partition of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and the ideological push by the West for the spread of electoral democracy combined to affect, and in many cases undermine, the existing international legitimacy of African states. The perception of changing international norms regarding territorial integrity led to a resurgence of autonomy-seeking activities by regional leaders around the world, Africa included. The de facto

secessions of Somaliland and Puntland, which occurred after Somalia had all but collapsed as a functional state, are each a case in point. Senegal's Casamance conflict, although it had begun in 1982, also took on renewed military vigor in 1990. In Mali, the Azawad People's Movement and the Islamic Arab Front of Azawad began their armed campaign for Tuareg separatism during the 1990–1994 period. In Niger too, Tuareg secessionism emerged as a violent political project in the early 1990s. By the middle to late 1990s, however, Western donors, faced with increased conflicts in the developing world, returned to policies supporting state integrity rather than self-determination, which contributed to largely closing this second window of separatist opportunity (Englebert and Hummel 2005).

The end of the Cold War also meant that the international small-arms market burgeoned, with cheap weaponry becoming readily available (Muggah 2002). There is little doubt that groups that came to control mineral-rich areas, such as the RUF in Sierra Leone, the various Liberian factions, and insurgency groups in eastern Congo, used these minerals to tap into emerging international weapon markets. Beyond accessing cheap weaponry, armed groups were also able to take advantage of new advances in communications technology. The ubiquity of cell and satellite phones on the African continent has increased the ability of guerrillas to communicate on the battlefield and with the international community. In Congo, Laurent Kabila's men used cell phones to coordinate their assault against Mobutu's shrinking forces in 1996–1997. Satellite phones have also enabled rebel leaders to communicate with the international media. Both Foday Sankoh and Sam Bockarie of the RUF, for instance, used them to connect directly to the British Broadcasting Corporation's Africa outlet. For a few groups, the Internet has provided another tool by which to communicate with external audiences. Websites are created, often by external supporters in Europe or the United States, in order to champion the causes of rebel groups, circulate their agendas, network with external supporters, and raise funds.

Arguably, the post–Cold War era can be demarcated by the events of 11 September 2001, namely because of the powerful sway that the US-driven "war on terror" continues to exercise over global politics. As such, the "war on terror" has become a new frame by which many Western policymakers and scholars engage with contemporary African guerrilla movements. One consequence has been the increased concern of the United States and the European Union about "failed states" and "ungoverned zones" as breeding grounds for international terrorism. The fact that al-Qaeda planned the attacks of 9/11 from the safe haven of Afghanistan, considered to be a "failed state," pushed the problem to the top of the security agenda in Western capitals (Collins 2007; Rotberg 2002).

It should be noted that this new geopolitical framework has also provided opportunities and resources for African political elites (Dunn 2007; Jourde 2006). Some African leaders have publicly linked their own struggles

torture and mutilation, often against unarmed civilians. For many observers, these acts of brutality are regarded as evidence of inherent irrationality, savagery, and a "coming anarchy" (Kaplan 1994). The cases of Sierra Leone and Liberia have produced multiple interpretations of the conflicts and the reasons for their marked brutality (see Richards 1996; Abdullah 1998; Bøås 2001; Richards 2005b; Fithen and Richards 2005). Ibrahim Abdullah (1998:204, 207), for example, focuses attention on socially marginalized Sierra Leone youth in search of a "radical alternative" to the regime. These unemployed or unemployable youth, mostly young men, he argues, are "prone to criminal behaviour, petty theft, drugs, drunkenness and gross indiscipline." Lacking opportunities, they take up arms against the regime. Because these groups are mainly from urban areas, Thandika Mkandawire (2002:181) suggests that they are likely to engage in "extremely brutal and spiteful forms of violence" toward the peasants they regard as enemies or traitors. Yet the examples of violent conflict in Uganda, Casamance, Côte d'Ivoire, and Angola seem to contradict many of these assumptions and arguments.

While many recent African conflicts have been characterized by brutality, violence might have a rationality. Rather than evidence of inherent savagery, brutal acts can be understood in relation to patterns of violence already embedded within society (Jabri 1996:22–23). For example, anthropologist Rosa Ehrenreich (1998) has pointed out that the brutality employed by the LRA in Uganda fits into a coherent belief system, grounded in established social and spiritual beliefs of the region. Understanding that Kony and the LRA frame their actions in part as struggles against evil spirits, the brutal violence waged against civilians remains tragic but is no longer senseless.

The LRA illustrates the religious and spiritual dimensions of many modern African conflicts. Stephen Ellis (1999) has examined the spiritual symbols and religious beliefs employed in the Liberian conflict. For Ellis, Liberians developed specific ways of thinking about the nature of power in their society that informed the actions of various participants in the war. Specifically, Ellis examines the role that Liberian secret societies had in shaping the ways power was understood and violence enacted. In these secret societies, power was achieved through the incorporation, figuratively and literally, of other people, somehow legitimating sacrifice and ritual murder. Thus, violence in this context carries very powerful meanings for those involved.

Finally, many scholars have emphasized that Africa's "new wars" fundamentally challenge state-centric assumptions about conflict and security. For example, Mark Duffield (1998) has argued that the traditional statist focus on thinking about conflict obscures the fundamental nature of contemporary conflicts, where the goal is often not to impose political authority

over a territorial space in the traditional sense. Duffield speaks of "postmodern conflicts" to illustrate that emerging substate conflicts blur traditional social, political, and military categories, thus making responses grounded in traditional state-to-state strategic assumptions deeply flawed. Others have employed the term "post-Westphalian wars" to characterize conflicts like those in the DRC, Somalia, and Sudan in which the state's monopoly of violence has been significantly challenged from the outside and inside, leading to conflicts that are fought primarily between militias, paramilitaries, warlord armies, private security firms, and criminal gangs.

Theories of War in Africa

Scarcity

War-prone countries tend to be poor today. The poorest one-sixth of humanity endures about four-fifths of the world's civil wars. In seeking to explain this pattern, scholars assume that poverty magnifies inequality, making it a powerful cause of armed violence. Some recent research, dubbed "Malthusian" or "neo-Malthusian" by proponents and critics alike, examines the relationship between conflict and scarcity. Thomas Homer-Dixon (1994) suggests three hypotheses linking conflict with environmental scarcity. First, decreasing supplies of physically controllable resources would provoke interstate "simple-scarcity" conflicts or "resource wars." For example, Michael Klare (2001) has asserted that competition and control over critical natural resources will be the guiding principle behind the use of military force in the twenty-first century. Second, environmental scarcity might lead groups to migrate and produce "ethnic" conflict between newcomers and established communities (this has happened in Burkina Faso, for example, where many Mossi have moved to the country's southwest region in search of land). Finally, environmental scarcity would not only impoverish people but also weaken institutions like the state and cause "deprivation conflicts" reflected in civil strife and insurgency (Homer-Dixon 1999). In short, increased scarcity will lead to resource capture by those with the means to do so, and marginalization of those without. African states' lack of "adaptive capacity" (Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998:9) might make them particularly susceptible to these forces. The claim is that economically poor states, lacking both financial and human capital and being ethnically diverse, are less likely to be able to manage severe environmental challenges that lead to scarcity.

Approaches that make causal links between scarcity and violent conflict have been strongly challenged by other scholars. Paul Richards (1996), for example, has roundly rejected what he labels the "Malthus with guns" thesis by pointing out that it fails to note the possibility that resources have

nonmaterial dimensions and that the causal factor might be scarcity not of resources but of justice in resource allocation. Scholars have noted that the relationship between environmental scarcity and contextual factors is highly interactive, making it impossible to determine the relative power of environmental scarcity as a cause of violence in specific cases. Moreover, there are a number of empirical studies that suggest that environmental change rarely causes conflict directly and only occasionally does so indirectly (Kahl 2006; Derman, Odgaard, and Sjaastad 2007; see also Kevane and Gray 2008). Thus, one should be cautious in inferring a simple relationship between increased environmental scarcity and warfare.

While neo-Malthusian assumptions and causal claims generate a fair amount of scholarly controversy, they do raise important considerations about the role of scarce resources, such as land, in the development of armed conflicts. The centrality of land in African societies should not be downplayed. On a continent that remains overwhelmingly agricultural, land continues to lie at the heart of social, economic, and political life. Moreover, there remains a lack of clarity regarding property rights in contemporary Africa, and land tenure continues to be deeply contested on much of the continent. The potential for disputes over land to contribute to the outbreak of armed conflict has been of central concern. Citing such examples as Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe, the World Bank acknowledged in its 2003 report *Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction* that "deprivation of land rights as a feature of more generalized inequality in access to economic opportunities and low economic growth have caused seemingly minor social or political conflicts to escalate into large-scale conflicts" (Deininger 2003:157).

The degree to which land insecurity is assumed to be a cause of conflict varies among scholars. Much, of course, depends on the specific case under examination. Land scarcity can function as a structural or proximate cause of conflict. In the latter case, land disputes, tenure insecurity, and inequality in land access are combined with other factors that contribute to the outbreak of violence, as was arguably the case with the 1994 Rwandan genocide (André and Platteau 1998). Of course, land insecurity does not, in and of itself, necessarily lead to armed conflict. Not all countries suffering land scarcity or inequality in landownership experience conflict. Yet in Africa and elsewhere, access to land is often interwoven with ethnic dimensions. Land use patterns and customary land tenure systems have historically had an ethnic basis, something colonialism institutionalized in many parts of Africa. This has meant that important issues around citizenship and migration—specifically claims of autochthony—come into play and can gain powerful salience.

Autochthony, literally meaning "emerging from the soil," implies localist forms of belonging, and can inform debates about the electoral eligibility

of candidates as well as violent struggles over landownership (Bøås and Dunn 2013; Geschiere 2004). The presence of such controversies on the African continent is not a new phenomenon. Their origins are found in both precolonial practices and ideas about the politics of place embedded in the colonial project. After independence, many African states introduced citizenship laws to determine who legitimately lived within the borders of their territories, and could therefore enjoy the privileges of belonging, and who did not. Land issues become particularly vulnerable to the politics of identity and belonging, especially where two or more groups "shared" the land. In this case, one group might claim autochthony or "son of the soil" status, presenting the others as "newcomers," "immigrants," or "strangers." Autochthony and citizenship disputes are an increasingly pronounced feature of African politics, especially within polities experiencing contested elections. Debates over "who belongs" and "who has access to resources," including the ability to vote, can become increasingly politicized, particularly by aggressive political entrepreneurs. Of course, claims of autochthony need not necessarily lead to violence (Geschiere 2009; Dunn 2009; Jackson 2006; Bayart, Geschiere, and Nyamnjoh 2001).

Greed Not Grievance

A number of scholars have expanded on Homer-Dixon's hypotheses regarding "simple-scarcity" or "resource wars." Paul Collier (2000, 2007), for example, suggests that the calculations of costs and gains made by leaders of a rebellion are shaped by the revenues to be generated by control of natural resources, the availability of young men, and low levels of economic development, all of which, he argues, make conflict more likely. For Collier, economic greed (or opportunity cost) and control over scarce resources are far stronger explanatory factors than political grievance. Collier and others often imply that African wars are fought not over political issues but in order to gain access to profits. Thus, conflict is regarded as driven by the pursuit of personal wealth instead of political power (though one may argue that these are the same things in neopatrimonial societies). Philippe le Billon (2005) has noted that, as natural resources gain in importance for combatants, the nature of the conflict itself changes, as military activities become centered on areas of economic significance. No longer is the Maoist tactic of winning over the peasantry important. Rather, guerrillas often seek to establish permanent strongholds or areas of "insecurity" wherever resources are located. The state then typically deploys troops to the area, who often join in the plunder, making it hard to distinguish between rebels and soldiers (who might well collaborate) and displacing civilian populations. Cases in point include the so-called sobels of Sierra Leone and the multiple violent actors in eastern Congo after 2003.

The "greed" thesis suggests that contemporary African conflicts are explained primarily by economic considerations. Some observers have suggested that the goal of many armed conflicts in Africa is not necessarily the defeat of the enemy in battle, but the institutionalization of violence for profit (Berdal and Malone 2000). Combatants gain access to wealth not just by looting but also by maintaining resource-rich territories that are linked to international trading networks. This brings us back to the "resource curse" of Chapter 6, which associates an abundance of natural resources, particularly mineral exports, with poor economic performance and greater socioeconomic inequalities and conflict (Ross 1999; Cilliers and Dietrich 2000). One oft-cited example of the resource curse is the presence of oil in the Niger Delta, which has caused a number of states to expand control over oil and oil revenues against a backdrop of increased demands for self-determination (and access to resource-generated profits) from minorities in the region. In recent years, the region has seen the rise of armed groups and militant youth movements that have contributed to fueling violence (Watts 2005). An umbrella movement for several militant groups, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), has blown up pipelines, kidnapped foreign oil workers, and killed government troops. Its main demands are control over oil and reparations for environmental damage. The group's popularity can be partially understood given that, despite billions of dollars in revenue from decades of oil production, many of the inhabitants of the Niger Delta remain impoverished. But in keeping with the "greed not grievance" thesis, it can be suggested that the impetus for the commencement of violence has more to do with economic profitability than with political marginalization. For example, several other militant groups have joined MEND in the region, arguably taking advantage of the foreign oil companies' willingness to negotiate with kidnappers and pay large ransoms (usually around $250,000) for captured workers.

Critics like Richards (2005b) and Bøås and Dunn (2007) have argued that the "greed not grievance" approach assumes that theft and predation are the *reasons* for the guerrilla struggle, mistaking effect for cause. While such an approach may help explain how some conflicts are sustained, they fail to explain why conflicts start in the first place. There is clearly merit in the argument that economic rivalries greatly complicate and prolong a number of wars, the case of the Angolan civil war being the clearest example. But the "greed not grievance" thesis primarily offers the observation that economic factors are necessary but not sufficient conditions for conflicts to occur. It would be a mistake, for example, to assume that the recent wars in central and western Africa started as competition over control of alluvial diamonds, coltan, or other natural resources. In fact, in both Sierra Leone and the DRC, extraction and marketing of natural resources became significant components only after the conflicts were well under way. Obviously, economic

agendas are an integral part of African wars, as elsewhere. But the desire to accumulate (or, for grassroots combatants, to merely escape poverty), while an important motivation, is not the only one. Even authors closely associated with the "greed" thesis have later argued that to focus excessively on material explanations and the greed of actors may lead to one-sided explanations of conflict (Berdal 2003, 2005).

Crisis of Modernity

Some observers have asserted that African conflicts emerge because of a crisis of modernity. Specifically, they argue that African societies are incompatible with Western modernity and civilization (Huntington 1993; Kaplan 1994). These explanations employ evocative "Heart of Darkness"–style imagery of Africa and Africans being incapable of existing in the "modern" world, with particular attention given to "barbaric" practices of violence and the employment of witchcraft and other forms of religious spirituality (Dunn 2003). The underlying assumption is that Africa and Western modernity are somehow incompatible. Cold War competition and the balance of nuclear terror kept local conflicts in check, but now endemic hostilities have reasserted themselves. A case in point is Robert Kaplan's (1994, 1996) discussion of the RUF conflict in Sierra Leone, which he explains in terms of the dissolution of Africa's social fabric and the inherent inability of Africans to develop into a modern society. While roundly dismissed by most academics, this line of explanation continues to reassert itself in popular accounts of contemporary African conflicts.

A different angle is taken by scholars who argue that the crisis is with the project of modernity itself, and not with an incompatibility of cultures (Appadurai 1999; Dunn 2009). For some, the Westphalian state system—the representation and vehicle for Western modernity as it was exported to the rest of the world—has become increasingly challenged as a concept, an institution, and a practice. The reasons for this are varied, but the point is that these institutions and practices are failing to meet the needs within the lived experiences of most of the world's population, including Africans. Conflicts can emerge as the institutions and practices of Western modernity are reinterpreted, reinvented, and reemployed. This point will be revisited later in our discussion of state collapse.

Elite and Factional Competition

Political competition in any country is typically driven by political elites, usually of different backgrounds and policy perspectives, jockeying for access to political power and the various institutional resources associated with the state. Given the nature of neopatrimonial rule, the stakes for the

winners and losers of elite competition can be quite high in Africa. Political leaders such as Felix Houphouët-Boigny, Mobutu Sese Seko, and Jomo Kenyatta were masterful at managing elite competition to their own advantage. Problems often emerge, however, when political elites feel that the existing system thwarts their ability for political engagement. In such cases, the employment of violence may become increasingly acceptable for frustrated elites and their supporters (Bayart 1993).

In Africa, as elsewhere, many armed groups either are led by or contain large numbers of people who once enjoyed the fruits of state power and now seek to recapture those benefits through force of arms. Many former Mobutists, excluded from access to the formal and informal political system of post-Mobutu Congo, picked up arms under the banners of the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) or the Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC). Likewise, some of the leaders of the Forces Nouvelles in Côte d'Ivoire were political elites excluded by the post-Houphouët state. It is worth noting that frustrated political elites who pick up arms are often interested in capturing the state and the spoils that come with it, while guerrilla leaders who are external to the established political elite (such as the LRA's Joseph Kony) are usually less interested in capturing the central government. In this line of analysis, many African conflicts can be understood as physical manifestations of the breakdown of the existing political system and its ability to successfully manage elite competition nonviolently (Bayart 1993; Mkandawire 2002).

Factional conflicts tend to emerge when competing elites mobilize their constituents in a struggle with other groups for scarce state-controlled resources (Chazan et al. 1999:201). This occasionally happens when an electoral faction decides that success is more likely through armed struggle than through the established legal system. Such was the case when Jonas Savimbi's UNITA restarted its armed struggle in 1992 after failing to win an outright majority in elections. Armed conflict is more likely to emerge from factional competition when the basis of mobilization is driven by feelings of social marginalization or regional disenfranchisement. Around the world, regions or social groups that feel they are being marginalized by the central state have contributed to fostering the emergence of armed insurgencies. One can witness examples of this in Africa's regional wars of secession, particularly in Eritrea, South Sudan, Biafra in Nigeria, and Katanga in Congo.

Identity Conflicts

Identity conflicts, or communal conflicts, are usually driven by subnational groups raising fundamental questions about, and challenges to, existing power relations within a state. In many cases, the nature and territorial existence of the state may be challenged. All postcolonial African states, with

the exceptions of Swaziland and Lesotho, have internal communal subdivisions, which provide fertile soil for the expression of political aspirations tied to subnational identities (Posner 2005). Daniel Horowitz (1985) has argued that ethnic conflict is at the center of politics in divided societies, straining the bonds that sustain civility and often igniting violence. Yet it should be stressed that the expression of communal identities, whether they be ethnically, racially, or religiously defined, does not necessarily lead to armed conflict. In fact, many African states with diverse populations, such as Tanzania, have not experienced significant ethnic or subethnic conflicts. Communal struggles tend to emerge in states that have several large geographically distinct ethnoregional groups, such as Nigeria, Sudan, Angola, and Congo, or a dominant group and an extremely cohesive, culturally distinct, and usually economically more advantaged minority, such as in Ethiopia.

The European colonial project relied on the institutionalization, reification, and in some cases invention of ethnic identities. Under colonialism, perceived cultural identities often became the foundation for political identities, which were enforced within the territorial state and reproduced through the mechanism of the law as singular and unidimensional entities. For example, colonial rule in Rwanda turned the historically porous categories of Tutsi and Hutu into discrete and rigid political categories (Mamdani 2001). Across Africa, electoral competition, introduced in the transition to independence, often politicized ethnic and other subnational identities (Ottaway 1999). As Peter Geschiere and Francis Nyamnjoh (2000) have noted, political liberalization can lead to fierce debates on who belongs where, violent exclusion of "strangers," and a general affirmation of roots and origins as the basic criteria of citizenship and belonging. In many cases, political liberalization has contributed to fostering a markedly illiberal move toward closure and exclusion. For example, the 1991 national conference in Zaire not only introduced highly stringent citizenship laws but also denied the Banyarwanda delegation access to the conference.

Crawford Young (1976) observed that democratic competition rewards the numerically superior ethnoregional groupings, leaving the minorities—who, due to colonial practices, were often more educated and economically advanced—feeling underrepresented, marginalized, and disempowered. In some postcolonial African states, feelings of inequality and discrimination were exacerbated by elites constructing systems of patronage and political rewards based on shared ethnic identities. For example, Igbo fears of disempowerment and discrimination at the hands of the larger Hausa-Fulani led to Biafran secession and war. As discussed in Chapter 3, almost all postcolonial African states have had to contend with the possibility of subnational communal conflict, be they ethnically or religiously defined. Many African states have attempted to deal with these possible tensions, employing both structural solutions (such as Nigeria's requirement of multiple

ethnoregional representation within all political parties) and symbolic practices (such as Mobutu's adoption of multiple ethnic symbols on his personage to create a unified national symbol). Given the continent's subnational diversity, most modern African states have actually been quite successful in managing possible identity conflicts.

Yet some scholars, such as Edmond Keller (1996), have asserted that one of the defining features of the post–Cold War era is the emergence or resurgence of subnationalism, particularly ethnicity, in multiethnic states. While this does not necessarily lead to armed conflict, many modern African conflicts are framed as identity conflicts. Chapter 3 explores the issues of ethnicity in African politics and notes the difference between the theoretical approaches of primordialism, constructivism, and instrumentalism. We will not replay those differences here, but we note that, regardless of your theoretical approach, communal identity is a quite real phenomenon, given that it can serve as symbolic justification for very concrete political and economic interests. Yet the causal role played by ethnicity and identity in African conflicts remains highly debated among scholars.

Crisis of the African State

After 1990 the African state entered an era of crisis—if not outright collapse in several places (e.g., Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia)—caused by multiple forces, such as the shrinking of central government finances and the marginalization of Africa in the world economy. As a result, the model of the sovereign state underwent severe crisis across the continent, though the manifestations of that crisis have been varied and geographically uneven. Recent scholarship has focused on three related aspects of state crisis: the bankruptcy of neopatrimonial practices, the emergence of weak states, and the existence of collapsed states.

As discussed in Chapter 4, political elites in newly independent states of Africa often created a special patrimonial path of redistribution, which divided the indigenous population along regional, religious, ethnic, and familial lines. This created a state in which extraction and redistribution became privatized. This is not uniquely African, but in the African context the system of neopatrimonialism initially proved to be remarkably stable and long-lasting, creating states that were simultaneously both "strong" and "weak." Specifically, neopatrimonialism produced weak states with remarkably stable regimes, such as the Mobutist regime in Zaire.

The 1990s and early 2000s witnessed a breakdown of the neopatrimonial system in many African states. In some cases, the patrimonial logic became so dominant that it lost its integrating and legitimating aspects, making it difficult, if not impossible, for the reciprocal assimilation of elites. At the most basic level, the success of neopatrimonial systems of rule relies on

the ability of political elites to fulfill the expected vertical redistribution of resources through the patron-client relationship. Many African neopatrimonial states, however, became unable to deliver on the promises of the patronage system. As a result, there emerged both a crisis of legitimacy for the ruling elites and a perceived bankruptcy of the established state system. The first result is important, for it establishes a target for the resentment and frustration felt in certain sectors of domestic society—that is, the legitimacy of existing leaders is undermined and their position of power becomes increasingly challenged. While this is often the traditional trajectory in the emergence of armed insurgencies against the ruling elite, what became significant in recent years was less the perceived illegitimacy of specific ruling elites and more the perceived bankruptcy of the neopatrimonial state model itself.

With the crisis of the neopatrimonial state, control of the state may no longer be the primary goal of armed insurgents. The desired outcome of conflict may not be to change state leadership, but to carve out and maintain a personal territorial fiefdom, as is evidenced by some Mai Mai militias in eastern DRC. During the Liberian war, the Lofa Defense Force (LDF) and the United Liberian Movement for Democracy in Liberia–Kromah faction (ULIMO-K) were seen as movements attempting to protect their people against the backdrop of the collapsed neopatrimonial order (Ellis 1998; Reno 1998; Bøås 2005).

For many observers, the collapse of neopatrimonialism can be regarded as either a cause or an effect of the rise in "weak" states across the continent. While scholars may employ the terms "weak," "fictive," and "shadow," the shared assumption is that state institutions continue to exist but are unable to function effectively for various reasons (Sandbrook 1985; Cruise O'Brien 1991). Some authors argue that the postcolonial African state was created structurally weak (Jackson and Rosberg 1982). For them, African political leaders and their external supporters have no interest in altering the status quo, and thus African weak states persist. For others, the African state has been made "weak" by the practices of African political elites. In many states, political leaders have used extrastate instruments to maintain their power. In some cases, this has meant the employment of private military contractors, such as mercenaries (O'Brien 2000). Yet political leaders have also protected their privileged positions through the creation of private armed militias. In some cases, militias are directly loyal to the regime in power, as in Côte d'Ivoire, where the Jeunes Patriotes and other militias in the southern part of the country were closely connected to the presidency of Laurent Gbagbo through an informal shadow-state structure. Similarly, in the Republic of Congo, former president Denis Sassou-Nguesso used his private militia, the Cobras, to return to power in 1997 (Clark 2008). In other situations, "freelance" militias are employed by the

state to do their dirty work. This is one way to interpret the Sudanese government's handling of the crisis in Darfur, and the same analysis can also be applied to the employment of so-called former freedom fighters by the Zimbabwean regime in its land-grabbing schemes.

Whether inherent or created, the "weakness" of the African state might contribute to the rise of armed conflicts. As state institutions no longer prove effective instruments of power, new opportunities become available both to individual officials and to other "strongmen" whose interests often run counter to those of the ruler (Utas 2012; Reno 1998). As the state shrinks and political competition can no longer be managed through legitimate channels, armed conflict emerges and the possibility of outright state collapse increases.

State collapse refers to situations in which the state's structure and authority cease to function in a recognizable way, with the result being that established law and political order fall apart and require reconstitution. While "weak" states continue to perform the expected functions of states on some level, collapsed states can no longer perform the functions required of them. Specifically, the state fails to practice its sovereign authority, perform its institutional role as a tangible organization of decisionmaking or its intangible role as a symbol of national identity, or operate as the guarantor of security for the population within its territory. William Zartman (1995:2–3) has argued that state collapse in Africa has occurred in two waves. The first took place during the second decade of independence, "when regimes that replaced the original nationalist generation were overthrown, carrying the whole state structure with them into a vacuum." He points to the examples of Chad in 1980–1982, Uganda in 1979–1981, and Ghana in 1979–1981. The second wave occurred in the immediate post–Cold War era and continues to the present, exemplified by Liberia in the 1990s and Somalia today.

Collapsed states reflect those situations when the state experiences complete loss of control over political and economic space. Perhaps the most widely cited author in the literature on this topic, Zartman (1995:8) argues that state collapse is a "long-term degenerative disease," with the emergence of armed insurgents regarded as a symptom, not a cause, of the collapse. Armed insurgents and internal conflict, however, can accelerate the process of state collapse. As the state loses control over its political space, neighboring states and dissident groups involve themselves directly in the vacuum left by the collapsed political order. But what causes a state to collapse? Zartman conceives of the process as a long-term slippery slope in which the established political and social orders are slowly worn away, often by societal pressures. René Lemarchand (1997) argues that states experience turning or breaking points, such as a major influx of refugees into their territory, highly disputed transition elections, or the intervention of the military into state affairs. These triggering events often sharpen the edge of a conflict and can accelerate the process of internal decomposition, as happened in Zaire and Rwanda in the 1990s.

Implicit, and sometimes even explicit, in the state-collapse literature is a state-centrism that privileges strong institutional structures. Yet many have noted that state collapse has not been brought about by the anarchic tendencies of populations, but often by political elites trying to protect their privileges within the status quo. In Sierra Leone, for example, President Valentine Strasser reconfigured the bases of political authority and reshaped political networks in his favor, pursuing a strategy that intentionally destroyed state agencies and hastened state collapse (Reno 1995). The destruction of state institutions may not reflect so much the deterioration of political authority as dramatic shifts in the bases of political structure. Moreover, while many proponents of the "collapsed state" approach advocate the strengthening of state structures (Chesterman, Ignatieff, and Thakur 2005; Zartman 2005), others question whether large centralized states can be reformed to serve the interests of the masses or are even the best instruments for economic and social development in Africa (Longman 1998). Others have suggested that the state-collapse literature uncritically assumes the universality of Western models of statehood (Dunn 2001). Underpinning the state-collapse literature is an assumption that all states are constituted and function in a similar way: on a spectrum from good to bad. This begs the question, "For whom is the state failing and how?" Thus, the task is not to determine whether or not the African state is "failing" or "collapsing," but to investigate how political order is constituted and reconfigured. Different actors within the state have different interests, and what is good for some, such as informalized power structures that enable elite consolidation of power and profit, may not be good for ordinary citizens. In fact, the goal of the regime may be to create and sustain structures and power relations that are generally considered the consequences of state failure. Gérard Prunier and Rachel Gisselquist (2003), for example, portray Sudan as a "successfully failed" state, an intentionally hollowed-out entity sustained almost entirely by oil revenue.

From the perspective of conflict and security, collapsed states can exacerbate regional insecurity, as neighboring states worry that domestic dissidents will seek refuge in the vacuum of the collapsed state. This can be seen in the contemporary case of Somalia. Widely regarded as a collapsed state, the country has been without a functioning central government since 1991. Though a transitional government exists, it is relatively ineffective and controls little territory within the country. Even then, it relies on military support from Ethiopian and Ugandan forces that operate under UN auspices. Much of the country is under the control of armed militias, including the Islamist group al-Shabaab in the south. In the absence of political authority in the country, practices of maritime piracy have increased off the

coast of Somalia, leading the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to actively patrol the coastline. The United States has focused considerable attention on Somalia, as it fears that al-Shabaab is receiving support from al-Qaeda and training potential terrorists (Lindley 2009). In October 2011, neighboring Kenya sent hundreds of military personnel into Somalia, to secure the border region and thwart kidnappers who were launching incursions into Kenya from Somali territory. In response, al-Shabaab threatened terrorist attacks on Kenya, as it had done against Uganda in 2010 in retaliation for the latter's sending of troops to Somalia in support of the transition government.

Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution

Postconflict African societies often illustrate the truism that peace is fragile. In many cases, a precarious balance exists between renewed conflict and sustained peace, which makes the term "postconflict" more than a little misleading. Some scholars have coined the term "conflict trap" to illustrate that many societies emerge from conflicts with only a fragile "negative" peace in which the structural causes of the conflict, such as underdevelopment and social inequality, go unaddressed (Collier and Sambanis 2002; Collier et al. 2003). It is estimated that half of the countries that are in their first decade of postconflict peace will fall back into conflict within that decade (Walter 2004). How do African conflicts end? What can be done to facilitate the cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a lasting peace?

During the Cold War era, conflicts tended to end through the outright victory of one side over the other. Geopolitical competition between the superpowers exacerbated this situation, given that their approach to resolving conflicts was often to increase support for their beneficiaries. In the post–Cold War era, however, emphasis tends to focus on negotiations, consensus, and compromise. As such, increased attention is given to concepts such as peacekeeping and conflict resolution.

Johan Galtung (1975) distinguishes between peacekeeping, understood as halting violence of a conflict through military intervention; peacemaking, understood as reconciliation through mediation, negotiation, arbitration, and conciliation; and peacebuilding, which achieves social change through socioeconomic reconstruction and development. While the former two can address direct violence, peacebuilding is necessary, Galtung argues, to confront "structural violence" ingrained in such issues as long-term insecurity, economic injustice, and the culture of violence. Galtung's work has had a profound impact on the field of conflict resolution. A more recent theorist, John Paul Lederach (1997), built upon it to argue for the need to move away from a concern with resolving specific issues and toward a focus on restoring and rebuilding relationships. Not confusing effects for cause, the goal for Lederach is the sustainable transformation of societies.

But how does one balance the practical demands of ending an immediate conflict with the long-term aspirations of remaking a society? What mechanisms are available to Africans for these tasks? To what degree have theories of African conflicts informed conflict resolution and peacebuilding? In recent years, there have been a variety of strategies employed for conflict resolution across the continent: diplomatic mediation and negotiations, armed intervention by international organizations such as the United Nations, armed intervention by regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), armed intervention by multinational forces, arms-control verification, humanitarian assistance, election supervision, and postconflict reconstruction.

International Interventions

The era of African independence coincided with an increasingly interventionist United Nations. One of the UN's first experiments in peacekeeping occurred within the context of the 1960 Congo crisis. In the wake of Katanga's secession and the unauthorized deployment of Belgian troops across the country, the Congolese government requested UN intervention and assistance. The subsequent UN operation (ONUC) was initially not authorized by the Security Council to become a party to the internal conflict, but to use force in self-defense only. It was only after increased violence and the murder of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba that the Security Council chose to become further engaged, transforming ONUC from a noninterventionist peacekeeping force into an active participant in the conflict. While some consider the ONUC operation a success, the situation in Congo grew considerably worse after ONUC arrived and its mandate had to be altered before the conflict ended. ONUC helped keep Congo together but its intervention did not resolve any underlying cause of state failure or conflict in the country, as subsequent years would show.

After its intervention in Congo, there was considerable suspicion of the UN across Africa, and the Security Council became less willing to involve its members in African conflicts. During the Cold War, neither superpower was particularly interested in promoting the involvement of multinational peacekeeping forces in what were often regarded as Cold War proxy wars. Thus the 1970s and 1980s witnessed a relative absence of UN-led interventions in Africa, despite numerous armed conflicts. A substantial shift occurred toward the end of the Cold War, when the two superpowers worked together and through the UN to bring about resolution of the seemingly intractable conflict involving Angola, Namibia, and South Africa.

The end of the Cold War reinvigorated humanitarian interventions and UN peacekeeping operations around the globe. From 1987 to 1994, the UN Security Council quadrupled the number of resolutions it issued and tripled the number of peacekeeping operations it authorized. Significantly, it positioned

itself as the global guardian of peace and security by expanding the legitimate reasons for intervention to include protracted civil wars and humanitarian crises (Otunnu and Doyle 1998). A significant expansion of the UN's role was in the peace enforcement mission, regarded by some as "third-generation" peacekeeping. First-generation is usually understood as traditional peacekeeping, in which lightly armed UN forces are stationed between warring factions to monitor a truce or troop withdrawal. Second-generation peacekeeping operations are multidimensional, with the UN becoming more involved in implementing peace agreements, from disarming former combatants and training new security forces to repatriating refugees and monitoring elections. Peace enforcement operations, in contrast, are effectively war-making missions, including enforcement of cease-fires but also military operations to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance or repel aggression (Doyle and Sambanis 2006).

The humanitarian crisis that gripped the collapsed state of Somalia provided the UN Security Council with its first large-scale third-generation peacekeeping intervention in Africa since ONUC in the 1960s. After President Siad Barre fled Somalia in January 1991, a power vacuum existed in the country that none of the warring factions could completely fill. With the collapse of the state, a civil war raged and widespread famine engulfed the country. In response to the growing humanitarian crisis, the UN Security Council authorized military intervention (UNOSOM I). Warring factions agreed to a cease-fire within the capital, Mogadishu, for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, but when the operation was expanded into rural areas, the small contingent of UNOSOM forces came under fire and the situation worsened. The operation was then taken over by UNITAF, a US-led, UN-sanctioned multinational force tasked with providing a peaceful environment for the distribution of humanitarian assistance. While initially driven by humanitarian motives, there was substantial confusion about the scope of the mission. Initially, the United States sought to limit its involvement to just securing the delivery of food, while the UN Secretary-General argued for a broader role that would include disarming the warring militias. After UNITAF was dissolved, UNOSOM II was established, also with US leadership but with an expanded mandate from the Security Council. UNOSOM II took on a more aggressive role, including engaging in a full-scale war with one local warlord, General Farah Aidid. The operation faced considerable opposition, including several battlefield victories for Aidid's forces, which led the United States to withdraw in March 1994 and UNOSOM II to abandon the country the following year. The failure of the UNOSOM missions raised substantial questions about the efficacy of peacekeeping operations in general, and the conflation between peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. Moreover, it raised concerns that military interventions in the context of collapsed states offer few solutions unless tied to long-term programs of "nation building."

When the Rwandan genocide unfolded in 1994, the UN Security Council was paralyzed, in part because the United States refused to become involved in another African conflict that it claimed not to comprehend (Powers 2003). Within the UN itself, nonintervention was frequently touted as the only ethical response, even though there was already a small UN contingent on the ground as part of the Arusha peace process (Barnett 2003). Eventually, the UN was severely criticized from some corners for its inability or unwillingness to intervene in the Rwandan genocide, which contributed, in turn, to a more proactive engagement in subsequent conflicts. As of early 2013, the UN was involved in eight African peacekeeping operations: Burundi, the Central African Republic/Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Darfur, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sudan, and Western Sahara, with discussions of a forthcoming deployment in Mali.

In addition to the more formal roles played by international organizations, international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) are often significant actors in both preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. They frequently serve the vital role of providing early warnings of the outbreak of hostilities, refugee flows, and human rights abuses. They can also be instrumental in facilitating dialogue between parties to ensure that disputes do not become full-fledged conflicts. Likewise, they frequently serve as vital actors in conflict resolution, largely because they are perceived to be neutral entities by the warring parties. For example, the US-based Carter Center was instrumental in facilitating the negotiated settlement of the Ethiopia-Eritrea war. INGOs have also been fruitful in "second track" diplomacy efforts at resolving African conflicts, as was the case in the Mozambican civil war, where St. Egidio, a Vatican-related NGO, was instrumental. At the same time, some observers have noted that the different roles that INGOs and militaries play in peace operations can lead to organizational breakdown and potentially harmful outcomes. For example, Severine Autesserre (2010) and Theodore Trefon (2011a) have both illustrated quite dramatically how peacekeeping operations in the DRC often have been debilitated by the cacophony of interests, with NGOs, international peacekeepers, and domestic interests often undermining each other and occasionally working at cross-purposes.

Regional Organizations and Solutions

Shaped in part by the relatively poor record of UN intervention in African conflicts, a shift in peacekeeping occurred in the 1990s toward regional intervention and finding "African solutions to African problems." As discussed in Chapter 8, it is often assumed that regional organizations are quicker to respond (given their smaller size) and more in tune with the conflict at hand (given proximity and shared cultural background). Neighboring states are likely to suffer the impacts of armed conflict, so they may

have a personal interest in maintaining security and stability within their region.

The African Union's peace and security architecture. The Organization of African Unity resisted taking on peacekeeping operations largely due to its founding precept of noninterference in the domestic affairs of member states, though budget constraints were also a consideration. In fact, the OAU's only substantial peacekeeping operation was a failed 1981 intervention in Chad. The transformation of the OAU into the African Union—discussed in Chapter 8—reflected a "fundamental change in the vision, objectives, and responsibilities entrusted in the organization" (Engel and Porto 2009:82). While the AU was to be guided by the same core principles as the OAU—noninterference and peaceful resolution of disputes—other principles were enshrined in the AU's constitution, such as respect for democratic practices and promotion of human rights. Noting the potential conflict between these principles, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government gave the AU authority to intervene in the affairs of member states in "grave circumstances," namely war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity, with a later amendment adding "serious threats to legitimate order" (Baimu and Sturman 2003). Since its creation, the AU has been involved in armed peacekeeping operations in five member states: Burundi (2003–2004 and since 2007), Sudan (2004–2007), Comoros (2006 and 2008), Somalia (since 2007), and Mali (since 2013).

Central to the transformation of the AU was the creation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Established in 2002, though still very much in its infancy, the APSA includes the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Military Staff Committee, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), and the Panel of the Wise. It also relies on its African Standby Force (ASF), composed of approximately 20,000 soldiers drawn from five regional brigades.[4] Only the PSC has been fully enacted so far. Yet the PSC has faced some practical challenges in fulfilling its broad mandate, which includes peace promotion, conflict prevention, postconflict reconstruction, fighting international terrorism, and developing a common AU defense policy (Engel and Porto 2009). Like all AU organs, it lacks resources. Moreover, it faces "fundamental differences of outlook and style among the regional organizations, reflecting different perceptions of threat, historical experience, and cultural background," which lead to different strategic approaches (Söderbaum and Tavares 2009:71–72).

Even before the official launch of the PSC, the African Union engaged in its first peace operation, in Burundi (AMIB), with some 3,500 troops from Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Africa, in 2003. AMIB faced uncertainty regarding its mandate, financial constraints, and political difficulties due to neighboring states supporting different factions. Yet within a year it had helped stabilize the majority of the country and was generally regarded as a success. The following year, the AU embarked on its mission in Sudan (AMIS), a far larger operation that deployed in Darfur after Sudan rejected a UN intervention. Despite some limited successes, AMIS was ultimately unable to bring stability to the region due to the familiar problems regarding contested mandates, coordination issues, challenges of operating within an ongoing conflict, and lack of resources. The AU also authorized a peacekeeping operation to Comoros (AMISEC) in 2006, composed of 400 troops, mainly to create a stable environment and monitor elections. Despite the relatively smooth results, the democratic process broke down shortly thereafter. South Africa tried to resolve the situation through diplomatic negotiations, but in March 2008 the AU authorized a 1,350-strong force to remove the regime of Mohammed Bacar. While the operation was a success, the government of South Africa criticized it for undermining diplomatic negotiations, while others noted that the AU did not engage in similar actions against coups in other states. In 2013 the AU sent troops to Mali following France's military campaign against Islamist insurgents in the north.

Perhaps the most significant AU peace operation has been the mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which was launched in 2007 and was still unfolding as of 2013. Perhaps the biggest challenge was securing troops for the mission. Until Burundian troops arrived in December 2007, Uganda was the only country to deploy soldiers to AMISOM. Despite scolding from AU commissioner Alpha Konare, member states were extremely reluctant to fulfill their promise of dispatching troops into the Somali conflict zone. The operation has also been undermined by Ethiopia and Kenya, both of which have sent troops into Somalia to pursue their own agendas. Though there were plans to create a UN-supported Internationalization Force in 2008, it never materialized. At the time of writing, a crippled AMISOM force remains in Somalia to back the weak interim government, suffering increasing attacks and casualties, especially at the hands of al-Shabaab militia. For many observers, the AU's engagement in Somalia stands as an unnecessary strategic blunder (Williams 2009).

Regional interventions. The post–Cold War era has also witnessed a greater emphasis on peacekeeping and security by African regional organizations, with interventions by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in Liberia (1990–1998 and 2003), Sierra Leone (1997–2000), Guinea-Bissau (1998–1999), and Côte d'Ivoire (2003–2004); the Southern African Development Community (SADC), in Lesotho (1998) and the DRC (1998); the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), in the Central African Republic (2002–2008); and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), also in the Central African Republic (since 2008).

Peacekeeping operations by regional organizations have faced challenges related to command-and-control, poor coordination between participating states, weak political will, debates around mandates, and limited resources (Hentz, Söderbaum, and Tavares 2009). There have also been significant allegations of corruption and abuse of civilians by ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peacekeepers (Obi 2009). Some Liberians relabeled the mission "Every Car or Moving Object Gone." Of course, allegations of abuse and corruption are not limited to regional missions and have also characterized international operations, as evidenced by charges of rape and abuse by UN troops in the DRC and elsewhere. Finally, it should be noted that regional peacekeeping operations are often seen as vehicles through which regional states strengthen their hegemony and pursue their own foreign policy agendas behind the facade of multilateralism. In the case of ECOMOG, Nigeria clearly played the leading role, while also providing an estimated 80 percent of the troops, 90 percent of the funding, and sustaining the bulk of the casualties (Adebajo and Mustapa 2008). Regardless, regional organizations seem to have become the primary mechanism for peacekeeping operations across the continent, a point we return to in Chapter 8.

Postconflict Justice

Postconflict societies tend to experience periods of intense political upheaval. The central quandary is whether the crimes and atrocities that were committed during the preceding conflict should be prosecuted or forgotten. Will recalling and prosecuting those crimes contribute to or undermine reconciliation? What mechanisms should be used in the attempt to balance the competing demands for accountability and reconciliation?

In many contemporary postconflict societies, a focus is placed on achieving transitional justice, which comes in different models (Bassiouni 2002). The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), created by the UN to prosecute crimes committed during the 1994 genocide, provides an example of the international judicial model. The government of Rwanda initially supported its creation, but became the only country to vote against approving the ICTR's mandate. It objected to the absence of the death penalty, the method used to appoint the ad hoc tribunal's judges, and its location in Arusha, Tanzania. Since its establishment, the government continues to criticize the tribunal's high cost, extremely slow pace, and limited prosecutions. Ironically, the ICTR is completely the creation of the international community and is operating over the objections of the government of Rwanda, which has chosen to focus on its *gacaca* justice institutions (Jones 2010).

Partly in response to the Rwandan genocide, the international community established the permanent International Criminal Court in 1998, which

about half of Africa's states have ratified to date. The ICC can investigate and prosecute international crimes only, namely genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression, and only in cases where a state's domestic judicial system is unable or unwilling to do so. Since its creation, the ICC has received complaints concerning crimes in at least 139 countries, but as of 2012 had opened investigation into seven cases, all of them in Africa: the Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, the DRC, Kenya, Libya, Sudan, and Uganda. The first arrest warrant issued by the ICC was for Joseph Kony, the leader of Uganda's Lord's Resistance Army, and four of his lieutenants. Other cases include Thomas Lubanga, Jean-Pierre Mbemba, and Bosco Ntaganda, all Congolese rebel leaders or warlords; Sudan's president, Omar al-Bashir (accused of crimes in Darfur); as well as Kenya's Uhuru Kenyatta (son of the country's first president, Jomo, who was himself elected president in 2013), and three other politicians (for election-related violence in 2007). In 2011, Côte d'Ivoire's ousted Laurent Gbagbo became the first former head of state to appear at the ICC, charged with four counts of crimes against humanity. While many welcomed the prosecution of Gbagbo, it further illustrated the fact that the ICC has so far prosecuted Africans exclusively.

The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) follows the mixed judicial model. The pursuit of postconflict justice in Sierra Leone has employed two concurrent transitional justice mechanisms. On the one hand is the domestic, quasi-juridical Truth and Reconciliation Commission, based upon the South African model. On the other hand is the UN-approved SCSL. This was the first hybrid international court, jointly administered by the United Nations and the government of Sierra Leone. Though the international community largely considered the dual mechanisms in Sierra Leone a success, especially given the conviction of Charles Taylor in 2012, some have been critical of the ways in which the victim-perpetrator dichotomy has been employed. This dichotomy resulted in the further alienation of young, lower-ranking ex-combatants, whose social marginalization contributed to the conflict in the first place, and served as an obstacle for their reintegration into postconflict Sierra Leonean society (Shaw 2010; see also Kelsall 2009).

Unlike the international juridical model, the national juridical model pursues transitional justice through a state's domestic legal system. For example, Ethiopia's transitional government established a special office to prosecute the crimes committed by the military council that had ruled from 1974 to 1991. These were known as the "Red Terror" trials, and were aimed primarily at establishing accountability and exacting revenge for those crimes (Tiba 2011).

The best-known example of quasi-judicial transitional justice is South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), an innovative and courtlike institution established in 1995 to investigate human rights offenses

that took place within the country during the apartheid era, specifically from 1960 to 1994. Victims were invited to testify about their experiences, with a focus on restoring their dignity and assisting their rehabilitation. The perpetrators of violence were also invited to give testimony and could request amnesty from prosecution. Thus, the goal of the TRC was to promote restorative justice, with the focus on uncovering the truth about past abuses, using amnesty as a mechanism rather than punishing the perpetrators. The TRC was an ambitious project that, among other things, sought to enable the development of empathetic interpersonal relationships and promote a sense of personal responsibility for systemic political and economic injustices. Former president F. W. de Klerk appeared before the commission and offered his apologies for the suffering caused by apartheid, but his predecessor, P. W. Botha, refused, dismissing the reconciliation process as a "circus." Generally regarded as a pivotal mechanism in the nonviolent transition to a post-apartheid South Africa, the TRC has also been criticized for offering only the illusion of reconciliation and for failing to hold the most serious perpetrators of violence accountable (du Bois and du Bois-Pedian 2008).

Partly due to frustrations with the traditional models of transitional justice, there has been a recent shift toward customary law and other forms of local justice to complement tribunals and truth commissions (Shaw and Waldorf with Hazan 2010). For example, in northern Uganda, local elites have employed (and reinvented) Acholi rituals to cleanse, integrate, and reconcile former LRA combatants (Allen 2006; Baines 2007). One of the most notable, and controversial, local customary justice mechanisms has been the aforementioned *gacaca* system in Rwanda. Based on reinterpretation of a traditional structure employing community participation, *gacaca* was aimed both at prosecuting genocide suspects, of whom approximately 20,000 were already detained in jails across the country, and at helping to reconstruct Rwanda's damaged social fabric (Clark 2010). *Gacaca* has faced a number of obstacles. At the outset, it has had to deal with a confused, fearful, and deeply traumatized population. The Rwandan state has been accused of coercing participation in the trials and interfering with the hearings in order to collectivize the guilt of all Hutus (Ingelaere 2008). Moreover, *gacaca* has been regarded as extremely one-sided given the complete absence of prosecution of crimes committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (Straus 2008).

Critiques of Conflict Resolution

African peacekeeping has been criticized in part because of its failure to consider insights provided by the theories of African conflict. Some authors, like David Shearer (1997), wonder whether international mediations and

negotiations may prolong conflicts in warlord insurgencies such as in Sierra Leone. Likewise, Christopher Clapham (1998b) has expressed concern that the accepted standardized mechanism for conflict resolution has been defined by, and in the interests of, neoliberal democratic states. Clapham argues that in the post–Cold War era, sovereign states and their territorial integrity have lost their privileged status, democratic values and neoliberal understandings of human rights have been accepted as universal values, and all parties in a conflict have been granted a standing in peacemaking processes. As such, two models of conflict resolution have become dominant: the installation of a constitution based on multiparty democracy (e.g., Angola and Mozambique) and the creation of a coalition government (attempted in Liberia and Somalia). By looking at the Rwandan case in the early 1990s, in which variants of both approaches were applied with disastrous consequences, Clapham suggests that the assumptions in the dominant conflict resolution model are inherently flawed, particularly the notion that combatants might share common values and that mediators are neutral. For Clapham, these assumptions contributed to fostering the conditions from which the 1994 Rwandan genocide emerged.

Mark Duffield (2007) has suggested that contemporary conflict resolution enables Western regulation of the developing world, by stressing that conflicts stem from localized misunderstandings or disagreements, and ignoring issues of inequality, economic growth, and resource distribution. For Duffield, international conflict resolution projects are actually Western interventions that function as new forms of imperialism in which the structural divisions between global development and underdevelopment are maintained and policed. And Pierre Englebert and Denis Tull (2008) have shown that international interventions tend to underappreciate the domestic political logic of African conflicts and might be overly optimistic about their chances of effectively shaping local outcomes.

Inherent in practices of contemporary conflict resolution is the assumption that government institutions need reforming and strengthening. Indeed, there is an uncritical assumption of the need for a strong state. Even when there is general agreement that the central state is one of the main sources of insecurity among the population, externally imposed projects of postconflict restructuring privilege the strengthening of the state. In her work in postconflict DRC, for example, Severine Autesserre (2010) notes that most NGOs and international actors recognize that the Congolese state is a negative force in most people's lives, yet they continue to support state-centric notions of reconstruction that work to strengthen the central state and increase human insecurity on the ground. Indeed, the conflict in the DRC highlights the variances in defining "security" and arguably illustrates the need to shift focus more toward "human" security.

Human Security and Insecurity

Traditionally, national security has been about protection from external military threats or from internal subversion of the established political order. In Africa as elsewhere, "national security" is often more narrowly equated with "regime security." In recent decades there has been a shift in how security is conceived to include a range of other considerations. Barry Buzan, in *People, States, and Fear* (1983), claimed that security should be defined to include political, economic, societal, and environmental aspects. Others have argued that we need to move beyond regarding the state as the primary, if not exclusive, referent for discussions about security. The state, after all, is but one form of social organization that changes over time and place (as the African cases so aptly illustrate). Many scholars and activists have argued that more appropriate referents of security are the biosphere and the individual, together linked by the concept of "human security." This position was embraced by the OAU, which released the Kampala Document in 1991 on security, stating: "The concept of security . . . embraces all aspects of the society including economic, political and social dimensions of individual, family, and community, local and national life. The security of a nation must be construed in terms of the security of the individual citizen to live in peace with access to basic necessities of life while fully participating in the affairs of his/her society in freedom and enjoying all fundamental human rights" (OAU 1991). Of course, this is a far cry from what most African states have achieved at home.[5]

Human Security, Gender, and Development

Feminist security analysis has tended to focus on patriarchal structures of privilege and control that effectively legitimize various forms of violence (Parpart and Thompson 2012). From this perspective, the concept of "national security" has been used to preserve the male-dominated order, rather than protecting the state from external attack (Enloe 1989; Hooper 2001). To what extent is the security discourse gendered? Do women experience security/insecurity differently than men? How does taking a gender analysis of the concept of human security illuminate the different ways women might conceive of and experience insecurity in Africa?

Young men continue to make up the majority of armed combatants in conflicts in general, yet women often bear the brunt of these armed conflicts, and sometimes in ways that are different from men's experience. It has often been noted that women frequently experience armed conflict as victims of rape, torture, and sexual slavery. For example, up to half a million women were raped during the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Because women, and women's bodies, become sites upon which violence is inflicted by men during

armed conflict, warfare is gendered at the most basic level (Baaz and Stern 2013). Yet African women regularly experience violence, rape, and sexual assault in their daily lives, regardless of whether or not they find themselves in a war zone. In 2009, South Africa's Medical Research Council reported that more than a quarter of men in that country admitted to having committed rape, with almost half of those reporting multiple assaults. Reportedly, 60 percent of boys over age eleven believe that forcing someone to have sex is not an act of violence. The study concludes with the observation that "rape is far too common, and its origins too deeply embedded in ideas about South African manhood, for the problem to be predominantly addressed through strategies of apprehension and prosecution of perpetrators" (Jewkes et al. 2009:2). When Jacob Zuma stood trial in 2006 for raping a family friend, he defended himself in court by arguing that the woman "was dressed provocatively and that it was against Zulu culture for a man to leave a sexually aroused woman unsatisfied" (Lindow 2009). For many feminist activists, his acquittal highlighted both the often violent patriarchal structures of African society and the difficulty in finding legal protection, the combination of which increases women's insecurity in their daily lives.

Sources of insecurity for African women are also generated by the gender inequalities in control over resources. As noted in Chapter 3, women's access to land and other types of property is legally limited in many parts of Africa. A significant proportion of married African women do not enjoy control over their own earnings. According to UN statistics, "more than half of rural households and about a quarter of urban households in sub-Saharan Africa lack easy access to drinking water, and most of the burden of water collection falls on women" (United Nations 2010:xi). The burden of meeting basic needs, such as food, clothing, and shelter for themselves and their families, often falls on the female and thus becomes a major source of insecurity. This is often exacerbated by the gender inequalities in power and decisionmaking.

More generally, a number of scholars working from a human security approach have noted the link between development and insecurity. Indeed, it has become commonplace to assert that one cannot have development without security, or security without development. The argument is often made that conflicts are frequently driven by poverty and underdevelopment. The assumption is that the developed world must assist in reducing poverty and developing unstable regions of the world. Human security has thus been increasingly framed in terms of protecting and improving the livelihood of the world's poor and marginalized (UNDP 1994; King and Murray 2001). Yet scholars such as Mark Duffield (2001, 2007) have challenged this assumed connection, suggesting that traditional approaches to development, along with humanitarian intervention, function less as a vehicle of change and more as tools for maintaining global (and gender) inequality.

Human Security and the Environment

Scholars have become concerned about how environmental change will increase human insecurity (see Chapter 6; Deudney and Matthews 1999; Myers 1989, 1993; Ohlsson 1999; Dalby 2002, 2009; Barnett 2001). There has been little consensus, however, around these issues. What exactly does "environmental security" mean? What are the sources of environmental insecurity in Africa? What are some possible responses to these problems?

As discussed earlier, the "neo-Malthusian" argument suggests that environmental degradation can lead to a rise in violent conflict. Numerous scholars working in Africa have been quick to point out, however, that environmental change is not the same as environmental degradation. For example, Melissa Leach and Robin Mearns (1996) challenge various myths and half-truths that have shaped established thinking and policymaking regarding the African environment. James Fairhead and Leach (1996) suggest that many forests have not shrunk, but have been stewarded by the agency of Africans. Likewise, Jeremy Swift (1996) has shown that many of the alarmist pronouncements about desertification in Africa have rested upon misused or misinterpreted data and a conflation of separate processes of environmental change not necessarily linked to desertification. Authors such as these do not imply that there are no serious environmental problems in Africa, but rather urge readers to be much more critical about environmental diagnoses and the data on which these diagnoses are based.

With respect to climate, Africa has the smallest carbon footprint of all continents. In 2007, for example, emissions of carbon dioxide (CO_2) for all of Africa stood at 1 ton per capita, in comparison with a world average of 4.3 tons per capita and US emissions of 19 tons per capita (UNDP 2007). Yet Africans are among the most vulnerable to greenhouse gas emissions, and among the most ill-equipped to respond to them. Many scientists predict that Africa will face increased environmental insecurity as crop production is affected by increased temperatures, changes in rainfall, rising sea levels, and extreme events such as floods and landslides. Temperatures are expected to rise across Africa, which will increase the risk of drought and further stress agricultural production. Given that a high proportion of Africans rely on crops and livestock for their livelihoods, human security on the continent is highly vulnerable to environmental changes. For example, Uganda's Department of Meteorology warned in 2007 that even a slight temperature increase could wipe out most of the country's coffee crop, which is essential to the country for generating export revenues (Republic of Uganda 2007:12–13).

Water remains an extremely important resource in Africa, for people, crops, livestock, and energy generation. Changes in the availability of water would have substantial impacts on many aspects of life for both rural and urban dwellers. Rainfall is expected to decline significantly across most of Africa, including in the Sahara desert. Even where rainfall is predicted to increase, as in eastern Africa, much of this will come in the form of heavier and more torrential conditions, leading to destructive runoff and erosion. During 2007, Africa experienced its worst flooding in three decades, with more than a million people affected in twenty countries. Heavy rains and flooding destroyed homes and crops, leaving many communities extremely short of food and vulnerable to substantial health risks.

There is also concern that deforestation, due to both climate change and overclearing driven by economic pressures, will increase desertification and soil erosion. In many parts of Africa, forests are vital for local livelihoods, yet people's ability to manage, control, and even access these resources is often legally constrained. African forests are also becoming a global commodity, whether as a resource for carbon emission reduction in the attempts to address climate change or as a source of raw materials such as timber, fuel, and pulp (Toulmin 2009:85). Global climate changes will affect the human security of not just rural Africans but also urban dwellers, given the expected increases in heat waves, flooding, and pollution, and the expected rise in sea levels. Those most at risk are the poor majority, who already live in a precarious situation with extremely limited access to water, sanitation, and government services. Despite the fact that Africa will likely suffer the brunt of problems associated with global climate change, it has been powerless to address these security issues in the global arena. This is partly due to the divergent agendas and opinions among African states, but also due to their position within world affairs. It is to these concerns—African international relations both near and far—that we turn next.

Notes

1. The global average length for a conflict is fifteen years. Africa's higher average may be partly explained by such lengthy outliers as the conflicts in Sudan and Ethiopia.

2. World Bank, *World Development Indicators,* http://data.worldbank.org/indicator (accessed March 2013).

3. For excellent general overviews of the development of African warfare, see Reno 2011 and Williams 2011.

4. The five brigades are to be established, one each, by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU).

5. It is worth noting that some scholars find the "human security" concept problematic due to its potentially expansive nature (Paris 2001:88). Other criticisms include the concern that the concept might cause more harm than good, in the sense

that a "human security" approach may raise expectations and be too moralistic to be attainable. Finally, the Copenhagen school of international relations theory has raised considerable concern about the process of "securitization," in which politicians and policymakers increasingly frame a wide range of social issues and practices through the lens of security (Waever et al. 1993; Huysmans 2000).

8

International Relations Near and Far

WHAT IS AFRICA'S PLACE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM? HOW HAVE relations among African states evolved since independence, and what have been the main challenges and achievements of cooperation between them? What issues and themes have characterized African states' relations with their former colonial powers and with other non-African international actors? What avenues have emerged for African agency within international politics?

In scholarly writings about African international relations, it is not uncommon to find at least one of two claims: Africa is politically and economically marginalized within the practice of world politics, and Africa is ignored or marginalized by theorists of world politics. The first suggests that Africa and Africans exist on the margins of the world stage, seemingly besieged by a plethora of unanswered and underreported "crises," ranging from war, poverty, famine, corruption, and disease to environmental degradation. For some, the "external world" largely ignores these tragedies, denying Africans the adequate media coverage and policy attention they might need to find solutions to their predicaments. In some corners of the Western popular press, Africa is repeatedly portrayed as a helpless, collapsing continent in need of saving but, at the same time, seemingly beyond comprehension and salvation (Kaplan 1994; *The Economist* 2000b). This portrayal is often underpinned by an assumption that Africans and African states have very little political or economic weight in world affairs. From this position, an image emerges of Africa at the margins of world affairs, with external forces (be they foreign states, markets, or institutions) acting upon the continent unimpeded because of Africa's negligible agency.

That Africa suffers rather severe problems associated with poverty and underdevelopment cannot be dismissed. Yet it would be a mistake to conclude that Africans or African states lack agency in their own affairs. As noted throughout this book, ordinary Africans are neither passive nor