US Counterinsurgency Doctrine, Practice, and the Afghanistan Case: Dr. Terry Tucker

                                       Terry Tucker and Afghan Interpreter, 2011

A woman begs in bombed city 

US Counterinsurgency Doctrine is a synthesis of lessons learned over the century, and continues to be a dynamic process. Dr. Terry Tucker, of the Army Lessons Learned division of the Department of Defense, is also a war historian. After 54 months in Afghanistan training Afghani and Coalition Forces, Dr. Tucker now synthesizes Lessons Learned using his intake work with returning troops, trains deploying troops and works to advance the effectiveness of Counterinsurgency.

In this Policy Pace interview with Paula LeRoy, MAIPS Security and Development from Monterey Institute of International Studies, Dr. Tucker gives examples of counterinsurgency principles and practices and particularly elaborates on the Afghanistan counterinsurgency operations. With candor about the mistakes made, regime change, future outlook, and stabilization difficulties, the Afghanistan case is reviewed.

Click here to download the hour long interview.

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Mismatched Military Mission in the Afghanistan Theater: Lessons Learned? with Terry Tucker

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Dr. Terry Tucker, of the Department of Army Lessons Learned, summarizes his varied experience in counterinsurgency that includes working for the DEA, Saudia Royal Army, and the ISAF training Afghan and Coalition forces until 2010. Paula LeRoy hosts the first in the series of four interviews for Policy Pace with Dr. Tucker about counterinsurgency, military-civilian integration and Afghanistan.

The interview begins with analyzing how the military’s mission was mismatched with the skills set and history of military training (doctrine). Then recognizing the economic and political issues that color the conflict, a recap of the Powell and Bush doctrine requires a revisiting of Westphalia and Geneva Hague’s definitions of war.

The strength of Al-Queda is evaluated in terms of how war was “declared,” the impetus of fear, and the possibility that the US’s aggressive response has led to its own diminishment.  Fifteen minutes into the interview, Dr. Tucker elaborates on several examples of improvements in the use of soft power, cultural and language sensitivity, showing some lessons learned. The final part, considers conflict as a social movement, a theory which forms the basis of present day counterinsurgency tactics.

Click here to download the audio in MP3 format. The entire interview is 46 minutes.Add Media

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