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# **Distinction**

A Social Critique of the  
Judgement of Taste

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Harvard University Press  
Cambridge, Massachusetts  
1984

# Introduction

You said it, my good knight! There ought to be laws to protect the body of acquired knowledge.

Take one of our good pupils, for example: modest and diligent, from his earliest grammar classes he's kept a little notebook full of phrases.

After hanging on the lips of his teachers for twenty years, he's managed to build up an intellectual stock in trade; doesn't it belong to him as if it were a house, or money?

Paul Claudel, *Le soulier de satin*, Day III, Scene ii

There is an economy of cultural goods, but it has a specific logic. Sociology endeavours to establish the conditions in which the consumers of cultural goods, and their taste for them, are produced, and at the same time to describe the different ways of appropriating such of these objects as are regarded at a particular moment as works of art, and the social conditions of the constitution of the mode of appropriation that is considered legitimate. But one cannot fully understand cultural practices unless 'culture', in the restricted, normative sense of ordinary usage, is brought back into 'culture' in the anthropological sense, and the elaborated taste for the most refined objects is reconnected with the elementary taste for the flavours of food!

Whereas the ideology of charisma regards taste in legitimate culture as a gift of nature, scientific observation shows that cultural needs are the product of upbringing and education: surveys establish that all cultural practices (museum visits, concert-going, reading etc.), and preferences in literature, painting or music, are closely linked to educational level (measured by qualifications or length of schooling) and secondarily to social origin.<sup>1</sup> The relative weight of home background and of formal education (the effectiveness and duration of which are closely dependent on social origin) varies according to the extent to which the different cultural practices are recognized and taught by the educational system, and the influence of social origin is strongest—other things being equal—in 'extra-curricular' and avant-garde culture. To the socially recognized hierarchy of the arts, and within each of them, of genres, schools or periods, corresponds a social hierarchy of the consumers. This predisposes

castes to function as markers of 'class'. The manner in which culture has been acquired lives on in the manner of using it: the importance attached to manners can be understood once it is seen that it is these imponderables of practice which distinguish the different—and ranked—modes of culture acquisition, early or late, domestic or scholastic, and the classes of individuals which they characterize (such as 'pedants' and *moulinets*). Culture also has its titles of nobility—awarded by the educational system—and its pedigrees, measured by seniority in admission to the nobility.

The definition of cultural nobility is the stake in a struggle which has gone on unceasingly, from the seventeenth century to the present day, between groups differing in their ideas of culture and of the legitimate relation to culture and to works of art, and therefore differing in the conditions of acquisition of which these dispositions are the product.<sup>2</sup> Even in the classroom, the dominant definition of the legitimate way of appropriating culture and works of art favours those who have had early access to legitimate culture, in a cultured household, outside of scholastic disciplines, since even within the educational system it devalues scholarly knowledge and interpretation as 'scholastic' or even 'pedantic' in favour of direct experience and simple delight.

The logic of what is sometimes called, in typically 'pedantic' language, the 'reading' of a work of art, offers an objective basis for this opposition. Consumption is, in this case, a stage in a process of communication, that is, an act of deciphering, decoding, which presupposes practical or explicit mastery of a cipher or code. In a sense, one can say that the capacity to see (*voir*) is a function of the knowledge (*savoir*), or concepts, that is, the words, that are available to name visible things, and which are, as it were, programmes for perception. A work of art has meaning and interest only for someone who possesses the cultural competence, that is, the code, into which it is encoded. The conscious or unconscious implementation of explicit or implicit schemes of perception and appreciation which constitutes pictorial or musical culture is the hidden condition for recognizing the styles characteristic of a period, a school or an author, and, more generally, for the familiarity with the internal logic of works that aesthetic enjoyment presupposes. A beholder who lacks the specific code feels lost in a chaos of sounds and rhythms, colours and lines, without rhyme or reason. Not having learnt to adopt the adequate disposition, he stops short at what Erwin Panofsky calls the 'sensible properties', perceiving a skin as downy or lace-work as delicate, or at the emotional resonances aroused by these properties, referring to 'austere' colours or a 'joyful' melody. He cannot move from the 'primary stratum of the meaning we can grasp on the basis of our ordinary experience' to the 'stratum of secondary meanings', i.e., the 'level of the meaning of what is signified', unless he possesses the concepts which go beyond the sensible properties and which identify the specifically stylistic properties of the

work.<sup>3</sup> Thus the encounter with a work of art is not 'love at first sight' as is generally supposed, and the act of empathy, *Einfühlung*, which is the art-lover's pleasure, presupposes an act of cognition, a decoding operation, which implies the implementation of a cognitive achievement, a cultural code.<sup>4</sup>

This typically intellectualist theory of artistic perception directly contradicts the experience of the art-lovers closest to the legitimate definition: acquisition of legitimate culture by insensible familiarization within the family circle tends to favour an enchanted experience—of culture which implies forgetting the acquisition.<sup>5</sup> The 'eye' is a product of history reproduced by education. This is true of the mode of artistic perception now accepted as legitimate, that is, the aesthetic disposition, the capacity to consider in and for themselves, as form rather than function, not only the works designated for such apprehension, i.e., legitimate works of art, but everything in the world, including cultural objects which are not yet consecrated—such as, at one time, primitive arts, or, nowadays, popular photography or kitsch—and natural objects. The 'pure' gaze is a historical invention linked to the emergence of an autonomous field of artistic production, that is, a field capable of imposing its own norms on both the production and the consumption of its products.<sup>6</sup> An art which, like all Post-Impressionist painting, is the product of an artistic intention which asserts the primacy of the mode of representation over the object of representation demands categorically an attention to form which previous art only demanded conditionally.

The pure intention of the artist is that of a producer who aims to be autonomous, that is, entirely the master of his product, who tends to reject not only the 'programmes' imposed a priori by scholars and scribes, but also—following the old hierarchy of doing and saying—the interpretations superimposed a posteriori on his work. The production of an 'open work', intrinsically and deliberately polysemic, can thus be understood as the final stage in the conquest of artistic autonomy by poets and, following in their footsteps, by painters, who had long been reliant on writers and their work of 'showing' and 'illustrating'. To assert the autonomy of production is to give primacy to that of which the artist is master, i.e., form, manner, style, rather than the 'subject', the external referent, which involves subordination to functions—even if only the most elementary one, that of representing, signifying, saying something. It also means a refusal to recognize any necessity other than that inscribed in the specific tradition of the artistic discipline in question: the shift from an art which imitates nature to an art which imitates art, deriving from its own history the exclusive source of its experiments and even of its breaks with tradition. An art which ever increasingly contains reference to its own history demands to be perceived historically; it asks to be referred not to an external referent, the represented or designated 'reality', but to the universe of past and present works of art. Like artistic produc-

tion, in that it is generated in a field, aesthetic perception is necessarily historical, inasmuch as it is differential, relational, attentive to the deviations (*écarts*) which make styles. Like the so-called naive painter who, operating outside the field and its specific traditions, remains external to the history of the art, the 'naive' spectator cannot attain a specific grasp of works of art which only have meaning—or value—in relation to the specific history of an artistic tradition. The aesthetic disposition demanded by the products of a highly autonomous field of production is inseparable from a specific cultural competence. This historical culture functions as a principle of pertinence which enables one to identify, among the elements offered to the gaze, all the distinctive features and only these, by referring them, consciously or unconsciously, to the universe of possible alternatives. This mastery is, for the most part, acquired simply by contact with works of art—that is, through an implicit learning analogous to that which makes it possible to recognize familiar faces without explicit rules or criteria—and it generally remains at a practical level; it is what makes it possible to identify styles, i.e., modes of expression characteristic of a period, a civilization or a school, without having to distinguish clearly, or state explicitly, the features which constitute their originality. Everything seems to suggest that even among professional valuers, the criteria which define the stylistic properties of the 'typical works' on which all their judgements are based usually remain implicit.

The pure gaze implies a break with the ordinary attitude towards the world, which, given the conditions in which it is performed, is also a social separation. Orregu y Gasset can be believed when he attributes to modern art a systematic refusal of all that is 'human', i.e., generic, common—as opposed to distinctive, or distinguished—namely, the passions, emotions and feelings which 'ordinary' people invest in their 'ordinary' lives. It is as if the 'popular aesthetic' (the quotation marks are there to indicate that this is an aesthetic 'in itself' not 'for itself') were based on the affirmation of the continuity between art and life, which implies the subordination of form to function. This is seen clearly in the case of the novel and especially the theatre, where the working-class audience refuses any sort of formal experimentation and all the effects which, by introducing a distance from the accepted conventions (as regards scenery, plot etc.), tend to distance the spectator, preventing him from getting involved and fully identifying with the characters. (I am thinking of Brechtian alienation or the disruption of plot in the *nouveau roman*). In contrast to the detachment and disinterestedness which aesthetic theory regards as the only way of recognizing the work of art for what it is, i.e., autonomous, self-interesting, the 'popular aesthetic' ignores or refuses the refusal of 'facile' involvement and 'vulgar' enjoyment, a refusal which is the basis of the taste for formal experiment. And popular judgements of paintings or photographs spring from an 'aesthetic' (in fact it is an

ethos) which is the exact opposite of the Kantian aesthetic. Whereas, in order to grasp the specificity of the aesthetic judgement, Kant strove to distinguish that which pleases from that which gratifies and, more generally, to distinguish disinterestedness, the sole guarantor of the specifically aesthetic quality of contemplation, from the interest of reason which defines the Good, working-class people expect every image to explicitly perform a function, if only that of a sign, and their judgements make reference, often explicitly, to the norms of morality or agreeableness. Whether rejecting or praising, their appreciation always has an ethical basis.

Popular taste applies the schemes of the ethos, which pertain in the ordinary circumstances of life, to legitimate works of art, and so performs a systematic reduction of the things of art to the things of life. The very seriousness (or naivety) which this taste invests in fictions and representations demonstrates a contrario that pure taste performs a suspension of 'naive' involvement which is one dimension of a 'quasi-judic' relationship with the necessities of the world. Intellectuals could be said to believe in the representation—literature, theatre, painting—more than in the things represented, whereas the people chiefly expect representations and the conventions which govern them to allow them to believe 'naively' in the things represented. The pure aesthetic is rooted in an ethic, or rather, an ethos of elective distance from the necessities of the natural and social world, which may take the form of moral agnosticism (visible when ethical transgression becomes an artistic *parti pris*) or of an aestheticism which presents the aesthetic disposition as a universally valid principle and takes the bourgeois denial of the social world to its limit. The detachment of the pure gaze cannot be dissociated from a general disposition towards the world which is the paradoxical product of conditioning by negative economic necessities—a life of ease—that tends to induce an active distance from necessity.

Although art obviously offers the greatest scope to the aesthetic disposition, there is no area of practice in which the aim of purifying, refining and sublimating primary needs and impulses cannot assert itself, no area in which the stylization of life, that is, the primacy of forms, over function, of manner over matter, does not produce the same effects. And nothing is more distinctive, more distinguished, than the capacity to confer aesthetic status on objects that are banal or even 'common' (because the 'common' people make them their own, especially for aesthetic purposes), or the ability to apply the principles of a 'pure' aesthetic to the most everyday choices of everyday life, e.g., in cooking, clothing or decoration, completely reversing the popular disposition which annexes aesthetics to ethics.

In fact, through the economic and social conditions which they presuppose, the different ways of relating to realities and fictions, of believing in fictions and the realities they simulate, with more or less distance

and detachment, are very closely linked to the different possible positions in social space and, consequently, bound up with the systems of dispositions (*habitus*) characteristic of the different classes and class fractions. Taste classifies, and it classifies the classifier. Social subjects, classified by their classifications, distinguish themselves by the distinctions they make, between the beautiful and the ugly, the distinguished and the vulgar, in which their position in the objective classifications is expressed or betrayed. And statistical analysis does indeed show that oppositions similar in structure to those found in cultural practices also appear in eating habits. The antithesis between quantity and quality, substance and form, corresponds to the opposition—linked to different distances from necessity—between the taste of necessity, which favours the most 'filling' and most economical foods, and the taste of liberty—or luxury—which shifts the emphasis to the manner (of presenting, serving, eating etc.) and tends to use stylized forms to deny function.

The science of taste and of cultural consumption begins with a transgression that is in no way aesthetic: it has to abolish the sacred frontier which makes legitimate culture a separate universe, in order to discover the intelligible relations which unite apparently incommensurable choices, such as preferences in music and food, painting and sport, literature and hairstyle. This barbarous reintegration of aesthetic consumption into the world of ordinary consumption abolishes the opposition, which has been the basis of high aesthetics since Kant, between the 'taste of sense' and the 'taste of reflection', and between facile pleasure, pleasure reduced to a pleasure of the senses, and pure pleasure, pleasure purified of pleasure, which is predisposed to become a symbol of moral excellence and a measure of the capacity for sublimation which defines the truly human man. The culture which results from this magical division is sacred. Cultural consecration does indeed confer on the objects, persons and situations it touches, a sort of ontological promotion akin to a transubstantiation. Proof enough of this is found in the two following quotations, which might almost have been written for the delight of the sociologist:

'What struck me most is this: nothing could be obscene on the stage of our premier theatre, and the ballerinas of the Opera, even as naked dancers, sylphs, sprites or Bacchae, retain an inviolable purity.'<sup>7</sup>

'There are obscene postures: the stimulated intercourse which offends the eye. Clearly, it is impossible to approve, although the interpolation of such gestures in dance routines does give them a symbolic and aesthetic quality which is absent from the intimate scenes the cinema daily flaunts before its spectators' eyes ... As for the nude scene, what can one say, except that it is brief and theatrically not very effective? I will not say it is chaste or innocent, for nothing commercial can be so described. Let us say it is not shocking, and that the chief objection is that it serves as a box-office gimmick ... In *Hair*, the nakedness fails to be symbolic.'<sup>8</sup>

The denial of lower, coarse, vulgar, venal, servile—in a word, natural—employment, which constitutes the sacred sphere of culture, implies an affirmation of the superiority of those who can be satisfied with the sublimated, refined, disinterested, gratuitous, distinguished pleasures forever closed to the profane. That is why art and cultural consumption are predisposed, consciously and deliberately or not, to fulfil a social function of legitimating social differences.

# I The Aristocracy of Culture

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Sociology is rarely more akin to social psychoanalysis than when it confronts an object like taste, one of the most vital stakes in the struggles fought in the field of the dominant class and the field of cultural production. This is not only because the judgement of taste is the supreme manifestation of the discernment which, by reconciling reason and sensibility, the pedant who understands without feeling and the *mondain*<sup>1</sup> who enjoys without understanding, defines the accomplished individual. Nor is it solely because every rule of propriety designates in advance the project of defining this indefinable essence as a clear manifestation of philistinism—whether it be the academic propriety which, from Alois Riegl and Heinrich Wölfflin to Elie Faure and Henri Focillon, and from the most scholastic commentators on the classics to the avant-garde semiologist, insists on a formalist reading of the work of art; or the upperclass propriety which treats taste as one of the surest signs of true nobility and cannot conceive of referring taste to anything other than itself.

Here the sociologist finds himself in the area par excellence of the denial of the social. It is not sufficient to overcome the initial self-evident appearances, in other words, to relate taste, the uncreated source of all 'creation', to the social conditions of which it is the product, knowing full well that the very same people who strive to repress the clear relation between taste and education, between culture as the state of that which is cultivated and culture as the process of cultivating, will be amazed that anyone should expend so much effort in scientifically proving that self-evident fact. He must also question that relationship, which only appears to be self-explanatory, and unravel the paradox whereby the relationship

with educational capital is just as strong in areas which the educational system does not teach. And he must do this without ever being able to appeal unconditionally to the positivistic arbitration of what are called facts. Hidden behind the statistical relationships between educational capital or social origin and this or that type of knowledge or way of applying it, there are relationships between groups maintaining different, and even antagonistic, relations to culture, depending on the conditions in which they acquired their cultural capital and the markets in which they can derive most profit from it. But we have not yet finished with the self-evident. The question itself has to be questioned—in other words, the relation to culture which it tacitly privileges—in order to establish whether a change in the content and form of the question would not be sufficient to transform the relationships observed. There is no way out of the game of culture; and one's only chance of objectifying the true nature of the game is to objectify as fully as possible the very operations which one is obliged to use in order to achieve that objectification. *De la fabula narratur*. The reminder is meant for the reader as well as the sociologist. Paradoxically, the games of culture are protected against objectification by all the partial objectifications which the actors involved in the game perform on each other: scholarly critics cannot grasp the objective reality of society aesthetes without abandoning their grasp of the true nature of their own activity; and the same is true of their opponents. The same law of mutual lucidity and reflexive blindness governs the antagonism between 'intellectuals' and 'bourgeois' (or their spokesmen in the field of production). And even when bearing in mind the function which legitimate culture performs in class relations, one is still liable to be led into accepting one or the other of the self-interested representations of culture which 'intellectuals' and 'bourgeois' endlessly fling at each other. Up to now the sociology of the production and producers of culture has never escaped from the play of opposing images, in which 'right-wing intellectuals' and 'left-wing intellectuals' (as the current taxonomy puts it) subject their opponents and their strategies to an objectivist reduction which vested interests make that much easier. The objectification is always bound to remain partial, and therefore false, so long as it fails to include the point of view from which it speaks and so fails to construct the game as a whole. Only at the level of the field of positions is it possible to grasp both the generic interests associated with the fact of taking part in the game and the specific interests attached to the different positions, and, through this, the form and content of the self-positionings through which these interests are expressed. Despite the aura of objectivity they like to assume, neither the 'sociology of the intellectuals', which is traditionally the business of 'right-wing intellectuals', nor the critique of 'right-wing thought', the traditional speciality of 'left-wing intellectuals', is anything more than a series of symbolic agitations which take on additional force when they dress themselves up in the impeccable neutrality of science. They tacitly agree in leaving hid-

den what is essential, namely the structure of objective positions which is the source, *inter alia*, of the view which the occupants of each position can have of the occupants of the other positions and which determines the specific form and force of each group's propensity to present and receive a group's partial truth as if it were a full account of the objective relations between the groups.

The analyses presented in this book are based on a survey by questionnaire, carried out in 1963 and 1967-68, on a sample of 1,217 people. (Appendix 1 gives full information concerning the composition of the sample, the questionnaire, and the main procedures used to analyze it. Appendix 3 contains the statistical data drawn from the survey, as well as data from other sources.) The survey sought to determine how the cultivated disposition and cultural competence that are revealed in the nature of the cultural goods consumed, and in the way they are consumed, vary according to the category of agents and the area to which they applied, from the most legitimate areas such as painting or music to the most personal ones such as clothing, furniture or cookery, and, within the legitimate domains, according to the markets—academic and 'non-academic'—in which they may be placed. Two basic facts were thus established: on the one hand, the very close relationship linking cultural practices (or the corresponding opinions) to educational capital (measured by qualifications) and, secondarily, to social origin (measured by father's occupation); and, on the other hand, the fact that, at equivalent levels of educational capital, the weight of social origin in the practice and preference-explaining system increases as one moves away from the most legitimate areas of culture.

The more the competences measured are recognized by the school system, and the more 'academic' the techniques used to measure them, the stronger is the relation between performance and educational qualification. The latter, as a more or less adequate indicator of the number of years of scholastic inculcation, guarantees cultural capital more or less completely, depending on whether it is inherited from the family or acquired at school, and so it is an unequally adequate indicator of this capital. The strongest correlation, between performance and educational capital qua cultural capital recognized and guaranteed by the educational system (which is very unequally responsible for its acquisition) is observed when, with the question on the composers of a series of musical works, the survey takes the form of a very 'scholastic' exercise on knowledge very close to that taught by the educational system and strongly recognized in the academic market.

The interviewer read out a list of sixteen musical works and asked the respondent to name the composer of each. Sixty-seven percent of those with only a CEP or a CAP could not identify more than two composers (out of

sixteen works), compared to 45 percent of those with a BEPC, 19 percent of those with the *baccalauréat*, 17 percent of those who had gone to a technical college (*petite école*) or started higher education and only 7 percent of those having a qualification equal or superior to a *licence*.<sup>2</sup> Whereas none of the manual or clerical workers questioned was capable of naming twelve or more of the composers of the sixteen works, 52 percent of the 'artistic producers' and the teachers (and 78 percent of the teachers in higher education) achieved this score.

The rate of non-response to the question on favourite painters or pieces of music is also closely correlated with level of education, with a strong opposition between the dominant class on the one hand and the working classes, craftsmen and small tradesmen on the other. (However, since in this case whether or not people answered the question doubtless depended as much on their dispositions as on their pure competence, the cultural pretensions of the new *petite bourgeoisie*—junior commercial executives, the medical and social services, secretaries, and the various cultural intermediaries (see Chapter 6)—found an outlet here.) Similarly, listening to the most 'highbrow' radio stations, France-Musique and France-Culture, and to musical or cultural broadcasts, owning a record-player, listening to records (without specifying the type, which minimizes the differences), visiting art galleries, and knowledge of painting—features which are strongly correlated with one another—obey the same logic and, being strongly linked to educational capital, set the various classes and class fractions in a clear hierarchy (with a reverse distribution for listening to variety programmes). In the case of activities like the visual arts, or playing a musical instrument, which presupposes a cultural capital generally acquired outside the educational system and (relatively) independent of the level of academic certification, the correlation with social class, which is again strong, is established through social trajectory (which explains the special position of the new *petite bourgeoisie*).

The closer one moves towards the most legitimate areas, such as music or painting, and, within these areas, which can be set in a hierarchy according to their modal degree of legitimacy, towards certain genres or certain works, the more the differences in educational capital are associated with major differences (produced in accordance with the same principles) between genres, such as opera and operetta, or quartets and symphonies, between periods, such as contemporary and classical, between composers and the *Concerto for the Left Hand* (which, as will become apparent, are distinguished by the modes of acquisition and consumption which they presuppose), are opposed to the Strauss waltzes and the *Sabre Dance*, pieces which are devalued either by belonging to a lower genre ('light music') or by their popularization (since the dialectic of distinction and pretension designates as devalued 'middle-brow' art those legitimate works which become 'popularized'),<sup>3</sup> just as, in the world of song, Georges Brassens and Léo Ferré are opposed to Georges Guétary and Petula Clark, these differences corresponding in each case to differences in educational capital (see table 1).

In fact, the weight of the secondary factors—composition of capital, vol-

Table 1 Class preferences for singers and music.<sup>a</sup>

Classes	Educational qualification	N	Singers				Music			
			Guétary	P. Clark	Brassens	Ferré	Blue Danube	Sabre Dance	Well-Tempered Clavier	Concerto for Left Hand
Working	None, CEP, CAP	143	33.0	31.0	38.0	20.0	65.0	28.0	1.0	0
	BEPC and above	18	17.0	17.0	61.0	22.0	62.5	12.5	0	0
Middle	None, CEP, CAP	243	23.0	29.0	41.0	21.0	64.0	26.0	1.5	1.5
	BEPC and above	335	12.5	19.0	47.5	39.0	27.0	16.0	8.0	4.0
	BEPC, bac	289	12.0	21.0	46.5	39.0	31.0	17.5	5.0	4.0
	higher education	46	17.0	9.0	54.0	39.0	3.0	5.0	21.0	4.0
Upper	None, CEP, CAP	25	16.0	44.0	36.0	12.0	17.0	21.0	8.0	8.0
	BEPC and above	432	5.0	17.0	74.0	35.0	16.0	8.0	15.0	13.0
	BEPC, bac	107	8.5	24.0	65.0	29.0	14.0	11.0	3.0	6.0
	higher education	325	4.0	14.5	77.0	39.0	16.5	7.0	19.0	15.0
	technical college	80	5.0	20.0	73.5	32.0	19.5	5.5	10.0	18.0
	licence	174	4.5	17.0	73.0	34.5	17.0	9.5	29.5	12.0
	agrég., grande école	71	0	3.0	90.0	49.5	11.5	3.0	29.5	12.0

a. The table (e.g., first row) is read as follows: out of every 100 working-class respondents with either no qualification, a CEP or a CAP, 33 choose Guétary and 31 Petula Clark among their three favourite singers

(from a list of twelve); 65 choose the *Blue Danube* and 28 the *Sabre Dance* among their three favourite works of music (from a list of sixteen).




ume of inherited cultural capital (or social trajectory), age, place of residence—varies with the works. Thus, as one moves towards the works that are least legitimate (at the moment in question), factors such as age become increasingly important; in the case of *Rhapsody in Blue* or the *Hungarian Rhapsody*, there is a closer correlation with age than with education, father's occupational category, sex or place of residence.

Thus, of all the objects offered for consumers' choice, there are none more classifying than legitimate works of art, which, while distinctive in general, enable the production of distinctions ad infinitum by playing on divisions and sub-divisions into genres, periods, styles, authors etc. Within the universe of particular tastes which can be recreated by successive divisions, it is thus possible, still keeping to the major oppositions, to distinguish three zones of taste which roughly correspond to educational levels and social classes: (1) *Legitimate taste*, i.e., the taste for legitimate works, here represented by the *Well-Tempered Clavier* (see figure 1, histogram 1), the *Art of Fugue* or the *Concerto for the Left Hand*, or, in painting, Breughel or Goya, which the most self-assured aesthetes can combine with the most legitimate of the arts that are still in the process of legitimization—cinema, jazz or even song (here, for example, Léo Ferré, Jacques Douai)—increases with educational level and is highest in those fractions of the dominant class that are richest in educational capital. (2) *'Middle-brain' taste*, which brings together the minor works of the major arts, in this case *Rhapsody in Blue* (histogram 2), the *Hungarian Rhapsody*, or in painting, Utrillo, Buffet or even Renoir, and the major works of the minor arts, such as Jacques Brel and Gilbert Bécaud in the art of song, is more common in the middle classes (*classes moyennes*) than in the working classes (*classes populaires*) or in the 'intellectual' fractions of the dominant class. (3) Finally, *'popular' taste*, represented here by the choice of works of so-called 'light' music or classical music devalued by popularization, such as the *Blue Danube* (histogram 3), *La Traviata* or *L'Arlésienne*, and especially songs totally devoid of artistic ambition or pretension such as those of Luis Mariano, Guétary or Pétula Clark, is most frequent among the working classes and varies in inverse ratio to educational capital (which explains why it is slightly more common among industrial and commercial employers or even senior executives than among primary teachers and cultural intermediaries).

The three profiles presented in figure 1 are perfectly typical of those that are found when one draws a graph of the distribution of a whole set of choices characteristic of different class fractions (arranged in a hierarchy, within each class, according to educational capital). The first one (the *Well-Tempered Clavier*) reappears in the case of all the authors or works named above, and also for such choices in the survey questionnaire (see appendix 1) as 'reading philosophical essays' and 'visiting museums' etc.; the second

Figure 1 Distribution of preferences for three musical works by class fraction.



(*Rhapsody in Blue*) characteristics, in addition to all the works and authors mentioned (plus the *Twilight of the Gods*), 'photography', 'comfortable, cosy home' etc.; and the third (*Blue Danube*) is equally valid for 'love stories' and 'clean, tidy home' etc.

### The Titles of Cultural Nobility

A relationship as close as that between academic capital (measured by duration of schooling) and knowledge or practices in areas as remote from academic education as music or painting, not to mention jazz or the cinema—like the correlation between museum visits and level of education—raises in the highest degree the question of the significance of the relationship, in other words, the question of the real identity of the two linked terms which are defined in their very relationship. One has explained nothing and understood nothing by establishing the existence of a correlation between an 'independent' variable and a 'dependent' variable. Until one has determined what is designated in the particular case, i.e., in each particular relationship, by each term in the relationship (for example, level of education and knowledge of composers), the statistical relationship, however precisely it can be determined numerically, remains a pure datum, devoid of meaning. And the 'intuitive' half-understanding with which sociologists are generally satisfied in such cases, while they concentrate on refining the measurement of the 'intensity' of the relationship, together with the *illusion of the constancy* of the variables or factors resulting from the *nominal identity* of the 'indicators' (whatever they may indicate) or of the terms which designate them, tends to rule out any questioning of the terms of the relationship as to the meaning they take on in that particular relationship and indeed receive from it.

Both terms of the relationship have to be questioned in each case, the independent variable—occupation, sex, age, father's occupation, places of residence etc., which may express very different effects—and the dependent variable, which may manifest dispositions that themselves vary considerably depending on the classes divided up by the independent variables. Thus, for an adequate interpretation of the differences found between the classes or within the same class as regards their relation to the various legitimate arts, painting, music, theatre, literature etc., one would have to analyse fully the social uses, legitimate or illegitimate, to which each of the arts, genres, works or institutions considered lends itself. For example, nothing more clearly affirms one's 'class', nothing more infallibly classifies, than tastes in music. This is of course because, by virtue of the rarity of the conditions for acquiring the corresponding dispositions, there is no more 'classificatory' practice than concert-going or playing a 'noble' instrument (activities which, other things being equal, are less widespread than theatre-going, museum-going or even visits to modern-art galleries). But it is also because the flaunting of 'musical cul-

ture' is not a cultural display like others: as regards its social definition, 'musical culture' is something other than a quantity of knowledge and experiences combined with the capacity to talk about them. Music is the most 'spiritual' of the arts of the spirit and a love of music is a guarantee of 'spirituality'. One only has to think of the extraordinary value nowadays conferred on the lexis of 'listening' by the secularized (e.g., psychoanalytical) versions of religious language. As the countless variations on the soul of music and the music of the soul bear witness, music is bound up with 'interiority' ('inner music') of the 'deepest' sort and *all* concerts are sacred. For a bourgeois world which conceives its relation to the populace in terms of the relationship of the soul to the body, 'insensitivity to music' doubtless represents a particularly unavowable form of materialist coarseness. But this is not all. Music is the 'pure' art par excellence. It says nothing and has *nothing to say*. Never really having an expressive function, it is opposed to drama, which even in its most refined forms still bears a social message and can only be 'put over' on the basis of an immediate and profound affinity with the values and expectations of its audience. The theatre divides its public and divides itself. The Parisian opposition between right-bank and left-bank theatre, bourgeois theatre and avant-garde theatre, is inextricably aesthetic and political. Nothing comparable occurs in music (with some rare, recent exceptions). Music represents the most radical and most absolute form of the negation of the world, and especially the social world, which the bourgeois ethos tends to demand of all forms of art.

For an adequate interpretation of what would be implied in a table correlating occupation, age or sex with a preference for the *Well-Tempered Clavier* or the *Concerto for the Left Hand*, one has to break both with the blind use of indicators and with spurious, essentialist analyses which are merely the universalizing of a particular experience, in order to make completely explicit the multiple, contradictory meanings which these works take on at a given moment for the totality of social agents and in particular for the categories of individuals whom they distinguish or who differ with respect to them (in this particular case, the 'inheritors' and the 'newcomers'). One would have to take account, on the one hand, of the socially pertinent properties attached to each of them, that is, the social image of the works ('Baroque'/'modern', harmony/dissonance, rigour/lyricism etc.), the composers and perhaps especially the corresponding instruments (the sharp, rough timbre of plucked strings/the warm, bourgeois timbre of hammered strings); and, on the other hand, the distributional properties acquired by these works in their relationship (perceived with varying clarity depending on the case) with the different classes or class fractions ('*ça fait...*') and with the corresponding conditions of reception (belated knowledge through records/early knowledge through playing the piano, the bourgeois instrument par excellence).

The opposition found at the level of distributional properties is generally homologous to that found at the level of stylistic characteristics. This is because homology between the positions of the producers (or the works) in the field of production and the positions of the consumers in social space (i.e., in the overall class structure or in the structure of the dominant class) seems to be the most frequent case. Roughly speaking, the amateur of Mallarmé is likely to be to the amateur of Zola as Mallarmé was to Zola. Differences between works are predisposed to express differences between authors, partly because, in both style and content, they bear the mark of their authors' socially constituted dispositions (that is, their social origins, retranslated as a function of the positions in the field of production which these dispositions played a large part in determining); and partly because they remain marked by the social significance which they received from their opposition, and that of their authors, in the field of production (e.g., left/right, clear/obscure etc.) and which is perpetuated by the university tradition.

It is also clear what would be required for an adequate interpretation of the bourgeois predilection for the 'Impressionists', whose simultaneously lyrical and naturalistic adherence to natural or human nature contrasts both with realist or critical representation of the social world (doubtless one dimension of the opposition between Renoir and Goya, not to mention Courbet or Daumier) and with all forms of abstraction. Again, to understand the class distribution of the various sports, one would have to take account of the representation which, in terms of their specific schemes of perception and appreciation, the different classes have of the costs (economic, cultural and 'physical') and benefits attached to the different sports—immediate or deferred 'physical' benefits (health, beauty, strength, whether visible, through 'body-building' or invisible through 'keep-fit' exercises), economic and social benefits (upward mobility etc.), immediate or deferred symbolic benefits linked to the distributional or positional value of each of the sports considered (i.e., all that each of them receives from its greater or lesser rarity, and its more or less clear association with a class, with boxing, football, rugby or body-building evoking the working classes, tennis and skiing the bourgeoisie and golf the upper bourgeoisie), gains in distinction accruing from the effects on the body itself (e.g., slowness, sun-tan, muscles obviously or discreetly visible etc.) or from the access to highly selective groups which some of these sports give (golf, polo etc.).

Thus the only way of completely escaping from the intuitionism which inevitably accompanies positivistic faith in the nominal identity of the indicators would be to carry out a strictly interminable analysis of the social value of each of the properties or practices considered—a Louis XV commode or a Brahms symphony, reading *Historia* or *Le Figaro*, playing rugby

or the accordion and so on. The statistics of the class distribution of newspaper reading would perhaps be interpreted less blindly if sociologists bore in mind Proust's analysis of 'that abominable, voluptuous act called "reading the paper", whereby all the misfortunes and caracisms suffered by the universe in the last twenty-four hours—battles which have cost the lives of fifty thousand men, murders, strikes, bankruptcies, fires, poisonings, suicides, divorces, the cruel emotions of statesman and actor, transmuted into a morning feast for our personal entertainment, make an excellent and particularly bracing accompaniment to a few mouthfuls of *café au lait*.' This description of the aesthete's variant invites an analysis of the class variations and the invariants of the mediated, relatively abstract experience of the social world supplied by newspaper reading, for example, as a function of variations in social and spatial distance (with, at one extreme, the local items in the regional dailies—marriages, deaths, accidents—and, at the other extreme, international news, or, on another scale, the royal engagements and weddings in the glossy magazines) or in political commitment (from the detachment depicted in Proust's text to the activist's outrage or enthusiasm).

In fact, the absence of this kind of preliminary analysis of the social significance of the indicators can make the most rigorous-seeming surveys quite unsuitable for a sociological reading. Because they forget that the apparent constancy of the products conceals the diversity of the social uses they are put to, many surveys on consumption impose on them taxonomic which have sprung straight from the statisticians' social unconscious, associating things that ought to be separated (e.g., white beans and green beans) and separating things that could be associated (e.g., white beans and bananas—the latter are to fruit as the former are to vegetables). What is there to be said about the collection of products brought together by the apparently neutral category 'cereals'—bread, rusks, rice, pasta, flour—and especially the class variations in the consumption of these products, when one knows that 'rice' alone includes 'rice pudding' and *riz au gras*, or rice cooked in broth (which tend to be 'working-class') and 'curried rice' (more 'bourgeois' or, more precisely, 'intellectual'), not to mention 'brown rice' (which suggests a whole life-style)? Though, of course, no 'natural' or manufactured product is equally adaptable to all possible social uses, there are very few that are perfectly 'univocal' and it is rarely possible to deduce the social use from the thing itself. Except for products specially designed for particular use (like 'slimming bread') or closely tied to a class, by tradition (like tea—in France) or price (like caviar), most products only derive their social value from the social use that is made of them. As a consequence, in these areas the only way to find the class variations is to introduce them from the start, by replacing words or things whose apparently univocal meaning creates no difficulty for the abstract classifications of the academic unconscious, with the social uses in which they become fully determined. Hence it is necessary to attend, for example, to *ways* of photographing and *ways* of cooking—in the casserole or the pressure-cooker, i.e., without counting time and money, or quickly and cheaply—or to the products of these operations—family snaps or photos of folk dancing, *boeuf bourguignon*, or curried rice.

Appearances, need I repeat, always support appearances: and sociological science, which cannot find the differences between the social classes unless it introduces them from the start, is bound to appear prejudiced to those who dissolve the differences, in all good faith and with impeccable method, simply by surrendering to positivistic *laissez-faire*.

But the substantialist mode of thinking is perhaps most unrestrained when it comes to the search for 'explanatory factors'. Slipping from the substantive to the substance (to paraphrase Wittgenstein), from the constancy of the substantive to the constancy of the substance, it treats the properties attached to agents—occupation, age, sex, qualifications—as *forces* independent of the relationship within which they 'act'. This eliminates the question of what is determinant in the determinant variable and what is determined in the determined variable, in other words, the question of what, among the properties chosen, consciously or unconsciously, through the indicators under consideration, constitutes the *permanent property* that is really capable of determining the relationship within which it is determined. Purely statistical calculation of the variations in the intensity of the relationship between a particular indicator and any given practice does not remove the need for the specifically sociological calculation of the *effects* which are expressed in the statistical relationship and which statistical analysis, when oriented towards the search for its own intelligibility, can help to discover. One has to take the relationship itself as the object of study and scrutinize its sociological significance (*signification*) rather than its statistical 'significance' (*significativité*); only in this way is it possible to replace the relationship between a supposedly constant variable and different practices by a series of different *effects*—sociologically intelligible constant relationships which are simultaneously revealed and concealed in the statistical relationships between a given indicator and different practices. The truly scientific endeavour has to break with the spurious self-evidences of immediate understanding (to which the pseudo-refinements of statistical analysis—e.g., path analysis—bring unexpected reinforcement). In place of the phenomenal relationship between this or that 'dependent variable' and variables such as level of education or social origin, which are no more than *common-sense notions* and whose apparent 'explanatory power' stems from the mental habits of *common-sense knowledge* of the social world, it aims to establish 'an exact relation of well-defined concepts', the rational principle of the effects which the statistical relationship records despite everything—for example, the relationship between the titles of nobility (or marks of infamy) awarded by the educational system and the practices they imply, or between the disposition required by works of legitimate art and the disposition which, deliberately and consciously or not, is taught in schools.

THE ENTITLEMENT EFFECT. Knowing the relationship which exists between cultural capital inherited from the family and academic capital, by

virtue of the logic of the transmission of cultural capital and the functioning of the educational system, one cannot impute the strong correlation, observed between competence in music or painting (and the practice it presupposes and makes possible) and academic capital, solely to the operation of the educational system (still less to the specifically artistic education it is supposed to give, which is clearly almost non-existent). Academic capital is in fact the guaranteed product of the combined effects of cultural transmission by the family and cultural transmission by the school (the efficiency of which depends on the amount of cultural capital directly inherited from the family). Through its value-inculcating and value-imposing operations, the school also helps (to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the initial disposition, i.e., class of origin) to form a general, transposable disposition towards legitimate culture, which is first acquired with respect to scholastically recognized knowledge and practices but tends to be applied beyond the bounds of the curriculum, taking the form of a 'disinterested' propensity to accumulate experience and knowledge which may not be directly profitable in the academic market.

The educational system defines non-curricular general culture (*la culture 'libre'*), negatively at least, by delimiting, within the dominant culture, the area of what it puts into its syllabuses and controls by its examinations. It has been shown that the most 'scholastic' cultural objects are those taught and required at the lowest levels of schooling (the extreme form of the 'scholastic' being the 'elementary'), and that the educational system sets an increasingly high value on 'general' culture and increasingly refuses 'scholastic' measurements of culture (such as direct, closed questions on authors, dates and events) as one moves towards the highest levels of the system.

In fact, the generalizing tendency of the cultivated disposition is only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for the entrapment of cultural appropriation, which is inscribed, as an objective demand, in membership of the bourgeoisie and in the qualifications giving access to its rights and duties. This is why we must first stop to consider what is perhaps the best-hidden effect of the educational system, the one it produces by imposing 'titles',<sup>6</sup> a particular case of the attribution by status, whether positive (ennobling) or negative (stigmatizing), which every group produces by assigning individuals to hierarchically ordered classes. Whereas the holders of educationally uncertified cultural capital can always be required to prove themselves, because they are only what they do, merely a by-product of their own cultural production, the holders of titles of cultural nobility—like the titular members of an aristocracy, whose 'being', defined by their fidelity to a lineage, an estate, a race, a past, a fatherland or a tradition, is irreducible to any 'doing', to any know-how or function—only have to be what they are, because all their practices derive their value from their authors, being the affirmation and perpetuation of

the essence by virtue of which they are performed.<sup>7</sup> Defined by the titles which predispose and legitimate them in being what they are, which make what they do the manifestation of an essence earlier and greater than its manifestations, as in the Platonic dream of a division of functions based on a hierarchy of beings, they are separated by a difference in kind from the commoners of culture, who are consigned to the doubly devalued status of autodidact and 'stand-in'.<sup>8</sup>

Aristocracies are essentialist. Regarding existence as an emanation of essence, they set no intrinsic value on the deeds and misdeeds enrolled in the records and registries of bureaucratic memory. They prize them only insofar as they clearly manifest, in the nuances of their manner, that their one inspiration is the perpetuating and celebrating of the essence by virtue of which they are accomplished. The same essentialism requires them to impose on themselves what their essence imposes on them—noblesse oblige—to ask of themselves what no one else could ask, to 'live up' to their own essence.

This effect is one of the mechanisms which, in conditions of crisis, cause the most privileged individuals, who remain most attached to the former state of affairs, to be the slowest to understand the need to change strategy and so to fall victim to their own privilege (for example, ruined nobles who refuse to change their ways, or the heirs of great peasant families who remain celibate rather than marry beneath them). It could be shown, in the same way, that the ethic of noblesse oblige, still found in some fractions of the peasantry and traditional craftsmen, contributes significantly to the self-exploitation characteristic of these classes.

This gives us an insight into the effect of academic markers and classifications. However, for a full understanding we have to consider another property of all aristocracies. The essence in which they see themselves refuses to be contained in any definition. Escaping petty rules and regulations, it is, by nature, freedom. Thus, for the academic aristocracy it is one and the same thing to identify with an essence of the 'cultivated man' and to accept the demands implicitly inscribed in it, which increase with the prestige of the title.

So there is nothing paradoxical in the fact that in its ends and means the educational system defines the enterprise of *legitimate 'autodidacticism'* which the acquisition of 'general culture' presupposes, an enterprise that is ever more strongly demanded as one rises in the educational hierarchy (between sections, disciplines, and specialities etc., or between levels). The essentially contradictory phrase 'legitimate autodidacticism' is intended to indicate the difference in kind between the highly valued 'extra-curricular' culture of the holder of academic qualifications and the illegitimate extra-curricular culture of the autodidact. The reader of the popular-science monthly *Science et Vie* who talks about the genetic code

or the incest taboo exposes himself to ridicule as soon as he ventures outside the circle of his peers, whereas Claude Lévi-Strauss or Jacques Monod can only derive additional prestige from their excursions into the field of music or philosophy. Illegitimate extra-curricular culture, whether it be the knowledge accumulated by the self-taught or the 'experience' acquired in and through practice, outside the control of the institution specifically mandated to inculcate it and officially sanction its acquisition, like the art of cooking or herbal medicine, craftsmen's skills or the stand-in's irreplaceable knowledge, is only valorized to the strict extent of its technical efficiency, without any social added-value, and is exposed to legal sanctions (like the illegal practice of medicine) whenever it emerges from the domestic universe to compete with authorized competences.

Thus, it is written into the tacit definition of the academic qualification formally guaranteeing a specific competence (like an engineering diploma) that it really guarantees possession of a 'general culture' whose breadth is proportionate to the prestige of the qualification, and, conversely, that no real guarantee may be sought of what it guarantees formally and really or, to put it another way, of the extent to which it guarantees what it guarantees. This effect of symbolic imposition is most intense in the case of the diplomas consecrating the cultural élite. The qualifications awarded by the French *grandes écoles* guarantee, without any other guarantee, a competence extending far beyond what they are supposed to guarantee. This is by virtue of a clause which, though tacit, is firstly binding on the qualification-holders themselves, who are called upon really to procure the attributes assigned to them by their status.<sup>10</sup>

This process occurs at all stages of schooling, through the manipulation of aspirations and demands—in other words, of self-image and self-esteem—which the educational system carries out by channelling pupils towards prestigious or devalued positions implying or excluding legitimate practice. The effect of 'allocation', i.e., assignment to a section, a discipline (philosophy or geography, mathematics or geology, to take the extremes) or an institution (a *grande école* that is more or less *grande*, or a faculty), mainly operates through the social image of the position in question and the prospects objectively inscribed in it, among the foremost of which are a certain type of cultural accumulation and a certain image of cultural accomplishment.<sup>11</sup> The official differences produced by academic classifications tend to produce (or reinforce) real differences by inducing in the classified individuals a collectively recognized and supported belief in the differences, thus producing behaviours that are intended to bring real being into line with official being. Activities as alien to the explicit demands of the institution as keeping a diary, wearing heavy make-up, theatre-going or going dancing, writing poems or playing rugby can, thus find themselves inscribed in the position allotted within the institution as a tacit demand constantly underlined by various

mediations. Among the most important of these are teachers' conscious or unconscious expectations and peer-group pressure, whose ethical orientation is itself defined by the class values brought into and reinforced by the institution. This allocation effect and the status assignment it entails doubtless play a major role in the fact that the educational institution succeeds in imposing cultural practices that it does not teach and does not even explicitly demand, but which belong to the attributes attached by status to the position it assigns, the qualifications it awards and the social positions to which the latter give access.

This logic doubtless helps to explain how the legitimate disposition that is acquired by frequent contact with a particular class of works, namely, the literary and philosophical works recognized by the academic canon, comes to be extended to other, less legitimate works, such as avant-garde literature, or to areas enjoying less academic recognition, such as the cinema. The generalizing tendency is inscribed in the very principle of the disposition to recognize legitimate works, a propensity and capacity to recognize their legitimacy and perceive them as worthy of admiration in themselves, which is inseparable from the capacity to recognize in them something already known, i.e., the stylistic traits appropriate to characterize them in their singularity ('It's a Rembrandt', or even 'It's the *Helmeled Man*') or as members of a class of works ('It's Impressionist'). This explains why the propensity and capacity to accumulate 'gratuitous' knowledge, such as the names of film directors, are more closely and exclusively linked to educational capital than is mere cinema-going, which is more dependent on income, place of residence and age.

Cinema-going, measured by the number of films seen among the twenty films mentioned in the survey, is lower among the less-educated than among the more highly educated, but also lower among provincials (in Lille) than among Parisians, among low-income than among high-income groups, and among old than among young people. And the same relationships are found in the surveys by the Centre d'études des supports de publicité (CESP): the proportion who say they have been to the cinema at least once in the previous week (a more reliable indicator of behaviour than a question on cinema-going in the course of the year, for which the tendency to overstate is particularly strong) is rather greater among men than women (7.8 percent compared to 5.3 percent), greater in the Paris area (10.9 percent) than in towns of over 100,000 people (7.7 percent) or in rural areas (3.6 percent), greater among senior executives and members of the professions (11.1 percent) than among junior executives (9.5 percent) or clerical and commercial employees (9.7 percent), skilled manual workers and foremen (7.3 percent), semi-skilled workers (6.3 percent), small employers (5.2 percent) and farmers and farm workers (2.6 percent). But the greatest contrasts are between the youngest (22.4 percent of the 21-24 year olds had been to the cinema at least once in the previous week) and the oldest (only 3.2 percent of the 35-49 year olds, 1.7 percent of the 50-64

year olds and 1.1 percent of the over-65s), and between the most and least highly educated (18.2 percent of those who had been through higher education, 9.5 percent of those who had had secondary education, and 2.2 percent of those who had had only primary education or none at all had been to the cinema in the previous week) (C.S. XIIIa).<sup>12</sup>

Knowledge of directors is much more closely linked to cultural capital than is mere cinema-going. Only 7 percent of the respondents who had an elementary school diploma could name at least four directors (from a list of twenty films) compared to 10 percent of holders of the BEPC or the *baccalauréat* and 22 percent of those who had had higher education, whereas the proportion in each category who had seen at least four of the twenty films was 22 percent, 33 percent and 40 percent respectively. Thus, although film-viewing also varies with educational capital (less so, however, than visits to museums and concerts), it seems that differences in consumption are not sufficient to explain the differences in knowledge of directors between holders of different qualifications. This conclusion would probably also hold good for jazz, strip cartoons, detective stories or science fiction, now that these genres have begun to achieve cultural consecration.<sup>13</sup>

Further proof is that, while increasing slightly with level of education (from 13 percent for the least educated to 18 percent for those with secondary education and 23 percent for the most qualified), knowledge of actors varies mainly—and considerably—with the number of films seen. This awareness, like knowledge of the slightest events in the lives of TV personalities, presupposes a disposition closer to that required for the acquisition of ordinary knowledge about everyday things and people than to the legitimate disposition. And indeed, these least-educated regular cinema-goers knew as many actors' names as the most highly educated. Among those who had seen at least four of the films mentioned, 45 percent of those who had had only a primary education were able to name four actors, as against 35 percent of those who had had a secondary education and 47 percent of those who had had some higher education. Interest in actors is greatest among office workers: on average they named 2.8 actors and one director, whereas the craftsmen and small shopkeepers, skilled workers and foremen named, on average, only 0.8 actors and 0.3 directors. (The secretaries and junior commercial executives, who also knew a large number of actors—average 2.4—were more interested in directors—average 1.4—and those in the social and medical services even named more directors—1.7—than actors—1.4). The reading of sensational weeklies (e.g., *Le Paris*) which give information about the lives of stars is a product of a disposition similar to interest in actors; it is more frequent among women than men (10.8 percent had read *Le Paris* in the last week, compared to 9.3 percent of the men), among skilled workers and foremen (14.5 percent), semi-skilled workers (13.6 percent), or office workers (10.3 percent) than among junior executives (8.6 percent) and especially among senior executives and members of the professions (3.8 percent) (C.S. XXVIII).

By contrast, although at equivalent levels of education, knowledge of directors increases with the number of films seen, in this area assiduous cinema-going does not compensate for absence of educational capital: 45.5 percent of the CEP-holders who had seen at least four of the films mentioned



could not name a single director, compared to 27.5 percent of those with a BEPC or the *baccalauréat* and 13 percent of those with a higher education diploma.

Such competence is not necessarily acquired by means of the 'scholastic' labours in which some 'cinéphiles' or 'jazz-freaks' indulge (e.g., transcribing film credits onto catalogue cards).<sup>14</sup> Most often it results from the unintentional learning made possible by a disposition acquired through domestic or scholastic inculcation of legitimate culture. This transposable disposition, aimed with a set of perceptual and evaluative schemes that are available for general application, inclines its owner towards other cultural experiences and enables him to perceive, classify and memorize them differently. Where some only see 'a Western starring Burt Lancaster', others 'discover an early John Sturges' or 'the latest Sam Peckinpah'. In identifying what is worthy of being seen and the right way to see it, they are aided by their whole social group (which guides and reminds them with its 'Have you seen ...?' and 'You must see ...') and by the whole corporation of critics mandated by the group to produce legitimate classifications and the discourse necessarily accompanying any artistic enjoyment worthy of the name.

It is possible to explain in such terms why cultural practices which schools do not teach and never explicitly demand vary in such close relation to educational qualifications (it being understood, of course, that we are provisionally suspending the distinction between the school's role in the correlation observed and that of the other socializing agencies, in particular the family). But the fact that educational qualifications function as a condition of entry to the universe of legitimate culture cannot be fully explained without taking into account another, still more hidden effect which the educational system, again reinforcing the work of the bourgeois family, exerts through the very conditions within which it inculcates. Through the educational qualification certain conditions of existence are designated—those which constitute the precondition for obtaining the qualification and also the aesthetic disposition, the most rigorously demanded of all the terms of entry which the world of legitimate culture (always tacitly) imposes. Anticipating what will be demonstrated later, one can posit, in broad terms, that it is because they are linked either to a bourgeois origin or to the quasi-bourgeois mode of existence presupposed by prolonged schooling, or (most often) to both of these combined, that educational qualifications come to be seen as a guarantee of the capacity to adopt the aesthetic disposition.

**THE AESTHETIC DISPOSITION** Any legitimate work tends in fact to impose the norms of its own perception and tacitly defines as the only legitimate mode of perception the one which brings into play a certain disposition and a certain competence. Recognizing this fact does not mean constituting a particular mode of perception as an essence, thereby

falling into the illusion which is the basis of recognition of artistic legitimacy. It does mean taking note of the fact that all agents, whether they like it or not, whether or not they have the means of conforming to them, find themselves objectively measured by those norms. At the same time it becomes possible to establish whether these dispositions and competences are gifts of nature, as the charismatic ideology of the relation to the work of art would have it, or products of learning, and to bring to light the hidden conditions of the miracle of the unequal distribution of the capacity for inspired encounters with works of art and high culture in general.

Every essentialist analysis of the aesthetic disposition, the only socially accepted 'right' way of approaching the objects socially designated as works of art, that is, as both demanding and deserving to be approached with a specifically aesthetic intention capable of recognizing and constituting them as works of art, is bound to fail. Refusing to take account of the collective and individual genesis of this product of history which must be endlessly 're-produced' by education, it is unable to reconstruct its sole *raison d'être*, that is, the historical reason which underlies the arbitrary necessity of the institution. If the work of art is indeed, as Panofsky says, that which 'demands to be experienced aesthetically', and if any object, natural or artificial, can be perceived aesthetically, how can one escape the conclusion that it is the aesthetic intention which 'makes the work of art', or, to transpose a formula of Saussure's, that it is the aesthetic point of view that creates the aesthetic object? To get out of this vicious circle, Panofsky has to endow the work of art with an 'intention', in the Scholastic sense. A purely 'practical' perception contradicts this objective intention, just as an aesthetic perception would in a sense be a practical negation of the objective intention of a signal, a red light for example, which requires a 'practical' response: braking. Thus, within the class of worked-upon objects, themselves defined in opposition to natural objects, the class of art objects would be defined by the fact that it demands to be perceived aesthetically, i.e., in terms of form rather than function. But how can such a definition be made operational? Panofsky himself observes that it is virtually impossible to determine scientifically at what moment a worked-upon object becomes an art object, that is, at what moment form takes over from function: 'If I write to a friend to invite him to dinner, my letter is primarily a communication. But the more I shift the emphasis to the form of my script, the more nearly does it become a work of literature or poetry.'<sup>15</sup>

Does this mean that the demarcation line between the world of technical objects and the world of aesthetic objects depends on the 'intention' of the producer of those objects? In fact, this 'intention' is itself the product of the social norms and conventions which combine to define the always uncertain and historically changing frontier between simple technical objects and objects d'art: 'Classical tastes', Panofsky observes, 'demanded that private letters, legal speeches and the shields of heroes

should be "artistic" ... while modern taste demands that architecture and ash trays should be "functional".<sup>16</sup>

But the apprehension and appreciation of the work also depend on the beholder's intention, which is itself a function of the conventional norms governing the relation to the work of art in a certain historical and social situation and also of the beholder's capacity to conform to those norms, i.e., his artistic training. To break out of this circle one only has to observe that the ideal of 'pure' perception of a work of art qua work of art is the product of the enunciation and systematization of the principles of specifically aesthetic legitimacy which accompany the constituting of a relatively autonomous artistic field. The aesthetic mode of perception in the 'pure' form which it has now assumed corresponds to a particular state of the mode of artistic production. An art which, like all Post-Impressionist painting, for example, is the product of an artistic intention which asserts the absolute primacy of form over function, of the mode of representation over the object represented, categorically demands a purely demiturgic ambition of the artist, capable of applying to any object the pure intention of an artistic effort which is an end in itself, calls for an unlimited receptiveness on the part of an aesthete capable of applying the specifically aesthetic intention to any object, whether or not it has been produced with aesthetic intention.

This demand is objectified in the art museum; there the aesthetic disposition becomes an institution. Nothing more totally manifests and achieves the autonomizing of aesthetic activity vis-à-vis extra-aesthetic interests or functions than the art museum's juxtaposition of works. Though originally subordinated to quite different or even incompatible functions (crucifix and fetish, Pietà and still life), these juxtaposed works tacitly demand attention to form rather than function, technique rather than theme, and, being constructed in styles that are mutually exclusive but all equally necessary, they are a practical challenge to the expectation of realistic representation as defined by the arbitrary canons of an everyday aesthetic, and so lead naturally from stylistic relativism to the neutralization of the very function of representation. Objects previously treated as collectors' curios or historical and ethnographic documents have achieved the status of works of art, thereby materializing the omnipotence of the aesthetic gaze and making it difficult to ignore the fact that—if it is not to be merely an arbitrary and therefore suspect affirmation of this absolute power—artistic contemplation now has to include a degree of erudition which is liable to damage the illusion of immediate illumination that is an essential element of pure pleasure.

PURE TASTE AND 'BARBAROUS' TASTE In short, never perhaps has more been asked of the spectator, who is now required to 'reproduce' the primary operation whereby the artist (with the complicity of his whole in-

tellectual field) produced this new fetish.<sup>17</sup> But never perhaps has he been given so much in return. The naive exhibitionism of 'conspicuous consumption', which seeks distinction in the crude display of ill-mastered luxury, is nothing compared to the unique capacity of the pure gaze, a quasi-creative power which sets the aesthete apart from the common herd by a radical difference which seems to be inscribed in 'persons'. One only has to read Ortega y Gasset to see the reinforcement the charismatic ideology derives from art, which is 'essentially unpopular, indeed, anti-popular and from the curious sociological effect' it produces by dividing the public into two 'antagonistic castes', those who understand and those who do not. 'This implies', Ortega goes on, 'that some possess an organ of understanding which others have been denied; that these are two distinct varieties of the human species. The new art is not for everyone, like Romantic art, but destined for an especially gifted minority.' And he ascribes to the 'humiliation' and 'obscure sense of inferiority' inspired by 'this art of privilege, sensuous nobility, instinctive aristocracy', the irritation it arouses in the mass, 'unworthy of artistic sacraments': 'For a century and a half, the "people", the mass, have claimed to be the whole of society. The music of Stravinsky or the plays of Pirandello have the sociological power of obliging them to see themselves as they are, as the "common people", a mere ingredient among others in the social structure, the inert material of the historical process, a secondary factor in the spiritual cosmos. By contrast, the young art helps the "best" to know and recognize one another in the greyness of the multitude and to learn their mission, which is to be few in number and to have to fight against the multitude.'<sup>18</sup>

And to show that the self-legitimizing imagination of the 'happy few' has no limits, one only has to quote a recent text by Suzanne Langer, who is presented as 'one of the world's most influential philosophers': 'In the past, the masses did not have access to art; music, painting, and even books, were pleasures reserved for the rich. It might have been supposed that the poor, the "common people", would have enjoyed them equally, if they had had the chance. But now that everyone can read, go to museums, listen to great music, at least on the radio, the judgement of the masses about these things has become a reality and through this it has become clear that great art is not a direct sensuous pleasure. Otherwise, like cookies or cocktails, it would flatter uneducated taste as much as cultured taste.'<sup>19</sup>

It should not be thought that the relationship of distinction (which may or may not imply the conscious intention of distinguishing oneself from common people) is only an incidental component in the aesthetic disposition. The pure gaze implies a break with the ordinary attitude towards the world which, as such, is a social break. One can agree with Ortega y Gasset when he attributes to modern art—which merely takes to its extreme conclusions an intention implicit in art since the Renais-



sance—a systematic refusal of all that is 'human', by which he means the passions, emotions and feelings which ordinary people put into their ordinary existence, and consequently all the themes and objects capable of evoking them: 'People like a play when they are able to take an interest in the human destinies put before them', in which 'they participate as if they were real-life events.'<sup>20</sup> Rejecting the 'human' clearly means rejecting what is generic, i.e., *common*, 'easy' and immediately accessible, starting with everything that reduces the aesthetic animal to pure and simple animality, to palpable pleasure or sensual desire. The interest in the content of the representation which leads people to call 'beautiful' the representation of beautiful things, especially those which speak most immediately to the senses and the sensibility, is rejected in favour of the difference and distance which refuse to subordinate judgement of the representation to the nature of the object represented.<sup>21</sup> It can be seen that it is not so easy to describe the 'pure' gaze without also describing the naive gaze which it defines itself against, and vice versa, and that there is no neutral, impartial, 'pure' description of either of these opposing visions (which does not mean that one has to subscribe to aesthetic relativism, when it is so obvious that the 'popular aesthetic' is defined in relation to 'high' aesthetics and that reference to 'legitimate' art and its negative judgement on 'popular' taste never ceases to haunt the popular experience of beauty). Refusal or privation? It is as dangerous to attribute the coherence of a systematic aesthetic to the objectively aesthetic commitments of ordinary people as it is to adopt, albeit unconsciously, the strictly negative conception of ordinary vision which is the basis of every 'high' aesthetic.

THE POPULAR 'AESTHETIC' Everything takes place as if the 'popular aesthetic' were based on the affirmation of continuity between art and life, which implies the subordination of form to function, or, one might say, on a refusal of the refusal which is the starting point of the high aesthetic, i.e., the clear-cut separation of ordinary dispositions from the specifically aesthetic disposition. The hostility of the working class and of the middle-class fractions least rich in cultural capital towards every kind of formal experimentation asserts itself both in the theatre and in painting, or still more clearly, because they have less legitimacy, in photography and the cinema. In the theatre as in the cinema, the popular audience delights in plots that proceed logically and chronologically towards a happy end, and 'identifies' better with simply drawn situations and characters than with ambiguous and symbolic figures and actions or the enigmatic problems of the theatre of cruelty, not to mention the suspended animation of Beckettian heroes or the bland absurdities of Pinteresque dialogue. Their reluctance or refusal springs not just from lack of familiarity but from a deep-rooted demand for participation, which formal experiment systematically disappoints, especially when, refusing to offer

the 'vulgar' attractions of an art of illusion, the theatrical fiction denounces itself, as in all forms of 'play within a play'. Pirandello supplies the paradigm here, in plays in which the actors are actors unable to act—*Six Characters in Search of an Author*, *Comme ci (ou comme ça)* or *Ce soir on improvise*—and Jean Genet supplies the formula in the Prologue to *The Blacks*: 'We shall have the politeness, which you have taught us, to make communication impossible. The distance initially between us we shall increase, by our splendid gestures, our manners and our insolence, for we are also actors.' The desire to enter into the game, identifying with the characters' joys and sufferings, worrying about their fate, espousing their hopes and ideals, living their life, is based on a form of *investment*, a sort of deliberate 'naivety', ingenuousness, good-natured credulity ('We're here to enjoy ourselves'), which tends to accept formal experiments and specifically artistic effects only to the extent that they can be forgotten and do not get in the way of the substance of the work.

The cultural divide which associates each class of works with its public means that it is not easy to obtain working-class people's first-hand judgements on formalist innovations in modern art. However, television, which brings certain performances of 'high art into the home, or certain cultural institutions (such as the Beaubourg Centre or the Maisons de la culture), which briefly bring a working-class public into contact with high art and sometimes avant-garde works, create what are virtually experimental situations, neither more nor less artificial or unreal than those necessarily produced by any survey on legitimate culture in a working-class milieu. One then observes the confusion, sometimes almost a sort of panic mingled with revolt, that is induced by some exhibits—I am thinking of Ben's heap of coal, on view at Beaubourg shortly after it opened—whose parodic intention, entirely defined in terms of an artistic field and its relatively autonomous history, is seen as a sort of aggression, an affront to common sense and sensible people. Likewise, when formal experimentation insinuates itself into their familiar entertainments (e.g., TV variety shows with sophisticated technical effects, such as those by Jean-Christophe Averty) working-class viewers protest, not only because they do not feel the need for these fancy games, but because they sometimes understand that they derive their necessity from the logic of a field of production which excludes them precisely by these games: 'I don't like those cut-up things at all, where you see a head, then a nose, then a leg... First you see a singer all drawn out, three metres tall, then the next minute he's got arms two metres long. Do you find that funny? Oh, I just don't like it, it's stupid, I don't see the point of distorting things' (a baker, Grenoble).

Formal refinement—which, in literature or the theatre, leads to obscurity—is, in the eyes of the working-class public, one sign of what is sometimes felt to be a desire to keep the uninitiated at arm's length, or, as one respondent said about certain cultural programmes on TV, to speak to

other initiates 'over the viewers' heads'.<sup>22</sup> It is part of the paraphernalia which always announces the sacred character, separate and separating, of high culture—the icy solemnity of the great museums, the grandiose luxury of the opera-houses and major theatres, the décor and decorum of concert-halls.<sup>23</sup> Everything takes place as if the working-class audience vaguely grasped what is implied in conspicuous formality, both in art and in life, i.e., a sort of censorship of the expressive content which explodes in the expressiveness of popular language, and by the same token, a distancing, inherent in the calculated coldness of all formal exploration, a refusal to communicate concealed at the heart of the communication itself, both in an art which takes back and refuses what it seems to deliver and in bourgeois politeness, whose impeccable formalism is a permanent warning against the temptation of familiarity. Conversely, popular entertainment secures the spectator's participation in the show and collective participation in the festivity which it occasions. If circus and melodrama (which are recreated by some sporting spectacles such as wrestling and, to a lesser extent, boxing and all forms of team games, such as those which have been televised) are more 'popular' than entertainments like dancing or theatre, this is not merely because being less formalized (compare, for example, acrobatics with dancing) and less euphemized, they offer more direct, more immediate satisfactions. It is also because, through the collective festivity they give rise to and the array of spectacular delights they offer (I am thinking also of the music-hall, light opera or the big feature film)—fabulous sets, glittering costumes, exciting music, lively action, enthusiastic actors—like all forms of the comic and especially those working through satire or parody of the 'great' (mimics, chansonniers etc.), they satisfy the taste for and sense of revelry, the plain speaking and hearty laughter which liberate by setting the social world head over heels, overturning conventions and proprieties.

**AESTHETIC DISTANCING.** This popular reaction is the very opposite of the detachment of the aesthete, who, as is seen whenever he appropriates one of the objects of popular taste (e.g., Westerns or strip cartoons), introduces a distance, a gap—the measure of his distant distinction—vis-à-vis 'first-degree' perception, by displacing the interest from the 'content', characters, plot etc., to the form, to the specifically artistic effects which are only appreciated relationally, through a comparison with other works which is incompatible with immersion in the singularity of the work immediately given. Detachment, disinterestedness, indifference—aesthetic theory has so often presented these as the only way to recognize the work of art for what it is, autonomous, *selbständig*, that one ends up forgetting that they really mean disinvestment, detachment, indifference, in other words, the refusal to invest oneself and take things seriously. Worldly-wise readers of Rousseau's *Lettre sur les spectacles*,<sup>24</sup> who have long been aware that there is nothing more naive and vulgar than to invest too

much passion in the things of the mind or to expect too much seriousness of them, tending to assume that intellectual creativity is opposed to moral integrity or political consistency, have no answer to Virginia Woolf when she criticizes the novels of Wells, Galsworthy and Bennett because 'they leave one with a strange sense of incompleteness and dissatisfaction' and the feeling that it is 'necessary to do something—to join a society, or, more desperately, to write a cheque', in contrast to works like *Tristram Shandy* or *Pride and Prejudice*, which, being perfectly 'self-contained', 'leave one with no desire to do anything, except indeed to read the book again, and to understand it better.'<sup>25</sup>

But the refusal of any sort of involvement, any 'vulgar' surrender to easy seduction and collective enthusiasm, which is, indirectly at least, the origin of the taste for formal complexity and objectless representations, is perhaps most clearly seen in reactions to paintings. Thus one finds that the higher the level of education,<sup>26</sup> the greater is the proportion of respondents who, when asked whether a series of objects would make beautiful photographs, refuse the ordinary objects of popular admiration—a first communion, a sunset or a landscape—as 'vulgar' or 'ugly', or reject them as 'trivial', silly, a bit 'wet', or, in Ortega y Gasset's terms, naively 'human'; and the greater is the proportion who assert the autonomy of the representation with respect to the thing represented by declaring that a beautiful photograph and a fortiori a beautiful painting, can be made from objects socially designated as meaningless—a metal frame, the bark of a tree, and especially cabdages, a trivial object par excellence—or as ugly and repulsive—such as a car crash, a butcher's stall (chosen for the Rembrandt allusion) or a snake (for the Boileau reference)—or as misplaced—e.g., a pregnant woman (see tables 2 and 3).

Since it was not possible to set up a genuine experimental situation, we collected the interviewees' statements about the things they consider 'photogenic' and which therefore seem to them capable of being looked at aesthetically (as opposed to things excluded on account of their triviality or ugliness or for ethical reasons). The capacity to adopt the aesthetic attitude is thus measured by the gap (which, in a field of production that evolves through the dialectic of distinction, is also a time-lag, a backwardness) between what is constituted as an aesthetic object by the individual or group concerned and what is constituted aesthetically in a given state of the field of production by the holders of aesthetic legitimacy.

The following question was put to the interviewees: 'Given the following subjects, is a photographer more likely to produce a beautiful, interesting, meaningless or ugly photo: a landscape, a car crash etc.?' In the preliminary survey, the interviewees were shown actual photographs, mostly famous ones, of the objects which were merely named in the full-scale survey—pebbles, a pregnant woman etc. The reactions evoked by the mere idea of the image were entirely consistent with those produced by the image itself (evidence that the value attributed to the image tends to correspond to the

**Table 2** Aesthetic disposition, by educational capital (%).<sup>a</sup>

Educational capital	N	First communion					Folk dance				
		No reply or incoherent	Ugly	Meaningless	Interesting	Beautiful	No reply or incoherent	Ugly	Meaningless	Interesting	Beautiful
No qualification, CEP	314	2.0	5.0	19.0	23.0	51.0	1.0	0.5	3.0	41.0	54.5
CAP	97	4.0	1.0	26.0	38.0	31.0	4.0	0	3.0	33.0	60.0
BEPC	197	2.5	7.0	27.0	31.0	32.5	3.5	0	7.0	33.5	56.0
Baccalauréat	217	2.0	12.0	43.0	24.0	19.0	2.0	0.5	13.0	47.5	37.0
Started higher education	118	4.0	13.0	45.0	23.0	15.0	6.0	2.5	13.0	37.0	41.5
Licence	182	1.0	11.0	53.0	28.0	7.0	2.0	1.0	11.0	49.5	36.5
Agrégation, grande école	71	4.0	15.5	49.0	6.0	25.5	4.0	6.0	22.5	28.0	39.5

**Table 2** (continued).

Educational capital	N	Bark of a tree					Butcher's stall					Cabbages				
		No reply or incoherent	Ugly	Meaningless	Interesting	Beautiful	No reply or incoherent	Ugly	Meaningless	Interesting	Beautiful	No reply or incoherent	Ugly	Meaningless	Interesting	Beautiful
No qualification, CEP	314	2.0	14.5	46.5	21.5	15.5	1.5	31.0	46.0	16.5	5.0	2.0	28.0	56.0	10.0	4.0
CAP	97	5.0	1.0	20.0	37.0	37.0	6.0	15.5	48.5	24.0	6.0	5.0	16.5	63.0	7.0	8.5
BEPC	197	2.5	8.5	31.5	30.0	27.5	3.0	28.0	47.0	17.0	5.0	2.0	17.0	55.0	13.0	13.0
Baccalauréat	217	2.0	3.0	21.0	32.0	42.0	3.0	29.5	32.0	25.0	10.5	2.0	17.5	48.5	19.0	13.0
Started higher education	118	6.0	1.0	23.0	25.0	45.0	4.0	30.5	29.0	18.5	18.0	6.0	9.0	47.5	19.5	18.0
Licence	182	0	3.0	18.0	23.0	56.0	4.5	29.5	22.5	24.0	19.5	2.0	16.0	51.5	8.0	22.5
Agrégation, grande école	71	4.0	3.0	8.5	24.0	60.5	4.0	29.5	23.0	18.0	25.5	3.0	11.0	38.0	21.0	27.0

a. The respondents had to answer this question: 'Given the following subjects, is a photographer more likely to make a beautiful, interesting, meaningless, or ugly photo: a landscape, a car crash, a little girl playing with a cat, a pregnant woman, a still life, a woman suckling a child, a metal frame, tramps quarrelling, cabbages, a sunset over the sea, a

weaver at his loom, a folk dance, a rope, the bark of a tree, a butcher's stall, a famous monument, a scrap-yard, a first communion, a wounded man, a snake, an "old master"?' In each column, the italic figures indicate the strongest tendencies.

**Table 3** Aesthetic disposition, by class and education (%).

Classes	Educational qualification	N	Pregnant woman					Cabbages				
			No reply or incoherent	Ugly	Meaningless	Interesting	Beautiful	No reply or incoherent	Ugly	Meaningless	Interesting	Beautiful
Working	None, CEP, CAP	143	1.5	40.0	36.5	14.0	8.0	1.5	28.0	57.0	8.5	5.0
	BEPC and above <sup>a</sup>	18	0	39.0	22.0	11.0	28.0	0	5.5	72.5	16.5	5.5
Middle	None, CEP, CAP	243	1.0	46.0	27.5	15.0	10.5	2.0	22.5	61.5	10.0	4.0
	BEPC and above <sup>a</sup>	335	3.5	34.0	30.0	13.5	19.0	2.5	17.5	49.5	14.5	16.0
	BEPC	149	3.5	39.0	35.0	9.0	13.5	2.0	21.0	56.0	8.5	12.5
	bac	140	3.5	37.0	21.0	17.5	21.0	3.0	15.5	45.0	19.5	17.0
Upper	higher education	46	4.0	8.5	42.0	13.0	32.5	4.0	13.0	41.0	20.0	22.0
	None, CEP, CAP	25	20.0	36.0	24.0	12.0	8.0	20.0	36.0	28.0	12.0	4.0
	BEPC and above <sup>a</sup>	432	3.0	36.0	22.0	19.0	20.0	3.0	14.5	48.0	15.5	19.0
	BEPC	31	6.5	48.5	38.5	0	6.5	6.5	6.5	38.5	32.5	16.0
	bac	76	0	60.5	16.0	5.0	18.5	0	21.0	55.5	17.0	6.5
	higher education	325	3.0	30.0	22.5	23.0	21.5	3.0	14.0	47.5	13.5	22.0
	technical college	80	7.5	17.5	30.0	32.5	12.5	6.5	6.5	52.0	20.0	15.0
	licence	174	0.5	36.0	21.5	19.5	22.5	2.0	18.5	49.0	7.5	23.0
	agrég., grande école	71	4.0	29.5	17.0	20.0	29.5	3.0	11.0	38.0	21.0	27.0

Table 3 (continued).

Classes	Educational qualification	N	Snake					Sunset over sea				
			No reply or incoherent	Ugly	Meaningless	Interesting	Beautiful	No reply or incoherent	Ugly	Meaningless	Interesting	Beautiful
Working	None, CEP, CAP	143	1.0	35.0	16.0	38.0	10.0	1.0	0	1.0	10.0	88.0
	BEPC and above	18	0	28.0	22.0	39.0	11.0	0	0	6.0	6.0	88.0
Middle	None, CEP, CAP	243	1.0	25.0	23.0	35.0	16.0	1.0	0.5	2.5	6.0	90.0
	BEPC and above	335	3.0	28.5	14.0	30.5	24.0	3.0	1.5	9.0	8.5	78.0
	BEPC	149	3.0	38.0	8.5	34.0	16.5	1.5	1.5	4.5	6.5	86.0
	bac	140	4.0	21.0	17.0	34.0	24.0	4.0	2.0	10.0	9.0	75.0
	higher education	46	2.0	19.5	24.0	9.0	45.5	2.0	2.0	20.0	13.0	63.0
Upper	None, CEP, CAP	25	20.0	36.0	4.0	24.0	16.0	20.0	0	8.0	8.0	64.0
	BEPC and above	432	3.0	18.0	13.0	38.0	28.0	2.0	3.0	15.0	17.0	63.0
	BEPC	31	6.5	19.5	16.0	29.0	29.0	0	0	22.5	0	77.5
	bac	76	0	22.5	8.0	50.0	19.5	0	0	14.5	8.0	77.5
	higher education	325	4.0	16.5	14.5	35.5	29.5	3.0	4.0	14.0	21.0	58.0
	technical college	80	5.0	14.0	20.0	36.0	25.0	6.0	5.0	10.0	26.5	52.5
	licence	174	2.5	20.0	14.5	35.0	28.0	0	5.0	13.0	24.0	58.0
	agrég., grande école	71	5.5	11.5	8.5	36.5	38.0	5.5	1.5	19.5	8.5	65.0

a. The category 'BEPC and above' (created for the sake of formal comparability) does not have the same content in the different social classes: the proportion of high qualifications within this category rises with social class. This essentially explains why the rarest choices—'beautiful' for the cabbages or the snake, 'ugly' or 'trivial' for the sunset—be-

come more numerous as one moves up the social scale. The apparent exception in the case of the pregnant woman is due to the absence of women (who are known to be more likely to accept this subject) in this category.

value attributed to the thing). Photographs were used partly to avoid the legitimacy-imposing effects of paintings and partly because photography is perceived as a more accessible practice, so that the judgements expressed were likely to be less unreal.

Although the test employed was designed to collect statements of artistic intention rather than to measure the ability to put the intention into practice in doing painting or photography or even in the perception of works of art, it enables one to identify the factors which determine the capacity to adopt the posture socially designated as specifically aesthetic. Factorial analysis of judgements on 'photogenic' objects reveals an opposition within each class between the fractions richest in cultural capital and poorest in economic capital and the fractions richest in economic capital and poorest in cultural capital. In the case of the dominant class, higher-education teachers and artistic producers (and secondarily, teachers and the professions) are opposed to industrial and commercial employers, private-sector executives and engineers are in an intermediate position. In the petite bourgeoisie, the cultural intermediaries (distinctly separated from the closest fractions, the primary teachers, medical services and art craftsmen) are opposed to the small shopkeepers or craftsmen and the office workers.

In addition to the relationship between cultural capital and the negative and positive indices (refusal of 'witness', the capacity to valorize the trivial) of the aesthetic disposition—or, at least, the capacity to operate the arbitrary classification which, within the universe of worked-upon objects, distinguishes the objects socially designated as deserving and demanding an aesthetic approach that can recognize and constitute them as works of art—the statistics establish that the preferred objects of would-be aesthetic photography, e.g., the folk dance, the weaver or the little girl with her cat, are in an intermediate position. The proportion of respondents who consider that these things can make a beautiful photograph is highest at the levels of the CAP and BEPC, whereas at higher levels they tend to be judged either interesting or meaningless.

The proportion of respondents who say a first communion can make a beautiful photo declines up to the level of the *licence* and then rises again at the highest level. This is because a relatively large proportion of the highest-qualified subjects assert their aesthetic disposition by declaring that any object can be perceived aesthetically. Thus, in the dominant class, the proportion who declare that a sunset can make a beautiful photo is greatest at the lowest educational level, declines at intermediate levels (some higher education, a minor engineering school), and grows strongly again among those who have completed several years of higher education and who tend to consider that anything is suitable for beautiful photography.

The statistics also show that women are much more likely than men to manifest their repugnance toward repugnant, horrible or distasteful objects: 44.5 percent of them, as against 35 percent of the men, consider that there can only be an ugly photograph of a wounded man, and there are similar differences for the butcher's stall (33.5 and 27 percent), the snake (30.5 and 21.5 percent) or the pregnant woman (45 and 33.5 percent), whereas the gap disappears with the still life (6 and 6.5 percent) and the cabbages (20.5 and 19 percent). The traditional division of labour between the sexes as-

signs 'humane' or 'humanitarian' tasks and feelings to women and more readily allows them effusions and tears, in the name of the opposition between reason and sensibility; men are, *ex officio*, on the side of culture whereas women (like the working class) are cast on the side of nature. Women are therefore less imperatively required to censor and repress 'natural' feelings as the aesthetic disposition demands (which indicates, incidentally, that, as will be shown subsequently, the refusal of nature, or rather the refusal to surrender to nature, which is the mark of dominant groups—who start with *self-control*—is the basis of the aesthetic disposition).

Women's revolution is expressed more overtly, at the expense of aesthetic neutralization, the more completely they are subject to the traditional model of the sexual division of labour and (in other words) the weaker their cultural capital and the lower their position in the social hierarchy. Women in the new petite bourgeoisie, who, in general, make much greater concessions to affective considerations than the men in the same category (although they are equally likely to say that there can be a beautiful photograph of cabbages), much more rarely accept that a photograph of a pregnant woman can only be ugly than women in any other category (31.5 percent of them, as against 70 percent of the wives of industrial and commercial employers, 69.5 percent of the wives of craftsmen and shopkeepers, 47.5 percent of the wives of manual workers, clerical workers or junior executives). In doing so they manifest simultaneously their aesthetic pretensions and their desire to be seen as 'liberated' from the ethical taboos imposed on their sex.

Thus, nothing more rigorously distinguishes the different classes than the disposition objectively demanded by the legitimate consumption of legitimate works, the aptitude for taking a specifically aesthetic point of view on objects already constituted aesthetically—and therefore put forward for the admiration of those who have learned to recognize the signs of the admirable—and the even rarer capacity to constitute aesthetically objects that are ordinary or even 'common' (because they are appropriated, aesthetically or otherwise, by the 'common people') or to apply the principles of a 'pure' aesthetic in the most everyday choices of everyday life, in cooking, dress or decoration, for example.

Statistical enquiry is indispensable in order to establish beyond dispute the social conditions of possibility (which will have to be made more explicit) of the 'pure' disposition. However, because it inevitably looks like a scholastic test intended to measure the respondents against a norm rarely regarded as absolute, it may fail to capture the meanings which this disposition and the whole attitude to the world expressed in it have for the different social classes. What the logic of the test would lead one to describe as a deficiency (and that is what it is, from the standpoint of the norms defining legitimate perception of works of art) is *also* a refusal which stems from a denunciation of the arbitrary or ostentatious gratuitousness of stylistic exercises or purely formalistic experiments. A certain 'aesthetic', which maintains that a photograph is justified by the object

photographed or by the possible use of the photographic image, is being brought into play when manual workers almost invariably reject photography for photography's sake (e.g. the photo of pebbles) as useless, perverse or bourgeois: 'A waste of film', 'They must have film to throw away', 'I tell you, there are some people who don't know what to do with their time', 'Haven't they got anything better to do with their time than photograph things like that?' 'That's bourgeois photography.'

It must never be forgotten that the working-class 'aesthetic' is a dominated 'aesthetic' which is constantly obliged to define itself in terms of the dominant aesthetics. The members of the working class, who can neither ignore the high-art aesthetic, which denounces their own 'aesthetic', nor abandon their socially conditioned inclinations, but still less proclaim them and legitimate them, often experience their relationship to the aesthetic norms in a twofold and contradictory way. This is seen when some manual workers grant 'pure' photographs a purely verbal recognition (this is also the case with many petit bourgeois and even some bourgeois who, as regards paintings, for example, differ from the working class mainly by what they know is the right thing to say or do or, still better, not to say): 'It's beautiful, but it would never occur to me to take a picture of a thing like that', 'Yes, it's beautiful, but you have to like it, it's not my cup of tea.'

AN ANTI-KANTIAN 'AESTHETIC'. It is no accident that, when one sets about reconstructing its logic, the popular 'aesthetic' appears as the negative opposite of the Kantian aesthetic, and that the popular ethos implicitly answers each proposition of the 'Analytic of the Beautiful' with a thesis contradicting it. In order to apprehend what makes the specificity of aesthetic judgement, Kant ingeniously distinguished 'that which pleases' from 'that which gratifies', and, more generally, strove to separate 'disinterestedness', the sole guarantee of the specifically aesthetic quality of contemplation, from 'the interest of the senses', which defines 'the agreeable', and from 'the interest of Reason', which defines 'the Good'. By contrast, working-class people, who expect every image to fulfil a function, if only that of a sign, refer, often explicitly, to norms of morality or agreeableness in all their judgements. Thus the photograph of a dead soldier provokes judgements which, whether positive or negative, are always responses to the reality of the thing represented or to the functions the representation could serve, the horror of war or the denunciation of the horrors of war which the photographer is supposed to produce simply by showing that horror.<sup>27</sup> Similarly, popular naturalism recognizes beauty in the image of a beautiful thing or, more rarely, in a beautiful image of a beautiful thing. 'Now, that's good, it's almost symmetrical. And she's a beautiful woman. A beautiful woman always looks good in a photo. The Parisian manual worker echoes the plain-speaking of Hippias the Sophist: 'I'll tell him what beauty is and I'm not likely to

be refused by him! The fact is, Socrates, to be frank, a beautiful woman, that's what beauty is" (Plato, *Greater Hippias*, 287c).

This 'aesthetic', which subordinates the form and the very existence of the image to its function, is necessarily pluralistic and conditional. The insistence with which the respondents point out the limits and conditions of validity of their judgements, distinguishing, for each photograph, the possible uses or audiences, or, more precisely, the possible use for each audience ('As a news photo, it's not bad', 'All right, if it's for showing to kids'), shows that they reject the idea that a photograph can please 'universally'. 'A photo of a pregnant woman is all right for me, not for other people', said a white-collar worker, who has to use his concern for propriety as a way of expressing anxiety about what is 'presentable' and therefore entitled to demand admiration. Because the image is always judged by reference to the function it fulfils for the person who looks at it or which he thinks it could fulfil for other classes of beholders, aesthetic judgement naturally takes the form of a hypothetical judgement implicitly based on recognition of 'genres', the perfection and scope of which are defined by a *concept*. Almost three-quarters of the judgements expressed begin with an 'if', and the effort to recognize culminates in classification into a genre, or, which amounts to the same thing, in the attribution of a social use, the different genres being defined in terms of their use and their users ('It's a publicity photo', 'It's a pure document', 'It's a laboratory photo', 'It's a competition photo', 'It's an educational photo' etc.). And photographs of nudes are almost always received with comments that reduce them to the stereotype of their social function: 'All right in Pigalle', 'It's the sort of photos they keep under the counter.' It is not surprising that this 'aesthetic', which bases appreciation on informative, tangible or moral interest, can only refuse images of the trivial, or, which amounts to the same thing in terms of this logic, the triviality of the image: judgement never gives the image of the object autonomy with respect to the object of the image. Of all the characteristics proper to the image, only colour (which Kant regarded as less pure than form) can prevent rejection of photographs of trivial things. Nothing is more alien to popular consciousness than the idea of an aesthetic pleasure that, to put it in Kantian terms, is independent of the charming of the senses. Thus judgements on the photographs most strongly rejected on grounds of futility (pebbles, bark, wave) almost always end with the reservation that 'in colour, it might be pretty'; and some respondents even manage to formulate the maxim governing their attitude, when they declare that 'if the colours are good, a colour photograph is always beautiful.' In short, Kant is indeed referring to popular taste when he writes: 'Taste that requires an added element of charm and emotion for its delight, not to speak of adopting this as the measure of its approval, has not yet emerged from barbarism.'<sup>28</sup>

Refusal of the meaningless (*insignifiant*) image, which has neither

sense nor interest, or of the ambiguous image means refusing to treat it as a finality without purpose, as an image signifying itself, and therefore having no other referent than itself. The value of a photograph is measured by the interest of the information it conveys, and by the clarity with which it fulfils this informative function, in short, its legibility, which itself varies with the legibility of its intention or function, the judgement it provokes being more or less favourable depending on the expressive adequacy of the signifier to the signified. It therefore contains the expectation of the title or caption which, by declaring the signifying intention, makes it possible to judge whether the realization signifies or illustrates it adequately. If formal explorations, in avant-garde theatre or non-figurative painting, or simply classical music, are disconnecting to working-class people, this is partly because they feel incapable of understanding what these things must signify, insofar as they are signs. Hence the uninitiated may experience as inadequate and unworthy a satisfaction that cannot be grounded in a meaning transcendent to the object. Not knowing what the 'intention' is, they feel incapable of distinguishing a tour de force from clumsiness, telling a 'sincere' formal device from cynical imposture.

The confessions with which manual workers faced with modern pictures betray their exclusion ('I don't understand what it means' or 'I like it but I don't understand it') contrast with the knowing silence of the bourgeois, who, though equally disconnected, at least know that they have to refuse—or at least conceal—the naive expectation of expressiveness that is betrayed by the concern to 'understand' ('programme music' and the titles foisted on so many sonatas, concertos and symphonies are sufficient indication that this expectation is not an exclusively popular one).

But formal refinement is also that which, by foregrounding form, i.e., the artist, his specific interests, his technical problems, his effects, his allusions and echoes, throws the thing itself into the background and precludes direct communion with the beauty of the world—a beautiful child, a beautiful girl, a beautiful animal or a beautiful landscape. The representation is expected to be a feast for the eyes and, like still life, to 'stir up memories and anticipations of feasts enjoyed and feasts to come.'<sup>29</sup> Nothing is more opposed to the celebration of the beauty and joy of the world that is looked for in the work of art, 'a choice which praises', than the devices of cubist or abstract painting, which are perceived and unanimously denounced as aggressions against the thing represented, against the natural order and especially the human form. In short, however perfectly it performs its representative function, the work is only seen as fully justified if the thing represented is worthy of being represented, if the representative function is subordinated to a higher function, such as that of capturing and exalting a reality that is worthy of



being made eternal. Such is the basis of the 'barbarous taste' to which the most antithetical forms of the dominant aesthetic always refer negatively and which only recognizes realist representation, in other words, a respectful, humble, submissive representation of objects designated by their beauty or their social importance.


**AESTHETICS, ETHICS AND AESTHETICISM** When faced with legitimate works of art, people most lacking the specific competence apply to them the perceptual schemes of their own ethos, the very ones which structure their everyday perception of everyday existence. These schemes, giving rise to products of an unwilling, unconscious systematicity, are opposed to the more or less fully stated principles of an aesthetic.<sup>30</sup> The result is a systematic 'reduction' of the things of art to the things of life, a bracketing of form in favour of 'human' content, which is barbarism par excellence from the standpoint of the pure aesthetic.<sup>31</sup> Everything takes place as if the emphasis on form could only be achieved by means of a neutralization of any kind of affective or ethical interest in the object of representation which accompanies (without any necessary cause-effect relation) mastery of the means of grasping the distinctive properties which this particular form takes on in its relations with other forms (i.e., through reference to the universe of works of art and its history).

Confronted with a photograph of an old woman's hands, the culturally most deprived express a more or less conventional emotion or an ethical complicity but never a specifically aesthetic judgement (other than a negative one): 'Oh, she's got terribly deformed hands! ... There's one thing I don't get (the left hand)—it's as if her left thumb was about to come away from her hand. Funny way of taking a photo. The old girl must've worked hard. Looks like she's got arthritis. She's definitely crippled, unless she's holding her hands like that (imitates gesture)? Yes, that's it, she's got her hand bent like that. Not like a duchess's hands or even a typist's! ... I really feel sorry seeing that poor old woman's hands, they're all knotted, you might say' (manual worker, Paris). With the lower middle classes, exaltation of ethical virtues comes to the fore. 'Hands worn out by toil', sometimes tinged with populist sentimentality ('Poor old thing! Her hands must really hurt her. It really gives a sense of pain'), and sometimes even concern for aesthetic properties and references to painting make their appearance: 'It's as if it was a painting that had been photographed ... Must be really beautiful as a painting' (clerical worker, Paris). 'That reminds me of a picture I saw in an exhibition of Spanish paintings, a monk with his hands clasped in front of him and deformed fingers' (technician, Paris). 'The sort of hands you see in early Van Goghs, an old peasant woman or people eating potatoes' (junior executive, Paris). At higher levels in the social hierarchy, the remarks become increasingly abstract, with (other people's) hands labour and old age functioning as allegories or symbols which serve as pretexts for general reflections on general problems:



'Those are the hands of someone who has worked too much, doing very hard manual work ... As a matter of fact it's very unusual to see hands like that' (engineer, Paris). 'These two hands unquestionably evoke a poor and unhappy old age' (teacher, provinces). An aestheticizing reference to painting, sculpture or literature, more frequent, more varied and more subtly handled, resorts to the neutralization and distancing which bourgeois discourse about the social world requires and performs. 'I find this a very beautiful photograph. It's the very symbol of toil. It puts me in mind of Flaubert's old servant-woman ... That woman's gesture, at once very humble ... It's terrible that work and poverty are so deforming' (engineer, Paris).

A portrait of a heavily made-up woman, taken from an unusual angle with unusual lighting, provokes very similar reactions. Manual workers, and even more so craftsmen and small shopkeepers, react with horror and disgust: 'I wouldn't like that photo in my house, in my room. It isn't very nice to look at. It's rather painful' (manual worker, provinces). 'Is she dead? Ghastly, enough to keep you awake at night ... ghastly, horrible, I don't want to look at it' (shopkeeper, provinces). While most of the office workers and junior executives reject a photo which they can only describe as 'frightful' or 'unpleasant to look at', some of them try to characterize it as 'beautiful' or 'very well taken, very beautiful, but horrible' (clerical worker, Paris). 'What gives the impression of something monstrous is the expression on the face of the man or woman who is the subject of the photo and the angle from which it has been taken, that's to say looking up from below' (junior executive, Paris). Others appeal to aesthetic reference from the cinema: 'A rather fantastic sort of character, or at least rather bizarre ... it could be a Dreyer character, Bergman at a pinch,



The Lacq gasworks by night

or perhaps even Eisenstein, in *Ivan the Terrible*... I like it a lot' (technician, Paris). Most of the senior executives and members of the professions find the photograph 'beautiful' and 'expressive' and make reference not only to the films of Bergman, Orson Welles, Dreyer, and others, but also to the theatre, invoking Hamlet, Macbeth or Racine's *Athalie*.

When confronted with a photograph of the Lacq gas refinery, which is likely to disconcert realist expectations both by its subject, an industrial complex, normally excluded from the world of legitimate representation, and by the treatment it receives (night photography), manual workers perplexed, hesitate, and eventually, in most cases, admit defeat: 'At first sight it's a construction in metal but I can't make head or tail of it. It might be something used in an electric power station... I can't make out what it is, it's a mystery to me' (manual worker, provinces). 'Now, that one really bothers me, I haven't got anything to say about it... I can't see what it could be, apart from the lighting. It isn't car headlights, it wouldn't be all straight lines like that. Down here I can see a railing and a goods lift, no, really, I can't say' (manual worker, Paris). 'That's something to do with electronics, I don't know anything about that' (manual worker, Paris). Among small employers, who tend to be hostile to modern art experiments and, more generally, to all art in which they cannot see the marks and traces of work, a sense of confusion often leads to simple refusal: 'That is of no interest, it may be all very fine, but not for me. It's always the same thing. Personally that stuff leaves me cold' (craftsman, provinces). 'I've tried to work out if it really is a photo. Perhaps it's a reproduction of a drawing done with a few pencil lines... I wouldn't know what to do with a photo like that. Perhaps it suits modern tastes. Up and down with the pencil and they like it. And as for the photo and the photographer, they don't deserve any credit, they've done nothing at all. The artist did it all, he's the one who ought to take the credit, he's the one who drew it' (shop-

keeper, provinces). Office workers and junior executives, who are just as disconcerted as the manual workers and small employers, but are less inclined to admit it than the former and less inclined than the latter to challenge the legitimacy of what challenges them, less often decline to give a verdict.<sup>32</sup> 'I like it as a photo... because it's all drawn out, they're just lines, it seems immense to me... A vast piece of scaffolding... It's just light, captured by the camera' (clerical worker, Paris). 'Buffer likes doing things like that' (technician, Paris). But only among members of the dominant class, who most often recognize the object represented, does judgement of form take on full autonomy vis-à-vis judgement of content ('It's inhuman but aesthetically beautiful because of the contrasts'), and the representation is apprehended as such, without reference to anything other than itself or realities of the same class ('abstract painting', 'avant-garde plays' etc.).

The variations in the attitude to a very comparable object, a metal frame provide a numerical proof of this: the proportion among respondents who think it could make a beautiful photo is 6 percent among manual workers and domestic servants, 9 percent among craftsmen and small shopkeepers, 9.5 percent among the clerical workers and junior administrative executives, percent among the primary teachers and technicians, 24.5 percent in the dominant class—and 50 percent among the secondary and higher-educate teachers. (One may assume that the reactions aroused by the architecture of the Beaubourg Centre obey the same principles.)

The aestheticism which makes the artistic intention the basis of 'art of living' implies a sort of moral agnosticism, the perfect antithesis of the ethical disposition which subordinates art to the values of the art of living. The aesthetic intention can only contradict the dispositions of ethos or the norms of the ethic which, at each moment, define the legitimate objects and modes of representation for the different social classes excluding from the universe of the 'representable' certain realities and most spectacular way to 'shock (*épater*) the bourgeois' in proving the extent of one's power to confer aesthetic status is to *épater* ever more radically the ethical censorships (e.g., in matters of which the other classes accept even within the area which the dominant disposition defines as aesthetic. Or, more subtly, it is done by confer aesthetic status on objects or ways of representing them that are excluded by the dominant aesthetic of the time, or on objects that are given their status by dominated 'aesthetics'.

One only has to read the index of contents recently published by *Art 1* (1974), a 'vaguely modern review run by a clique of academics who are vaguely art historians' (as an avant-garde painter nicely put it), which occupies a sort of neutral point in the field of avant-garde art criticism between *Flaubert* or *Art Press* and *Artitude* or *Opus*. In the list of features titles one finds: *Africa* (one title: 'Art Must Be for All'), *Architecture*



titles, including 'Architecture without an Architect', *Comic Strips* (five titles, nine pages out of the forty-six in the whole index), *Kids' Art*, *Kitsch* (three titles, five pages), *Photography* (two titles, three pages), *Street Art* (fifteen titles, twenty-three pages, including 'Art in the Street?', 'Art in the Street, First Episode', 'Beauty in the Back-Streets: You Just Have to Know How to Look', 'A Suburb Sets the Pace'), *Science-Fiction-Utopia* (two titles, three pages), *Underground* (one title), *Writing-Ideograms-Graffiti* (two titles, four pages). The aim of inverting or *transgressing*, which is clearly manifested by this list, is necessarily contained within the limits assigned to it a contrario by the aesthetic conventions; it denounces and by the need to secure recognition of the aesthetic nature of the transgression of the limits (i.e., recognition of its conformity to the norms of the transgressing group). Hence the almost Markovian logic of the choices, with, for the cinema, Antonioni, Chaplin, cinémathèque, Eisenstein, eroticism-pornography, Fellini, Godard, Klein, Monroe, underground, Warhol.

This commitment to symbolic transgression, which is often combined with political neutrality or revolutionary aestheticism, is the almost perfect antithesis of petit-bourgeois moralism or of what Sartre used to call the revolutionary's 'seriousness'.<sup>33</sup> The ethical indifference which the aesthetic disposition implies when it becomes the basis of the art of living is in fact the root of the ethical aversion to artists (or intellectuals) which manifests itself particularly vehemently among the declining and threatened fractions of the petite bourgeoisie (especially independent craftsmen and shopkeepers), who tend to express their regressive and repressive dispositions in all areas of practice (especially in educational matters and vis-à-vis students and student demonstrations), but also among the rising fractions of that class whose striving for virtue and whose deep insecurity render them very receptive to the phantasm of 'pornocracy'.

The pure disposition is so universally recognized as legitimate that no voice is heard pointing out that the definition of art, and through it the art of living, is an object of struggle among the classes. Dominated life-styles (*arts de vivre*), which have practically never received systematic expression, are almost always perceived, even by their defenders, from the destructive or reductive viewpoint of the dominant aesthetic, so that their only options are degradation or self-destructive rehabilitation ('popular culture'). This is why it is necessary to look to Proudhon<sup>34</sup> for a naively systematic expression of the petit-bourgeois aesthetic, which subordinates art to the core values of the art of living and identifies the cynical perversion of the artist's life-style as the source of the absolute primacy given to form.

Under the influence of property, the artist, *depraved* in his reason, *dissolute in his morals, venal and without dignity*, is the impure image of egoism. The idea of *justice* and *honesty* slides over his heart without taking root, and of all the classes of society, the artist class is the poorest in strong souls and noble characters.<sup>35</sup>

'Art for art's sake, as it has been called, not having its legitimacy within itself, being based on nothing, is nothing. It is *debauchery* of the heart and *dissolution* of the mind. Separated from right and duty, cultivated and pursued as the highest thought of the soul and the supreme manifestation of humanity, art or the ideal, stripped of the greater part of itself, reduced to nothing more than an *excitement of fantasy and the senses*, is the source of *sin*, the origin of all servitude, the poisoned spring from which, according to the Bible, flow all the *fornications* and abominations of the earth ... Art for art's sake, I say, verse for verse's sake, style for style's sake, form for form's sake, fantasy for fantasy's sake, all the diseases which like a plague of lice are gnawing away at our epoch, are *vire* in all its refinement, the quintessence of evil.'<sup>36</sup>

What is condemned is the autonomy of form and the artist's right to the formal refinements by which he claims mastery of what ought to be merely a matter of 'execution': 'I have no quarrel with nobility, or elegance, or pose, or style, or gesture, or any aspect of what constitutes the execution of a work of art and is the usual object of traditional criticism.'<sup>37</sup>



Dependent on demand in the choice of their objects, artists take their revenge in the execution: 'There are church painters, history painters, genre painters (in other words, painters of anecdotes or farces), portrait painters, landscape painters, animal painters, seascape painters, painters of Venus, painters of fantasy. One specializes in nudes, another in drapery. Then each one endeavours to distinguish himself by one of the means which contribute to the execution. One goes in for sketching, another for colour; this one attends to composition, that one to perspective, a third to costume or local colour; one shines through sentiment, another through his idealized or realistic figures; yet another redeems the futility of his subject by the fineness of his detail. Each strives to have his own trick, his own 'je ne sais quoi', a personal manner, and so, with the help of fashion, reputations are made and unmade.'<sup>38</sup>

In contrast to this decadent art cut off from social life, respecting neither God nor man, an art worthy of the name-must be subordinated to science, morality and justice. It must aim to arouse the moral sense, to inspire feelings of dignity and delicacy, to idealize reality, to substitute for the thing the ideal of the thing, by painting the true and not the real. In a word, it must educate. To do so, it must transmit not 'personal impressions' (like David in *The Tennis-Court Oath*, or Delacroix) but, like Coubert in *Les Paysans de Flagey*, reconstitute the social and historical truth which all may judge. ('Each of us only has to consult himself to be able, after brief consideration, to state a judgement on any work of art.'<sup>39</sup>) And it would be a pity to conclude without quoting a eulogy of the small detached house which would surely be massively endorsed by the middle and working classes: 'I would give the Louvre, the Tuileries, Notre-Dame—and the Vendôme column into the bargain—to live in my own home, in a *little house of my own design*, where I would live alone, in

the middle of a little plot of ground, a quarter of an acre or so, where I'd have water, shade, a lawn, and silence. And if I thought of putting a statue in it, it wouldn't be a Jupiter or an Apollo—those gentlemen are nothing to me—not views of London, Rome, Constantinople or Venice. God preserve me from such places! I'd put there what I lack—mountains, vineyards, meadows, goats, sheep, reapers and shepherds.<sup>40</sup>

NEUTRALIZATION AND THE UNIVERSE OF POSSIBLES Unlike non-specific perception, the specifically aesthetic perception of a work of art (in which there are of course degrees of accomplishment) is armed with a perceptive principle which is socially constituted and acquired. This principle of selection enables it to pick out and retain, from among the elements offered to the eye (e.g., leaves or clouds considered merely as indices or signals invested with a denotative function—'It's a poplar', 'There's going to be a storm'), all the stylistic traits—and only those—which, when relocated in the universe of stylistic possibilities, distinguish a particular manner of treating the elements selected, whether clouds or leaves, that is, a style as a mode of representation expressing the mode of perception and thought that is proper to a period, a class or class fraction, a group of artists or a particular artist. No stylistic characterization of a work of art is possible without presupposing at least implicit reference to the compossible alternatives, whether simultaneous—to distinguish it from its contemporaries—or successive—to contrast it with earlier or later works by the same or a different artist. Exhibitions devoted to an artist's whole oeuvre or to a genre (e.g., the still-life exhibition in Bordeaux in 1978) are the objective realization of the field of interchangeable stylistic possibilities which is brought into play when one 'recognizes' the singularities of the characteristic style of a work of art. As E. H. Gombrich demonstrates, Piet Mondrian's *Broadway Boogie Woogie* only takes on its 'full meaning' in terms of a previous idea of Mondrian's work and of the expectations it favours. The 'impression of gay abandon' given by the play of bright, strongly contrasting patches of colour can only arise in a mind familiar with 'an art of straight lines and a few primary colours in carefully balanced rectangles' and capable of perceiving the 'relaxed style of popular music' in the distance from the 'severity' which is expected. And as soon as one imagines this painting attributed to Gino Severini, who tries to express in some of his paintings 'the rhythm of dance music in works of brilliant chaos', it is clear that, measured by this stylistic yardstick, Mondrian's picture would rather suggest the first *Brandenburg Concerto*.<sup>41</sup>

The aesthetic disposition, understood as the aptitude for perceiving and discerning specifically stylistic characteristics, is thus inseparable from specifically artistic competence. The latter may be acquired by explicit learning or simply by regular contact with works of art, especially those assembled in museums and galleries, where the diversity of their

Piet Mondrian, *Broadway Boogie Woogie*Piet Mondrian,  
*Painting I*Gino Severini, *Dynamic Hieroglyphic of the Bal Tabarin*

original functions is neutralized by their being displayed in a place consecrated to art, so that they invite pure interest in form. This practical mastery enables its possessor to situate each element of a universe of artistic representations in a class defined in relation to the class composed of all the artistic representations consciously or unconsciously excluded. Thus, an awareness of the stylistic features which make up the stylistic originality of all the works of a period relative to those of another period, or, within this class, of the works of one school relative to another, or of the works of one artist relative to the works of his school or period, or even of an artist's particular period or work relative to his whole oeuvre, is inseparable from an awareness of the stylistic redundancies, i.e., the typical treatments of the pictorial matter which define a style. In short, a grasp of the resemblances presupposes implicit or explicit reference to the differences, and vice versa. Attribution is always implicitly based on reference to 'typical works', consciously or unconsciously selected because they present to a particularly high degree the qualities more or less explicitly recognized as pertinent in a given system of classification. Everything suggests that, even among specialists, the criteria of pertinence which define the stylistic properties of 'typical works' generally remain implicit and that the aesthetic taxonomies implicitly mobilized to distinguish, classify and order works of art never have the rigour which aesthetic theories sometimes try to lend them.

In fact, the simple placing which the amateur or specialist performs when he undertakes attribution has nothing in common with the genuinely scientific intention of grasping the work's immanent reason and *raison d'être* by reconstructing the perceived situation, the subjectively experienced problematic, which is nothing other than the space of the positions and self-positionings constituting the field and within which the artistic intention of the artist in question has defined itself, generally by opposition. The references which this reconstructing operation employs have nothing to do with the kinds of semantic echo or affective correspondence which adorn celebratory discourse—they are the indispensable means of constructing the field of thematic or stylistic possibilities in relation to which, objectively and to some extent subjectively, the possibility selected by the artist presented itself. Thus, to understand why the early Romantic painters returned to primitive art, one would have to reconstitute the whole universe of reference of the pupils of David, with their long beards and Greek costumes, who, 'outdoing their master's cult of antiquity, wanted to go back to Homer, the Bible and Ossian, and condemned the style of classical antiquity itself as "rococo", "Van Loo" or "Pompadour".'<sup>42</sup> This would lead one back to the inextricably ethical and aesthetic alternatives—such as the identification of the naive with the pure and the natural—in terms of which their choices were made and which have nothing in common with the transhistorical oppositions beloved of formalist aesthetics.<sup>43</sup>

But the celebrant's or devotee's intention is not that of understanding, and, in the ordinary routine of the cult of the work of art, the play of academic or urbane references has no other function than to bring the work into an interminable circuit of inter-legitimation, so that a reference to Jan Breughel's *Bouquet of Flowers* lends dignity to Jean-Michel Piccart's *Bouquet of Flowers with Parrot*, just as, in another context, reference to the latter can, being less common, serve to enhance the former. This play of cultured allusions and analogies endlessly pointing to other analogies, which, like the cardinal oppositions in mythical or ritual systems, never have to justify themselves by stating the basis of the relating which they perform, weaves around the works a complex web of factitious experiences, each answering and reinforcing all the others, which creates the enchantment of artistic contemplation. It is the source of the 'idolatrie' to which Proust refers, which leads one to find 'an actress's robe or a society woman's dress beautiful ... not because the cloth is beautiful but because it is the cloth painted by Moreau or described by Balzac.'<sup>44</sup>

Analogy, functioning as a circular mode of thought, makes it possible to tour the whole area of art and luxury without ever leaving it. Thus Châteaune Margaux wine can be described with the same words as are used to describe the château, just as others will evoke Proust apropos of Monet or César Franck, which is a good way of talking about neither: 'The house is in the image of the vintage. Noble, austere, even a little solemn. ... Châteaune Margaux has the air of an ancient temple devoted to the cult of wine. ... Vineyard or dwelling, Margaux disdains all embellishments. But just as the wine has to be served before it unfolds all its charms, so the residence waits for the visitor to enter before it reveals its own. In each case the same words spring to one's lips: elegance, distinction, delicacy and that subtle satisfaction given by something which has received the most attentive and indeed loving care for generations. A wine long matured, a house long inhabited: Margaux the vintage and Margaux the château are the product of two equally rare things: *rigour and time*.'<sup>45</sup>

**DISTANCE FROM NECESSITY** To explain the correlation between educational capital and the propensity or at least the aspiration to appreciate a work 'independently of its content' as the culturally most ambitious respondents put it, and more generally the propensity to make the 'gratuitous' and 'disinterested' investments demanded by legitimate works, it is not sufficient to point to the fact that schooling provides the linguistic tools and the references which enable aesthetic experience to be expressed and to be constituted by being expressed. What is in fact affirmed in this relationship is the dependence of the aesthetic disposition on the past and present material conditions of existence which are the precondition of both its constitution and its application and also of the accumulation of a cultural capital (whether or not educationally sanctioned) which can

only be acquired by means of a sort of withdrawal from economic necessity. The aesthetic disposition which tends to bracket off the nature and function of the object represented and to exclude any 'naïve' reaction—horror at the horrible, desire for the desirable, pious reverence for the sacred—along with all purely ethical responses, in order to concentrate solely upon the mode of representation, the style, perceived and appreciated by comparison with other styles, is one dimension of a total relation to the world and to others, a life-style, in which the effects of particular conditions of existence are expressed in a 'misrecognizable' form.<sup>46</sup> These conditions of existence, which are the precondition for all learning of legitimate culture, whether implicit and diffuse, as domestic cultural training generally is, or explicit and specific, as in scholastic training, are characterized by the suspension and removal of economic necessity and by objective and subjective distance from practical urgencies, which is the basis of objective and subjective distance from groups subjected to those determinisms.

To be able to play the games of culture with the playful seriousness which Plato demanded, a seriousness without the spirit of seriousness, one has to belong to the ranks of those who have been able, not necessarily to make their whole existence a sort of children's game, as artists do, but at least to maintain for a long time, sometimes a whole lifetime, a child's relation to the world. (All children start life as baby bourgeois, in a relation of magical power over others and, through them, over the world, but they grow out of it sooner or later.) This is clearly seen when, by an accident of social genetics, into the well-policed world of intellectual games there comes one of those people (one thinks of Rousseau or Chernyshevsky) who bring inappropriate stakes and interests into the games of culture, who get so involved in the game that they abandon the margin of neutralizing distance that the *illuminé* (believed in the game) demands: who treat intellectual struggles, the object of so many pathetic manifestos, as a simple question of right and wrong, life and death. This is why the logic of the game has already assigned them rôles—eccentric or boor—which they will play despite themselves in the eyes of those who know how to stay within the bounds of the intellectual illusion and who cannot see them any other way.

The aesthetic disposition, a generalized capacity to neutralize ordinary urgencies and to bracket off practical ends, a durable inclination and attitude for practice without a practical function, can only be constituted within an experience of the world freed from urgency and through the practice of activities which are an end in themselves, such as scholastic exercises or the contemplation of works of art. In other words, it presupposes the distance from the world (of which the 'role distance' brought to light by Erving Goffman is a particular case) which is the basis of the bourgeois experience of the world. Contrary to what certain mechanistic theories would suggest, even in its most specifically artistic dimension

the pedagogic action of the family and the school operates at least as much through the economic and social conditions which are the precondition of its operation as through the contents which it inculcates.<sup>47</sup> The scholastic world of regulated games and exercise for exercise' sake is, at least in this respect, less remote than it might appear from the 'bourgeois' world and the countless 'disinterested' and 'gratuitous' acts which go to make up its distinctive rarity, such as home maintenance and decoration, occasioning a daily squandering of care, time and labour (often through the intermediary of servants), walking and tourism, movements without any other aim than physical exercise and the symbolic appropriation of a world reduced to the status of a landscape, or ceremonies and receptions, pretexts for a display of ritual luxuries, décors, conversations and finery, not to mention, of course, artistic practices and enjoyments. It is not surprising that bourgeois adolescents, who are both economically privileged and (temporarily) excluded from the reality of economic power, sometimes express their distance from the bourgeois world which they cannot really appropriate by a refusal of complicity whose most refined expression is a propensity towards aesthetics and aestheticism. In this respect they share common ground with the women of the bourgeoisie, who, being partially excluded from economic activity, find fulfilment in stage-managing the décor of bourgeois existence, when they are not seeking refuge or revenge in aesthetics.

Economic power is first and foremost a power to keep economic necessity at arm's length. This is why it universally asserts itself by the destruction of riches, conspicuous consumption, squandering, and every form of *gratuitous* luxury. Thus, whereas the court aristocracy made the whole of life a continuous spectacle, the bourgeoisie has established the opposition between what is paid for and what is free, the interested and the disinterested, in the form of the opposition, which Weber saw as characterizing it, between place of work and place of residence, working days and holidays, the outside (male) and the inside (female), business and sentiment, industry and art, the world of economic necessity and the world of artistic freedom that is snatched, by economic power, from that necessity.

Material or symbolic consumption of works of art constitutes one of the supreme manifestations of *taste*, in the sense both of objective leisure and subjective facility. The detachment of the pure gaze cannot be separated from a general disposition towards the 'gratuitous' and the 'disinterested', the paradoxical product of a negative economic conditioning which, through facility and freedom, engenders distance vis-à-vis necessity. At the same time, the aesthetic disposition is defined, objectively and subjectively, in relation to other dispositions. Objective distance from necessity and from those trapped within it combines with a conscious distance which doubles freedom by exhibiting it. As the objective distance from necessity grows, life-style increasingly becomes the product of what Weber calls a 'stylization of life', a systematic commitment

which orients and organizes the most diverse practices—the choice of a vintage or a cheese or the decoration of a holiday home in the country. This affirmation of power over a dominated necessity always implies a claim to a legitimate superiority over those who, because they cannot assert the same contempt for contingencies in gratuitous luxury and conspicuous consumption, remain dominated by ordinary interests and urgencies. The tastes of freedom can only assert themselves as such in relation to the tastes of necessity, which are thereby brought to the level of the aesthetic and so defined as vulgar. This claim to aristocracy is less likely to be contested than any other, because the relation of the 'pure', 'disinterested' disposition to the conditions which make it possible, i.e., the material conditions of existence which are rarest because most freed from economic necessity, has every chance of passing unnoticed. The most 'classifying' privilege thus has the privilege of appearing to be the most natural one.

THE AESTHETIC SENSE AS THE SENSE OF DISTINCTION Thus, the aesthetic disposition is one dimension of a distant, self-assured relation to the world and to others which presupposes objective assurance and distance. It is one manifestation of the system of dispositions produced by the social conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence when they take the paradoxical form of the greatest freedom conceivable, at a given moment, with respect to the constraints of economic necessity. But it is also a distinctive expression of a privileged position in social space whose distinctive value is objectively established in its relationship to expressions generated from different conditions. Like every sort of taste, it unites and separates. Being the product of the conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence, it unites all those who are the product of similar conditions while distinguishing them from all others. And it distinguishes in an essential way, since taste is the basis of all that one has—people and things—and all that one is for others, whereby one classifies oneself and is classified by others.

Tastes (i.e., manifested preferences) are the practical affirmation of an inevitable difference. It is no accident that, when they have to be justified, they are asserted purely negatively, by the refusal of other tastes.<sup>49</sup> In matters of taste, more than anywhere else, all determination is negation,<sup>50</sup> and tastes are perhaps first and foremost distastes, disgust provoked by horror or visceral intolerance ('*sick-making*') of the tastes of others. 'De gustibus non est disputandum': not because 'tous les goûts sont dans la nature', but because each taste feels itself to be natural—and so it almost is, being a habitus—which amounts to rejecting others as unnatural and therefore vicious. Aesthetic intolerance can be terribly violent. Aversion to different life-styles is perhaps one of the strongest barriers between the classes; class endogamy is evidence of this. The most intolerable thing for those who regard themselves as the possessors of legitimate culture is the

sacrilegious reuniting of tastes which taste dictates shall be separated. This means that the games of artists and aesthetes and their struggles for the monopoly of artistic legitimacy are less innocent than they seem. At stake in every struggle over art there is also the imposition of an art of living, that is, the transmutation of an arbitrary way of living into the legitimate way of life which casts every other way of living into arbitrariness.<sup>51</sup> The artist's life-style is always a challenge thrown at the bourgeois life-style, which it seeks to condemn as unreal and even absurd, by a sort of practical demonstration of the emptiness of the values and powers it pursues. The neutralizing relation to the world which defines the aesthetic disposition potentially implies a subversion of the spirit of seriousness required by bourgeois investments. Like the visibly ethical judgements of those who lack the means to make art the basis of their art of living, to see the world and other people through literary reminiscences and pictorial references, the 'pure' and purely aesthetic judgements of the artist and the aesthete spring from the dispositions of an ethos, but because of the legitimacy which they command so long as their relationship to the dispositions and interests of a group defined by strong cultural capital and weak economic capital remains unrecognized, they provide a sort of absolute reference point in the necessarily endless play of mutually self-relativizing tastes. By a paradoxical reversal, they thereby help to legitimate the bourgeois claim to 'natural distinction' as difference made absolute.

Objectively and subjectively aesthetic stances adopted in matters like cosmetics, clothing or home decoration are opportunities to experience or assert one's position in social space as a rank to be upheld or a distance to be kept. It goes without saying that the social classes are not equally inclined and prepared to enter this game of refusal and counter-refusal, and that the strategies aimed at transforming the basic dispositions of a life-style into a system of aesthetic principles, objective differences into elective distinctions, passive options (constituted externally by the logic of the distinctive relationships) into conscious, elective choices are in fact reserved for members of the dominant class, indeed the very top bourgeoisie, and for artists, who as the inventors and protectors of the 'stylization of life' are alone able to make their art of living one of the fine arts. By contrast, the entry of the petite bourgeoisie into the game of distinction is marked, *inter alia*, by the anxiety of exposing oneself to classification by offering to the taste of others such infallible indices of personal taste as clothes or furniture, even a simple pair of armchairs, as in one of Nathalie Sarraute's novels. As for the working classes, perhaps their sole function in the system of aesthetic positions is to serve as a foil, a negative reference point, in relation to which all aesthetics define themselves, by successive negations.<sup>52</sup> Ignoring or ignorant of manner and style, the 'aesthetic' (in itself) of the working classes and culturally most deprived fractions of the middle classes defines as 'nice', 'pretty', 'lovely' (rather than 'beautiful') things that are already defined as



such in the 'aesthetic' of calendars and postcards: a sunset, a little girl playing with a cat, a folk dance, an old master, a first communion, a children's procession. The striving towards distinction comes in with petit bourgeois aestheticism, which delights in all the cheap substitutes for chic objects and practices—distressed and painted pebbles, cane and raffia, art handicrafts and art photography.

This aestheticism defines itself against the 'aesthetic' of the working classes, refusing their favourite subjects, the themes of 'views', such as mountain landscapes, sunsets and woods, or souvenir photos, such as the first communion, the monument or the old master (see figure 2). In photography, this taste prefers objects that are close to those of the popular aesthetic but semi-neutralized by more or less explicit reference to a pictorial tradition or by a visible stylistic intention combining the human picturesque (weaver at his loom, tramps quarrelling, folk dance) with gratuitous form (pebbles, rope, tree bark).

Technicians seem to offer the purest form of 'middle-brow' taste. Their tastes in photography locate them centrally in the structure of the middle classes (see figure 2), with the craftsmen, small shopkeepers, clerical workers and junior executives inclining towards the working class and the primary teachers and new petit bourgeois inclining towards the upper classes. They are particularly drawn to the objects most typical of middle-brow photography—the still life—whereas the new petit bourgeois prefer objects which they see as lying outside the repertoire of the traditional aesthetic and therefore more 'original' (rope, cabbages), and also those belonging to the 'social picturesque' (tramps quarrelling).

It is significant that this middle-brow art par excellence finds one of its preferred subjects in one of the spectacles most characteristic of middle-brow culture (along with the circus, light opera and bull-fights), the folk dance (which is particularly appreciated by skilled workers and foremen, junior executives, clerical and commercial employees) (C.S. VII). Like the photographic recording of the social picturesque, whose populist objectivism distances the lower classes by constituting them as an object of contemplation or even commiseration or indignation, the spectacle of the 'people' making a spectacle of itself, as in folk dancing, is an opportunity to experience the relationship of distant proximity, in the form of the idealized vision purveyed by aesthetic realism and populist nostalgia, which is a basic element in the relationship of the petite bourgeoisie to the working or peasant classes and their traditions. But this middle-brow aestheticism in turn serves as a foil to the most alert members of the new middle-class fractions, who reject its favoured subjects, and to the secondary teachers whose aestheticism (the aestheticism of consumers, since they are relatively infrequent practitioners of photography and the other arts) purports to be able to treat any object aesthetically, with the excep-

Figure 2 The aesthetic disposition in the petite bourgeoisie (the various objects are ranked for each class fraction according to the percentage saying they would make a beautiful photo).

	Independent craftsmen, shopkeepers	Clerical, junior admin. executives	Technicians	Primary teachers	New petite bourgeoisie
Most choices	sunset landscape folk dance girl with cat woman breast-feeding weaver first communion old master famous monument still life bark of tree pregnant woman metal structure snake tramps' quarrel wounded man scrap-yard rope cabbages butcher's stall car crash	sunset landscape folk dance girl with cat woman breast-feeding old master still life first communion bark monument weaver snake metal structure pregnant woman cabbages tramps' quarrel rope butcher's stall scrap-yard wounded man car crash	sunset landscape girl with cat woman breast-feeding weaver folk dance still life bark snake first communion monument metal structure old master scrap-yard rope pregnant woman cabbages tramps' quarrel wounded man butcher's stall car crash	sunset woman breast-feeding girl with cat landscape bark weaver folk dance snake pregnant woman monument still life metal structure rope old master scrap-yard tramps' quarrel cabbages butcher's stall wounded man first communion car crash	sunset landscape woman breast-feeding girl with cat bark weaver still life folk dance rope snake old master cabbages pregnant woman metal structure tramps' quarrel monument first communion scrap-yard butcher's stall wounded man car crash
Fewest					

tion of those so constituted by the middle-brow art of the petite bourgeoisie (such as the weaver and the folk dance, which are deemed merely 'interesting').<sup>54</sup> These would be aesthetes demonstrate by their distinctive refusals that they possess the practical mastery of the relationships between objects and groups which is the basis of all judgements of the type 'Ça fait' ('It looks...') ('Ça fait petit-bourgeois', 'Ça fait nouveau riche' etc.), without being able to go so far as to ascribe beauty to the most marked objects of the popular aesthetic (first communion) or the petit-bourgeois aesthetic (mother and child, folk dance) which the relations of structural proximity spontaneously lead them to devalue.

Explicit aesthetic choices are in fact often constituted in opposition to the choices of the groups closest in social space with whom the competition is most direct and most immediate, and more precisely, no doubt, in relation to those choices most clearly marked by the intention (perceived as pretension) of marking distinction vis-à-vis lower groups, such as, for intellectuals, the primary teachers' Brassens, Jean Ferrat or Ferré. Thus the song, as a cultural property which (like photography) is almost universally accessible and genuinely common (since hardly anyone is not exposed at one moment or another to the 'successes' of the day), calls for particular vigilance from those who intend to mark their difference. The intellectuals, artists and higher-education teachers seem to hesitate between systematic refusal of what can only be, at best, a middle-brow art, and a selective acceptance which manifests the universality of their culture and their aesthetic disposition.<sup>55</sup> For their part, the employers and professionals, who have little interest in the 'intellectual' song, indicate their distance from ordinary songs by rejecting with disgust the most popular and most 'vulgar' singers, such as Les Compagnons de la Chanson, Mireille Mathieu, Adamo or Sheila, and making an exception for the oldest and most consecrated singers (like Edith Piaf or Charles Trénet) or those closest to opera and bel canto. But it is the middle classes who find in song (as in photography) an opportunity to manifest their artistic pretension by refusing the favourite singers of the working classes, such as Mireille Mathieu, Adamo, Charles Aznavour or Tino Rossi, and declaring their preference for the singers who endeavour to dignify this 'minor' genre. That is why the primary teachers distinguish themselves most clearly from the other fractions of the petite bourgeoisie in this area, where, more easily than in the domain of legitimate art, they can invest their academic dispositions and assert their own taste in the choice of singers who offer populist poetry in the primary-school tradition, such as Jacques Douai or Brassens (who was on the syllabus of the Saint-Cloud entrance examination a few years ago).<sup>56</sup>

In addition to the data provided by the survey question, use was also made of the findings of a survey by the opinion research department of the

French broadcasting service (ORTF) (C.S. XIX) and of thirty in-depth interviews designed to grasp the constellation of preferences and refusals in conditions as close as possible to ordinary conversation. These interviews confirmed that, as the ORTF survey also shows, the more strongly a singer is preferred by the less cultivated, the more he or she is refused by the most cultivated—whose tastes in this area are almost exclusively expressed in reactions. These refusals, almost always expressed in the mode of distaste, are often accompanied by pitying or indignant remarks about the corresponding tastes ('I can't understand how anyone can like that').

Similarly, one finds that the declining petite bourgeoisie most readily claims for itself the virtues that the new petite bourgeoisie most readily claims for itself (witty, refined, stylish, artistic, imaginative); whereas the latter signals its aesthetic pretension by a refusal of the most typically 'bourgeois' configurations and by a concern to go against common judgements, in which aesthetic commitments figure prominently. Thus, when asked to state the ideal qualities of a friend or a domestic interior, they produce motley combinations such as: 'artistic, sociable, amusing, comfortable, easy to maintain, imaginative' (sales representative, Paris), 'dynamic, pragmatic, stylish, studied, warm, imaginative' (gallery director, Lille), 'dynamic, refined, pragmatic, comfortable, harmonious, cosy' (radio presenter, Lille). It is again a similar process that leads the members of the professions to distinguish themselves from newcomers to the bourgeoisie by rejecting the qualities of ambition and upward mobility, such as 'pragmatic', 'dynamic' (often chosen by managerial executives), or the most 'pretentious' adjectives, such as 'stylish' or 'refined', which are much favoured by the new petite bourgeoisie.

It may also be assumed that the affirmation of the omnipotence of the aesthetic gaze found among higher-education teachers, the group most inclined to say that all the objects mentioned could make a beautiful photograph and to profess their recognition of modern art or of the artistic status of the photograph, stems much more from a self-distinguishing intention than from a true aesthetic universalism. This has not escaped the most knowing avant-garde producers, who carry sufficient authority to challenge, if need be, the very dogma of the omnipotence of art,<sup>57</sup> and are in a position to recognize this faith as a defensive manoeuvre to avoid self-exposure by reckless refusals: 'Who would say this: "When I look at a picture, I'm not interested in what it represents"? Nowadays, the sort of people who don't know much about art. Saying that is typical of someone who hasn't any idea about art. Twenty years ago, I'm not even sure that twenty years ago the abstract painters would have said that. I don't think so. It's exactly what a guy says when he hasn't a clue: "I'm not one of these old fogies, I know what counts is whether it's pretty" (avant-garde painter, age 35). They alone, at all events, can afford the audacious imposture of refusing all refusals by recuperating, in parody or sublimation, the very objects refused by the lower-degree aestheticism. The 'rehabilitation' of vulgar objects is more risky, but also more 'profitable', the smaller the distance in social space or time, and the 'horrors'

of popular kitsch are easier to 'recuperate' than those of petit-bourgeois imitation, just as the 'abominations' of bourgeois taste can begin to be found 'amusing' when they are sufficiently dated to cease to be 'compromising'.

Suffice it to point out that, in addition to those subjects which had already been constituted as aesthetic at the time of the survey, either by a pictorial tradition (e.g., the metal frame of Léger or Gromaire, the tramps quarrelling, a variant of an old theme of realist painting often taken up in photography, or the butcher's stall), or by the photographic tradition (e.g., the weaver, the folk dance, the bark), most of the 'banal' subjects have subsequently been constituted aesthetically by one avant-garde painter or another (for example, the sunset over the sea, by Richer, who paints typically romantic landscapes from photographs, or Long and Fulton, English painters who make 'conceptual' landscape photographs, or even Land Art; or the car crash, by Andy Warhol; or the tramps' quarrel, with the 'tramps sleeping in the Bowery' of the American hyper-realists; or the first communion, by Bolianski, who has even given artistic status to the family album etc.). The only 'unrecuperated' and, for the moment, 'irrecuperable' subjects are the favourite themes of first-degree aestheticism, the weaver at his loom, the folk dance, the treebark, and the woman suckling a child. They are too close to favour the flaunting of an absolute power of aesthetic constitution; and because they do not allow distance to be manifested, they are more liable to be mistaken for 'first-degree' intentions. Reappropriation is that much more difficult when the aesthetic-in-itself which it works on clearly manifests recognition of the dominant aesthetic so that the distinctive deviation is liable to go unnoticed.

The artist agrees with the 'bourgeois' in one respect: he prefers naively to 'pretentiousness'. The essential merit of the 'common people' is that they have none of the pretensions to art (or power) which inspire the ambitions of the 'petit bourgeois'. Their indifference tacitly acknowledges the monopoly. That is why, in the mythology of artists and intellectuals, whose outflanking and double-negating strategies sometimes lead them back to 'popular' tastes and opinions, the 'people' so often play a role not unlike that of the peasantry in the conservative ideologies of the declining aristocracy.

In fact, their 'pretension' leaves the petit bourgeois particularly disarmed in the less legitimate or not-yet legitimate domains which the cultural elite abandon to them, whether in photography or in cinema, in which their ambitions are often expressed (as is shown, for example, in the fact that the gap between the petit bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie is much less wide regarding knowledge of cinema directors than of composers). The new-style petit bourgeois, who, confronted with objectively ranked judgements, are able to choose the 'right' answer, are almost as disarmed as the working

classes when faced with an opportunity for aesthetic constitution of an object (not a single small art-dealer says that a car accident can make a beautiful photo, and the scrap-yard arouses similar responses).

### *Cultural Pedigree*

While variations in educational capital are always very closely related to variations in competence, even in areas, like cinema or jazz, which are neither taught nor directly assessed by the educational system, the fact remains that, at equivalent levels of educational capital, differences in social origin (whose 'effects' are already expressed in differences in educational capital) are associated with important differences in competence. These differences become all the more striking (except at the highest educational levels, where over-selection tends to neutralize differences of trajectory), firstly, when one appeals less to a strict, and strictly assessable, competence and more to a sort of familiarity with culture; and, secondly, as one moves from the most 'scholastic' and 'classical' areas of culture to less legitimate and more 'outlandish' areas of the 'extra-curricular' culture, which is not taught in schools but is valued in the academic market and can often yield high symbolic profit. The relative weight of educational capital in the system of explanatory factors can even be much weaker than that of social origin when the respondents are only required to express a status-induced familiarity with legitimate or soon-to-be-legitimated culture, a paradoxical relationship made up of that mixture of self-assurance and (relative) ignorance, expressing true bourgeois rights, which are measured by seniority.

At equal educational levels, the proportion who say they know at least twelve of the musical works mentioned increases more sharply than the proportion who can attribute at least twelve of them to their composers, as one moves from the working class to the upper class (and the gap is very narrow among graduates) (see table 4). The same logic governs the differences by sex, except that they are less marked. Whereas, as regards composers, no differences are found between the sexes among individuals of the same class, strong differences appear in favour of women as regards familiarity with works, especially in the middle and upper classes (in the working class, this knowledge is very limited in both sexes); in the two most feminine occupational categories—the medical and social services and secretaries—all the persons questioned claimed to know at least three of the works. This difference in the experiential or stated relationship to music is no doubt partly explained by the fact that the traditional division of labour assigns to women familiarity with the things of art and literature.

The differences linked to social origin are also very strong as regards knowledge of film directors, which, at equal educational levels, rises with social origin. So too does the proportion who assert that 'ugly' or trivial



Table 4 Knowledge of composers and musical works by education and class of origin (%)

Educational qualification	Class of origin	Number of composers known				Number of works known			
		0-2	3-6	7-11	12+	0-2	3-6	7-11	12+
None, CEP, CAP	Working	69.5	23.5	5.5	1.5	32.5	48.5	17.5	1.5
	Middle	68.5	21.0	8.5	2.0	21.0	55.0	19.5	4.5
	Upper	46.0	25.0	8.5	20.5	12.5	33.5	29.0	25.0
	All classes	67.0	22.0	7.5	3.5	24.5	51.0	19.5	5.0
BEP	Working	57.5	15.5	23.0	4.0	15.5	27.0	50.0	7.5
	Middle	48.5	35.5	9.5	6.5	8.5	43.0	34.5	14.0
	Upper	31.5	41.5	13.5	13.5	8.0	31.5	41.0	19.5
	All classes	44.5	34.0	13.0	8.5	9.5	37.0	39.0	14.5
Baccalauréat	Working	11.0	59.5	18.5	11.0	0	33.0	52.0	15.0
	Middle	19.0	32.0	38.0	11.0	3.5	26.5	51.0	19.0
	Upper	21.5	21.5	37.5	19.5	5.0	19.5	42.5	33.0
	All classes	18.5	32.5	35.5	13.5	3.5	25.5	48.5	22.5
Technical college, some higher education	Working	20.0	0	70.0	10.0	0	30.0	60.0	10.0
	Middle	16.0	22.5	51.5	10.0	13.0	19.5	54.5	13.0
	Upper	17.5	11.5	39.0	32.0	11.5	11.5	33.5	43.5
	All classes	17.5	13.5	45.5	23.5	11.0	15.5	42.0	31.5
Licence, agrégation, grande école	Working	0	35.0	32.5	32.5	0	7.0	66.5	26.5
	Middle	7.0	15.0	47.5	30.5	0	22.0	49.0	29.0
	Upper	7.5	15.5	44.5	32.5	8.0	13.5	38.5	40.0
	All classes	7.0	16.5	44.5	32.0	5.5	15.0	43.0	36.5

objects can make a beautiful photograph. Needless to say, corresponding to the different modes of acquisition, there are differences in the nature of the works preferred. The differences linked to social origin tend to increase as one moves away from the academic curriculum, from literature to painting or classical music and a fortiori jazz or avant-garde art.

An earlier survey showed that students of working-class or middle-class origin who had scores similar to those of students of bourgeois origin in classical culture fell back as the test moved towards 'extra-curricular' culture, i.e., both avant-garde theatre and Paris 'boulevard' (middle-brow) theatre. One finds an entirely analogous relation here between the artistic producers and the secondary teachers (or even the art teachers, who—as is evident in another survey now being analysed—especially when they are of working-class or middle-class origin, mostly have very 'classical' tastes and are much closer to the teachers than to the artists).

Those who have acquired the bulk of their cultural capital in and for school have more 'classical', safer cultural investments than those who have received a large cultural inheritance. For example, whereas the members of the dominant class with the highest qualifications (the *agrégation* or diploma from a *grande école*) never mention certain works or certain painters typical of middle-brow culture, such as Buffet or Utrillo, have considerable knowledge of composers, and prefer the *Well-Tempered Clavier* or the *Firebird Suite*, the highly educated members of the working and middle classes more often make choices which indicate their respect for a more 'scholastic' culture (Goya, Leonardo, Breughel, Watteau, Raphael), and a significant proportion of them concur with the opinion that 'paintings are nice but difficult'. By contrast, those who originate from the dominant class know more works and more often choose works further from 'scholastic' culture (Brague, *Concerto for the Left Hand*). Similarly, those members of the established petite bourgeoisie (craftsmen, shopkeepers, clerical and commercial employees, junior executives) who have relatively low educational capital (BEP or below) make choices clearly marked by their trajectory. Thus, those who are rising socially show their respect for legitimate culture in various ways (e.g., they are more likely to agree that 'paintings are nice but difficult') and choose works typical of middle-brow (Buffet, Utrillo) or even popular taste (*Blue Danube*). However, those whose fathers belonged to the upper classes manifest, at equivalent levels of educational capital, greater familiarity with musical works (although they are no more familiar with the composers' names), just as they more often say they like the Impressionists, visit museums more often and more often choose academically consecrated works (Raphael or Leonardo).

**MANNERS AND MANNER OF ACQUISITION** Cultural (or linguistic) competence, which is acquired in relation to a particular field functioning both as a source of inculcation and as a market, remains defined by the conditions of acquisition. These conditions, perpetuated in the mode of utilization—i.e., in a given relationship to culture or language—function like a sort of 'trade-mark', and, by linking that competence to a particular market, help to define the value of its products in the various markets.

other words, what are grasped through indicators such as educational level or social origin or, more precisely, in the structure of the relationship between them, are *also* different modes of production of the cultivated habitus, which engender differences not only in the competences acquired but also in the manner of applying them. These differences in manner constitute a set of secondary properties, revealing different conditions of acquisition and predisposed to receive very different values in the various markets.

Knowing that 'manner' is a symbolic manifestation whose meaning and value depend as much on the perceivers as on the producer, one can see how it is that the manner of using symbolic goods, especially those regarded as the attributes of excellence, constitutes one of the key markers of 'class' and also the ideal weapon in strategies of distinction, that is, as Proust put it, 'the infinitely varied art of marking distances'. The ideology of natural taste contrasts two modalities of cultural competence and its use, and, behind them, two modes of acquisition of culture. Total, early, imperceptible learning, performed within the family from the earliest days of life and extended by a scholastic learning which presupposes and completes it, differs from belated, methodical learning not so much in the depth and durability of its effects—as the ideology of cultural 'need' would have it—as in the modality of the relationship to language and culture which it simultaneously tends to inculcate.<sup>59</sup> It confers the self-certainty which accompanies the certainty of possessing cultural legitimacy, and the ease which is the touchstone of excellence; it produces the paradoxical relationship to culture made up of self-confidence amid (relative) ignorance and of casualness amid familiarity, which bourgeois families hand down to their offspring as if it were an heirloom.

The competence of the 'connoisseur', an unconscious mastery of the instruments of appropriation which derives from slow familiarization and is the basis of familiarity with works, is an 'art', a practical mastery which, like an art of thinking or an art of living, cannot be transmitted solely by precept or prescription. Learning it presupposes the equivalent of the prolonged contact between disciple and master in a traditional education, i.e., repeated contact with cultural works and cultured people. And just as the apprentice or disciple can unconsciously acquire the rules of the art, including those that are not consciously known to the master himself, by means of a self-abandonment, excluding analysis and selection of the elements of the exemplary conduct, so too the art-lover, in a sense surrendering himself to the work, can internalize its principles of construction, without these ever being brought to his consciousness and formulated or formulable as such, and this is what makes all the difference between the theory of art and the experience of the connoisseur, who is generally incapable of stating the principles of his judgements. By contrast, all institutionalized learning presupposes a degree of rationalization, which leaves its mark on the relationship to the goods consumed. The sovereign pleasure of the aesthete dispenses with concepts. It is op-

posed as much to the thoughtless pleasure of the 'naïve' (glorified in ideology through the myth of childhood and the innocent eye) as to supposedly pleasureless thought of the petit bourgeois and the 'parve' who are always exposed to those forms of aesthetic perversion which knowledge above experience and sacrifice contemplation of the work discussion of the work, *aisthesis* to *akthesis*, like film-buffs who know everything there is to know about films they have not seen.<sup>60</sup> Not the educational system ever entirely fulfils its rational function: the central part of what schools communicate is again acquired incidentally such as the system of classification which the school system inculcates through the order in which it inculcates knowledge or through the suppositions of its own organization (the hierarchy of disciplines, notions, exercises etc.) or its operation (mode of assessment, rewards, punishments etc.). But, in order to transmit at all, it has to perform a degree of rationalization of what it transmits. Thus, for example, in the degree of rationalization of what it transmits. Thus, for example, in the degree of practical schemes of classification, which are always partial and limited to practical contexts, it puts explicit, standardized taxonomies, fixed and for all in the form of synoptic schemas or dualistic typologies ('classical'/'romantic'), which are expressly inculcated and therefore served in the memory as knowledge that can be reproduced in virtually identical form by all the agents subjected to its action.

To avoid any absolutization of the culture in relation to which the autodidact's middle-brow culture is objectively defined, it has to be remembered that the higher one rises in the social hierarchy, the more one's tastes are shaped by the organization and operation of the educational system, which is responsible for inculcating the 'programme' (syllabus and intellectual schemes) which governs 'cultivated minds' even in their pursuit of the 'personal touch' and their aspiration to 'originality'. Discrepancies between rational qualifications and cultural competence (linked to social trajectory and largely attributable to the domestic transmission of non-scholastic cultural capital) are, however, sufficiently frequent to safeguard the irreducibility, recognized even by academics, of 'authentic' culture to 'scholastic' knowledge, which as such is devalued.

By providing the means of expression which enable practical principles to be brought to the level of quasi-systematic discourse and to consciously organized around explicit principles, the educational system makes possible a (more or less adequate) symbolic mastery of the practical principles of taste. As grammar does for linguistic competence, it rationalizes the 'sense of beauty', in those who already have it, giving it the means of referring to principles (of harmony or rhetoric, for example), precepts, formulae, instead of relying on improvisation; it sutures the intentional quasi-systematicity of a formal aesthetic for objective systematicity of the 'aesthetic-in-itself' produced by the practical principles of taste. Thus academicism is potentially present in e-

rational pedagogy which tends to convey piecemeal, in a doctrinal set of explicit norms and formulae, explicitly taught, generally negative rather than positive, what traditional learning transmits in the form of a total style directly grasped in practice. But above all—and this is why aesthetes so abhor pedagogues and pedagogy—the rational teaching of art provides substitutes for direct experience, it offers short cuts on the long path of familiarization, it makes possible practices which are the product of concepts and rules instead of springing from the supposed spontaneity of taste, thereby offering a solution to those who hope to make up for lost time.

The ideology of natural taste owes its plausibility and its efficacy to the fact that, like all the ideological strategies generated in the everyday class struggle, it naturalizes real differences, converting differences in the mode of acquisition of culture into differences of nature; it only recognizes as legitimate the relation to culture (or language) which least bears the visible marks of its genesis, which has nothing 'academic', 'scholastic', 'bookish', 'affected' or 'studied' about it, but manifests by its ease and naturalness that true culture is nature—a new mystery of immaculate conception. This is clearly seen in the remarks of an aesthete of the culinary art, who writes no differently from Pierre Francastel when the latter, in a devastating confession for an art historian, rejects 'intellectualized knowledge', which can only 'recognize', in favour of 'visual experience', the sole means of access to 'true vision'.<sup>61</sup>

'Taste must not be confused with gastronomy. Whereas taste is the natural gift of recognizing and loving perfection, gastronomy is the set of rules which govern the cultivation and education of taste. Gastronomy is to taste as grammar and literature are to the literary sense. And this brings us to the heart of the problem: if the gourmet is a delicate *connaisseur*, is the gastronome a *pedant*?... The gourmet is his own gastronome, just as the man of taste is his own grammarian... Not everyone is a gourmet; that is why we need gastronomes. We must look upon gastronomes as we look upon pedagogues in general: they are sometimes intolerable pedants, but they have their uses. They belong to the lower, modest order, and it is up to them to improve this rather minor genre by means of tact, restraint and elegant lightness... There is such a thing as bad taste... and persons of refinement know this instinctively. For those who do not, rules are needed'.<sup>62</sup>

Knowledge by experience, which, like Aquinas's *cognitio Dei experientialis*, feels and deplores the essential inadequacy of words and concepts to express the reality 'tasted' in mystical union, rejects as unworthy the intellectual love of art, the knowledge which identifies experience of the work with an intellectual operation of deciphering.<sup>63</sup>

SCHOLARS AND GENTLEMEN The differences in manner that indicate differences in mode of acquisition—i.e., in seniority of access to the dominant class—which are generally associated with differences in com-

## Court Wit and Fussy Learning

TRISSOTIN

I'm not surprised to hear this gentleman say  
The things he's said in this unpleasant fray.

He's much at court, and as one might expect,  
He shares the court's mistrust of intellect,

And, as a courtier, defends with zest  
The ignorance that's in his interest.

CITANDRE

You're very hard indeed on the poor court,

Which hears each day how people of your sort,

Who deal in intellectual wares, decry it,

Complain that their careers are blighted by it,

Deplore its wretched taste, and blame their own

Unhappy failures on that cause alone.

Permit me, Mister Trissotin, with due

Respect for your great name, to say

that you  
And all your kind would do well

to discuss

The court in tones less harsh and querulous;

That the court is not so short of wit and brain

As you and all your scribbling friends maintain;

That all things there are viewed with common sense,

That good taste, too, is much in evidence,

And that its knowledge of the world surpasses

The fussy learning of pedantic asses.

TRISSOTIN

It has good taste, you say? If only it had!

CITANDRE

What makes you say, Sir, that its taste is bad?

J. B. P. de Molière, *Les femmes savantes* (1672) in *The Learned Ladies*, translated into English verse by Richard Wilbur (New York and London, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978), pp. 117-118.

position of capital, are predisposed to mark differences within the dominant class, just as differences in cultural capital mark the differences between the classes.<sup>64</sup> That is why manners, especially the manner of relationship to legitimate culture, are the stake in a permanent struggle. There can be no neutral statement in these matters: the terms designating the opposing dispositions can be taken as complimentary or pejorative depending on the point of view. It is no accident that the opposition between the 'scholastic' (or 'pedantic') and the 'mondain', the effortlessly elegant, is at the heart of debates over taste and culture in every age: behind two ways of producing or appreciating cultural works, it very clearly designates two contrasting modes of acquisition, and, in the modern period at least, two different relationships to the educational system.

In France, literary debate in the first half of the seventeenth century was dominated by the antagonism between the *doctes*—Chapelain, Balzac, La Mesnardière, Farey, Colletet, d'Aubignac etc., who looked to Italian theorists, and ultimately to Aristotle, for the rules they sought to impose on the construction of literary works,<sup>65</sup> and at the same time strove to ground these rules in reason—and the *mondains*, who refused to be bound by precept, made their pleasure their guide and pursued the infinitesimal nuances which make up the 'je ne sais quoi' and the delicate perfection of *savoir vivre*. The great debates over taste which literary works arouse or dramatize (such as the question of the précieux, who by codifying and rationalizing salon delicacy, an art of living defined as indefinable, changed its whole nature) involve not only the virtues with which the different fractions of the dominant class identify, but, as the Chevalier de Méré so well puts it, 'the manners of practising them, which are themselves kinds of virtues', and through which seniority in their class, and their way of getting there, are expressed or betrayed.

Innumerable illustrations could be cited from the vast literature designed to codify, inseparably, ordinary behaviour and the creation and perception of works of art, in short everything which falls under the absolute jurisdiction of taste, one of the key words of the age,<sup>66</sup> but one example will suffice, because it explicitly links manner, mode of acquisition and the group it designates: 'The author [Furetière, the bourgeois author of *Le Roman bourgeois* who had criticized La Fontaine and Benserade] shows clearly that he is neither of society nor of the court and that his taste is of a pedantry one cannot even hope to rectify. Certain things are never understood if they are not understood at once: some hard and rough minds will never be led into the charm and grace of Benserade's ballers and La Fontaine's fables. That door is closed to them, and so is mine . . . One can only pray to God for such a man and hope never to have dealings with him' (Mme. de Sévigné, letter to Bussy-Rabutin, 14 May 1686).

Paradoxically, precocity is an effect of seniority: aristocracy is the form par excellence of precocity since it is nothing other than the seniority which is the birthright of the offspring of ancient families (at least in societies in which age and aristocracy—virtually equivalent notions—are recognized as values). And this initial status-derived capital is enhanced by the advantages which precocious acquisition of legitimate culture gives in learning cultural skills, whether table manners or the art of conversation, musical culture or the sense of propriety, playing tennis or pronunciation. The embodied cultural capital of the previous generations functions as a sort of advance (both a head-start and a credit) which, by providing from the outset the example of culture incarnated in familiar models, enables the newcomer to start acquiring the basic elements of

## Ease or Cultivated Naturalness

'I would have a man know everything and yet, by his manner of speaking, not be convicted of having studied.' Antoine Gombaud, Chevalier de Méré (1607-1685), *De la conversation*.

'What needs correction in most teachers is something too composed, which reeks of art and study. The aim must be to make it seem natural.' Méré, *Des agréments*.

'But kind words on all matters, agreeably uttered, will gratify every listener. Wit cannot go further, it is the masterpiece of intelligence. . . . Say to them nothing which savours of study or seems far-fetched. Above all, since they are well pleased with their own worth, refrain from instructing them on any matter, or correcting them, whatever mistakes you observe them to make.' Méré, *De la conversation*.

'This civility is perceived in the features, the manner, in the slightest

actions of the body and mind; and the more one considers it, the more one is charmed by it, without realizing where it comes from. . . . For everything that is done out of constraint or servitude, or has any trace of coarseness, destroys it. And to render a person amiable in his ways you should please him as much as you can and take care not to burden him with tedious instructions.'

Méré, *Des agréments*.

'Persons of refinement are sometimes obliged to turn a hand to many things, even the things of which they know least. In such a case, they should not behave like professional craftsmen, whose sole concern is to finish their task. A gentleman should seek, not so much to be expert in what he undertakes, as to undertake it like a gentleman. . . . This air of ease which comes from a fortunate birth and an excellent habit is one of the amenities of a gentleman; he should set about even the most difficult task with such detachment that it seems to cost him no effort.' Méré, *Des agréments*.

the legitimate culture, from the beginning, that is, in the most unconscious and palpable way—and to dispense with the labour of detour, correction and retaining that is needed to undo the effects of inappropriate learning. Legitimate manners owe their value to the fact that they manifest the rarest conditions of acquisition, that is, a social power over time which is tacitly recognized as the supreme excellence: to possess things from the past, i.e., accumulated, crystallized history, aristocratic names and titles, châteaux or 'stately homes', paintings and collections, vintage wines and antique furniture, is to master time, through all those things whose common feature is that they can only be acquired in the course of time, by means of time, against time, that is, by inheritance or through dispositions which, like the taste for old things, ar

likewise only acquired with time and applied by those who can take their time.

Every group tends to set up the means of perpetuating itself beyond the finite individuals in whom it is incarnated. (This was one of Durkheim's fundamental insights.) In order to do so, it establishes a whole set of mechanisms, such as delegation, representation and symbolization, which confer ubiquity and eternity. The representative (e.g., the king) is eternal. As Kantarovich has shown, the king has two bodies, a biological, mortal body, subject to biological infirmities, passion or imbecility, and a political body, immortal, immaterial and freed from infirmities or weaknesses.<sup>67</sup> He can secure ubiquity by delegating to others the authority with which he is invested. His taxes are levied by *fiscus ubique praesens*, and, as Post observes, the delegate who holds *plena potestas agendi* 'can do everything that the mandator himself can do', thanks to his *procuratio ad omnia facienda*.<sup>68</sup> Again, *universitas non moritur*. Death, from the point of view of groups, is only an accident, and personified collectives organize themselves in such a way that the demise of the mortal bodies which once embodied the group—representatives, delegates, agents, spokesmen—does not affect the existence of the group or the function in which it is realized: *dignitas non moritur*.

If this is accepted (and it would need to be established more systematically), then capital makes it possible to appropriate the collectively produced and accumulated means of really overcoming anthropological limits. The means of escaping from generic alienations include representation, the portrait or statue which immortalizes the person represented (sometimes, by a sort of pleonasm, in his own lifetime); and memorials, the tombstone, the written word, *aere perennius*, which celebrates and 'hands on to posterity', and, in particular, historical writing, which gives a place in legitimate history—hence the particular status which the public, especially the bourgeois public, gives to historians, the masters of scientific eternization—and the commemorative ceremonies in which the group offers tributes of homage and gratitude to the dead, who are thereby shown to be still living and active. Thus it can be seen that eternal life is one of the most sought-after social privileges: the quality of the eternity depends, of course, on the quality and extent of the group providing it, and can range from a requiem mass organized by the family to an annual national holiday.

If the foregoing argument suggests an 'analysis of essence' (though far removed, it would seem, from Hegel and his 'old chest'), that is because most groups have sought to lay down absolute, final differences by means of the irreversibility of time, which gives inflexible rigour to every form of social order based on the order of successions. The holders and claimants to succession—father and son, owner and heir, master and disciple, predecessor and successor—are separated by nothing, except time; but there is every sort of social mechanism to make this gap unbridgeable. Thus, in the struggle between the different 'manners', i.e., the different manners of acquiring, the dominant groups are always on the side of

the most insensible and invisible mode of acquisition, that is, the oldest and most precious one. This is what provides the invariant elements of the dominant discourse and gives an air of eternal youth to certain themes, although they are in reality strictly situated and dated, like all the commonplaces of elegant disquisition on innate taste or the blundering of 'pedants'.

A practical mastery of social significance, based on functional and structural homology, underlies and facilitates everyday reading of the 'classics', and, even more, since it is a practical use, literary quotation, a quite special use of discourse which is a sort of summons to appear as advocate and witness, addressed to a past author on the basis of a social solidarity disguised as intellectual solidarity. The practical sense of meaning, which stops short of objectifying the social affinity which makes it possible—since that would nullify the desired effect, by relativizing both the reading and the text—provides simultaneously a social use and a denial of the social basis of that use.

Identifying the invariants must not, however, lead us to treat a particular state of the struggle as eternal, and a true comparative study would have to take account of the specific forms that the struggle and the themes in which it is expressed take on when the objective relations between the class fractions change. It seems, for example, that in the second half of the seventeenth century the growing authority of the mondains and of the court, combined with the tendency of high society to become more cultivated, reduced the distance between doctes and mondains; this led to the rise of a new species of man of letters, typified by the Jesuits Rapin and Bouhours,<sup>69</sup> masters of rhetoric who were themselves both doctes and mondains, who frequented artists and aristocrats and helped to produce a synthesis of the demands of the court and the academy (and did so by shifting the centre of the debate from the question of worthy subjects to that of the style in which they might be treated).

Similarly, nowadays, the fact that an increasingly large proportion of the business bourgeoisie is making intensive use of the educational system (and especially, in France, the *grandes écoles*) is tending to modify the form of the relationship between the mondain and the scholastic—cultural excellence increasingly belongs to those who combine the two modes of acquisition—and consequently the content of the ritual antitheses in which the opposition between 'scholars' and 'gentlemen' is expressed.<sup>70</sup>

The case of the relations between the nineteenth-century German universities and the princely courts represents another state of the power relation, resulting in a different configuration of the images of the scholarly virtues and the courtly virtues. As Norbert Elias very clearly shows, bourgeois intellectuals were much earlier and much more completely integrated into the world of the court in France than in Germany. The

conventions of style and forms of civility which dominate the educational system and all its products, in particular the attention given to language and to intellectual propriety, derived, in the case of France, from court society, whereas in Germany the intelligentsia, especially in the universities, set itself up in opposition to the court and the French models it was importing, summing up its vision of 'high society' in the antithesis between 'Civilization', characterized by frivolity and superficiality, and 'Culture', defined by seriousness, profundity and authenticity.<sup>71</sup> In other words, there is the same basic opposition between doctes and mondains, with identical content, but with the values reversed: here the doctes could not assert their autonomy except by asserting their own virtues and their own 'manner of practising them', thereby devaluing high society virtues.

The fact remains that the 'pedant's' situation is never entirely comfortable. Against the 'populace' and with the mondain aristocracy—who have every reason also to accept it, since they have an interest in birth-rights—he is inclined to accept the ideology of innate tastes, since it is the only absolute guarantee of his election; but against the mondain he is forced to assert the value of his acquisitions, and, indeed, the value of the work of acquisition, the 'slow effort to improve the mind', as Kant put it, which is a blemish in the eyes of the mondain, but in his own eyes his supreme merit.

The embarrassment of academic minds, indebted and committed to acquisition, surfaces whenever it is a question of the adequate approach to a work of art and the right way to acquire it; and the contradiction is at the heart of all their aesthetic theories, not to mention their attempts to establish a pedagogy of art. The ideology of natural gifts is too potent, even within the educational system, for an expression of faith in the powers of a rational pedagogy aimed at reducing the practical schemes of familiarity to codified rules, despite the fact that this practical affirmation of the 'natural right' to art is the natural weapon of those who appeal to knowledge and ideas and aim to discredit the divine right of the advocates of immediate experience and pleasure. For example, there are all the debates over the teaching of art (more specifically, the teaching of drawing)—a contradiction in terms for some, who hold that beauty is neither taught nor learnt, but is a grace transmitted from invested masters to predestined disciples; for others, a field of pedagogy like any other. (One thinks, for example, of the polemics between the advocates of rational pedagogy, such as Guillaume, and the champions of the charismatic view, such as Ravaisson, over the introduction of drawing lessons into general education in the early years of the Third Republic.)

EXPERIENCE AND KNOWLEDGE Ideology is an illusion consistent with interest, but a well-grounded illusion. Those who invoke experience against knowledge have a basis for their prejudice in the real opposition between the domestic learning and the scholastic learning of culture.

Bourgeois culture and the bourgeois relation to culture owe their inimitable character to the fact that, like popular religion as seen by Groethuysen, they are acquired, pre-verbally, by early immersion in a world of cultivated people, practices and objects. When the child grows up in a household in which music is not only listened to (on hi-fi or radio nowadays) but also performed (the 'musical mother' of bourgeois autobiography), and a fortiori when the child is introduced at an early age to a 'noble' instrument—especially the piano—the effect is at least to produce a more familiar relationship to music, which differs from the always somewhat distant, contemplative and often verbose relation of those who have come to music through concerts or even only through records, in much the same way as the relation to painting of those who have discovered it belatedly, in the quasi-scholastic atmosphere of the museum, differs from the relation developed by those born into a world filled with art objects, familiar family property, amassed by successive generations, testifying to their wealth and good taste, and sometimes 'home-made' (like jam or embroidered linen).

Differences linked to social origin are no doubt most marked in personal production of visual art or the playing of a musical instrument, aptitudes which, both in their acquisition and in their performance, presuppose not only dispositions associated with long establishment in the world of art and culture but also economic means (especially in the case of piano-playing) and spare time. At equal educational levels, they vary strongly by social origin. Thus, among holders of the *baccalauréat*, 11.5 percent of the respondents who originate from the dominant class say they often play a musical instrument, compared with 5 percent of those of middle-class or working-class origin. Among graduates, the corresponding proportions are 22.5 percent and 5 percent. Painting and sculpture, relatively neglected by those with the highest qualifications, are also, at equal educational levels, much more common among respondents of dominant-class origin.

Status-linked familiarity is manifested in, for example, knowledge of the opportunities and conditions for acquiring works of art, which depends not only on the material and cultural capacity to appropriate but also on long-standing membership in a social world in which art being an object of appropriation, is present in the form of familiar, personal objects. Thus, in the survey commissioned by the Ministry of Culture (C.S. VII), the percentage of respondents able to give an answer when asked the lowest price at which 'one can now buy an original lithograph or serigraph by a contemporary professional artist' varies considerably by social class, ranging from 10.2 percent of agricultural workers, 13.6 percent of unskilled and semi-skilled workers and 17.6 percent of clerical and commercial employees to 66.6 percent of senior executives and professionals.

The choice of works such as the *Concerto for the Left Hand* (much more frequent among those who play an instrument—especially the piano—than among others) or *L'Enfant et les sortilèges* is much more strongly



linked to social origin than to educational capital. By contrast, with works like the *Well-Tempered Clavier* or the *Art of Fugue*, there is a stronger correlation with educational capital than with social origin. Through these indicators, despite their imperfections, one can distinguish different relations to the hierarchical, hierarchizing world of cultural works, which are closely linked to a set of interrelated differences and which stem from different modes of acquisition—domestic and scholastic, or exclusively scholastic—of cultural capital. Thus, when Roland Barthes makes an aesthetic out of a particular relation to music, produced by early, domestic, 'practical' acquaintance, and describes aesthetic enjoyment as a sort of immediate communication between the listener's body and the performer's 'inner body', present in 'the grain of the singer's voice' or 'the pad of the pianist's fingers', he is in fact referring to the opposition between two modes of acquisition.

On the one hand, there is music for record collectors (linked to a demand arising from the 'growth of the number of listeners and the disappearance of practitioners'), an expressive, dramatic, sentimentally clear art of communication, of understanding: 'This culture . . . wants art, wants music, provided they be clear, that they "translate" an emotion and represent a signified (the "meaning" of a poem): an art that inoculates pleasure (by reducing it to a known, coded emotion) and reconciles the subject to what in music *can be said*: what is said about it by Institution, Criticism, Opinion.'<sup>72</sup> On the other hand, there is an art which pre-fects the sensible to sense, which hates eloquence, grandiloquence, pathos and the pathetic, the expressive and the dramatic. This is French *mélodie*, Duparc, the later Fauré, Debussy, everything that in another age would have been called pure music, the intimism of the piano, the maternal instrument, and the intimacy of the bourgeois salon. In this antithesis between two relations to music which are always defined, more unconsciously than consciously, in relation to each other—the taste for the artists of the past, Panzera or Corro, loved even for their imperfections which evoke the freedom of the amateur, implies a distaste for modern performers and their impeccable recordings for mass production—one again finds the old opposition between the doctre, who is bound to the code (in every sense), the rules, and therefore the Institution and Criticism, and the hedonistic mondain, who, being on the side of nature, the 'natural', is content to feel and enjoy, and who expels all trace of intellectualism, didacticism, pedantry from his artistic experience.

**OBJECT LESSONS** Every material inheritance is, strictly speaking, also a cultural inheritance. Family heirlooms not only bear material witness to the age and continuity of the lineage and so consecrate its social identity, which is inseparable from permanence over time; they also contribute in a practical way to its spiritual reproduction, that is, to transmitting the

values, virtues and competences which are the basis of legitimate membership in bourgeois dynasties. What is acquired in daily contact with ancient objects, by regular visits to antique-dealers and galleries, or, more simply, by moving in a universe of familiar, intimate objects 'which are there', as Rilke says, 'guileless, good, simple, certain', is of course a certain 'taste', which is nothing other than a relation of immediate familiarity with the things of taste. But it is also the sense of belonging to a more polished, more polite, better policed world, a world which is justified in existing by its perfection, its harmony and beauty, a world which has produced Beethoven and Mozart and continues to produce people capable of playing and appreciating them. And finally it is an immediate adherence, at the deepest level of the habitus, to the tastes and distastes, sympathies and aversions, fantasies and phobias which, more than declared opinions, forge the unconscious unity of a class.

If a group's whole life-style can be read off from the style it adopts in furnishing or clothing, this is not only because these properties are the objectification of the economic and cultural necessity, which determined their selection, but also because the social relations objectified in familiar objects, in their luxury or poverty, their 'distinction' or 'vulgarity', their 'beauty' or 'ugliness', impress themselves through bodily experiences which may be as profoundly unconscious as the quiet caress of beige carpets or the thin clamminess of tattered, garish linoleum, the harsh smell of bleach or perfumes as imperceptible as a negative scent.<sup>73</sup> Every interior expresses, in its own language, the present and even the past state of its occupants, bespeaking the elegant self-assurance of inherited wealth, the flashy arrogance of the nouveaux riches, the discreet shabbiness of the poor and the gilded shabbiness of 'poor relations' striving to live beyond their means; one thinks of the child in D. H. Lawrence's story 'The Rocking-Horse Winner' who hears throughout the house and even in his bedroom, full of expensive toys, an incessant whispering: 'There must be more money.' Experiences of this sort would be the material of a social psychoanalysis which set out to grasp the logic whereby the social relations objectified in things and also, of course, in people are insensibly internalized, taking their place in a lasting relation to the world and to others, which manifests itself, for example, in thresholds of tolerance of the natural and social world, of noise, overcrowding, physical or verbal violence—and of which the mode of appropriation of cultural goods is one dimension.<sup>74</sup>

The effect of mode of acquisition is most marked in the ordinary choices of everyday existence, such as furniture, clothing or cooking, which are particularly revealing of deep-rooted and long-standing dispositions because, lying outside the scope of the educational system, they have to be confronted, as it were, by naked taste, without any explicit prescription or proscription, other than from semi-legitimate legitimizing agencies such as women's weeklies or 'ideal home' magazines.

This means that, however imperfect it may be, given the present state of functioning of the educational system, the minimal rationalization implied by every institutionalized pedagogy, in particular the transformation of class 'sense', functioning in practical form, into partially codified knowledge (e.g., literary history, with its classifications by periods, genres and styles), has the effect of reducing, at least among the most over-selected survivors, the weight of what is abandoned to inherited 'senses' and, consequently, the differences linked to economic and cultural inheritance. It is also true that these differences continue to function in other areas, and that they re-cover their full force as soon as the logic of the struggle for distinction moves its real stakes into these areas—which it of course always tends to do.

The adjectives the respondents have chosen to describe an interior, and the source of their furniture, are more closely linked to their social origin than to their educational qualifications (unlike their judgement on photographs or their knowledge of composers), because nothing, perhaps, more directly depends on early learning, especially the learning which takes place without any express intention to teach, than the dispositions and knowledge that are invested in clothing, furnishing and cooking or, more precisely, in the way clothes, furniture and food are bought. Thus, the mode of acquisition of furniture (department store, antique-dealer, shop or Flea Market) depends at least as much on social origin as on schooling. At equal educational levels, those members of the dominant class who were also born into that class—who, more often than the others, inherited some of their furniture—acquired their furniture (especially those living in Paris) from an antique-dealer more often than those born into other classes, who tended to buy from a department store, a specialized shop or the Flea Market. (The last is especially frequented on

Table 5 Furniture purchases in the dominant class, by education and social origin (percentage of respondents who bought their furniture from each source).<sup>a</sup>

educational qualification	Social origin	Department store	Specialized shop	Flea market	Auction	Antique-dealer
lower than bac	Working and middle classes	25.5	41.5	11.0	14.5	33.5
	Upper classes	11.5	23.5	15.0	31.5	43.5
technical college	Working and middle classes	13.5	36.5	4.5	32.0	4.5
	Upper classes	6.0	24.5	30.5	20.5	65.5
university	Working and middle classes	11.0	28.5	11.0	11.0	21.5
	Upper classes	4.5	21.5	21.5	14.5	49.0
university, grande école	Working and middle classes	21.5	46.5	32.0	21.5	43.0
	Upper classes	18.0	29.0	8.0	13.0	60.5

a. Some respondents indicated more than one source.

the one hand by the rising members of the dominant class who have most educational capital, and on the other hand by members of the dominant class, born into that class, who have less educational capital than their origin promised, i.e., those who have had one or two years of higher education—see table 5.)

And it is probably in tastes in food that one would find the strongest and most indelible mark of infant learning, the lessons which longest withstand the distancing or collapse of the native world and most durably maintain nostalgia for it. The native world is, above all, the maternal world, the world of primordial tastes and basic foods, of the archetypal relation to the archetypal cultural good, in which pleasure-giving is an integral part of pleasure and of the selective disposition towards pleasure which is acquired through pleasure.

While the aim was to identify preferences in food, the search for the most economical and 'synthetic' questions led me to question the respondents on the meals they served on special occasions, an interesting indicator of the mode of self-presentation adopted in 'showing off' a life-style (in which furniture also plays a part). For a complete understanding of choices in this area, a particularly complex set of factors has to be borne in mind: the style of meal that people like to offer is no doubt a very good indicator of the image they wish to give or avoid giving to others and, as such, it is the systematic expression of a system of factors including, in addition to the indicators of the position occupied in the economic and cultural hierarchies, economic trajectory, social trajectory, and cultural trajectory.

This being so, it is not surprising that the effects are most visible in the *petite bourgeoisie*. The members of the established *petite bourgeoisie* more often serve their friends 'plentiful and good', 'simple but well-presented' meals than the new *petite bourgeoisie*, who prefer to serve 'original' meals or 'pot luck'. But one also finds strong differences linked to trajectory. Thus new *petite bourgeois* of middle or working-class origin more often offer 'plentiful and good' meals, which is *never* the case with those of upper-class origin, who, by contrast, are very inclined to the 'original and exotic'. In the established *petite bourgeoisie*, the propensity to offer 'plentiful and good' meals is as strong among those in decline as among those who are upwardly mobile and originate from the working classes. The former never say they offer 'pot luck' or 'original and exotic' meals, whereas the latter sometimes do (though not, of course, as often as the new *petite bourgeois*).

It is no accident that even the purest pleasures, those most purified of any trace of corporality (such as the 'unique, pure note' of the *Philobus*, which already reserved them for the 'few'), contain an element which, as in the 'crudest' pleasures of the tastes of food, the archetype of all taste, refers directly back to the oldest and deepest experiences, those which determine and over-determine the primitive oppositions—bitter/sweet, flavoured/insipid, hot/cold, coarse/delicate, austere/bright—which are as




essential to gastronomic commentary as to the refined appreciations of aesthetes. To different degrees, depending on the art, the genre and the style, art is never entirely the *cosa mentale*, the discourse intended only to be read, decoded, interpreted, which the intellectualist view makes of it. This product of an 'art' in Durkheim's sense, i.e., 'a pure practice without theory', and sometimes of a simple mimetis, a sort of symbolic gymnastics, always contains also something ineffable, not through excess, as the celebrants would have it, but by default, something which communicates, as it were, from body to body, like the rhythm of music or the flavour of colours, that is, falling short of words and concepts. Art is also a 'bodily thing', and music, the most 'pure' and 'spiritual' of the arts, is perhaps simply the most corporeal. Linked to *états d'âme* which are also states of the body or, as they were once called, humours, it ravishes, carries away, moves. It is pitched not so much beyond words as below them, in gestures and movements of the body, rhythms—which Piaget somewhere says characterize the functions located, like everything which governs taste, at the articulation of the organic and the mental—quickening and slowing, crescendo and decrescendo, tension and relaxation.<sup>75</sup> This is no doubt why, once it leaves the realm of pure technique, musical criticism scarcely speaks other than in adjectives and exclamations. As mystics speak of divine love in the language of human love, so the least inadequate evocations of musical pleasure are those which can replicate the peculiar forms of an experience as deeply rooted in the body and in primitive bodily experiences as the tastes of food.

INHERITED CAPITAL AND ACQUIRED CAPITAL. Thus, the differences which the relationship to educational capital leaves unexplained, and which mainly appear in the relationship with social origin, may be due to differences in the mode of acquisition of the cultural capital now possessed. But they may also be due to differences in the degree to which this capital is recognized and guaranteed by academic qualifications: a certain proportion of the capital actually owned may not have received certain academic sanction, when it has been directly inherited and even when it has been acquired in school. Because of the long hysteresis of the mode of acquisition, the same educational qualifications may guarantee quite different relations to culture—but decreasingly so, as one rises in the educational hierarchy and as more value comes to be set on ways of using knowledge and less on merely knowing. If the same volume of educational capital (guaranteed cultural capital) may correspond to different volumes of socially profitable cultural capital, this is first because although the educational system, by its monopoly of certification, governs the conversion of inherited cultural capital into educational capital, it does not have a monopoly on the production of cultural capital. It gives an sanction to inherited capital to a greater or less extent (i.e., there is an unequal conversion of inherited cultural capital) because, at different

moments and, at the same moment, at different levels and in different sectors, what it demands is more or less identical to what the 'inheritors' bring it, and because it acknowledges more or less value in other forms of embodied capital and other dispositions (such as docility towards the institution itself).

The possessors of strong educational capital who have also inherited strong cultural capital, and so enjoy a dual title to cultural nobility, the self-assurance of legitimate membership and the ease given by familiarity (point B in figure 3), are opposed, first, to those who lack both educational capital and inherited cultural capital (A) (and to all those who are situated lower down the axis representing perfect reconversion of cultural capital into educational capital). But they are also opposed, on the one hand, to those who, with equivalent inherited cultural capital, have obtained lower educational capital (C or C') (or who have an inherited cultural capital greater than their educational capital—e.g., C' relative to B', or D' relative to D), and who are closer to them, especially as regards 'general culture', than holders of identical qualifications; and, on the other hand, to those who have similar educational capital but who started off with less cultural capital (D or D') and whose relation to culture, which they owe more to the school and less to the family, is less familiar and more scholastic. (These secondary oppositions occur at every level of the axis.)

Figure 3 The relationship between inherited cultural capital and educational capital.



One could construct a similar diagram for each type of capital (economic, cultural and social) possessed initially and at the time of observation, and then define the set of possible cases for the relationship between initial capital (defined as regards volume and composition) and eventual capital, characterized in the same way. (There would be, for example, individuals declining in all types of capital, or declining in only one and rising in others—reconversion—etc.) If one sufficiently refined the analysis of the species of capital (dividing cultural capital, for example, into sub-species such as literary, scientific and legal-economic capital) or the analysis of the level, it would be possible to find all the cases empirically observed, in all their complexity but also in their quasi-infinite multiplicity.

To be entirely rigorous, one would have to allow for structural changes, such as the devaluation of nominal qualifications which occurs in periods (as in recent years) when the educational system is used more intensively. (This devaluation has been symbolized by placing the line indicating the real equivalents of qualifications below the bisector which marks the equivalents of the nominal value of qualifications.) One would also have to make allowance for the discrepancy between the number of years of study and the qualification obtained (which becomes more probable as initial capital rises and schooling becomes more widespread—so that it now affects even the working classes whose children often leave secondary school without any qualification). It would then be seen that, to explain certain practices adequately (in particular, autodidacticism) one has to consider not only the qualification and the number of years of schooling but also the relationship between the two (which may generate self-assurance or embarrassment, arrogance or resentment etc.). One might also consider the relationship between age at the end of schooling and the legitimate age for a qualification, such as the *bac* (*baccalauréat*) at 17 or the age limits for the *concours* (entrance examinations for the *grandes écoles*). One of the mediations through which cultural capital is transformed into educational capital is speed of progress through the system.

The discrepancy between educational capital and the cultural capital actually possessed, which is the source of differences between holders of identical educational capital, can also result from the fact that the same educational qualification may correspond to schooling of very unequal duration (i.e., there is unequal conversion of scholastically acquired cultural capital). The direct or indirect effects of one or several years of study may in fact not be sanctioned by the award of a diploma—as is the case with all those who drop out in the two years leading to the *baccalauréat* or, at a higher level, those who have spent one or two years at university without obtaining a qualification. But in addition, because the frequency of this discrepancy has risen with the chances of access of the different classes to secondary and higher education, agents belonging to different generations (as identified by age-groups) are likely to have devoted a very different number of years of study (with all the related effects, including greater non-certified competence, of course, but also the

acquisition of a different relation to culture—'studentification' effect—etc.) in educational institutions differing greatly in their teachers, their teaching methods, their social recruitment etc. in order to obtain an identical qualification. It follows from this that the differences connected with ~~social trajectory~~ and the volume of inherited cultural capital are reinforced by differences, mainly visible among members of the petite bourgeoisie who are themselves born into the petite bourgeoisie or drawn from the working classes (and particularly represented in the established petite bourgeoisie), which reflect changes in the state of the relations between the educational system and the class structure. To these different *modes of generation* correspond different relations to the educational system which are expressed in different strategies of cultural investment not guaranteed by the educational institution (i.e., autodidacticism).

In the absence of more precise indicators of the overall style of cultural consumption (e.g., the opposition between the satirical weeklies *Le Canard Enchaîné* and *Charlie Hebdo*, or, in the area of popular science, between *Science et Vie* and *Psychologie*), one can study the information the survey provides on favourite singers. It might be thought that the fact that, at all levels of educational capital, the youngest respondents choose the singers of the younger generation (Françoise Hardy or Johnny Hallyday) more often than the older respondents, who more often choose older singers (Guitary or Mariano), is adequately explained by the dates of the singers' first appearance in the field of cultural production. In fact, among baccalauréat-holders, the youngest more often choose Jacques Douai (who was born in 1920 and performed at the Vieux Colomblot in 1963), Jacques Brel (who was born in 1929, made his Paris debut in 1953 at the Théâtre des Trois Baudets and performed at the Paris Olympia in 1958 and 1961) or even Léo Ferré (born 1916, degrees in Arts and Political Science, debut in Paris cabarets 1946), whereas the older ones more often choose Edith Piaf (born 1915, died 1963, debut at the ABC in 1937), Luis Mariano (born 1920, first success at Casino Montparnasse, 1945), Gilbert Bécaud (born 1927, first became known in right-bank cabarets and then at Olympia; consecrated in 1954, the 'Bécaud year') or even Pécunia Clark (born 1933, top of the bill at Olympia 1960, voted 'most likeable and popular star' in 1963).<sup>76</sup> It can be seen that to make sense of these relationships one has to take into account not only the singers' ages or the dates when they made their breakthroughs or even the places where they were performing at the time of the survey, but also—and especially—the degree of affinity between the style of their songs, more 'intellectual' in one case, closer to petit-bourgeois taste for light opera and realist song in the other, and the cultural dispositions of two educational generations produced by two very different states of the school system.

There are similar differences between educational generations within the 'technician' fraction of the class. The younger differ from the older not so much in their overall competence as in the extent and 'freedom' of their in-

vestments. Like their elders they read scientific and technical works, but they are slightly more interested in philosophical essays or poetry. They go no more frequently to museums, but when they do, they go more often to the Modern Art Museum. These tendencies are particularly pronounced amongst those of them (relatively more numerous than among the older ones) who originate from the middle or upper classes and who know a (relatively) very high number of musical works and composers, are interested in modern art and philosophy and often go to the cinema. But what perhaps most distinguish the two generations of technicians are the external signs—dress and hairstyle, in particular—and also their declared preferences; the younger ones, who seek to draw close to the student style, say they follow fashion and like clothes which 'suit their personality', whereas the older ones more often choose 'sober and correct' or 'classically cut' clothes (choices characteristic of established petit bourgeois).

The old-style autodidact was fundamentally defined by a reverence for culture which was induced by abrupt and early exclusion, and which led to an exalted, misplaced piety, inevitably perceived by the possessors of legitimate culture as a sort of grotesque homage.

The recognition of incompetence and cultural unworthiness which characterizes old-style autodidacticism is especially seen among members of the established petite bourgeoisie originating from the working or middle classes, who say very frequently (70 percent of them, compared with 31 percent of the new petite bourgeoisie originating from the same classes) that 'paintings are nice but difficult'. The clearest manifestation of the cultural alienation of old-style autodidacts is their readiness to offer proof of their culture even when it is not asked for, betraying their exclusion by their eagerness to prove their membership (in contrast to the well-born, who mask their ignorance by ignoring questions or situations which might expose it).

In these outsiders, who seek to use a deeply orthodox self-teaching as a way of continuing a brutally foreshortened trajectory by their own initiative, the whole relation to culture and cultural authorities bears the stamp of exclusion by a system that can get the excluded to recognize their exclusion. By contrast, new-style autodidacts have often kept a place in the educational system up to a relatively high level and in the course of this long, ill-rewarded association have acquired a relation to legitimate culture that is at once 'liberated' and disabused, familiar and disenchanted. It has nothing in common with the distant reverence of the old-style autodidact, although it leads to equally intense and passionate investments, but in quite different areas, disclaimed or abandoned by the educational system—strip cartoons or jazz rather than history or astronomy, psychology (even parapsychology) or ecology rather than archaeology or geology.<sup>77</sup> These are the categories which provide the audience for all the productions of the 'counter-culture' (*Charlie Hebdo*, *L'Echo des Sa-*

*unes*, *Sexpol* etc.) which offer the products of the intellectual avant-garde in journalistic form, as others 'popularize' (i.e., transmit beyond the group of legitimate receivers) the products of the academic rear-guard (*Historia*, for example) or the consecrated avant-garde (*Le Nouvel Observateur*).

The holders of the monopoly of manipulation of the sacred, the literati of every church, never have much time for those who 'claim to discover within themselves the sources of traditional authority' and to have direct access to the treasure of which they are the guardians. As Gershom Scholem shows, 'They usually do their best to place obstacles in the path of the mystic. They give him no encouragement, and if in the end the obstacles frighten the mystic and bring him back to the old accustomed ways—so much the better from the standpoint of authority.'<sup>78</sup> But preventive censorship by the institution can take place without anyone having to apply controls or constraints. Whereas traditional autodidacts still expect the academic institution to indicate and open the short cuts of popularization and the vulgar, which are always, directly or indirectly, dominated by the institution, 'the most liberated of the new autodidacts seek their gurus among the heresiarchs who still perform the function traditionally fulfilled by the authorities, namely, as Scholem also says, that of 'showing exactly what the novice has to expect at every step' and 'providing the symbols with which this experience can be described or interpreted.'

THE TWO MARKETS The family and the school function as sites in which the competences deemed necessary at a given time are constituted by usage itself, and, simultaneously, as sites in which the *price* of those competences is determined, i.e., as markets which, by their positive or negative sanctions, evaluate performance, reinforcing what is acceptable and discouraging what is not, condemning valueless dispositions to extinction (jokes which 'fall flat' or, though acceptable in another context, in another market, here seem 'out of place' and only provoke embarrassment or disapproval, quotations—in Lafin, for example—which sound 'pedantic' or 'laboured'). In other words, the acquisition of cultural competence is inseparable from insensible acquisition of a 'sense' for sound cultural investment.

This investment sense, being the product of adjustment to the objective chances of turning competence to good account, facilitates forward adjustment to these chances, and is itself a dimension of a relation to culture—close or distant, off-hand or reverential, hedonistic or academic—which is the internalized form of the objective relationship between the site of acquisition and the 'centre of cultural values'. The use of the phrase 'sense of investment', as in 'sense of propriety' or 'sense of balance', is intended to indicate that, when, for the purposes of objectification, terms are borrowed from the language of economics, it is in r

way suggested that the corresponding behaviour is guided by rational calculation of maximum profit, as the ordinary usage of these concepts, no doubt mistakenly, implies. Culture is the site, par excellence, of miscognition, because, in generating strategies objectively adapted to the objective chances of profit of which it is the product, the sense of investment secures profits which do not need to be pursued as profits; and so it brings to those who have legitimate culture as a second nature the supplementary profit of being seen (and seeing themselves) as perfectly disinterested, unblemished by any cynical or mercenary use of culture. This means that the term 'investment', for example, must be understood in the dual sense of economic investment—which it objectively always is, though miscognized—and the sense of affective investment which it has in psychoanalysis, or, more exactly, in the sense of *illusio*, belief, an involvement in the game which produces the game. The art-lover knows no other guide than his love of art, and when he moves, as if by instinct, towards what is, at each moment, the thing to be loved, like some businessman who make money even when they are not trying to, he is not pursuing a cynical calculation, but his own pleasure, the sincere enthusiasm which, in such matters, is one of the preconditions of successful investment.

So, for example, it is true that the effect of the hierarchies of legitimacy (the hierarchy of the arts, of genres etc.) can be described as a particular case of the 'labelling' effect well known to social psychologists. Just as people see a face differently depending on the ethnic label it is given,<sup>80</sup> so the value of the arts, genres, works and authors depends on the social marks attached to them at any given moment (e.g., place of publication). But the fact remains that the art-lover's sense of cultural investment which leads him always to love what is lovable, and only that, and always sincerely, can be supported by unconscious deciphering of the countless signs which at every moment say what is to be loved and what is not, what is or is not to be seen, without ever being explicitly oriented by pursuit of the associated symbolic profits. The specific competence (in classical music or jazz, theatre or film etc.) depends on the chances which the different markets, domestic, scholastic or occupational, together offer for accumulating, applying and exploiting it, i.e., the degree to which they encourage acquisition of this competence by promising or guaranteeing it profits which will reinforce it and induce new investments. The chances of using cultural competence profitably in the different markets play a part, in particular, in defining the propensity to make 'scholastic' investments and also the investments in extra-curricular 'general culture' which seem to owe nothing to the constraints or incentives of the institution.

The more legitimate a given area, the more necessary and 'profitable' it is to be competent in it, and the more damaging and 'costly' to be incompetent.<sup>81</sup> But this does not suffice to explain why it is that, as one

moves towards the most legitimate areas, the statistical differences related to educational capital become increasingly important, whereas the more one moves towards the least legitimate areas, which might seem to be the realm of free and inexplicable choice, such as cooking or interior decoration, choice of friends or furniture, the more important are the statistical differences linked to social trajectory (and capital composition), with the areas that are undergoing legitimization, such as 'intellectual' song, photography or jazz, occupying an intermediate position. Here too, it is in the relationship between the properties of the field (in particular, the chances of negative or positive sanctions it offers 'on average', for any agent) and the properties of the agent, that the 'efficacy' of these properties is defined. Thus both the propensity towards 'non-academic' investments and the area to which they are directed depend, strictly speaking, not on the 'average' rate of profit offered by the area in question but on the rate of profit it offers each agent or particular category of agents in terms of the volume and composition of their capital.

The hierarchy of 'average' rates of profit broadly corresponds to the hierarchy of degrees of legitimacy, so that knowledge of classical or even avant-garde literature yields higher 'average' profits, in the scholastic market and elsewhere, than knowledge of cinema, or, a fortiori, strip cartoons, detective stories or sport. But the *specific* profits, and the consequent propensities to invest, are only defined in the relationship between a field and a particular agent with particular characteristics. For example, those who owe most of their cultural capital to the educational system, such as primary and secondary teachers originating from the working and middle classes, are particularly subject to the academic definition of legitimacy, and tend to proportion their investments very strictly to the value the educational system sets on the different areas.

By contrast, 'middle-ground' arts such as cinema, jazz, and, even more, strip cartoons, science fiction or detective stories are predisposed to attract the investments either of those who have entirely succeeded in converting their cultural capital into educational capital or those who, not having acquired legitimate culture in the legitimate manner (i.e., through early familiarization), maintain an uneasy relationship with it, subjectively or objectively or both. These arts, not yet fully legitimate, which are disdained or neglected by the big holders of educational capital, offer a refuge and a revenge to those who, by appropriating them, secure the best return on their cultural capital (especially if it is not fully recognized scholastically) while at the same time taking credit for contesting the established hierarchy of legitimacies and profits. In other words, the propensity to apply to the middle-ground arts a disposition usually reserved for the legitimate arts—that measured, for example, by knowledge of film directors—depends less closely on educational capital than on a whole relationship to scholastic culture and the educational system which itself depends on the degree to which the cultural capital

possessed consists ~~solely of the capital~~ acquired in and recognized by the educational system. (Thus, members of the new petite bourgeoisie have generally inherited more cultural capital than the primary teachers but possess much the same educational capital: they know many more directors but fewer composers.)

In fact, one can never entirely escape from the hierarchy of legitimacies. Because the very meaning and value of a cultural object varies according to the system of objects in which it is placed, detective stories, science fiction or strip cartoons may be entirely prestigious cultural assets or be reduced to their ordinary value, depending on whether they are associated with avant-garde literature or music—in which case they appear as manifestations of daring and freedom—or combine to form a constellation typical of middle-brow taste—when they appear as what they are, simple substitutes for legitimate assets.

Given that each social space—family or school, for example—functions both as one of the sites where competence is produced and as one of the sites where it is given its price, one might expect each field to set the highest price on the products created within it. Thus one might expect the scholastic field to give the highest value to scholastically certified cultural capital and the scholastic modality, whereas the markets dominated by extra-scholastic values—'society' salons and dinners, or all the occasions of professional life (appointment interviews, board meetings, conferences etc.) or even academic life (oral examinations at ENA or Sciences Po, for example), in which the whole person is evaluated—would set the highest value on the familiar relation to culture, devaluing all the dispositions and competences which bear the mark of scholastic acquisition. But this would be to ignore the effects of domination whereby the products of the scholastic mode of production may be devalued as 'scholastic' in the scholastic market itself.<sup>82</sup> Indeed, the clearest sign of the heteronomy of the scholastic market is seen in its ambivalent treatment of the products of the 'scholastic' habitus, which varies inversely with the autonomy of the educational system as a whole (variable at different times and in different countries) and of its constituent institutions, with respect to the demands of the dominant fraction of the dominant class.<sup>83</sup>

What is certain is that there exists an immediate affinity between the dispositions that are acquired by familiarization with legitimate culture and the high-society market (or the most 'high-society' sectors of the educational market). The ordinary occasions of social life exclude tests as brutal as a closed questionnaire, the limiting case of the scholastic examination which the scholastic institution itself refuses whenever, implicitly accepting the high-society depreciation of the 'scholastic', it turns an examination intended to verify and measure competence into a variant of high-society conversation. In contrast to the most 'scholastic' of scholastic situations, which aim to disarm and discourage strategies of bluff, high-society occasions give unlimited scope to an art of playing with


competence which is to competence what 'play' is to the 'hand' in card games. The accomplished socialite chooses his terrain, sidesteps difficulties, turns questions of knowledge into questions of preference, ignorance into disdainful refusal—a whole set of strategies which may manifest self-assurance or insecurity, ease or embarrassment, and which depend as much on mode of acquisition and the corresponding familiarity or distance as on educational capital. In other words, the lack of deep, methodical, systematic knowledge in a particular area of legitimate culture in no way prevents him from satisfying the cultural demands entailed by most social situations, even in the quasi-scholastic situation of a survey.

In asking questions about painters in such a way that the knowledge claimed could not be verified in any way, the aim was not so much to measure the specific competence (which, one may assume, depends on the same factors as knowledge of composers) as to grasp indirectly the relationship to legitimate culture and the differential effects of the survey situation. Thus, respondents whose knowledge was not equal to their familiarity may have felt entitled to use strategies of bluff which are highly successful in the ordinary uses of culture (this is particularly the case with the new petite bourgeoisie). But bluff itself is only profitable if it is guided by the vague knowledge given by familiarity. Thus, while the room for manoeuvre in this question allowed the least competent to fasten on proper names which correspond neither to knowledge nor preference, such as Picasso (mentioned by 21 percent of the unskilled and semi-skilled workers) or Braque (10 percent), who was being celebrated in various ways at the time of the survey, it also functioned as a trap with Rousseau (10 percent), who was practically never mentioned by the other classes and was probably confused with the writer (Breughel, by contrast, was never mentioned by the unskilled and semi-skilled, no doubt because they would not risk pronouncing a name they were not likely to have heard.)

To bring to light this 'society sense', generally associated with strong inherited cultural capital but irreducible to a sum of strictly verifiable knowledge, one only has to compare the variations in two dimensions of cultural capital—possession of specific knowledge of composers and the 'flair' which is needed to make it profitable, measured by the capacity to recognize what Flaubert would have called the 'smart opinions' among the statements offered. Figure 4 correlates the proportion of individuals in each category who know the composers of at least twelve of the musical works with the proportion who claim that 'abstract painting interests them as much as the classical schools'. On the one hand there are the fractions whose strict competence is greater than their sense of the 'right' answer (secondary and higher-education teachers), and on the other, those whose sense of the legitimate posture is incommensurate with their specific competence (new petite bourgeoisie, new bourgeoisie, artistic producers). The gap is smallest among the rising petit bourgeois or bourgeois (primary teachers, junior administrative executives, engineers, senior public-sector executives).

It was not possible to use the opinions selected on music because—unlike

Figure 4 Specific competence and talk about art.



the set of statements on painting, which offered an intermediate opinion ('I love the Impressionists')—the range of possible judgements presented too great a discontinuity between the typically middle-brow opinion ('I like the Strauss waltzes') and the chic opinion ('All music of quality interests me'), so that the choice of the most legitimate judgement became more tempting for all those who refused to make do with a too visibly 'naive' judgement.

The distaste which bourgeois agents (especially those in decline) manifest for everything 'scholastic' is no doubt partly explained by the devaluation which the scholastic market inflicts, nonetheless, on the approximate knowledge and confused intuitions of familiarity. For example, the rejection of academic routine which underlies most of the innovations of the new cultural intermediaries (youth organizers, play leaders etc.) is more easily understood if one knows that the established petite bourgeoisie has relatively high educational capital and a relatively weak cultural inheritance, whereas the new petite bourgeoisie (of which artists are the limiting case) has a strong cultural inheritance and relatively low educational capital. The Parisian or even provincial primary teacher, who can beat the small employer, the provincial doctor or the Parisian antique-dealer in the tests of pure knowledge, is likely to appear incomparably inferior to them in all the situations which demand self-assurance or flair, or even the bluff which can cover lacunae, rather than the prudence, discretion and awareness of limits that are associated with scholastic acquisition. One can confuse Bernard Buffet with Jean Dubuffet and yet be quite capable of hiding one's ignorance under the commonplaces of celebration or the knowing silence of a pout, a nod or an inspired pose; one can identify philosophy with Saint-Exupéry, Teilhard de Chardin or even Léopold-Prince-Ringet, and still hold one's own in today's most prestigious market-places—receptions, conferences, interviews, debates, seminars, committees, commissions—so long as one possesses the set of distinctive features, bearing, posture, presence, diction and pronunciation, manners and usages, without which, in these markets at least, all scholastic knowledge is worth little or nothing and which, partly because schools never, or never fully, teach them, define the essence of bourgeois distinction.

Educationally equivalent individuals (e.g., the students of the *grandes écoles*) may differ radically as regards bodily hexis, pronunciation, dress or familiarity with legitimate culture, not to mention the whole set of specific competences and capacities which function as admission tickets to the bourgeois world, such as dancing, the rare sports, or parlour games (especially bridge). These skills, through the encounters they provide and the social capital they help to accumulate, no doubt explain subsequent differences in career.

The manner which designates the infallible taste of the 'taste-maker' and exposes the uncertain tastes of the possessors of an 'ill-gotten' culture is so important, in all markets and especially in the market which decides the value of literary and artistic works, only because choices always owe part of their value to the value of the chooser, and because, to a large extent, this value makes itself known and recognized through the manner of choosing. What is learnt through immersion in a world in which legitimate culture is as natural as the air one breathes is a sense of the legiti-



imate choice so pure of itself that it convinces by the sheer manner of the performance, like a successful bluff. It is not only a sense of the right area to invest in, directors rather than actors, the avant-garde more than the classical or, which amounts to the same thing, a sense of the right moment to invest or disinvest, to move into other fields, when the gains in distinction become too uncertain. It is, ultimately, the self-assurance, confidence, arrogance, which, normally being the monopoly of the individuals most assured of profit from their investments, has every likelihood—in a world in which everything is a matter of belief—of imposing the absolute legitimacy, and therefore the maximum profitability, of their investments.

The paradox of the imposition of legitimacy is that it makes it impossible ever to determine whether the dominant feature appears as distinguished or noble because it is dominant—i.e., because it has the privilege of defining, by its very existence, what is noble or distinguished as being exactly what itself is, a privilege which is expressed precisely in its self-assurance—or whether it is only because it is dominant that it appears as endowed with these qualities and uniquely entitled to define them. It is no accident that, to designate the legitimate manners or taste, ordinary language is content to say 'manners' or 'taste', 'in the absolute sense', as grammarians say. The properties attached to the dominant—Paris or Oxford 'accents', bourgeois 'distinction' etc.—have the power to discourage the intention of discerning what they are 'in reality' in and for themselves, and the distinctive value they derive from unconscious reference to their class distribution.

**FACTORS AND POWERS** It is now clear that the difficulty of the analysis was due to the fact that what the very tools of analysis—educational level and social origin—designate is being fought out in struggles which have the object of analysis—art and the relation to the work of art—as their prize in reality itself. These struggles are fought between those who are identified with the scholastic definition of culture and the scholastic mode of acquisition, and those who defend a 'non-institutional' culture and relation to culture. The latter, though mainly recruited from the oldest sectors of the bourgeoisie, receive unquestioned support from writers and artists and from the charismatic conception of the production and consumption of art, of which they are the inventors and guarantors. Battles over authors and schools, which hold the limelight of the literary or artistic stage, conceal more important struggles, such as those which oppose teachers (from whose ranks, throughout the nineteenth century, critics were often recruited) and writers, who tend to be more closely linked, by origin and 'connections', to the dominant fractions of the dominant class, or the endless struggles between the dominated fractions as a whole and the dominant fractions over the definition of the accomplished man and the education designed to produce him.

For example, what is at stake in the late-nineteenth-century creation of a private education giving great importance to sport—with, among others, Edouard Demolins, the founder of the *Ecole des Roches* and disciple of Frédéric Le Play, like Baron de Coubertin, another advocate of a new style of education—is the imposition of an aristocratic definition of education within the academic institution itself. Knowledge, erudition, the scholastic docility symbolized by 'barrack-like' lycée (this is where the much-repeated theme originates), and all the criteria of assessment favourable to the children of the petite bourgeoisie, through which the school affirms its autonomy, are contested in the name of such 'values' as 'energy', 'courage', 'will', the virtues of the leader (of the army or business—at that time it was almost the same thing) and, perhaps especially, (personal) initiative, baptized 'self-help' or 'enterprise', all virtues linked to sport. To put 'education' before 'instruction', 'character' before 'intelligence', sport before culture is to assert, within the scholastic world itself, the existence of a hierarchy irreducible to the specifically academic hierarchy which privileges the second term in each of these oppositions.

These struggles are not confined to the past, as is shown by the existence of two routes to the senior positions in large firms, one leading from the *Ecole des Roches* or the major Jesuit colleges and great bourgeois lycées (in the 16th arrondissement) to the Law Faculty or, increasingly, to Sciences Po or HEC, the other running from the ordinary provincial or Parisian lycée to the *Ecole Polytechnique*.<sup>86</sup> It is still more clearly seen in the opposition, at the level of the grandes écoles, between two academic markers differing profoundly in the content of the cultural competence demanded, in the value set on manners and the criteria used to evaluate them, with at one extreme the *Ecole Normale Supérieure* (ENS) and *Polytechnique* and at the other Sciences Po and the *Ecole Nationale d'Administration* (ENA). These struggles over the legitimate definition of culture and the legitimate way of evaluating it are only one dimension of the endless struggles which divide every dominant class. Behind the virtues of the accomplished man the legitimate titles to the exercise of domination are at stake. Thus the glorification of 'character-building' sport and the valorization of economic and political culture, at the expense of literary or artistic culture, are just two of the strategies through which the dominant fractions of the dominant class aim to discredit the values recognized by the 'intellectual' fractions of the dominant class and the petite bourgeoisie—whose children compete dangerously with the children of the bourgeoisie on the terrain of the most academically defined academic competence. But more profoundly, these manifestations of anti-intellectualism are only one aspect of an antagonism which, far beyond the question of the legitimate uses of the body or culture, touches on every dimension of existence; the dominant fractions always tend to conceive their relationship to the dominated fractions in terms of the opposition between the male and the female, the serious and

the frivolous, the responsible and the irresponsible, the useful and the futile, the realistic and the unrealistic.

The principles of logical division which statistics uses to produce its classes and the data it records about them are therefore also principles of 'socio-logical' division. The statistical variations associated with the (natively defined) two main variables—educational level and social origin—can only be correctly interpreted so long as it is remembered that they are bound up with antagonistic definitions of legitimate culture and of the legitimate relation to culture, or, more precisely, with different markets, in which the characteristics associated with one or the other are given different prices. It would be wholly mistaken to locate in any one of these factors an 'efficacy' which only appears in a certain *relationship* and may therefore be cancelled out or inverted in another field or another state of the same field. The dispositions constituting the cultivated *habitus* are only formed, only function and are only valid in a field, in the relationship with a field which, as Gaston Bachelard says of the physical field, is itself a 'field of possible forces', a 'dynamic situation',<sup>87</sup> in which forces are only manifested in their relationship with certain dispositions. This is why the same practices may receive opposite meanings and values in different fields, in different configurations or in opposing sectors of the same field.

So reflective analysis of the tools of analysis is not an epistemological scruple but an indispensable pre-condition of scientific knowledge of the object. Positivist laziness leads the whole, purely defensive, effort of verification to be focussed on the intensity of the relationships found, instead of bringing questioning to bear on the very conditions of measurement of the relationships, which may even explain the relative intensity of the different relationships. In order to believe in the independence of the 'independent variables' of positivist methodology, one has to be unaware that 'explanatory factors' are also 'powers' which are only valid and operative in a certain field, and that they therefore depend on the struggles which are fought, within each field, to transform the price-forming mechanisms which define it. If it is easy to imagine fields in which the weight of the two dominant 'factors' would be inverted (and tests which would be the experimental expression of this, giving greater prominence, for example, to less 'scholastic' objects and forms of questioning), this is because what is ultimately at stake in everyday struggles over culture is the transformation of the price-forming mechanisms defining the relative values of the cultural productions associated with educational capital and social trajectory (and the primary variables through which they are grasped).

If it is true that the statistical relationships between the properties attached to agents and their practices are only fully defined in the relationship between the dispositions of a *habitus* and a particular field, then the limits within which the relations observed retain their validity—an ap-

parent restriction which is the pre-condition for full generalization—cannot be defined until one questions the relationship within which these relationships have been established. The relationship set up by a closed questionnaire mainly devoted to legitimate culture is akin to that of an examination (albeit without any institutional sanction at stake); and it is to the scholastic market what a market-place, as a real-world site of exchanges, is to the market of economic theory. Both in its subject matter and in the form of exchange it imposes (a questioning, which, as Charles Bally noted, always implies a form of intrusion, violence, challenge—hence the attenuations which normally accompany it), a survey by questionnaire, especially when it takes the form of methodical, asymmetrical interrogation,<sup>88</sup> is the complete opposite of ordinary conversation—it has nothing in common with the café or campus discussions in which the 'counter-culture' is constructed, or the high-society chatter which shuns pedantic precision and didactic insistence. The variations one observes in the relative weight of educational qualification and inherited cultural capital as one moves, within this quasi-scholastic situation, from what is more academic in form and content to what is less academic either in form (questions measuring familiarity without testing knowledge) or in content (questions on knowledge of the cinema or preferences in cooking) give some idea of this relationship between 'factors' and markets.

All the indices (difficult to obtain by questionnaire) of the manner of applying, showing or exploiting competence (self-assurance, arrogance, off-handedness, modesty, earnestness, embarrassment etc.) strictly depend, for their meaning and value, on the market in which they are placed, because they are the visible traces of a mode of acquisition (domestic or scholastic), i.e., a market; and also because all the markers which are able to assert their autonomy of scholastic control give them priority. The emphasis on manners, and through them on mode of acquisition, enables seniority within a class to be made the basis of the hierarchy within the class;<sup>89</sup> it also gives the recognized possessors of the legitimate manner an absolute, arbitrary power to recognize or exclude. Manner, by definition, only exists for others, and the recognized holders of the legitimate manner and of the power to define the value of manners—dress, bearing, pronunciation—have the privilege of indifference to their own manner (so they never have to *put on a manner*). By contrast, the parents who presume to join the group of legitimate, i.e., hereditary, possessors of the legitimate manner, without being the product of the same social conditions, are trapped, whatever they do, in a choice between anxious hyper-identification and the negativity which admits its defeat in its very revolt: either the conformity of an 'assumed' behaviour whose very correctness or hyper-correctness betrays an imitation, or the ostentatious assertion of difference which is bound to appear as an admission of inability to identify.<sup>90</sup>

Because they are acquired in social fields which are also markers in

which they receive their price, cultural competences are dependent on these markets, and all struggles over culture are aimed at creating the market most favourable to the products which are marked, in their manner, by a particular class of conditions of acquisition, i.e., a particular market. Thus, what is nowadays called the 'counter-culture' may well be the product of the endeavour of new-style autodidacts to free themselves from the constraints of the scholastic market (to which the less confident old-style autodidacts continue to submit, although it condemns their products in advance). They strive to do so by producing another market, with its own consecrating agencies, that is, like the high-society or intellectual markets, capable of challenging the pretension of the educational system to impose the principles of evaluation of competences and manners which reign in the scholastic market, or at least its most scholastic sectors, on a perfectly unified market in cultural goods.

## II The Economy of Practices

But on things whose rules and principles had been instilled into her by her mother, on the way to make certain dishes, to play Beethoven's sonatas, to 'receive' with cordiality, she was quite sure that she had a right idea of perfection and of discerning how far others approximated to it. For these three things, moreover, perfection was almost the same, a kind of simplicity in the means, a sobriety and a charm. She repudiated with horror the introduction of spices in dishes that did not absolutely require them, affectation and abuse of the pedals in piano-playing, departure from perfect naturalness, and exaggerated talking of oneself in 'receiving.' From the first mouthful, from the first notes, from a simple letter she preened herself on knowing if she had to deal with a good cook, a real musician, a woman properly brought up. 'She may have many more fingers than I, but she lacks taste, playing that very simple *Andante* with so much emphasis.' 'No doubt a most brilliant woman full of parts, but it is a want of tact to speak of oneself in such a case.' 'Possibly a very knowing cook, but she does not know how to do steak and fried potatoes.' Steak and fried potatoes, an ideal competition-piece, a kind of culinary *Patheic Sonata*, a gastronomic equivalent to what is in social life the visit of a lady who comes for a servant's 'character' and who, in an act as simple as that, can sufficiently display the presence or absence of tact and education.

Marcel Proust, *Days of Reading*