

How to Study Urban Political Power

John Hull Mollenkopf

... In the early 1960s, pluralist political scientists launched an attack on the previously accepted view, established by sociologists, that socioeconomic elites dominated urban politics. The success of this assault enabled pluralists to establish their view as the norm in political science.

From the mid-1970s onward, however, a new generation of structurally oriented critics challenged the pluralist point of view. While they were able to undermine the prevailing wisdom, they did not manage to supplant it with a new one, in part because of defects in their arguments that pluralists were quick to point out. More recently, students of urban politics have attempted to synthesize the strengths of both approaches. With respect to framing the study of how the Koch administration amassed and exercised political power, the debate between pluralists and their critics focuses our attention on four interrelated questions:

- 1 Is urban politics worth studying at all, or is the urban political realm so subordinate to, dependent on, and constrained by its economic and social context that factors from this domain have little independent explanatory power?
- 2 If urban politics does have an independent impact, how should we conceptualize power relations among interests or actors?
- 3 In particular, what factors govern the construction of a dominant political coalition

within a given set of structural constraints and opportunities?

- 4 In constructing such a coalition, how important is promoting private investment compared to other strategies, such as increasing social spending to incorporate potentially insurgent groups?

The Pluralist Conception of the Urban Political Order

The classic pluralist studies of a generation ago, like Banfield's *Political Influence*, Dahl's *Who Governs?*, or Sayre and Kauffman's *Governing New York City*, made important theoretical and methodological advances over the so-called elitists they attacked. They did not deduce power relations from the interlocks between economic and political elites. Instead, they went into the field to examine the tangled complexity of interest alignments around actual policy decisions and disputes. Pluralist scholars showed that no model of direct control by a unified economic or status elite could easily explain what they saw.

While most pluralists did not dwell theoretically on the larger relationship between the state and the economy, they implicitly rejected the notion that some underlying structural logic subordinated local politics to the private economy. They saw politics as an autonomous realm that possessed real authority and commanded important

resources. They explicitly rejected the notion that economic or social notables controlled the state in any instrumental sense. Since they argued that every "legitimate" group commanded some important resource (if only the capacity to resist) and no one group commanded sufficient resources to control all others, pluralists argued that the bargaining among a multiplicity of groups defined the urban power structure.

In this view, coalition building was central to the definition of power. Political leaders and private interests built coalitions around specific issues, the coalitions varied from issue to issue, and they tended to be short lived. By selecting a range of different policy decisions as case studies for research, pluralists seemed to imply that urban development and social service issues had an equal importance in organizing political competition.

In the face of examples where entrenched interest groups dominated their own particular, fragmented policy areas over time to the exclusion of the public interest, the pluralist approach developed a clearly critical strand of analysis.² But these scholars simply saw the dark side of the pluralist worldview without fundamentally challenging its basic assumptions or deflating the optimistic claims about system openness or responsiveness prevailing among other pluralists. . . .

While the pluralist studies may have been convincing and accurate portraits of urban politics in the 1950s and early 1960s, the eruption of turmoil and political mobilization in the 1960s and the fiscal crisis of the 1970s soon revealed basic flaws in the pluralist analysis. Except for Robert Dahl's work, *Who Governs?*, these studies lacked a context in economic and political development. . . .

Structuralist Critiques

As the pluralist political equilibrium unraveled on the ground, it came under increasing challenge from structuralist critics. The broad outlines of their progress may be traced from Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz' classic essay on the "two faces of power" to Clarence Stone's work on "systemic power" to John Manley's "class analysis of pluralism."³ Bachrach and Baratz attacked pluralists for focusing on the "first face" of power, namely its exercise, while ignoring the second, namely the way that the relationship between the

state and the underlying socioeconomic system shapes the political agenda. "Power may be, and often is," they said, "exercised by confining the scope of decision-making to relatively 'safe' issues." But while making a case for analyzing how the values embedded in institutional practices bias the rules of the game, they do not specify the mechanisms that promote some interests and issues while dampening others. . . .

Neo-Marxist Critiques

Structuralists have decisively transcended the pluralist vocabulary.⁴ They provided the social and economic context missing from pluralism and highlighted the ways that private property, market competition, wealth and income inequality, the corporate system, and the stage of capitalist development pervasively shape the terrain on which political competition occurs. They underscored the need to analyze how basic patterns of the economic, political, or cultural rules of the game bias the capacity of different interests to realize their ends through politics and the state.

Most importantly, neo-Marxist structuralists were able to empirically investigate these mechanisms, refuting the pluralist retort that "nondecisions" either must be studied just like decisions or else are unobservable ideological constructs. They have shown cases in which the systemic and cumulative inequality of political capacity undergirded, and indeed was ideologically reinforced by, a superficial pluralism.⁵ Structuralist studies may be flawed by economic determinism, but they are factually on target in observing and describing mechanisms that generate systemic, cumulative, political inequality, which has a more profound impact on outcomes than the coalition patterns studied by pluralists. Such critiques won relatively broad support among the younger generation of scholars, if not their elders. They may be subclassified into theories that stress the political logic of capital accumulation, social control, or the interplay of accumulation and legitimation. Each offers a different perspective on the central mechanisms that generate cumulative political inequality.

Theorists influenced by Marx's economic works have tended to argue that the mode of production stamps its pattern more or less directly on the organization of the state and on the dynamics of

political competition. Marxists as different as David Harvey and David Gordon have both argued that the stage of capitalist development and the circuits of capital have determined urban spatial patterns, the bureaucratic state, and for Harvey even urban consciousness.⁷ While this strand of Marxist thinking made a breakthrough in orienting analysts to the importance of the process of capital accumulation, it has generally lacked a well-developed theory of the state that either identifies the instrumental mechanisms that link state actions to the power of capital or grants the state autonomy to the state.⁸

This literature does stress one mechanism, however: the state's dependence on private investment for public revenues. If the mobility of capital can discipline the state and constrain political competition, then competition among polities (whether cities or nations) to attract investment leads them to grant systematic benefits for capital, a dynamic that Alford and Friedland have called "power without participation."⁹ As Harvey wrote,

The successful urban region is one that evolves the right mix of life-styles and cultural, social, and political forms to fit with the dynamics of capital accumulation. . . . Urban regions racked by class struggle or ruled by class alliances that take paths antagonistic to accumulation . . . at some point have to face the realities of competition for jobs, trade, money, investments, services, and so forth.¹⁰

Sooner or later, the state and political competition will be subordinated to the needs of capital.

Several analysts, including Friedland and Palmer as well as Molotch and Logan, abstracted this mechanism from the larger Marxian vocabulary and made it central to their analysis of urban power. Friedland and Palmer argued that, while businesses do directly influence policy-making, such intervention is logically secondary.¹¹ "The growth of locales depends on the fortunes of the firms," according to Friedland and Palmer, thus "dominant and mobile [corporate] actors set the boundaries within which debate over public policy takes place."¹² As capital has become more mobile and less tied to specific locations, the need for business to intervene directly in politics has waned, while the structural subordination of local government to the general interests of business has waxed.

Molotch and Logan took a different tack on the same course. While conceding that the mobility of capital gives local government a powerful incentive to defer to capitalists, they argued that certain classes of business are not mobile: real estate developers, utilities, newspapers, and others with a fixed relationship to a place. Large sunk costs give these interests a powerful incentive to intervene in and dominate local politics in order to get local government to promote new investment. They saw this "growth machine" as a ubiquitous, inevitable, and at best weakly challenged feature of American cities.¹³ For Molotch and Logan, New York City is a paradigm case of the political influence of real estate development interests. They cited both the long career of Robert Moses as a builder of public works that favored private investors and the predominance of real estate interests among those who financed Mayor Koch's later political campaigns. . . .

[A] second, equally important school of neo-Marxist thinking stressed the way urban politics serves to dampen and regulate the conflicts inevitably generated by capitalist urbanization.¹⁴ Castells' work on "collective consumption" and urban social movements,¹⁵ Piven and Cloward's studies of urban protests,¹⁶ and Cloward's studies of the absorptive capacity of local bureaucracies and the bias against class issues in urban politics¹⁶ represent the best of this work.

While these analysts differed over how the state coopts movements that challenge urban governments, they share the idea that this process is a central feature of urban politics in advanced capitalist societies.¹⁷ Not everyone, even on the left, has agreed with these contentions. Theret, Mingione, and Gottdeiner have criticized the explanatory power of the notion of collective consumption, while Ceccarelli has argued that urban social movements did not turn out to be the force in West European urban politics that Castells portrayed them to be.¹⁸ Whatever the situation in Europe, the civil rights movement, urban unrest, and community organization clearly had a profound impact on urban politics in the United States after the 1960s, particularly in the rise of programs designed to absorb and deflect these forces.

Piven and Cloward have stressed that "the occasions when protest is possible among the poor, the forms that it must take, and the impact it can have are all delimited by the social structure in ways which usually diminish its extent and

diminish its force."¹⁹ When institutional crisis creates a space for defiance, established patterns of political competition tend to shape the form it takes. When protest sometimes breaks those boundaries, it is still shaped by the everyday-life situations of the protesters and the targets those situations afford. But in a highly unsettled national electoral environment, protest can still lead political leaders to "break with an established pattern of government accommodation to private elites."²⁰ This response generally aims to isolate and undermine as well as conciliate protest and to "reintegrate the movement into normal political channels and to absorb its leaders into stable institutional roles."²¹ Government attempts to coopt dissidents on terms that do not threaten the basic institutional arrangements of capitalism but leave behind a residue of reform, thus providing the central means of social control.

Katznelson has developed several of these themes. He first approached the subject matter of *City Trends* with the notion that government programs ostensibly aimed at reducing poverty and increasing citizen participation absorbed and deflected black protest in the Inwood/Washington Heights section of northern Manhattan. Upon reflection, however, he discovered a more deeply embedded set of barriers to and channels for protest: the physical separation of work and residence and the consequent dampening of class issues in the residence-based world of urban politics. Without fully abandoning his initial conception of governmental cooptation, he argued that the reproduction of class inequality is deeply embedded in and shaped by the spatial organization of residential communities.²²

A third stream of neo-Marxism, stimulated by James O'Connor's and Claus Offe's contributions to the theory of the state, attempted to develop a multivariate approach to the structure of urban power that accorded equal place to the imperatives to promote accumulation and to achieve legitimacy.²³ In this approach, the two imperatives are crosscutting: the state must promote accumulation but cannot be seen to be doing so without risking its legitimacy. Efforts to bolster legitimacy through expanded social spending may hinder corporate profits if they are financed through progressive taxation. The structure and political orientation of the state become a battleground where these issues are fought out.

Friedland used this approach to study how the presence of corporate headquarters and organized labor influenced patterns of spending on urban renewal and antipoverty programs in sixty-seven cities during the 1960s. He found that the presence of either of these interests, particularly corporate headquarters, promoted spending in these areas but also contributed to fiscal strain and the intensity of urban rioting. His work suggests an implicit distinction between two types of cities: those where corporations and labor unions are prevalent with a more liberal, Democratic political culture, and those where they are not with a more conservative and repressive political culture.²⁴ . . .

Public choice critiques

Neo-Marxist thinking is not the only source of structural criticism of the pluralist paradigm, however. Microeconomics, in the form of public choice theory, has contributed its own critique. Tiebout's seminal work led to Forrester's simulation of urban systems and ultimately to Paul Peterson's sophisticated "unitary" theory of urban politics. This tradition, born of the economists' distrust of state allocation of resources, has sought a functional equivalent to the marketplace in the multiplicity of local governments. They would compete, Tiebout argued, for residents of different means and desires by providing different service packages at various tax costs. An equilibrium would thus be reached in the sorting of populations across urban and suburban jurisdictions within the metropolis. This equilibrium would represent an efficient production of public goods, matching the marginal prospective resident with the jurisdiction's need to add (or subtract) residents on its own margin to provide services at the most efficient scale.²⁵

Such thinking has undergirded much of the orthodox literature on urban economics and local public finance. Urban housing, for example, has been analyzed as a function of how consumers trade off housing and commuting costs, given various levels of residential amenities. Forrester built the underlying assumptions into a model, influential for a time, that implied that whatever cities do to provide housing or social services for the poor will attract more of them, drive out the better off, and erode the tax base.²⁶

This analysis reached its highest form in Paul Peterson's *City Limits*. Like neo-Marxists, Peterson

analyzed how external economic conditions shape and constrain the urban political arena and concluded that "political variables no longer become relevant to the analysis."²⁷ Unlike neo-Marxists, however, he posited the importance of consumer as well as investor demand and imputed a unitary interest in economic growth to all constituent urban interests. "The interests of cities," he said, lie not in an optimum size for efficient service provision nor in some pluralist bargaining among constituencies, but in "policies [that] maintain or enhance the economic position, social prestige, or political power of the city, taken as a whole."²⁸

Of these, he found economic position paramount and equated it with the health of export industries. The overwhelming importance of promoting exports means that "the issues screened out of local politics are not eliminated by local electoral devices, bureaucratic manipulations, or a one-sided press... [but because they] fall outside the limited sphere of local politics."²⁹ In fact, local politics is so limited in Peterson's view that it cannot even generate partisan competition or serious group challenges to prevailing policy. Observed intergroup struggles are only ethnic competition over jobs and contracts. Subsequently, Peterson concluded that, owing to economic decline and racial transition, "the industrial city has become an institutional anachronism."³⁰

While this market-based explanation of the limits on urban politics has a markedly different and more positive evaluation of the final equilibrium than do neo-Marxist formulations, it has a similar logical structure and reaches similar conclusions. Politics — at any rate urban politics — loses its autonomy and even its explanatory relevance. Intergroup competition drives redistribution off the urban political agenda and puts the promotion of economic development in top position.

Structuralism Reconsidered

By providing the missing economic and social-structural context, these structuralist critiques achieved a considerable advance over pluralist analysis. Cities can no longer be taken as independent entities isolated from the larger economic and social forces that operate on them. Analysis can no longer ignore the impact of global and

national economic restructuring on large cities.³¹ Since cities cannot retard these global economic trends (though New York and others may propagate them), nor remake their population's will, they clearly navigate in a sea of externally generated constraints and imperatives.

The structuralist critiques also make it clear that urban politics can no longer be considered to be unrelated to the cumulative pattern of inequality in the economy and society. They have focused attention on how the state's dependence on private investment fosters political outcomes that systematically favor business interests. Structuralists have explored specific mechanisms that produce this result, such as the invidious competition among fragmented, autonomous urban governments for investment, the segregation of local government functions into quasi-private agencies that promote investment and politically exposed agencies that absorb and deflect protest, and the organization of the channels of political representation so as to articulate interests in some ways but not others. By stressing that advanced capitalism characteristically generates urban social movements and political conflicts, some structuralists have also implied that political action can alter some of the constraints capitalism imposes on democracy...

... [F]or all their strengths, structuralists conceptualized the political system as ultimately subordinate to economic structure. They tended to reduce urban politics to the fulfillment of economic imperatives; even social control achieved through political means serves capitalist ends. The most promising threads of structuralist thinking examined how systemic imperatives might conflict with each other or generate system-threatening conflict, thus opening the way for political indeterminacy. Here, however, they risked moving outside and beyond a structuralist paradigm. Indeed, orthodox Marxism (or for that matter orthodox, orthodox economics) simply does not provide a good basis for building a theory of politics. To the extent that structuralist theorists held true to the logic of their argument, they underplayed the importance of politics. They did not appreciate that policies that promote private investment must be constructed in a political environment that may favor but by no means guarantees this outcome. Indeed, popular, social, and communal forces pressure the state and the political process just as strongly in different, and often opposed, directions...

"Polity-centered" thinking must thus augment the "economy-centered" theorizing of the structuralist critiques.³² This does not require an equally one-sided political determinism. Rather, it requires us to extend the lines of structuralist thinking that stress conflict among imperatives or developmental tendencies until we go beyond the limits of economic determinism. We must recognize that "state power is *si generis* not reducible to class power," as Block put it.³³ Or as Manuel Castells recently reflected, "experience was right and Marxist theory was wrong" about the central theoretical importance of urban social movements and the impossibility of reducing them to a class basis.³⁴

But if we give politics an analytic weight equal to that of economic structure, how can we avoid returning to a voluntaristic pluralism? How can we develop a vocabulary for analyzing politics and state action that reconciles the political system's independent impact on social outcomes with its observed systemic bias in favor of capitalist interests? A satisfactory approach must operate at three interrelated levels: (1) how the local state's relationship to the economy and society conditions its capacity to act, (2) how the "rules of the game" of local politics shape the competition among interests and actors to construct a dominant political coalition able to exercise that capacity to act, and (3) how economic and social change and the organization of political competition shape the mobilization of these interests.

Toward a Theoretical Synthesis

We can begin to build such an approach by recognizing that city government and its political leaders interact with the resident population and constituency interests in its political and electoral operating environment and with market forces and business interests in its economic operating environment.³⁵ This approach emphasizes two primary interactions: first, between the leaders of city government and their political/electoral base; and second, between the leaders of city government and their economic environment. It also suggests that political entrepreneurs who seek to direct the actions of city government must contend with three distinct sets of interests: (1) public sector producer interests inside local government, (2) popular or constituency interests (which are

also public sector consumer interests), especially as they are organized in the electoral system, and (3) private market interests, particularly corporations with discretion over capital investment, as they are organized in the local economy.

To be sure, these interests are highly complex in a city like New York and cannot be captured by simple dichotomies like black versus white or capitalist versus worker... The city's residential communities are highly heterogeneous. Terms like "minority" hide far more than they reveal, even "black" or "Latino" blur important distinctions regarding nativity and ethnicity. Business interests come in many sizes, industries, and competitive situations; even corporate cities vary greatly. Still, a focus on the relationships among state, citizenry, and marketplace provides an entry point for analyzing what determines the shape of the urban political arena.

The concept of a "dominant political coalition" gives us a focal point for this analysis. A dominant political coalition is a working alliance among different interests that can win elections for executive office and secure the cooperation it needs from other public and private power centers in order to govern. To have an opportunity to become dominant, it must first win election to the chief executive office. To remain dominant, it must use the powers of government to consolidate its electoral base, win subsequent elections, and gain support from those other wielders of public authority and private resources whose cooperation is necessary for state action to go forward. Put another way, a dominant coalition must organize working control over both its political and its private market operating environments.

This formulation improves on the pluralist approach by directing our attention toward how the relationship between politics and markets biases outcomes in favor of private market interests, as structuralist approaches have pointed out. The notion of a dominant political coalition would not sit well with pluralists, who have argued that conditions are unstable, form or reform according to the issue, and may be stymied by the capacity of any sizable group to resist. We would instead that coalitions can be stable, operate across issues, and create persistent winners and losers. Challenging and supplanting such coalitions have generally been difficult, particularly for consumers.

encies that lack resources or are particularly vulnerable to sanction. Effective challenges generally arise only at moments of crisis in periods of rapid social and economic change.

This formulation also improves on the structuralist approach by equating the political/electoral arena an influence equal to that of economic forces. It also points us toward how strategies to control the direction of city government are shaped by (and in turn shape) the political environment and by the public sector producer interests that have a permanent stake in its operation. It posits a scope for political choice and innovation that is lacking in the structuralist perspective.

This approach points us toward the following central questions: how do political entrepreneurs seek to organize such coalitions, what enables them to succeed in the first instance, and how do they sustain success over time? In what ways can such coalitions be bound together? What interests do dominant coalitions include and exclude and why? How do the economic and political contexts affect these binding relationships? And what tensions or conflicts undermine dominant coalitions, opening the way for power realignment? . . .

Notes

- 1 Edward Banfield, *Political Influence* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1961); Robert Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961); Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, *Governing New York City: Politics in the Metropolis* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1960); Nelson Polsky, *Community Power and Political Theory: A further Look at Problems of Evidence and Inference*, 2nd ed., enlarged edition (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980), resists and defends the pluralist position against some of its critics.
- 2 Robert J. Wasté, "Community Power and Pluralist Theory," in Robert J. Wasté, ed., *Community Power: Directions for Future Research* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1986), pp. 117-37, gives a valuable overview of the variants of pluralist thinking, including those that emphasized social stratification and the predominant influence of private interests. Examples of these critical pluralists include Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York: Vintage, 1966); and Theodore Lowi, "The Public Philosophy: Interest-Group Liberalism," *American Political Science Review* 61 (March 1967): 5-24. See also Elmer Eric Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960).
- 3 Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," *American Political Science Review* 56 (December 1962): 947-52; Clarence Stone, "Systemic Power in Community Decision Making: A Restatement of Stratification Theory," *American Political Science Review* 74 (1980): 978-90; Stone, "Social Stratification, Nondecision-making, and the Study of Community Power," 275-302; John Manley, "Neo-Pluralism: A Class Analysis of Pluralism I and Pluralism II," *American Political Science Review* 77:2 (June 1983): 368-83.
- 4 See also Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, *Power and Poverty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).
- 5 For overviews of this literature, see Michael P. Smith, ed., *Cities in Transition: Class, Capital, and the State* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1984), particularly Smith's introductory essay, Christopher Pickvance's "Structuralist Critique in Urban Studies," and Robert Beauregard's defense of structuralism, "Structure, Agency, and Urban Redevelopment," chapters 1-3. Other interesting discussions include Marc Gottdiener, *The Decline of Urban Politics: Political Theory and the Crisis of the Local State* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1987), chapters 3-6; Harvey Boudley, "Social Control Theories of Urban Politics," *Social Science Quarterly* 59:4 (March 1979): 605-21, with responses by Katznelson and Gordon pp. 622-31; Charles Jarek, "Recent Neo-Marxist Urban Analysis," *Annual Review of Sociology* (1983): 605-38; Michael P. Smith, *City, State, and Market: The Political Economy of Urban Society* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), chapters 1, 3, and 9; and Susan E. Clarke and Andrew Kirby, "In Search of the Corpse: The Mysterious Case of Local Politics," *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 25:3 (March 1990): 389-412.
- 6 For a summary of such works, see Robert Alford and Roger Friedland, *Powers of Theory: Capitalism, the State, and Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), part III.
- 7 David Harvey, *Social Justice and the City* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), part II; Harvey, *The Urbanization of Capital* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), particularly chapter 1, "The Urban Process Under Capitalism," originally published in 1978; Harvey, *Consciousness and the Urban Experience: Studies in the History and Theory of Capitalist Urbanization* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985); David Gordon, "Capitalism and the Roots of Urban Fiscal Crisis," in R. Alcaiy and D. Mermelstein, eds., *Fiscal Crisis of American Cities* (New York: Vintage, 1977), pp. 82-112; David Gordon, Rick Edwards, and Michael Reich, *Segmented Work, Divided Workers* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
- 8 Gordon and his colleagues have developed the concept of the "social structure of accumulation" to cope with this problem, but this formulation continues to undertheorize the role of the state and politics.
- 9 Robert Alford and Roger Friedland, "Political Participation and Public Policy," *Annual Review of Sociology* 1 (1975): 429-79.
- 10 Harvey, *Urbanization of Capital*, "Urban Politics and Unwieldy Capitalist Development," p. 158.
- 11 Roger Friedland and Donald Palmer, "Park Place and Main Street: Business and the Urban Power Structure," *Annual Review of Sociology* 9 (1984): 406-7; Frances Fox Piven and Roger Friedland, "Public Choice and Private Power," in A. Kirby et al., eds., *Public Service Provision and Urban Development* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), pp. 390-420, reach a similar conclusion, though they emphasize the importance of a fragmented government structure for promoting interplace competition.
- 12 Harvey Molotch, "The City as a Growth Machine," *American Sociological Review* 8:2 (1976): 309-30; John Logan and Harvey Molotch, *Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); My The *Contested City* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983) develops a related argument in chapter 6 that private investment, reinforced by conservative national administrators, migrated to Southwestern cities to avoid the political conflict in older Northeastern cities.
- 13 Ivan Szelenyi is one of the few to apply this analysis to the former "actually existing socialisms," in "Structural Changes and Alternatives to Capitalist Development in the Contemporary Urban and Regional System," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 5:1 (1981): 1-14.
- 14 Manuel Castells, "Collective Consumption and Urban Contradictions in Advanced Capitalism," in *Castells, City, Class and Power* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978). For critiques, see B. Thoret, "Collective Means of Consumption, Capital Accumulation and the Urban Question," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 6:3 (1982): 345-71; and Gottdiener, *Decline of Urban Politics*, p. 95.
- 15 Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, *Regulating the Poor* (New York: Pantheon, 1971) and *Poor People's Movements* (New York: Pantheon, 1979).
- 16 Ira Katznelson, *Black Men, White Cities* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); "The Crisis of the Capitalist City: Urban Politics and Social Control," in W. Hawley et al., *Theoretical Perspectives on Urban Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976); *City Frontiers*.
- 17 Katznelson comments on his differences with Castells and Piven and Cloward in *City Frontiers*, pp. 210-15; Castells comments on Katznelson, Piven, and Cloward in *City and the Grassroots* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 296-301.
- 18 Thoret, "Collective Means of Consumption," *Enzo Mingione, Social Conflict and the City* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981); Gottdiener, *Decline of Urban Politics*, pp. 95-107; Paolo Ceccarelli, "Politics, Parties, and Urban Movements: Western Europe," in Susan and Norman Fainstein, eds., *Urban Policy Under Capitalism* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1982).
- 19 *Poor People's Movements*, p. 3.
- 20 *Ibid.*, p. 29.
- 21 *Ibid.*, p. 32.
- 22 Katznelson, *City Frontiers*, pp. 203-4. See also John Mollenkopf, "Community and Accumulation," in Michael Dean and Alan Scott, eds., *Urbanization and Urban Planning in Capitalist Societies* (New York: Methuen, 1981), pp. 319-38.
- 23 James O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973); Claus Offe, *Contradictions of the Welfare State*, ed. John Keane (London: Hutchinson, 1984).
- 24 Roger Friedland, *Power and Crisis in the City* (London: Macmillan Press, 1982).
- 25 Roger Friedland, Frances Piven, and Robert Alford, "Political Conflict, Urban Structure, and the Fiscal Crisis," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 1:3 (1977): 447-61.
- 26 Piven and Friedland, "Public Choice and Private Power," p. 390. See also Frances Piven, "Federal Policy and Urban Fiscal Strain," *Yale Law and Policy Review* 2:2 (Spring 1984): 291-320; and Stephen David and Paul Kantor, "Urban Policy in the Federal System: A Reconceptualization of Federalism," *Policy* 16 (Winter 1983): 283-304.
- 27 Martin Sheller, *Political Crisis/Fiscal Crisis: The Collapse and Revival of New York City* (New York: Basic Books, 1985).
- 28 Charles Tiebout, "Pure Theory of Public Expenditures," *Journal of Political Economy* 64 (1956): 416-24.
- 29 Jay Forrester, *Urban Dynamics* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969).
- 30 Paul Peterson, *City Limits* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 12.
- 31 *Ibid.*, p. 20.
- 32 *Ibid.*, p. 6.
- 33 Paul Peterson, ed., *New Urban Reality* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), p. 1.