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Middlebury College’s flagship center for the production and dissemination of knowledge about international and global issues. Through a diverse set of programs, the Center reaches across boundaries of language, culture, and geography to engage students’ capacity for rigorous analysis and independent thought in a rapidly changing world. In supporting Middlebury’s aim to be the leading global liberal arts college, the Center sponsors vibrant co-curricular programs, fosters dialogue with leading international scholars and practitioners, funds innovative undergraduate field research, and promotes scholarly collaborations between students and faculty. RCGA builds bridges across disciplines and communities, local and global.

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The Rohatyn Student Advisory Board (RSAB) is Rohatyn Center for Global Affairs’s (RCGA) affiliated student board, made up of a number of current students across a range of disciplines. RSAB meets weekly to discuss programming, outreach ideas, and the student-led global affairs conference competition. Among its functions, the Board aims to spread information about Rohatyn Center’s various events among students, while garnering interest for international and global events. The Board serves as the connecting point between the student body and RCGA—students should feel encouraged to reach out to RSAB to share ideas for international events, speakers, and co-sponsoring with other student organizations.

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We are pleased to introduce the inaugural edition of the “Global Reader,” the Rohatyn Student Advisory Board’s undergraduate journal. Our mission aligns with that of the Rohatyn Center, which is to advance an interdisciplinary understanding of pressing and historical global issues and questions. We hope that by engaging with the ideas and arguments presented in this journal, readers will come away with a deeper understanding of the forces, processes, and institutions that shape our world.

Middlebury students conduct rigorous research and write high-quality papers in their courses; however, we noticed there was no platform to showcase students’ written work. We felt it was necessary to fill this gap, and provide an opportunity for students to publish their scholarly work. Therefore, we decided to launch the “Global Reader.” Earlier this semester, we issued a call for submissions and received a number of incisive papers. We chose submissions that cover various regions of the world and examine the local, from the education for Turkish immigrants in Germany, to the global, such as human trafficking and globalization. Our theme is intentionally broad—spatially and temporally—to reflect both the vast and varied interests of Middlebury students. We hope this journal demonstrates the complexity of pursuing scholarship on global topics.

We were impressed and inspired by the breadth of submissions and hope to see more in the coming years. Moving forward, we plan to make the “Global Reader” an annual publication, and welcome all students to submit their work.

We hope you enjoy the first edition of the “Global Reader.”

Rohatyn Student Advisory Board

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Hearts and Hands: Africans’ Perceptions of the U.S. Peace Corps since 1961

by Kyler Blodgett, Class of 2017

Abstract:
The United States Peace Corps offers a unique perspective on the debate about aid effectiveness and accountability in the second half of the 20th century. Some laud the program as human diplomacy at its best, and others scorn it as a naïve symptom of American exceptionalism. Regardless, Peace Corps is a symbolically important part of American presence in the developing world and the African continent in particular, which has drawn 45 percent of cumulative volunteers. After presenting the domestic and international roots of the agency in the 1960s, this article examines how African leaders and communities have viewed the Peace Corps over time. Paradoxically, these sources indicate that many African partners may have appreciated volunteers more when they had less technical skills. In doing so, this research contributes to the body of knowledge studying American assistance from host countries’ perspectives.
Introduction

Since the 1970s, American development efforts on the African continent have come under attack. Aid as a concept has been called neo-imperialist and paternalistic, with clunky bureaucracies whirling along more to keep themselves in a job than to be held accountable by their beneficiaries (Moyo 54). Large multi-national projects have been accused of fueling government corruption and asset flight to private bank accounts in rich countries, and small-scale volunteerism has been called culturally-uninformed and a wasteful use of funds (Moyo 48; Vodopivec and Jaffe 112-13). All of these critiques have merit and numerous examples to support them. Each item on this list points to the reality that good intentions are not enough to improve the quality of life for underserved communities worldwide.

Perhaps the most important American symbol in this debate about paternalistic and wrong-headed efforts to help the world’s poor has been the Peace Corps. The Peace Corps’s stated mission is to promote world peace and friendship in three ways: (a) “to help the people of interested countries in meeting their need for trained men and women; (b) to help promote a better understanding of Americans on the part of the peoples served; and (c) to help promote a better understanding of other peoples on the part of Americans” (Peace Corps 2016). The agency places American volunteers in 27-month service postings in low-income countries around the world. Three months of in-country language, cultural, and technical training are followed by two years of direct service work in one of six domains: education, health, community economic development, agriculture, environment, and youth in development. Unlike many other development efforts, Peace Corps volunteers (PCVs) live in their communities of service, often in host families, and are paired with a local counterpart to facilitate their work and daily living.

After an impromptu promise on the campaign trail by John F. Kennedy in 1960, the nascent Peace Corps sent its first recruits to Ghana and Tanganyika (now Tanzania) a year later. Since that date, 45 percent of the 220,000 PCVs have worked on the African continent, making it the largest continental PCV destination for over 55 years (Peace Corps 2016). An eye-popping 47 African states have hosted volunteers at some point (Peace Corps 2010). Even so, only two African states, Cameroon and Ghana, have hosted volunteers uninterruptedly since the program’s inception (Peace Corps 2010). In proportion to its relatively miniscule financial size compared with other American foreign affairs departments, Peace Corps has aroused immense ire and respect from both liberals and conservatives over its lifetime. Critiques of American aid to Africa have focused on program design and success markers defined by donors rather than recipients, and on American paternalistic attitudes foisted upon African communities. The Peace Corps is ripe land to examine these claims.

The primary focus of this paper is how African host countries’ reactions to Peace Corps have changed over time. The scant literature on Peace Corps from non-American perspectives undercuts drawing from an appropriately diverse body of sources, and this research seeks to amplify African reactions to Peace Corps whenever possible. After summarizing American motivations for the founding of Peace Corps, this article argues that real need for human capacity in host nations accounted for Peace Corps’ success in Africa in the 1960s, even though PCVs were less qualified for their jobs than later volunteers. Host countries’ expressed needs changed importantly after the early 1970s, and even though PCVs were more skilled during this period, African leaders and
communities paradoxically appreciated later PCVs largely as symbols of human solidarity, rather than for their utility in development efforts.

**Political and Popular Roots in America**

According to scholar Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, who has published arguably the most detailed and even-handed account of Peace Corps organizational history through 1998, the Peace Corps at its founding was a quintessential product of the American sixties. Partly, the impetus was political. The incoming Kennedy administration wanted to counterbalance the heavy-handed and violent policies of the Vietnam War, which were provoking increasing popular backlash. As Cobbs Hoffman quips, “power begets pretensions to altruism” (5), and the US government felt the need to project an international image of America as more than a war machine. To mobilize electoral support, especially from a generation of college students among whom anti-war sentiment was particularly strong, Kennedy accurately predicted that Peace Corps could generate a positive national rallying point (Cobbs Hoffman 114). Peace Corps shone with the message that American values, grit, democracy, compassion, and energy were still fundamentally good, and that they could change the world for the better. Kennedy’s influence as a domestic and international figure of universalism, solidarity, and youthful potential of a post-WWII world did much to garner support for the Peace Corps (Cobbs Hoffman 10). Especially in a Cold War context that pit such values against the Soviet ones baked into nationalist propaganda, Peace Corps mobilized these values as an international containment strategy that did not involve guns and bombs.

But if Peace Corps gave young Americans—the average Peace Corps volunteer in the 1960s was in their early 20s—an outlet to express what they liked best about American culture, it also allowed applicants to defy the least desirable elements of being American on the international stage in the 1960s (Rice 40). Foremost in the minds of the overwhelmingly white PCV force was a desire to showcase that many Americans were not racist. Cobbs Hoffman notes that the messy process of desegregation and internationally known Jim Crow laws had been broadcast across the world for several years, and young Americans wanted to change the tone (28-29). Additionally, the American post-war economic boom of the 1950s had changed the physicality of the American job market, as jobs moved away from manual labor and into office desk chairs. Many recent male college graduates—the largest demographic of PCVs until the 1970s—felt increasingly emasculated and sought to reconnect the “American” identity with rugged work (Cobbs Hoffman 23). Some scholars even argue that Peace Corps began partly as a revival of Catholic mission work from the colonial era under a severely secular mandate (Allen 2015). In all likelihood, these trends converged in the 1960s and the first group of PCVs left three months after Kennedy entered the Oval office.

In the early years, what did these political and social motivations mean for the organizational culture of Peace Corps? And, how did these factors shape the interactions between PCVs and host country officials? Embodying the hippie spirit of the 1960s, Sargent Shriver, the first Peace Corps director through 1966, made agency self-criticism and a non-hierarchical structure top agency priorities (Cobbs Hoffman 55). This aversion to over-planning translated into an ad hoc manner of creating posts, under the assumption that American grit and adaptability—traits the
Peace Corps was itching to show off—would allow volunteers to create their own job description (Cobbs Hoffman 59). However, this work culture affected Peace Corps’ Latin American posts more, as the ubiquitous “B.A. Generalist” applicant was often slotted into vague Community Development positions across the continent. Contrarily, 80 percent of PCV jobs in Africa through the 1980s—equating to roughly 25,000 volunteers—were in educational jobs (Rice 30).

**Entry Point into Africa: An Enthusiastic Ghana**

Like many African governments in the years just after decolonization, Kwame Nkrumah’s administration in Ghana had big plans and scarce means to realize them. The primary focus of the newly departed British colonial system had been producing farmers and miners to extract Ghana’s natural wealth (Cobbs Hoffman 150). Indeed, Africanist Jeffrey Herbst notes that every aspect of the colonial regime, and especially the focus on developing urban sites at the expense of rural ones, prioritized extraction over social welfare (17). After independence, the handful of skilled Ghanaian workers flocked to higher-paying urban jobs, accentuating the absence of public servants, especially teachers, in rural areas. However, in an effort to solidify the sentiment of shared Ghanaian nationalism, Nkrumah had publically guaranteed free and compulsory education beginning in 1962 (Cobbs Hoffman 149). The Peace Corps’ well-timed offer promised to fill the hole: young, educated Americans willing to work in hardship posts and train the new generation of Ghanaian youth. Nkrumah himself had studied in America for his bachelor’s and doctoral degree, and had been very impressed by the progressive values of American education (149). Even so, Nkrumah recognized his bargaining position of power. As the first independent African nation, Ghana provided other newly independent nations with a role model for interacting with the global North. Nkrumah’s approval of the Peace Corps during Sargent Shriver’s country visit in 1961 facilitated similarly positive meetings with Nyerere of Tanganyika and the Nigerian Prime Minister, both of whom welcomed PCVs within a year (Cobbs Hoffman 151)

Still, Nkrumah was suspicious about the PCVs’ possible link to the CIA and took steps to limit volunteers’ influence of young Ghanaians’ worldviews. Cameroonian Peace Corps scholar Amin explains that teachers were restricted to teaching Math and English, seen the two most practical skills in a newly independent Ghana, and steered away from social sciences (“The Perils of Missionary Diplomacy” 40). Nkrumah also welcomed 100 Soviet teaching volunteers in 1962 as a signal to American volunteers that they were not irreplaceable (Cobbs Hoffman 160). These restrictions persisted until a coup toppled Nkrumah’s government in 1966, and subsequent Ghanaian leaders expanded the PCV role. Even throughout the Nkrumah years, however, local education officials recognized that need for qualified teachers in Nkrumah’s restricted subjects was still great, and pulled strings to keep volunteers teaching in these key disciplines (162).

In Sierra Leone as well, host country nationals greatly appreciated early PCVs for their services despite a low level of volunteer skills and experience relative to volunteers who would come later. A 1984 Education Sector evaluation reveals a dearth of secondary school Sierra Leonian teachers, especially in Math and English (Landrum 15). The president at the time echoed Nkrumah’s desire for “American methods of instruction” and the first education volunteers arrived in 1962 (Landrum 14). Like other African countries of the time, PCVs had incredible influence on
young students since there were so few secondary schools in the decade following independence. In the late 1960s, for example, PCVs accounted for an amazing 20 percent of secondary school teachers in Sierra Leone (Landrum 17). Local partners, including school headmasters and Sierra Leonean program directors, praised volunteers’ impact on the country’s attitude towards educational success (Landrum 21).

A key reason for Peace Corps’ warm welcome in the 1960s was the sheer scale of state-building that fledgling African governments were up against. Frontani and Taylor observe that volunteers—somewhat regardless of skill level—were especially useful in the early years when African governments had weak educational systems, and then intermittently as countries experienced shocks that caused a flight of skilled workers (90). Frontani and Taylor also examine this “flight” effect in the case of teachers and other basic service providers leaving Ghana during the 1970s in reaction to dangerous political instability and corruption—between 1966 and 1979, Ghana underwent eight changes of heads of state. In such an environment that discourages job security for teachers and other workers, Peace Corps Volunteers could play an important role even without specialized skills.

It is worth noting that not all countries accepted PCVs with urgent social service needs, especially in schools, as a top rationale. Amin observes that in Cameroon, President Ahmadou Ahidjo sought out US intervention to mitigate the power of former French colonial power in the weak new state (“Serving in Africa” 73). That help arrived in the form of PCVs in 1962, and presented the French in Cameroon and much of francophone Africa with a serious challenge. As Pierre-Michel Durand states, “Fondamentalement, et par idéologie, le Peace Corps se veut à l’opposé de l’ancienne relation colonial. En Afrique francophone, il entend donc s’opposer en tout aux Français (97).” Durand goes on to claim that American enthusiasm to work in the bush provided a stark and attractive contrast to contemporary French technical assistance (95). It is clear that even though volunteers came with more good intentions than technical skills in the 1960s, African leaders saw them as important elements in state-building, especially in rural areas where public service provision was difficult. As the urgency of these social service needs—and especially the reliance on outsiders in building an educated African populace—waned as countries matured through the 1970s and 1980s, Peace Corps did its best to respond to the changing demands for volunteers.

The 1970s and Beyond: The Best Skill Volunteers Brought were their Attitudes

From both the American and African perspectives, the 1970s can best be described as pragmatic. In America, anti-Vietnam War voices within Peace Corps had reached a peak in the late 1960s, and Nixon’s inauguration in 1969 ushered in an era of weeding out hotheaded radicals from the organization’s ranks. After a very public and embarrassing anti-war takeover of the Peace Corps building in 1969 by vocal staff members and returned volunteers, Nixon wanted to reduce the organization’s budget so that it would effectively cease to exist (Cobbs Hoffman 230). Since the political landscape changed in 1969, the Peace Corps director, Joseph Blatchford, became crafty and desperate; he appealed to Congressional Republicans by responding to their critiques that the Peace Corps

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1 Author’s translation: “Fundamentally, and ideologically, Peace Corps went in opposition to the former colonial regime. In francophone Africa, it therefore opposed all French influence.”
was primarily for young liberals who lacked real job skills. Blatchford campaigned to attract older volunteers with several years of professional experience. Figure 1 shows that between 1969 and 1985, average PCV age rose from 24 to 29 (Rice 12). This demographic shift to volunteers who applied based on skill over ideology was caused mostly by the simple goal of keeping the organization alive. After the 1974 Watergate scandal ushered in a new presidential administration, constraints on Peace Corps’ operating budget decreased, which renewed the agency’s sense of financial normalcy. However, the shift did set the tone for a new, better-qualified mold of PCV in a project that Blatchford boldly entitled “New Directions” in the early 1970s (Cobbs Hoffman 225).

The 1970s also brought important changes on the African side of Peace Corps affairs. Numbers told one side of the story, and it was an impressive one: by 1985, 25,000 PCVs had worked in education, 4,000 in agriculture and food, and 4,000 in health, contributing over 64,000 work hours in 30 African countries (Rice 30). However, as a decade of educational programs—thanks in part to Peace Corps—began to pay off, countries found in the mid-to-late 1970s that they had a surplus of workers and not enough jobs to employ them (Cobbs Hoffman 247). In studying the Peace Corps in Cameroon in this era, Amin notes that such changes did not go unnoticed by average Cameroonians. “Increasingly, [Cameroonians] questioned why their government paid thousands of dollars to bring in ‘unqualified’ Americans to serve when thousands of Cameroonian university graduates languished in unemployment” (Amin, “Serving in Africa” 83). It is true that around this time, most host countries had some “skin in the game” by committing to pay 15 percent of Peace Corps’ in-country operating costs (Rice 5). In the midst of their own demographic changes, how then did African governments view Peace Corps New Directions initiative to send more skilled volunteers?

Somewhat paradoxically, many African leaders and communities shrugged at newly skilled volunteers, and instead focused their appreciation of PCVs on the humanistic goodwill they displayed. Part of the reason was that in many cases, New Directions did not trickle down to creating more skilled positions. In a 1975 report on Peace Corps’ operations in West Africa, a few years after Peace Corps adopted New Directions as official policy, Chester and Sullivan concluded that “the New Directions concept is essentially inoperative in West Africa” (6). In their reckoning, life in the region was so tenuous as to depend on “the barest essentials needed for survival,” and in such resource-scarce circumstances the marginal benefit of a highly-skilled volunteer was not...
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much greater than that of semi-skilled one (Chester and Sullivan 6-7). Though this problematic statement diminishes African lives to a brutal subsistence existence, it does point to the fact that as “technical” volunteers brought somewhat incongruous skills into unfamiliar cultural and material environments, these skills may have taken on a secondary importance to simple PCV presence in their hosts’ eyes.

Julius Amin echoes the claim that a more skilled volunteer did not always translate into a better volunteer, writing about the PCV experience in Cameroon in the late 1990s. He congratulates volunteers for their openness to making friends, but laments volunteer efforts in both agroforestry and small-business development due to poor technical and cultural training about the way these sectors function in Cameroon (“Serving in Africa” 74). Amin also blames volunteers with more technical skills for being more easily frustrated when things did not work as they should, indicating that a higher level of volunteer specialization may make them less apt at accepting the bumps in the PCV road (79-80). It makes increasing sense why skilled volunteers may not have provided the programmatic clout that the New Directions program intended, making their main perceived impact one of symbolic solidarity rather than technical progress.

Nevertheless, African leaders continued to commend Peace Corps simply for their presence. In letters to the Peace Corps main office, excerpted in Gerard Rice’s book The Peace Corps in the 80s, African national leaders waxed poetic about the symbolic importance of Peace Corps’ work. President Stevens of Sierra Leone commended PCVs for the value of working in underserved areas (Rice 62). Nigerien President Kountché thanked them for embodying the value of persevering through difficult tasks, a sentiment echoed in a letter by a village association in Mauritania (64-65). The President of the Cameroonian National Assembly expressed gratitude to PCVs for turning a national spotlight on poor rural communities, and compliments them on their friendliness toward villagers (64). In comparison, very few words are said about material progress or volunteers’ technical skills, even after more than a decade of the New Directions recruits. Letter content is admittedly biased to please the Peace Corps recipients, but it is nevertheless telling that African leaders put so much emphasis on volunteer mindset and personality instead of utility. Roger Landrum, former Peace Corps/Nigeria volunteer and then-director of development consulting, stated that Peace Corps’ largest success in the 1980s was that it helped foster “respect, understanding, and affection between Americans and Africans” (Rice 30).

African leaders maintained this rhetoric because strong ties to Peace Corps could still be useful in bust times. For example, droughts and accompanying famines struck many African countries through the 1970s and early 1980s. Televised images of famine victims shocked viewers in America, leading to broad support for the Peace Corps’ African Food Systems Initiative in 1985 (Rice 15). Not only did the Initiative attempt to recruit and deploy more PCVs with agricultural-specific skills to communities in small teams, but also to engage in policy discussions with African governments to stop artificially depressing food prices to keep urban political constituencies happy—hence the emphasis on the “system.” The program was a success, as a proposal was presented to Congress in 1987 to expand the program’s budget in Mali, Niger, Zaire, and Lesotho (Chambers 1). In this way, African governments appreciated that Peace Corps was a good ally to maintain, especially in times of high need, and one of the easiest ways to nurture the connection was to consistently praise volunteers for their soft skills.
An Unclear Future for The Peace Corps and Africa

The 2016 report to Congress titled “The Peace Corps: Current Issues” highlights some facets of agency history that continue to be debated today, as well as new ones that make the future relations with African countries less clear. The report suggests that Peace Corps has accepted the fact that the vast majority of volunteers are generalists, and looks to increase in-country cultural and technical training time (Tarnoff 3). Yet the Peace Corps is certainly not giving up on volunteers with highly technical training, especially when deployed to address specific emergency needs. Since 2003, the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) has used Peace Corps volunteers as implementers of local small AIDS projects, given their intimate community knowledge (“President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief” 2016). In 2012, the Global Health Service Partnership began sending PCVs with specific skills as physicians or nurses to create solutions to systemic healthcare problems, with a particular focus on AIDS, in a model very reminiscent of the African Food Systems Initiative of the 1980s (“Global Health Service Partnership” 2016). However, recent developments make Peace Corps’ future somewhat unclear. A drastic shortening of the application process, combined with increased volunteer ability to choose country and sector of service, increased 2015’s application round to the highest number since 1975 (Tarnoff 8). At the same time, the report highlights increasing agency sensitivity to volunteer safety in areas of political insecurity and terrorism. Since 2010, volunteers have been evacuated from Mali, Niger, and Kenya for these reasons, and from Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone because of the 2014 Ebola outbreak (14). How the agency and its hosts manage the first major application surplus in decades with increased risk in many volunteer zones in Africa will dominate policy decisions about Peace Corps’ role in the region for years to come.

Conclusion

This analysis has attempted to shed light on the evolving dynamic between Peace Corps and its African hosts since 1961. It has argued somewhat of a historical paradox: at the time that PCVs were the least skilled, they were most appreciated for that modicum of skill given the height of African need, especially in the education sector, following independence. The paradox reversed itself but continued in later decades: despite Peace Corps efforts to send more skilled volunteers, later volunteers were more appreciated for symbolic goodwill than for their expertise, with a few notable exceptions of skilled PCV groups in crisis periods. PCVs have therefore shone most brightly to their hosts as moderately-skilled manpower in times of high need, rather than as effective technical agents in the slow church of development work.

More broadly, this study has sought to better understand how Africans—both leaders and community partners—have valued different parts of what PCVs have tried to offer over the years. In doing so, it modestly hopes to bring more African voices into a narrative that has been overwhelmingly driven by those of volunteers and American administrators. Much more research remains to be done on how African countries view the link between Peace Corps, and other community-level aid programs, and access to larger benefits of bilateral relations with the United States.
One entry point into this field would be an attempt to explain the variation in host countries’ requests for volunteers. Such a study would get at the heart of how African policy makers have defined their own national needs and how they have viewed American aid, specifically Peace Corps, as a tool in addressing those needs at different points in history. In the meantime, Peace Corps has a somewhat unique place as a foreign aid program that enjoys strong support at the community level in host countries, and can set an example for other aid programs by making space for non-American narratives in their organizational story.
Works Cited


Economics and Education of German Turks: The Story of a Lost Generation

by Hannah Pustejovsky, Class of 2018

Abstract:

What are the factors that explain the current economic shortcomings of second-generation Turkish immigrants in Germany? This paper will analyze the relationship between economic decline and Turkish immigrant incorporation and performance in the school system. Through a comparison of educational progress of immigrants in school systems across Europe, connections will be drawn between inherent racism and lower educational and economic performance of second-generation Turkish students. Placed at a disadvantage when entering the job force, many students face no option of upward mobility and structural obstacles that prevent comparable economic gains seen in their German peers. This paper will thus seek to examine the pressures of German ethnic homogeneity and institutional bias towards foreign students and parents to understand their regulation to second-class citizens, both economically and socially. Finally, this paper will also call into question the future of Turkish integration, especially in relation to the global refugee crises.
Introduction

In 2007, Aylin Selçuk, an 18 year old German Turkish student, founded the *DeuKische Generation* (German-Turkish Generation), a group that aims to better integrate second generation Turkish students living in Berlin (DeuKische). Selçuk identified a growing problem in Germany: the alienation and poor integration of the children of Germany’s guest workers. The divide between foreign and native stretches beyond the school systems; in fact, in recent years Turks have experienced a decline in economic ability that further exacerbates their outsider status. The children of immigrants are increasingly failing to achieve the same standard of living that their native counterparts reach, and are often seen as unqualified and incompetent. More importantly, there have been great increases in the number of Turkish youth who are considered unsuitable or “under-qualified” for German jobs, specifically from 44 percent to 57 percent between 2001 and 2006 (Popp et al.).

What are the factors that explain the current economic shortcomings of second-generation Turkish immigrants in Germany? In 2000, 28 percent of the foreign population in Germany was of Turkish origin, and today, Germany is home to more than 2.5 million peoples of Turkish background, with the number steadily increasing (Klopp 41). To understand the decline of economic opportunity, it is important to consider Germany’s historical relationship with immigrants, and furthermore, the role that the German education system has played in hindering economic mobility. This paper will analyze the relationship between the current economic decline and Turkish immigrant incorporation and performance in the school system.

Germany and Immigration

It would be impossible to discuss the position of immigrants in Germany without highlighting the strong ethnic homogeneity that has persisted throughout German history. As Wolfgang Schäuble, a German CDU politician mentioned in 1979, “we [Germany]—one of the old states of old Europe—are classical nation-states. We create our identity not from the belief in an idea, rather from the membership in/to a particular people [Volk]” (Klopp 33). As a result, until recently, Germany refused to identify as a country of immigration, preferring instead to rely on policies that encouraged repatriation and discouraged integration by creating a stark divide between ethnic Germans and foreigners. Germany has a history of governmentally enforced ethnic homogeneity that strove to keep German society an intact, definable entity, even throughout times of guest-worker programs. Germany’s first real encounter with immigration was in 1871, after German unification created a pull for Polish foreign laborers. Words such as *Polonisierung* (Polonization) and *Überfremdung* (being overrun with foreigners) became popularized, the latter of which is still utilized in German right-wing rhetoric today (Klopp 35).

The time between the 1950s and 1960s was known as the *Wirtschaftswunder*, a time of immense economic expansion. The economy experienced a productivity increase of 6.7 percent each year, and national unemployment was below one percent (Klopp 39). During this time period, Germany increasingly invited foreign workers to Germany through *gast arbeiter* programs. Germany recruited labor from all across Europe, but soon turned to North Africa and Turkey to
fulfill the labor demand of the country. Immigration during this time period can be categorized under the segmented labor theory: a market composed of a multitude of groups that had little interaction with each other. Douglas Massey uses this theory to highlight the strength of labor markets as a pull factor, as Germany struggled to create a market where Germans felt free to cross into new segments, creating the need for foreign labor (Massey 37). The quickly growing Turkish population seeking work led to Germany’s eventual status as “Turkey’s 68th Province” (Lucassen 146). These impressive increases in immigrants caused a general consensus that foreign labor was not only a necessity, but also a new normal for Germany. However, the oil crisis in 1973, caused by the OPEC oil embargo, led the German government to cease labor importation and revert to a policy of repatriation. However, as Otto Ily, the former German Federal Minister of the Interior pointed out, “they [Germany] wanted workers, but what they got were human beings who came with their families, their customs, and their culture” (Bucerius 19). Later in 1978, for the first time, the German government officially recognized the need for government sponsored immigrant integration, through the creation of a position of a federal commissioner to oversee said processes (Bundesregierung 1).

Unfortunately, this position has been largely symbolic, and in 1991, one commissioner, Liselotte Funcke, resigned, stating she “felt that the efforts of her office toward integration of ‘foreign fellow citizens’ were not supported” (Klopp 46). Then, on January 1st, 2005, Germany instated a new Immigration Act, which called for 630 hours of courses, 600 of which were German language instruction and 30 of which were German orientation classes (Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection). However, this act focused on the challenges facing new immigrants, and did nothing to aid the “foreigners” of the second generation. Thus, much of German history is characterized by a pattern of ignoring the “immigrant problem,” followed by programs aimed at the most visible group, but without much aid aimed at the children of these immigrants.

The Economics of Turkish Immigrants

In this graph,¹ published in the report on the Labor Market Integration of Immigrants in Germany by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the recent decline of economic opportunity is apparent. After 2001, Turkish nationals experienced a sharp decline in employment in comparison to German nationals (Liebig 22). Turkish nationals experienced roadblocks at every turn and were denied easy access to citizenship through the strict laws and codes. Faced with poor mobility and low access to education, it is not surprising that they lag behind their

¹ See end of paper for original graph.
German counterparts. In fact, data shows just how dire this situation is becoming. For example, in 1993, approximately 82,000 male immigrants were able to secure a place in a vocational training position; in 2002, only 48,000 found positions (Bucerius 32). Immigrants also face much higher rates of unemployment, with 20.5 percent of immigrants unemployed in 2004, as opposed to the national rate of 9 percent (Bucerius 33).

Generally when discussing the mobility and opportunities of immigrants in the labor market, social scientists and economists refer to the three-tiered concept of mobility, or the idea of immigrants being able to move up in three generations, from “peddler, to plumber, to professional” (Lessard-Phillips et al 2012: 166). Research shows that second generation Turks actually have more upward mobility in comparison to their parents than their native counterparts; however, Lessard-Phillips et al. suggests this data relies on the significantly lower starting point of first generation Turks than native German citizens (Lessard-Phillips 199).

The Education of Turkish Immigrants

What explains the widening gap between Turkish immigrants and their native counterparts? As T.H. Marshall says, “the education of children has a direct bearing on citizenship, and, when the state guarantees that all children shall be educated, it has the requirements and the nature of citizenship definitely in mind” (Klopp 103). Much of German immigration and incorporation policy is based around the idea that foreigners will eventually go home, thus, the historical German approach to such policy placed more emphasis on encouraging immigrants to form little or no ties to the German state. Consequently, Turkish-Germans are raised and educated in a culture that denies their German roots, which undermines their ability to plan for a future in Germany.

In Germany, children begin their compulsory schooling with primary school, or Grundschule, which comprises grades one through four. Germany eventually splits pupils into 15 different school systems based on a stratification method, which places students into the appropriate education sector. The three most common tracks are as follows: Hauptschule, (lower secondary school) which consists of grades five through nine, and provides opportunities for vocational training post ninth grade; Realschule, (intermediate secondary school) which covers grades five to ten, and provides qualifications for more technical schools; and Gymnasium (academic secondary school) which provides schooling grades five through twelve and sometimes thirteen, with a focus on preparation towards university. Vocational tracking educational systems are crucial to German-speaking countries. In 2005, 61 percent of students in Germany were enrolled in such a program, highlighting its importance (Crul et al. 109).

One of the most comprehensive studies on second-generation immigrants in Europe is the Integration of the European Second Generation project (TIES)\(^2\), edited by Maurice Crul et al. through seven years of research by thirty-five different researchers across eight countries. By examining integration of these groups into the educational, social, and economic systems of European countries, the TIES project made wide-ranging observations regarding the position of second-generation immigrants. In Germany, the project found that in Berlin, the majority of Turkish

\(^{2}\) The International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion in Europe Research Network (IMISCOE) carried out the TIES project. IMISCOE was originally sponsored by the European Commission, and is now a self-funded endeavor that aims to analyze European policymaking.
second-generation immigrants, 50.2 percent, achieved some sort of post secondary education, such as middle vocational education or apprenticeships, and in Frankfurt, the percentage was even higher, at 59.5 percent of immigrants (Crul et al. Table 5.2a, 111). However, the study also highlighted how children are less likely to surpass their parents’ education levels, due to many factors such as parental inability to assist children with homework, familial expectations, and integration barriers. For example, 35.7 percent of second-generation Turkish immigrants in Berlin whose parents have achieved only the most basic educational qualifications will also terminate their own school careers early. Furthermore, only 5.3 percent of Turkish children with poorly-educated parents will reach higher education in Berlin. As a result, the TIES study concluded that Turkish children experience low educational mobility in Germany, a mirror of the complicated economic mobility described above (Crul et al. 123 and 126). Education is clearly a key element in determining the situation and subsequent integration of second-generation immigrants.

Furthermore, children experience a “multiplier effect,” where the second generation experiences the same difficulties that their parents faced, but at “exponentially higher rates” (Crul et al. 126). This multiplier effect is one of the main causes for the economic hardships that Turks face in the labor market today. Challenged with a lack of access to higher education, and poor opportunities through lower education, many feel trapped. Especially when one out of every three Turkish students fails to acquire an apprenticeship after Hauptschule, it seems clear that even the route of expecting immigrants to be able to succeed in low paying jobs has not been entirely possible, as Turkish immigrants are less likely to be hired (Crul et al. 140). Furthermore, lower vocational pupils are 25 times more likely to become early school leavers than pupils following an academic track (Crul et al. 138). Unfortunately, the motivations for leaving school early often fall along gendered lines, with young girls increasingly leaving school to assist in housework.

Finally, the TIES study concluded that those second-generation Turkish immigrants in Germany face low educational mobility, a strenuous transition between schooling and apprenticeships, and a generally unfavorable school integration context (Crul et al. 151).

**Ensuing Factors**

As seen above, second generation Turkish immigrants currently struggle with growing economic instability and a long history of educational insufficiency, but what do the two factors have to do with each other? In the article *Assessing the Labor Market Position*, Lessard-Phillips et al. highlight how “employed second-generation youth experience difficulties in obtaining adequate returns on their educational investment” (Lessard-Phillips 205). This raises the question of the worth of such an educational investment, especially in the light of data from a study made by the OECD that compared student progress and performance globally. The study found that immigrant students who spend their entire school career in Germany fall far behind those immigrants who only receive part of their education in a German school (Bucerius 30). Thus, it can be concluded that the environment in German schools is a direct hindrance for Turkish immigrants on their subsequent progress. This is perhaps in part, due to the rising xenophobia in Germany that causes many Turks to feel alienated from their German communities.

3 Sixty percent of young girls who left school early were recorded as homemakers in either theirs or a parent’s household (Crul et al 2012: 143).
A study by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in 2010 found that more than 30 percent of German citizens harbored negative sentiments regarding the presence of immigrants in the country and a further 35 percent supported the idea that immigrants caused a deficit in the welfare system (Bucerius 27). As Joseph Carens points out in his book *The Ethics of Immigration*, sense of self is highly dependent on the perceptions of others. If fellow teachers, students, and community members feel adversely towards Turkish students, and later job seekers, it is no surprise that Turks continue to face many challenges (Carens 23). Other statistics, such as the Migrant Integration Policy Index II (MIPEX II), an index that looks at immigration integration policies across European countries, highlight further cultural disparities within Europe. More specifically, the MIPEX-D looks at the extent of discrimination in the labor market, and with a relatively low score of 50, Germany faces a high prevalence of discrimination and the lack of opportunities for immigrants (Lessard-Phillips 169).

Furthermore, a recent study in Britain of students from low-income families, *The Educational Binds of Poverty*, found that pupils from poorer families were more likely to be ignored by teachers (Brown 24). Consequently, overlooked and ostracized by teachers, Turkish students have little chance to achieve the same education as their German counterparts, despite apparently the same access to education. Moreover, even if second-generation Turks later succeed in finding jobs, “their frequent channeling into the low-skilled labor positions can be regarded as a key indicator of the labor market segmentation” (Lessard-Phillips 205). While the vocational track intends to provide easy access to jobs post education, many second-generation immigrants become trapped in a cycle of low-paying jobs as a result of being tracked away from higher education. In fact, the severe tracking experienced by many Turkish Germans could be considered “ethnically specific access to job training,” which thereby regulated immigrants to a particular sector of the economy (Lucassen 163).

**Conclusion**

In a report from 2011 by the Prognos Research Institute, predictions warned that Germany would be short more than 3 million workers by 2016 (Popp et al.). However, the Prognos Research Institute had no way of predicting the current refugee crisis, putting their current numbers into question. Nonetheless, if Germany cannot succeed at integrating and catering to their already existing immigrant population, it does not bode well for a unified future. Furthermore, with many employers reluctant to employ already existing Turkish immigrants due to their apparent “unskilled” nature, the country seems at a loss. In fact, in calculations done by the Cologne Institute for Economic Research, research shows that an 18 year old immigrant who enters the workforce through vocational training could provide the government with €4000 annually through taxes and other social contributions (Popp et al.). Thus, if employers were to tap into the potential capital posed by second generation immigrants, the economy would receive, as the Cologne Institute suggests, an influx of €66 billion in additional tax benefits by 2050.

The recent economic hardships of German Turks can be linked to an ever-worsening educational background for many second-generation immigrants that consequently place them at a
disadvantage when entering the job market. In 1979, the Federal Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Heinz Kühn, described foreign nationals in the German school system as being characterized by “insufficient school attendance, an extremely low rate of success even in the lower secondary schools, and a considerable under-representation in the higher tracks of secondary education” (Klopp 97). If the current problem is examined through a historical lens, Germany’s pattern of encouraging repatriation has successfully alienated immigrants who dearly need the modern tools of the educational system to achieve economic success. While it seems difficult to change the mindset of an entire country, Germany has slowly been moving towards a concept of Wilkommenskultur, as a direct response to their historical legacy. Many Germans have seen the need for change within their borders, and in July 2000, German President Johannes Rau called for “far-reaching educational reform,” further testimony to a growing problem within German borders (Klopp 98). The split loyalties of second-generation Turkish German immigrants need not be a social hindrance, if both parties worked equally towards integration. However, with little to no inclusion into the German community, Turks will continue to be ostracized in both the economic and educational sectors of German society.

Figure 2b: Employment/population ratios of German nationals, ethnic Germans, Turkish nationals, foreigners and foreign-born, women

Source: European Community Labour Force Survey.
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The Internet, Liberalization, and Democratization: A Case Study on China

by Liam Knox, Class of 2017

Abstract:

It is apparent that the Internet has had a deep and continually evolving impact on political development worldwide since its widespread adoption. The exact nature of this impact is elusive; scholars face a major challenge in pinning down conclusions about an extraordinarily dynamic technology with few relevant historical precedents. A particularly contentious topic of discussion surrounds the effects of the Internet on liberalization and democratization. This study examines these effects through the lens of China, a country with both widespread Internet adoption and an exceptionally Internet-restrictive regime. Internet channels for communication, reporting, networking, and protest are having clear liberalizing effects in China despite extensive regime controls, indicating that the Internet as a technology carries inherently liberalizing features, although its impact on actual democratization remains murky.
Introduction

The use of the Internet for communication and discovery of information has revolutionized many, if not most, systems of human interaction. Political interaction is no exception—it is commonly accepted that the Internet has had and will continue to have profound effects on politics both domestic and global. Recent high-profile examples of Internet use in politics, such as in protestor efforts during the Arab Spring and more recently in ISIS recruitment efforts, have naturally fueled this discussion. However, there has been little consensus and few concrete conclusions regarding the exact impact of the Internet on political interaction and development. There are a number of significant challenges associated with studying the Internet and politics. First, although the category of “Internet technology” is quite coherent and delineable from other forms of communication, it is also an incredibly broad category. In the sub-category of social media alone, there are 21 distinct platforms in the world with at least 100 million active users as of April 2016 (Clark). Given the sheer breadth of the technology, it is tough to make overarching arguments about the Internet’s effects on politics. Second, the state and scope of Internet technology is constantly changing. A study on the specific effects of Twitter on public opinion in a given election would be of limited use if Twitter became supplanted by a new, unforeseen medium, as can happen frequently and suddenly in the Internet marketplace. Finally, and perhaps most frustratingly, it can be quite difficult to isolate the specific effects of the Internet from other potential causes for political outcomes.

These difficulties have not dissuaded political scientists and other commentators from attempting to paint the picture of the Internet’s interplay with politics in broad strokes, especially with regard to its effects on freedom and democratization. Given that freedom of expression, reliable access to relevant information, and open communication are commonly regarded as critical for functional democracies and helpful for developing ones, and the Internet seemingly offers advances in these areas, the study of the Internet’s effects on democratization in particular has been a burgeoning area of interest for scholars. However, it is not immediately clear whether these perceived opportunities are inherent features of the Internet, and whether or not they are actually effective in fostering democratization. Arguments in this area generally can be characterized on a continuum ranging from skeptical to optimistic. Cautious critics argue that authoritarian regimes tend to have strong abilities to disrupt any liberalizing effects of the Internet, and in fact can use other Internet tools to advance their own anti-democratic agendas (Deibert 75-77). The more optimistic insist that the Internet has already proved to be valuable in opening political discourse and fighting authoritarian regimes, and will continue to prove a vital and potent tool for democratization within nations around the world (Freedom House). The aim of this paper is to determine if this hope is justified, and to what extent. Ultimately, should we consider the Internet to be beneficial to liberalization and democratization efforts in individual nations, or is its impact negligible?

The Chinese regime’s relationship with the Internet offers an excellent case study to help answer this question. China has both a high rate of Internet adoption for a still-developing country, and an extreme degree of regime control over Internet usage. In other words, the Chinese regime is one that accepts and even encourages widespread Internet usage while also striving to ensure that this usage does not threaten its power. Thus, the success of Internet liberalization in China would provide strong evidence toward the assertion that it could succeed in other nations with developing
Internet adoption, even those with highly suppressive regimes. This paper will cover the key definitions, historical background, and current state of Internet usage in China, using these to compare the Internet’s successes and difficulties in promoting liberalization in the country.

**Definitions**

It will be important to define some key terms before progressing into the background and context of China’s Internet usage. This paper makes frequent references to the citizens of China—in this case, “citizens” is intended to indicate those Chinese people with no active participation in the ruling regime. Those participating in the regime are referred to as “regime actors.” Broadly, “the Internet” refers to any technologies that use Internet connection protocols to communicate. Turning to more political terms, there is an important distinction to be made between the expressions “democratization” and “liberalization,” both of which are critical here. Political scientists Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan offer perhaps the neatest definitions of the terms: “liberalization may entail a mix of policy and social changes, such as less censorship of the media, somewhat greater space for the organization of autonomous working-class activities, the introduction of some legal safeguards for individuals such as *habeas corpus*, the releasing of most political prisoners, the return of exiles, perhaps measures for improving the distribution of income, and most important, the toleration of opposition.” In contrast, “democratization entails liberalization but is a wider and more specifically political concept” which “requires open contestation over the right to win control of the government, and this in turn requires free competitive elections, the results of which determine who governs” (Linz 3). As is clear, liberalization may create a more fertile environment for democratization to take root, but can occur without any actual democratization.

**Background**

Accurate records of China’s aggregate Internet usage date back to 1998, when the regime’s China Internet Network Information Center began publishing biannual reports on Internet penetration within the country. According to the most recent report, published in January 2016, China has 688 million Internet users, up about 39 million from the year before. In percentage terms, this marks the first time China has had a penetration rate of over half of its citizens, at 50.3 percent. Of Internet users, mobile users make up 90 percent, and rural users make up about 28 percent. Over 4 million websites are hosted in China (CNNIC 3-5).

Notably, all methods of Internet access in China are owned by the regime—mostly indirectly, through state-owned companies. Thus, citizens must rent bandwidth from the state in order to access the Internet in any capacity. This access structure allows the Chinese regime to exert practically unbounded influence over how citizens can access the web and which parts they can access (Herold 2). Indeed, after a wave of recent Chinese legislation tightening Internet restrictions, Freedom House has rated China’s Internet Freedom as the least free of any country in the world for the second consecutive year at a score of 88/100. Primary factors for the score include obstacles to access, limits on content, and violations of user rights (Freedom House). These restrictions accord with the Chinese regime’s firm assertion of its own “cyber sovereignty,” an idea emphasizing
the legitimacy of complete government control over the usage of the Internet within its borders (BBC). According to Freedom House, as part of this strategy, the Chinese regime surveils certain users, records user data, blocks access to most of the “Western Internet,” censors information unfavorable to the regime’s goals, and actively suppresses political expression against the regime with severe criminal punishment (Freedom House). Colloquially, third parties often refer to the collective technical aspects of China’s Internet restrictions as “the Great Firewall.” Officially, the Chinese government uses a more polished designation: “the Golden Shield Project” (Rajeck).

Despite its professed commitment to cyber sovereignty, the Chinese regime’s exertion of Internet control is not limited to actions within its borders. According to a 2016 report, about 6 percent of the world’s traffic in DDoS attacks (a common method of disrupting web activities) originates from China (Akamai 11). While it is difficult to trace cyber-attacks directly back to the Chinese regime, the sheer extent of the attacks and their frequent alignment with the goals of the regime lead many experts to strongly suspect Chinese military and intelligence involvement (Freedom House). In fact, a recent study has indicated that Chinese cyber-attacks and information theft have frequently targeted pro-democracy and human rights organizations around the world, causing tangible disruptions to their efforts (Deibert 68-71).

Despite these obstacles, there does exist a fairly developed online community for political expression in China. Much of this community has developed on the practice of microblogging, known as weibo in Mandarin Chinese—making short, informal posts to a publicly viewable personal page. Although there are a number of widely used weibo platforms in China, by far the most popular is Sina Weibo, a privately owned platform often characterized as a hybrid of Facebook and Twitter. Sina Weibo boasted 198 million users as of early 2015, nearly a third of total Internet users in China (Bischoff, “Weibo”). The high level of user penetration on weibo platforms, along with their capacity for quick information transfer, exposure of issues, and public comment, have made them quite influential on public opinion in China. While the Chinese regime can punish those who violate its strict censorship laws after they do so, it is unable to exercise prior review on microblog posts, and thus in certain cases the sheer number of posts critical of the government can overpower its immediate ability to censor. Similarly, due to the huge number of active users and posts on microblogs, the regime is forced to accept posts containing sentiments more liberal than they would perhaps prefer, due to the impracticality of prosecuting so many citizens (Gledhill 64-65).

This all being said, as Freedom House has noted, the Chinese regime’s redoubled crackdown on Internet activities in the past few years has caused a slight decline this year in digital activism and political expression by the country’s Internet users (Freedom House). Whether the Chinese regime will be able to continue this trend, and whether it indicates that Chinese Internet liberalization is fated to wane, are questions that merit further analysis and will be addressed in the following section.

**Online Expression and Protest**

Relative to other spaces for public political expression in China, which are practically non-existent for all but the most elite citizens (Congressional – Executive Committee on China), the Internet is a hotbed of political speech. A commonly cited example here is the effective series of
active protests and blog-style reporting on environmental issues that have occurred in recent years due in large part to Internet furor and support. For instance, Chinese protestors aided by Internet organization efforts, information, and support resources have successfully forced the modification and relocation of state-sponsored chemical manufacturing projects in three major cities since 2007 (Chin-Fu 51-54). In regard to more culturally focused protest, a 2015 study found that Uyghur-language bloggers are increasingly using sarcasm, idioms, and other such coded language to offer real criticisms of the government—a practice that regime actors usually restrict absolutely, especially coming from minority groups in the country (Clothey 870-871). Various advocacy groups also are reported to be using highly tempered public statements and “polyphonic” or multi-messaged language to subtly politicize their issues of choice, as in the case of Love Save Pneumoconiosis, a disease awareness and workers’ rights group that has recently helped to draw considerable attention to China’s high incidence of pneumoconiosis, a disease linked to mining and particulate pollution (Gleisse 525). In forcing government accountability and enacting genuine institutional changes in these cases and others, the Chinese Internet has actually created a form of citizen participation in government, which is certainly a liberalizing effect. In fact, the Chinese government has itself expressed approval of this dynamic in its official policy statement on the Internet, published in 2010: “The Chinese government has actively created conditions for the people to supervise the government, and attaches great importance to the Internet’s role in supervision. Governments at all levels are required to investigate and resolve in a timely manner all problems reported to the government by the public via the Internet, and to inform the public of the results” (SCIO).

Online protest and expression in China still certainly face strong limits. In the same Internet white paper, the Chinese government defends its right to prosecute and censor anyone expressing “illegal information,” a broad designation that essentially equates to any expression that regime actors view as threatening at a given time (SCIO). Recent hardline Internet laws passed in China merely serve to codify a power dynamic that already had existed: Chinese regime actors can interpret national restrictions and punish violators of these restrictions in essentially any way they like (Freedom House). The apparent result of this is that while the Chinese regime tolerates and even encourages some degree of online political expression, direct criticisms are still firmly off-limits. Further, the significance of even those tempered criticisms that slip through the cracks is mitigated thanks to a massive regime-run astroturfing initiative commonly known as the “50 Cent Party,” which encourages low-level regime bureaucrats and others on the state payroll to frequently post pro-government posts and comments online. A 2016 Harvard study concluded that nearly 448 million of these government-sponsored posts appear each year (King 3). Nevertheless, liberalization with severe limits is still liberalization, especially when considering citizens’ distinct lack of alternatives to the Internet for expressing their opinions. The Chinese government’s efforts, while extreme, are not enough to destroy the liberalizing Internet forces in China. Even if these restrictions continue to evolve, it is likely that online activism will merely change shape and persist rather than succumbing—a 2014 examination of the combined history of online activism and Internet controls in China found that above all, the relationship between the two is one of “mutual adaptation,” a sort of energetic arms race rather than a static system in which activists might be slow to respond to changing government controls (Yang, “Activism” 110).
Social Ramifications

Beyond the realm of pure politics, observers have also noted a number of ways in which the Internet is aiding social liberalization in China. Of particular interest is the Internet’s conferral to citizens the ability to form communication networks of widely varying size and purpose that would be impossible to maintain without it. A basic manifestation of this phenomenon is the widespread creation of networks based on interests, subcultures, and professions. A 2016 paper analyzing Internet content and communities in China characterized the Chinese Internet as a “vibrant cultural realm,” citing active communities of groups ranging from gamers to migrant workers to human rights activists. The liberalizing effect here is clear; Guobin Yang writes in the same paper that “as the values, behavior, and practices associated with these activities merge into everyday life, they become a central part of contemporary culture” (“Contents” 1046). The values and ideas propagated on the Chinese Internet actually do influence mainstream belief. Notably, they do so in a way that is too dilute and gradual for the government to combat without resorting to impractically broad restrictions. These network effects, and the associated improvement of exposure and resource access, also extend to the sphere of issue advocacy groups and NGOs in China. A 2016 network link cluster analysis found that the websites of the country’s most active and influential environmental advocacy groups form a statistically significant, highly identifiable cluster, meaning that in aggregate they collectively link to each other far more than to other websites outside of their cluster (Sullivan 428-432). Putting aside the likely resource-related and informational benefits of such strong networks, the increased issue exposure made possible by these networks is alone a notable benefit to public political advocacy, and thus to liberalization.

Social Internet liberalization in China faces many of the same difficulties that political liberalization faces, especially with regard to constant and heavy regime controls. Additionally, as critics have pointed out, the success of Internet liberalization relies on the attitudes of its users, and whether or not they choose to actually pursue liberalization in an effective way. For example, online public initiatives to weed out corruption in Chinese politics have frequently ended in failure due to excessive focus on exposing and purging individual corrupt officials and inadequate focus on actually shifting institutions to more permanently incentivize against corruption (Ang 35-37). Though these limitations on the Internet’s socially liberalizing properties are not insignificant, it is worth emphasizing again here that even flawed and limited Internet access is a vast improvement over no Internet whatsoever, in terms of capacity for liberalization. Additionally, the socially liberalizing effects of the Internet in China are much more subtle and difficult to pinpoint than Internet liberalization stemming from direct online protest and advocacy, making them more resilient against government restrictions.

The Verdict: Liberalization

It was noted prominently in the definitions section that liberalization can take place without democratization. This note is important here—China is certainly not undergoing a current democratic transition, through Internet forces or any other means. But it is clear that liberalization is at least occurring in China as a direct result of Internet usage there. Even with government interfer-
ence, weibo platforms and other Internet applications continue to allow for free expression, useful network effects between advocacy groups and cultural groups, and online protesting—all forms of citizen participation in Chinese government and civil society that were practically unavailable to the vast majority of citizens before the Internet arrived in China. The process of Internet liberalization does face an internal limit in that Internet communication and advocacy are only as effective as the civil society of which they are expressions. However, it is important to remember that many of the liberalizing forces that color China’s online civil society are as young as the phenomenon of Chinese Internet usage itself, having been initially birthed and enabled by it; given time and maturity, they will doubtless allow for more targeted liberalization efforts.

The ruling Chinese regime has demonstrated complete intolerance of any direct opposition or criticism on the Internet, and although it faces some difficulties in enforcing its restrictions with such a wide scope, it has made clear that it is committed to doing so. This commitment will certainly slow the pace of Internet liberalization, but there are several major factors limiting the regime’s ability to completely eliminate the liberalizing effects of the Internet. First, the volume of data that the Chinese regime needs to process to exercise its controls is vast, and the tighter the controls it desires, the more difficult the task becomes. As the level of Internet penetration in China continues to rapidly rise, this data burden will grow proportionately. Second, maintaining a “Great Firewall” and widespread surveillance at a national level also entails a great deal of technical difficulty in a country of China’s size. Though China has been aggressively improving the Firewall’s capabilities in the past few years, there still are various effective methods for circumventing the regime’s restrictions, some of which are technically basic enough to be available to determined individual Chinese citizens, such as the use of Virtual Private Networks or proxy servers (Bischoff, “VPN”). Third, and perhaps most significantly, the Chinese regime is actively encouraging the growth of Internet usage in China, and has indicated that it actually welcomes Internet expression to some extent—possibly as a way to receive criticism and adapt accordingly while still maintaining broad control of the conversation and ceding no formal power.

Quite notably, it seems that the liberalizing features of the Internet, especially its raw ability to enable expression, are inherent to it as a technology, at least in the context of its internal effects on a single country. It would seem prohibitively difficult for the Chinese regime or any other to “take the good without the bad” and allow Internet usage while avoiding the effects for which democratizers have hoped. Further, it seems unlikely that in other nondemocratic countries any factors opposing Internet liberalization would exceed the Chinese regime’s extreme and well-resourced campaign against Internet threats. Thus, the available evidence suggests that China’s Internet liberalization will continue to progress in tandem with its Internet penetration rate, and that the same will occur in other nondemocratic countries experiencing budding Internet adoption.

Internet and Democratization Prospects

Despite the fact that there are no clear signs of Internet-led democratization in China, the process of Internet liberalization is too young in the country to confidently assert that the Internet has no democratizing potential in the face of autocratic opposition. The lessons that can be drawn about the Internet’s relationship to democratization in this study are thus limited, and this result
invites divided views. To return to the original continuum between pessimistic and optimistic observers: the most skeptical and absolutist of pro-democracy activists might see Internet liberalization as an almost insidious process in that it still offers authoritarian governments new and intimate capacities for monitoring their citizens, and may give the illusion of an accountable government without actually leading to any real changes. A more optimistic democratizer might instead point out the more promising signs of China’s Internet liberalization and insist that it is growing and still far from its ceiling, barring all but the most extreme and unlikely measures from the Chinese regime. In truth, the extent to which Internet liberalization may influence democratization is likely much less constant between different nations than is the extent to which the Internet influences liberalization—after all, the Internet is a coherent technology with some features that are inherent no matter how governments interfere, whereas autocratic governments themselves vary enormously and carry with them the baggage of many different cultural and social factors. It may require many more case studies and a good length of time for these to develop before we can draw any sort of accurate overarching conclusions about the Internet’s interaction with democratization. But given recent tumultuous movements in the stock of liberalization and democratization worldwide, and the enormous significance of the Internet as a technology, it seems worth the effort to keep watch, notepads ready, as Internet usage continues to develop in China and elsewhere.
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Liam Knox


Unveiling The Façade of a Unified World: Human Trafficking and the Dark Side of Globalization

by Minori Fryer, *Class of 2018*

Abstract:

On both global and local scales, incumbents of power are always shifting. Although modern day superpowers no longer come in the form of empires, central authorities that prevail today come in the form of hegemonic states that are in charge of maintaining global governance through monitoring economic and political activities in the world system. The current capitalist world system largely came to be in conjunction with the growth of modern globalization, to the point where the world is now devoted to endless accumulation and profit-seeking opportunities in a market that treats goods and labor alike as commodities. The intensification of the flows of goods, people, ideas, services and money across the globe has certainly scaled down the size of the globe in terms of accessibility; however, it does so with a cost. Private ownership of trade, industry, and means of production that seeks to generate the most profit drives the notion that everything is a commodity that can be bought, sold, and traded, including human beings. Heavy prejudice is often placed against nations in which cases of trafficking are discovered, yet, the root of the problem lies in the modern world system that foists such pressure on the demand and supply of cheap goods that often have to be procured through illegal means.
Introduction

Globalization has brought about an unprecedented flow of capital, goods, and labor. Open borders, free trade, and growth have pressured developing countries, to integrate their economies into regional and international markets. Yet these trends are based on the notion of “inequality for all, prosperity for a few,” as put forth by economist Robert Reich. While globalization has, in fact, contributed to the mitigation of global inequality in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), it is important to note that inequality cannot be solely measured on economic terms. Thus, the while striving to continue to lower GDP inequality should be a global goal, the emphasis on economic dimensions cannot undermine the persisting presence of inequality manifested in social dimensions. Globalization, coupled with the free market economy, has perpetrated the notion that almost everything can be bought, sold, and traded, including human beings. As businesses and corporations seek low cost labor in order to maximize their profit margins, the issue of trafficking humans across borders has become a prominent issue of the twenty-first century. Increased interconnectedness has made it easier for people to be illegally transported to countries they are unfamiliar with, which often leads them to be unjustly exploited upon arrival. Heavy prejudice is often placed against nations in which cases of trafficking are discovered, yet, the root of the globalization phenomenon lies in the modern world system that foists such pressure on what Immanuel Wallerstein labels “periphery” nations to supply raw materials and labor for the “core” nations. This essay examines the linkage between globalization and human trafficking, focusing particularly on the areas of labor and sex trafficking.

Terminology and Classification

For the purpose of clarity, a few definitions for the terminology used throughout this paper are enumerated below. Globalization is defined as the:

“Closer integration of the countries and people of the world which has been brought about by the enormous reduction costs of transportation and communication, and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) people across borders” (Stiglitz 9).

Human trafficking is defined by the United Nations Trafficking Protocol as “the recruitment, transport, transfer, harboring or receipt of a person by such means as threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud or deception for the purpose of exploitation” (UNODC). It is important to distinguish this definition from that of smuggling, which is a crime against a State and their immigration laws instead of a crime against the victim who is forced into trafficking (Department of State). Consent from the migrant is usually present in the smuggling of illegal immigrants, and smuggling is almost always transnational, whereas trafficking can occur within borders (Nagel 132). “Source countries” categorize the nation states in which individuals
are trafficked from, who are then taken to the “destination countries” which are nation states where the trafficked individuals will be taken to. “Transit countries” are nation states in which trafficked persons are often passed through in order to reach the destination countries (Stop Violence Against Women).

Globalization and Labor Trafficking

The statistics associated with human trafficking are staggering. Currently, the industry generates $32 billion annually, and is the fastest growing criminal enterprise in the world after illicit drugs and weaponry (UNODC). The United Nations estimates that at any given moment, there are 2.5 million victims of human trafficking. Out of this 2.5 million, an estimated 1.4 million people are from Asia and the Pacific, 250,000 come from Latin America and the Caribbean, 230,000 come from the Middle East and Northern Africa, 130,000 come from Sub Saharan Africa, and 270,000 come from the US and Western Europe (Rahman 57). If those numbers are any indication, it is clear that no nation state in the world is unaffected by human trafficking; whether they may be a source, destination, or transit country. Globalization is driven by the theory of supply and demand, not only of transportable commodities, but also by the transfer of capital, open borders, and trade deregulation (Nagel 137). Certain conditions brought about by globalization such as free trade, free flow of capital, and cheaper foreign labor markets, have caused the movement of people to become more widespread (Peerapeng et al.). In this framework, businesses strive to find means of production that will generate the most profit at a low cost in order to stay competitive in the global market. As a result, the pawns in this power monopoly are often uneducated, low-skilled workers from developing countries. It is estimated that at least 12.3 million people are manipulated into falling victim to exploitive labor practices on an annual basis (Brewer). It is important to note that victims of labor trafficking are not a homogenous group of people; they are children, teenagers, men, and women (ACF). Globally, the International Labor Organization estimates that there are 21 million victims of forced labor—11.4 million women and girls and 9.5 million men and boys—in industries such as agriculture, construction, domestic work, and manufacturing (International Labor Organization statistics). This forced labor in the private economy generates US$ 150 billion in illegal profits per year (International Labor Organization statistics).

In order to better understand these pervasive trends of labor trafficking, it is necessary to address the ‘push’ and ‘pull factors of globalization that affect the dynamics of labor trafficking. Significant push factors include: low wages in rural areas, poverty level incomes, and lack of employment opportunities in developing countries. Workers affected by these circumstances are often manipulated into signing exploitative and deceptive contracts that promise better pay overseas, although that is rarely the case. Coupled with the primary pull factor of the large demand for cheap labor, there is a large market for laborers seeking work, and corporations that are seeking low-cost labor. It is often the case that migrant workers fill positions that domestic workers refuse to do because of low wages or undesirable working conditions (Misra 2). For example, migrant workers make up a majority of the workforce in the U.S. meat industry, which has one of the lowest wages and is thought to be the most dangerous factory job in America (Misra 2). This is because of meat-packing work has extraordinarily high rates of injury, and due to the ready availability of more workers, those injured on the job may face dismissal (Compa 1). Laborers working under illegal
circumstances do not have the safety of any compensation or protection in the event of accidents or emergencies. Furthermore, immigrant laborers, especially trafficked workers, are paid at a substantially lower rate, if at all. Their status as foreign workers makes them vulnerable to working conditions that would be deemed as unacceptable for legal workers (Compa 3).

There are two main types of labor trafficking that occur worldwide. The first is bonded labor, or debt bondage, which is the most widely used method of enticing workers to sign illegal contracts (International Labor Organization). Victims become bonded laborers when their labor becomes a means of repayment for a loan or service, of which its terms and conditions are undefined. Bonded labor is the most common in South Asia, where generations of families are bound to slave labor as a form of repayment (Kara 67). In this form of slavery, an individual is made to engage in manual labor work in order to repay loans that a family member took out in the past (Rahman 59). These ‘loans’ are falsely advertised by labor recruiters who lure individuals in desperate situations into borrowing a small sum of money in exchange for labor. Often times, the value of their work is greater than the sum of money borrowed. The other type of labor trafficking is forced labor, in which victims are faced to work against their own will, under the threat of violence or some other form of punishment. Forced labor can include domestic servitude, agricultural labor, sweatshop labor, and in some cases, begging. It is often difficult to identity victims of forced labor as many are essentially coached by traffickers to answer questions in a way that would minimize the evidence of illegal labor activities. In these ways, employers and traffickers exert physical or psychological control to the extent where victims believe they are unable to escape their circumstances (International Labor Organization). Additionally, victims may be blackmailed into not seeking help by having their status as an undocumented alien, or their participation in an illegal industry used against them by the traffickers (International Labor Organization).

Globalization and Sex Trafficking

Each year, an estimated 800,000 women and children are trafficked across international borders, and many more within countries (Polaris). Globally, the International Labor Organization estimates that there are 4.5 million people trapped in forced sexual exploitation at any given time (International Labor Organization). Patterns of sex trafficking can often be linked to economic globalization. In simple supply and demand terms, states involved in human trafficking can be classified into source, transit, or destination countries (Mejia 1). Source states provide the supply of victims, who are moved along routes through transit states to the destination countries that generate the demand for the international human trafficking “market” (Mejia 1). Scholars have found that source countries are characterized by conditions of extreme poverty, rapid social and political change, a community under stress, and a territory undergoing modernization and economic growth (Mejia 1). In recent years, there has been a substantial increase in women and children being sourced from countries such as Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam. (Peerapeng et al. 124). These countries are coincidentally opening up to global markets and implementing free trade policies (Peerapeng et al. 124). A variety of factors such as weak governments and weak law enforcement contribute to the ease in which traffickers are able to exploit vulnerable individuals in developing countries (Tomasi). Legal systems, as well as cultural traditions contribute to the vulnerability for
women and children, some of which include: early or forced marriage, discriminatory laws, lack of access to education and opportunities, and exclusion from positions of power (Peerapeng et al. 126). According to the United Nations Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking, an estimated 2.4 million people are forced into sex trafficking at any given moment, and out of those 2.4 million, approximately 1.4 million come from Asia and the Pacific (Rahman 129). These women often remain in Asia by being trafficked to large metropolitan cities such as Hong Kong, Singapore and Bangkok (Peerapeng et al. 128). Yet, these women are also trafficked all over the world, wherever the demand may be. Some of the main destination countries are: Belgium, Germany, Greece, Israel, Japan, Italy, Netherlands, Thailand, Turkey, and the United states (UNODC).

Like other consumer products, victims of sex trafficking are managed and branded, such as by race and age, to meet the expectations of the market. As a result, the average age of entry into the sex trafficking business for a child victim is around 11 and 12 years old (UNODC). It is estimated that an average pimp manages four to fix girls, and in some cases, boys, and can make $150,000-$200,000 per child per year, which is often up to twenty times more than the original price at which he or she was bought (Tomasi). Through the use of physical force and illicit drugs, these young girls and women feel as though they are unable to escape as they are often in an unfamiliar foreign country where they do not speak the local language (Soroptimist). Additionally, once in the custody of traffickers, a victim’s passport and official papers are typically confiscated and held, which inevitably makes the victims heavily reliant on their pimps to survive (Soroptimist). In turn, the pimps often use the supply of clothes and shelter as a form of debt bondage to the women. Ultimately, when they are no longer productive because of illness or age, the women are essentially disposed of in either the country they are in, or if lucky, in their home country. Trafficked people who return home may go back to the same difficulties they left with, but with new health problems and other challenges, such as the stigma attached to sex slavery and prostitution (Soroptimist).

Globalization and the Prevention of Human Trafficking

Human trafficking is an abhorrent manipulation of vulnerable peoples that serves to benefit the power and money hungry on a global scale. Victims of trafficking often endure physical abuse, and the effects on mental, emotional, and physical well-being are harrowing. Many experience post-traumatic stress disorder, and with that, acute anxiety, depression and insomnia (Soroptimist). Beyond the individual victim, sex trafficking promotes societal breakdown by removing women and children from their families and communities, and fuels organized crime groups that usually participate in many other illegal activities, including drug and weapons trafficking and money laundering (Soroptimist). The loss of human resources negatively impacts local and national labor markets, and trafficking as a whole “eroses government authority, encourages widespread corruption, and threatens the security of vulnerable populations” (Soroptimist). Undoubtedly, there has been tremendous benefit from globalization as the “process of interaction and integration among people,” such as cultural and economic cooperation, greater exchange of ideas, and free movement of people (Stiglitz). Yet, in order to sustainably continue benefitting from this system, it is vital to eradicate the incredibly harmful practice of human trafficking. At a net profit margin of over 70
percent, human trafficking one of the most profitable businesses in the world, and it is becoming increasingly easy and inexpensive to procure, move and exploit vulnerable peoples (Molloy). In order to tackle trafficking, the most important strategy is to extinguish the thought that trafficking is an immensely profitable business with minimal risk.

In policy terms, there must be an international protection protocol for victims of human trafficking. Many governments are hesitant to deal with the consequences of human trafficking from a migration standpoint, as the line between illegal immigration and trafficking is often blurred (International Labor Organization). States must recognize that victims of trafficking are not criminals, and efforts must be focused on criminalizing trafficking from the demand end. Many powerful businesses and corporations actively benefit from the use of trafficked labor, and active penalties should be put in place for companies that are caught exploiting their workers, or demanding illegal labor from abroad. All business surveyors and government officials, such as passport control officers, should participate in training courses, such as “identifying and investigating cases of forced labor and trafficking” offered by the International Labor Organization in order to be better equipped to identify signs of trafficking. Initiatives such as Airline Ambassadors, which trains flight attendants to spot signs of human trafficking among passengers, have been beneficial in stopping several cases of human trafficking (Airline Ambassadors).

Increasing awareness of the issue of human trafficking is paramount in bringing the issue to light, and preventing it from being an underground and taboo issue. Many consumers are unaware that by consuming certain products, they are unwittingly taking part in a market that supports the exploitation of people. While participating in the global economy should not automatically equal participation in exploitation, individuals must conceive the reality of the not-so-free market that unfortunately acts as the basis of our global economy. In the case of sex trafficking, many buyers of commercial sex are unaware, or in denial of the abusive realities of how the industry is run (Soroptimist). Therefore, no matter how ugly the reality, every consumer has the responsibility to think through and wisely choose their participation in the consumption of goods, ensuring that everyday purchases do not have a detrimental impact on others. Furthermore, globalization can undoubtedly be a catalyst for change in various views on gender and social dichotomies. Despite religious and cultural differences, it should be a global notion that all humans are equal, and that every human has the right to not be under the threat of being exploited. Ideally, nation states should come together to form an international human rights bill that will protect individuals facing exploitation regardless of their nationality, and regardless of the country they are being exploited in. Efforts made by the United Nations, Amnesty International, and the Human Rights Watch make differences every day as they strive to break the vicious cycle of human trafficking. It is important for the global community to accept that human trafficking is an international issue that exists today. The continued treatment of millions of individuals as a commodity, whether for sex or labor slaves, indicates the global community’s failure to protect our own fellow human beings across gender and age. While globalization has many benefits, merciless activities such as human trafficking cast a dark shadow on any positive attributes of globalization.
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The Greying Dragon: How Will China’s Aging Crisis Affect Future Politics in the Region?

by Mika Wysocki, Class of 2018

Abstract:

Over the last decade, substantial literature has been published analyzing the potential social and economic consequences of China’s aging crisis, and possible solutions to these issues. However, the unprecedented scope of this crisis creates difficulties with regard to policy making and reform. The crisis has provoked widespread debate about the adequacy of existing social policies for the elderly and how the Chinese government should reform to prepare for an elderly-dominant population within 30 years. Existing social policies for the elderly can be divided into three main categories: pension systems, medical insurance, and elderly care and services. This essay will examine the effectiveness of existing social benefits for the elderly in China and discuss prospects for future reform. It argues that while in recent years the Chinese government has made significant progress in improving its social policies for the elderly, many of the aforementioned benefits still fail to provide widespread coverage to both urban and rural populations, do not provide adequate and quality support to beneficiaries, and are economically unsustainable in the long-run. Ultimately, this analysis demonstrates that in order for the Chinese government to most effectively tackle the consequences of this demographic crisis, it must pursue a number of policy reforms, notably: (1) increasing China’s retirement age (2) implementing a universal social tax, and (3) increasing cooperation and sharing discretionary information with private healthcare providers.
Introducing China’s Aging Crisis

A combination of factors contributes to China’s current demographic woes. First, China is home to the largest elderly population in the world, with an elderly population (over the age of 65) predicted to increase from 90 million in 2000 to over 300 million in 2050 (PRB 1). It is currently 5.34 times larger than that of Russia, 3.77 times that of Japan, 2.68 times that of the United States, and larger than the elderly populations of the six largest developing countries in the world combined (Du and Yang 140). Second, China’s population is aging at an increasing rate. China is the most rapidly aging developing country, and the fifth most rapidly aging country worldwide (Du and Yang 140). Third, the number of individuals over the age of 80 is rapidly increasing. It is estimated that the number of Chinese citizens aged 80 and older will reach 90 million in 2050, compared to only 11 million in 2000 (Du and Yang 140). Finally, China is the first country to face an aging crisis before achieving an intermediate level of development (England, xiii). When China officially became an aged society in 2000, its per capita GDP was still below the world average (Du and Yang 142). Its Asian counterparts—South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong—only began to age rapidly after achieving “developed” status (England, xiii).

China’s aging crisis does not derive merely from increased life expectancy, but also from long-term economic and social policies. Though the Communist Party’s one-child policy, passed in 1980, drastically reduced the country’s fertility rate after the baby boom of the three preceding decades, it had unforeseen demographic consequences, contributing to the current crisis. China’s population is currently growing below the scientific replacement rate of 2.1 children per couple (it now stands at 1.5 to 1.6 children per couple), despite the CCP’s decision to relax this policy in 2013 (G.E.). This results in the one-child generation not being large enough to support the baby boom generation as it ages and becomes less independent. The one-child policy has resulted in a 4-2-1, or top-heavy pyramid structure, in which single children from the one-child generation bear the full burden of responsibility for two pairs of grandparents, two parents, and children of their own (Zhan 53; Flaherty 1295; Woo et al. 722). Furthermore, the one-child generation will not sufficiently replace the baby boom generation in the workforce with the number of people entering the Chinese workforce in 2020 set to decrease by 30 percent in compared to 2010 (Yap).

Economic policies have played an equally large role in exacerbating this demographic crisis. In the 1960s and 1970s, China’s comprehensive social welfare system included barefoot doctors and rural and urban public health insurance systems; however, when the country started embarking on economic reforms in 1978, it abandoned many of its insurance systems (Banister et al. 12). Although China’s transition from a socialist to free-market economy during the 1980s and 1990s created rapid economic growth, it negatively impacted the availability of social security and welfare. Prior to the reform process, 95 percent of employers were state-owned enterprises that guaranteed job security, healthcare, and retirement benefits to their employees (Zhan 54). The privatization and decentralization process, which led to state-owned enterprises constituting only 20 percent of all companies by 2000, resulted in increased instability with regard to social security benefits for senior citizens (Zhan 54). Pensions shifted from a guaranteed benefit to a less stable contribution plan, which reduced old-age security, especially for urban workers. Medical benefits also became less reliable, leading to an increase in out-of-pocket spending (Zhan 54).
The mass migration and urbanization stemming from rapid economic development has also created unforeseen consequences for the aging population. China’s urban population, as a proportion of its total population, increased from 20 percent in 2006 to 50 percent in 2013 (Zhan 54). The migration of more than 140 million people from urban to rural regions in China since 2004 has had a profound impact on health care for the rural elderly (Zhan 54). The mass migration of the working-aged to urban hubs has left the rural elderly without a traditional network of care from their children. Although the Chinese Constitution requires that children who have come of age support their parents, the past decade of unprecedented migration has seen inevitable deviation from values of filial piety (Wu et al. 38).

Review of Existing Social Policies

Although China has seen improvements in healthcare coverage for the elderly in recent years, its social security system still fails to provide basic benefits to a large portion of China’s elderly, especially to those who live in rural regions. China’s current pension system is inadequate in many respects and poses a potential threat to the social security of China’s growing elderly population as well as to the country’s economic development. In 1991, China’s State Council issued a Decision on the Reform of the Pension System for Urban Enterprise Workers, which established the current provincial pooling system and gave provincial governments the responsibility of administering pension funds (Vilela 3). The Decision proposed that the new system be a combination of mandatory components (individual accounts and basic pension plans) and voluntary components (enterprise contributions and individual savings) (Vilela 4). In 1997, the Chinese government put the 1991 Decision into action when it established the Urban Employees’ Basic Old Age Insurance (BOAI), which requires a 28 percent wage contribution—enterprises contribute 20 percent of their employees’ wages to the social security pool and employees contribute 8 percent of their wage to the personal account (Li 4). An official rural pension system took many more years to implement, however. A Basic Scheme of Rural Pensions at the County Level was established in 1992; but was abandoned due to operational complications in 1999, after which China did not have a functioning rural pension system until the establishment of the New Rural Social Pension Scheme (NRSPS) in 2009 (Vilela 4). The NRSPS includes a social component (a basic pension of 55 yuan paid to those over 60 whose children participate in the scheme) and a contributory component (annual individual contributions ranging from 100 to 500 yuan and annual local government contributions of at least 30 yuan) (Vilela 6).

China is still struggling to provide adequate pension coverage for a significant portion of its population, however. Although China has made significant progress in developing its pension system in urban regions—in 2010, the BOAI had 194 million participants (60 percent of urban workers) and 63 million retiree beneficiaries—its urban pension system is still inadequate in assuring the security of a large portion of the urban population (Banister et al. 13; Zhang 594). Li supports this claim by asserting that although the government aimed for pension levels to reach 59 percent of social average wage after the establishment of BOAI, pension levels have decreased from 76 percent of social average wage in 1997 to only 44 percent in 2011, barely enough to provide “basic protection” for retirees (5). Furthermore, although the NRSPS has made significant
progress—89 million rural residents have received pension payments from the NRSPS since its introduction in 2009—it still neglects a majority of the rural population and only offers minimal support to participants (Vilela 1). According to The China National Committee on Aging (CNCA), the 55 yuan per month basic pension is only 14 percent of China’s annual per capita net income for rural workers in 2008, and in many cases, not even sufficient to subsidize basic needs of the elderly. In comparison with other countries’ pension schemes, China’s rural pension benefit is one of the lowest in the world with regards to its level of economic development (Li 13).

Jing argues that China’s current pension system will also be economically unsustainable in the long run (89-93). He claims that a combination of the 1997 reform’s generous 65-67 percent replacement rate that was issued to workers who participated in the pension system before 1997, the low retirement age—currently 55 and 60 for men and women, respectively—and the inconsistent collection of contributions and inefficient pension investments, has created a pension deficit that will lead to the emergence of a pension crisis in the future (Jing 89). The World Bank estimates that China’s annual pension deficit will reach RMB 524 billion by 2050, with an accumulated debt of RMB 9,514 billion (8.5 percent of China’s GDP) (Jing 89).

China’s medical care system is facing many of the same issues as its pension system. In 1998, the State Council issued a Decision on the Establishment of Basic Cooperative Medical Insurance (BCMI) Institutions for Urban Employees, which required that all public and urban enterprise workers participate in the same policy, gave municipal governments responsibility for administering medical insurance, combined basic medical insurance and individual accounts, and established basic insurance as a pay-as-you-go system (Jing 90-91). The main goal of the medical insurance decision was to decrease the government’s fiscal burden that its former medical insurance system had created under the planned economy (Jing 90-91). In 2003, the Party also established a New Cooperative Medical Insurance System (NCMIS) in rural areas, in which peasants contributed RMB 30 on average to receive minimal medical benefits (Jing 90-91).

Nonetheless, a combination of the government’s attempts to unload some of its fiscal burden and economic reform created a heavy economic burden on individuals. Although the government saw a decline in fiscal responsibility after the establishment of these insurance systems, the medical service sector underwent marketization and became increasingly profit-driven as economic reform advanced (Jing 89-93). In 2000, government appropriation only accounted for 7.7 percent of hospital revenues in contrast to 30 percent in the 1980s (Jing 91). Furthermore, individual health expenditures began to surpass those of the government—government expenditures decreased from 36.4 percent in 1980 to 15.5 percent in 2001 (Jing 91).

According to Jing, in addition to increased individual healthcare expenditures, the current medical care system fails to provide adequate coverage of the population (92). He cites a survey carried out by the Ministry of Health in 2003 that determined 44.8 percent of urban residents and 79 percent of rural residents were not covered by any form of medical insurance (Jing 92). However, contrary to Jing’s claim, in 2011, China Daily stated that 90 percent of China’s population—430 million urban residents and more then 830 million rural residents—was benefitting from China’s BCMI and NCMIS programs (Zhang 594). Aglietta et al. support China Daily’s statistics and state that coverage of rural residents increased dramatically after the establishment of the NCMIS in 2003; however, they confirm that China’s medical care system remains inadequate by stating that
medical reimbursement rates averaged only 23 percent in 2010 compared to 77 percent in the socialist era. They also argue that there is great disparity in compensation rates between rural and urban citizens, with the wealthy benefiting more than the poor because compensation is based so heavily on individual contributions (Aglietta et al.).

Jing also argues that, similarly to its pension system, China’s medical care and insurance systems are relatively unsustainable (92). Research at Fu Dan University has demonstrated that national wealth will increasingly shift towards healthcare expenditures, especially towards elderly healthcare expenditures as the population ages (Jing 92). It estimates that in 2050, as much as 13.1 percent of China’s total GDP will be spent on elderly healthcare expenditures (Jing 92).

Although China has been active in encouraging innovative models for elderly care in the past decade, its elderly services still fail to satisfy the growing demand for long-term care. China began the construction of its first comprehensive elderly service system in the late 1990s, mostly in urban regions (Jing 94). Following this, district level governments increasingly began to experiment with cost-effective solutions for providing elderly care (Jing 94). Some of the first and most notable experiments were carried out in the early 2000s by the district government of Shanghai, which collaborated with for and non-profit organizations to provide more in-home elderly care services, introducing an alternative to the costly construction of new elderly homes (Simon and Teets 23). This Jing’an district pilot program inspired the current Home Care Program (HCP)—a government-sponsored, community-based and partially subsidized service system, which primarily assists “empty-nest” elderly citizens (Jing 94). In 2011, China’s State Council also issued a five-year strategic plan to create a social welfare system for the elderly, which would allow them to receive nursing subsidies and more community-based care services (Zhang 592).

China’s systems of elderly service however still fail to provide coverage of much of China’s elderly population, especially in urban regions. Jing argues that though the HCP proved successful—the Shanghai Bureau of Civil Affairs was funding 231 community and service agencies, which employed 32,000 home care workers serving 271,000 elderly households by the end of 2012—the urban policy innovation still only offers limited coverage of the urban elderly (94-95). Zhang also claims that despite the rapid development of elderly homes after the State Council’s five-year plan, the disparity between market demand and supply of elderly services is still large (592). According to the National Committee on Aging, in 2010, demand for nursing homes reached nearly 12 million, however there were only 3.19 million nursing home beds in operation (Zhang 592).

Many scholars claim that the inconsistency in the quality of services provided to the elderly is still a major issue. According to Zhang, because China’s nursing home industry is still in its infancy, systems of quality management and evaluation have yet to be officially implemented in the process of nursing home administration (594). Wu et al. emphasize that heavy reliance on out-of-pocket expenditures to pay monthly fees, as opposed to an insurance-funded system, has resulted in low salaries, long working hours, added emotional stress and consequently, high rates of staff turnover (51). Their study reveals that 56 percent of workers in the nursing home industry think salaries are too low, and 54 percent think that they are too labor intensive (Wu et al. 50). Wu et al. also ascertain that the majority of workers at elderly community service centers (“baomu(s)”), who are usually migrant workers or laid-off local workers, lack basic qualifications (55). In a survey of
community agencies, only 7 percent of representatives reported that all of their baomu employees had received training, while 70 percent reported that only some of their baomus had received basic training and 23 percent stated that none of their employees had been trained (Wu et al. 50).

**Future Policy Considerations**

In preparation for an elderly-majority population, and the resulting decline in China’s able workforce, the Chinese government will be forced to consider increasing the country’s legal retirement age. Li claims that raising China’s retirement age is necessary for several reasons: first and foremost, a higher age will allow for a more gradual decline of China’s labor force. Indeed, if the retirement age is raised, people will not be exiting the workforce as rapidly. Second, China’s current retirement age, as one of the lowest in the world, is currently outdated. China set the current age—60 for men, 50 for female factory workers and 55 for female public-sector workers—in the 1950s, when life expectancy was only 50 years (Li). Third, a higher age would benefit individual pension accounts. Raising the retirement age would prolong the pension payment period and increase the amounts accumulated in individual pension accounts, ultimately increasing overall monthly pension (Li). Fourth, such a measure would reduce the fiscal burden created by the pension system. Currently, high life expectancy means that most retirees will live for many years after their individual pension accounts are used up, years during which they are subsidized by the social pooling system. Increasing the retirement age will alleviate this strain on the BOAI’s financial system (Li).

Implementing such changes will inevitably engender complaints. According to Chinese media reports, there is widespread opposition to raising the retirement age. A 2012 poll by the Beijing Morning Post concluded that 96 percent of respondents opposed increasing the retirement age (Yap). The Chinese government will be faced with the difficult task of increasing the retirement age whilst avoiding the outbreak of social protests. Potential solutions could include raising the retirement age in a gradual manner (over the course of several years) or raising the female retirement age to match that of men before changing the male retirement age (Wong).

In order to increase the fairness and universality of its welfare system for the elderly, the Chinese government must consider implementing a universal social tax. Aglietta et al. advocate the establishment of a welfare state involving non-contributive universal insurance in order to promote equality (283). This would involve raising funds by requiring economic entities to levy a social tax based on all household income, rather than by collecting salary-based individual contributions (Aglietta et al. 283). For example, employers would levy taxes on payrolls, retirement funds would levy taxes on pensions, and fiduciary institutions would levy taxes on interests (Aglietta et al. 283). They also argue that the government should also take advantage of its state-owned enterprises by raising social welfare funds through SOE dividends (Aglietta et al. 283). Implementing a universal social tax would also help centralize China’s fragmented social welfare system. Under the current welfare system, social contributions, benefits and other funds are handled by local officials, who often lack fund management abilities and are frequently inclined to use funds for other, sometimes corrupt, purposes (Jing 98; Aglietta et al. 270). A more centralized welfare state would promote efficiency and accountability and decrease overall transaction costs (Jing 99). Those who oppose the
implementation of a unified welfare system often argue that a centralized welfare scheme would not be reasonable as living expenditures vary from region to region (Aglietta et al. 283). However, China’s social security system only aims to satisfy people’s basic needs, and there is only a minimal disparity in prices of basic staples between regions (Aglietta et al. 283).

The government may also be forced to consider modifying its relationship with NGOs and other private long-term healthcare providers. Donhue et al. discuss the current lack of appeal of China’s long-term care sector to private firms, and stress that creating favorable conditions, such as offering subsidies, to attract the private sector is crucial to improving both the accessibility and the quality of long-term elderly care in China (1-24). They state that private organizations find the long-term care industry unappealing due to high land costs, the lack of urban planning for elderly homes, and the lack of government funding (22). Donhue et al. also stress the importance of “collaborative governance”—an approach in which the government shares discretionary information with the private sector in order to spark collective action—the future of long-term elderly care (1-4). They call on the Chinese government to gradually shift from a “collaboration for resources” approach, to a “collaboration for productivity” model with private healthcare providers by allowing them to gain the authority and discretion to propose ideas for improving long-term care (Donhue et al. 16-17). Aglietta et al. also stress the importance of bringing private actors into the social services sector in order to create a system more flexible in meeting different needs. They advocate more freedom for private actors in the healthcare industry, and for the Chinese government to shift from an interventionist management role towards an oversight role (Aglietta et al. 284-5).

This transition to collaborative governance would be gradual due to conflicting CCP values, but it is nevertheless a feasible approach. The Chinese Communist Party’s recent revisions of its legal framework for the governance of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) show promising signs of increased private sector discretion. Xi Jinping’s statement at the Third Plenum Decision of the 18th Central Committee in 2013 employed the term “social governance” instead of the previously used “social management innovation,” which emphasized cooperation with rather than management of CSOs (ICNL). The Party’s “sustained clampdown” on certain aspects of civil society before the release of this Decision also revealed a favoring of CSOs related to finance, trade and social services over those involving advocacy, religion and ethnic minority affairs (ICNL). However, as demonstrated by still recent reforms, shared discretion with the private sector is still a sensitive topic. Although the Party aims to improve China’s industries and strengthen its relationship with the masses by proposing more alleged “freedoms” for CSOs, it still faces the deep-seated skepticism of non-profit organizations, who fear that the party will engage in “preference distortion,” and ultimately wants to mold civil society according to its own values in order to maintain control (ICNL).

This analysis of China’s current pension, medical care and elderly service systems reveals that there is still significant progress to be made to ensure adequate coverage, affordability, fiscal sustainability and quality of social policies concerning the elderly, especially in addressing the dramatic surge of China’s senior population. A review of the flaws in existing care systems leads one to the conclusion that the Party must take swift action during the next decade to reform its social policies and prevent them from falling even farther behind the growing needs of China’s aging population. Crucial reforms that the Party must consider include increasing the retirement age
to ensure a numerically stable workforce, increased individual pension benefits and a lower fiscal burden, establishing a centralized universal welfare system to promote fairness and efficiency, and increasing cooperation and shared discretion with the private sector. Core CCP values however continue to act as an obstacle to implementing these reforms. Ultimately, the Party must recognize the large and unprecedented nature of its aging crisis, and strike a balance between ensuring the welfare and satisfaction of its people and maintaining its authority.
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