ions in this regard. Nevertheless, problems
d the need for the WTO to continue its
de system. In particular, WTO members
g demands of efficiency, fairness, and
y as to keep the diverse membership of
ces a significant challenge in establishing
 its members that will be perceived as
apable of addressing the trade-related
al members.

the report relates to the challenge posed
herently discriminatory and thus at odds
iscrimination. Governments around the
reform – notably bilateral and regional
rade relationships among their signato-
e of multilateral trade negotiations and
onmaking is not the only spur toward
hows that these alternative vehicles for
onsequences for the multilateral trading
 reform is, and will continue to be, a
ibership. [...]

ew Essay in this special issue argue for
WTO as an institution for global
ught to emphasize either the juridical
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 providing other global public goods
 be sure, many of the public goods
d primarily for their contribution to
of transaction costs, the enhancement
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uniquely provides: there is no other
goods on an almost universal basis.
of managing globalization, in these

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A New World Order

Anne-Marie Slaughter

What is possible is not independent of what we believe to be possible. The possibility of such developments in the practical world depends upon their being grasped imaginatively by the people who make the practical world work.

– Neil MacCormick

Terrorists, arms dealers, money launderers, drug dealers, traffickers in women and children, and the modern pirates of intellectual property all operate through global networks. So, increasingly, do governments. Networks of government officials – police investigators, financial regulators, even judges and legislators – increasingly exchange information and coordinate activity to combat global crime and address common problems on a global scale. These government networks are a key feature of world order in the twenty-first century, but they are underappreciated, undersupported, and underused to address the central problems of global governance.

Consider the examples just in the wake of September 11. The Bush administration immediately set about assembling an ad hoc coalition of states to aid in the war on terrorism. Public attention focused on military cooperation, but the networks of financial regulators working to identify and freeze terrorist assets, of law enforcement officials sharing vital information on terrorist suspects, and of intelligence operatives working to preempt the next attack have been equally important. Indeed, the leading expert in the "new security" of borders and container bombs insists that the domestic agencies responsible for customs, food safety, and regulation of all kinds must extend their reach abroad, through reorganization and much closer cooperation with their foreign counterparts. And after the United States concluded that it did not have authority under international law to interdict a shipment of missiles from North Korea to Yemen, it turned to national law enforcement authorities to coordinate the

erritorial enforcement of their national criminal laws. Networked threats require [net]worked response.

...ning to the global economy, networks of finance ministers and central bankers [have] been critical players in responding to national and regional financial crises. The[y], as much a network of finance ministers as of heads of state; it is the finance ers who make key decisions on how to respond to calls for debt relief for ost highly indebted countries. The finance ministers and central bankers hold te news conferences to announce policy responses to crises such as the East financial crisis in 1997 and the Russian crisis in 1998. The G-20, a network cally created to help prevent future crises, is led by the Indian finance minister composed of the finance ministers of twenty developed and developing ies. More broadly, the International Organization of Securities Commissioners O) emerged in 1984. It was followed in the 1990s by the creation of the ational Association of Insurance Supervisors and a network of all three of these zations and other national and international officials responsible for financial y around the world called the Financial Stability Forum.

nd national security and the global economy, networks of national officials are g to improve environmental policy across borders. Within the North American rade Agreement (NAFTA), US, Mexican, and Canadian environmental agen-ve created an environmental enforcement network, which has enhanced the eness of environmental regulation in all three states, particularly in Mexico. ly, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and its Dutch equivalent have d the International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement E), which offers technical assistance to environmental agencies around the holds global conferences at which environmental regulators learn and exchange tion, and sponsors a website with training videos and other information.

...are regulators the only ones networking. National judges are exchanging is with one another through conferences, judicial organizations, and the t. Constitutional judges increasingly cite one another's decisions on issues ce speech to privacy rights. Indeed, Justice Anthony Kennedy of the US ie Court cited a decision by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in an unt 2003 opinion overturning a Texas antisodomy law. Bankruptcy judges in it countries negotiate minitreaties to resolve complicated international cases; n transnational commercial disputes have begun to see themselves as part of I judicial system. National judges are also interacting directly with their tional counterparts on trade and human rights issues.

y, even legislators, the most naturally parochial government officials due to rect ties to territorially rooted constituents, are reaching across borders. ional parliamentary organizations have been traditionally well meaning ineffective, but today national parliamentarians are meeting to adopt and c common positions on the death penalty, human rights, and environmental hey support one another in legislative initiatives and offer training programs unical assistance.

of these networks has specific aims and activities, depending on its subject mbership, and history, but taken together, they also perform certain common s. They expand regulatory reach, allowing national government officials to with corporations, civic organizations, and criminals. They build trust and

establish relationships among their participants that then create incentives to establish a good reputation and avoid a bad one. These are the conditions essential for long-term cooperation. They exchange regular information about their own activities and develop databases of best practices, or, in the judicial case, different approaches to common legal issues. They offer technical assistance and professional socialization to members from less developed nations, whether regulators, judges, or legislators.

In a world of global markets, global travel, and global information networks, of weap-ons of mass destruction and looming environmental disasters of global magnitude, gov-ernments must have global reach. In a world in which their ability to use their hard power is often limited, governments must be able to exploit the uses of soft power the power of persuasion and information. Similarly, in a world in which a major set of obsta-cles to effective global regulation is a simple inability on the part of many developing countries to translate paper rules into changes in actual behavior, governments must be able not only to negotiate treaties but also to create the capacity to comply with them.

Understood as a form of global governance, government networks meet these needs. As commercial and civic organizations have already discovered, their networked form is ideal for providing the speed and flexibility necessary to function effectively in an information age. But unlike amorphous "global policy networks" championed by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, in which it is never clear who is exercising power on behalf of whom, these are networks composed of national government officials, either appointed by elected officials or directly elected themselves. Best of all, they can perform many of the functions of a world government – legislation, administration, and adjudication – without the form. [...]

The Globalization Paradox: Needing More Government and Fearing It

Peoples and their governments around the world need global institutions to solve collective problems that can only be addressed on a global scale. They must be able to make and enforce global rules on a variety of subjects and through a variety of means. Further, it has become commonplace to claim that the international institutions cre-ated in the late 1940s, after a very different war and facing a host of different threats from those we face today, are outdated and inadequate to meet contemporary chal-lenges. They must be reformed or even reinvented; new ones must be created.

Yet world government is both infeasible and undesirable. The size and scope of such a government presents an unavoidable and dangerous threat to individual liberty. Further, the diversity of the peoples to be governed makes it almost impossible to conceive of a global demos. No form of democracy within the current global repertoire seems capable of overcoming these obstacles.

This is the globalization paradox. We need more government on a global and a regional scale, but we don't want the centralization of decision-making power and coercive authority so far from the people actually to be governed. It is the paradox iden-tified in the European Union by Renaud Dehousse and by Robert Keohane in his mil-lennial presidential address to the American Political Science Association. The European Union has pioneered "regulation by networks," which Dehousse describes as the response to a basic dilemma in EU governance: "On the one hand, increased uniformity

uinly needed, on the other hand, greater centralization is politically inconceivable, obably undesirable." The EU alternative is the "transnational option" – the use organized network of national officials to ensure "that the actors in charge of the nentation of Community policies behave in a similar manner."

dwide, Keohane argues that globalization "creates potential gains from ration" if institutions can be created to harness those gains; however, institu- hemselves are potentially oppressive. The result is "the Governance Dilemma: gh institutions are essential for human life, they are also dangerous." The y is discovering how well-structured institutions could enable the world to a rebirth of freedom."

ressing the paradox at the global level is further complicated by the additional n of accountability. In the 1990s the conventional reaction to the problem of government" was instead to champion "global governance," a much looser s threatening concept of collective organization and regulation without coer-

major element of global governance, in turn, has been the rise of global policy ks, celebrated for their ability to bring together all public and private actors on ritical to the global public interest.

al policy networks, in turn, grow out of various "reinventing government" s, both academic and practical. These projects focus on the many ways in which actors now can and do perform government functions, from providing exper- monitoring compliance with regulations to negotiating the substance of those ions, both domestically and internationally. The problem, however, is ensuring se private actors uphold the public trust [...]

ing at the international system through the lens of unitary states leads us to n traditional international organizations and institutions created by and com- f formal state delegations. Conversely, however, thinking about states the way k about domestic governments – as aggregations of distinct institutions with : roles and capacities – provides a lens that allows us to see a new international pe. Government networks pop up everywhere.

zontal government networks – links between counterpart national officials orders – are easiest to spot. Far less frequent, but potentially very important, ical government networks, those between national government officials and upranational counterparts. The prerequisite for a vertical government k is the relatively rare decision by states to delegate their sovereignty to tution above them with real power – a court or a regulatory commission. istitution can then be the genuine counterpart existence of a national nent institution. Where these vertical networks exist, as in the relations 1 national courts and the ECJ in the European Union, they enable the tional institution to be maximally effective. [...]

v World Order

ating the extent and nature of existing government networks, both horizontal ical, makes it possible to envision a genuinely new world order. "World order," e purposes, describes a system of global governance that institutionalizes

cooperation and sufficiently contains conflict such that all nations and their peoples may achieve greater peace and prosperity, improve their stewardship of the earth, and reach minimum standards of human dignity. The concept of a "new world order" has been used and overused to refer to everything from George H. W. Bush's vision of a post-Cold War world to the post-9/11 geopolitical landscape. Nevertheless, I use it to describe a different conceptual framework for the actual infrastructure of world order – an order based on an intricate three-dimensional web of links between disaggregated state institutions.

Recall Atlas and his globe at Rockefeller Center. A disaggregated world order would be a world latticed by countless government networks. These would include horizontal networks and vertical networks; networks for collecting and sharing information of all kinds, for policy coordination, for enforcement cooperation, for technical assistance and training, perhaps ultimately for rule making. They would be bilateral, plurilateral, regional, or global. Taken together, they would provide the skeleton or infrastructure for global governance.

To appreciate the full implications of this vision, consider again our implicit mental maps of "the international system" or even "world order." It's a flat map, pre-Columbian, with states at the level of the land and the international system floating above them somewhere. International organizations also inhabit this floating realm – they are apart from and somehow above the states that are their members. To the extent that they are actually seen as governing the international system or establishing global order, they must constitute an international bureaucracy equivalent in form and function to the multiple domestic bureaucracies of the states "underneath" them.

In a world of government networks, by contrast, the same officials who are judging, regulating, and legislating domestically are also reaching out to their foreign counterparts to help address the governance problems that arise when national actors and issues spill beyond their borders. Global governance, from this perspective, is not a matter of regulating states the way states regulate their citizens, but rather of addressing the issues and resolving the problems that result from citizens going global – from crime to commerce to civic engagement. Even where genuinely supranational officials participate in vertical government networks – meaning judges or regulators who exercise actual sovereign authority delegated to them by a group of states – they must work very closely with their national counterparts and must harness national coercive power to be effective.

Scholars and commentators in different issue areas have begun to identify various pieces of this infrastructure. Financial regulators, for instance, are becoming accus- tomed to describing the new international financial architecture as a combination of networks – G-7, G-8, and G-20, the Basel Committee, and IOSCO among them – with traditional international institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Scholars of the European Union, as noted above, are increasingly familiar with the concept of "regulation by network." Environmental activists would readily recognize some of the institutions associated with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as "environmental enforcement networks" composed of the environmental protection agencies of the United States, Canada, and Mexico. And constitutional law scholars, human rights activists, and transnational liti- gators would not balk at the idea of transnational judicial networks to describe the various ways in which courts around the world are increasingly interacting with one another. [...]

uses

: can, of course, be no one blueprint for world order. The proposal advanced here t of an active and ongoing debate. In the spirit of such debate, it is important to wledge that the model of world order I put forward rests on a combination of ptive and predictive empirical claims, which can be summarized in basic terms:

re state is not the only actor in the international system, but it is still the most portant actor.

re state is not disappearing, but it is disaggregating into its component institu-ns, which are increasingly interacting principally with their foreign counterparts oss borders.

ese institutions still represent distinct national or state interests, even as they o recognize common professional identities and substantive experience as lges, regulators, ministers, and legislators.

fferent states have evolved and will continue to evolve mechanisms for reaggre-ing the interests of their distinct institutions when necessary. In many circum-nces, therefore, states will still interact with one another as unitary actors in re traditional ways.

vernment networks exist alongside and sometimes within more traditional ernational organizations. [...]

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ISO and the Infrastructure for a Global Market

Craig N. Murphy and JoAnne Yates

ISO's leaders have, at times, spoken about the organization as if it were almost part of the United Nations (UN) family, but current practice is to call it "a non-governmental organization [NGO] that *forms a bridge between the public and private sectors* ... [M]any of its member[s] ... are part of the governmental structure of their countries ... [O]ther members have their roots uniquely in the private sector, having been set up by national partnerships of industry associations." About two-thirds of ISO's 158 member organi-zations are part of their country's central government; the rest are NGOs.

ISO conducts almost all of its work through technical committees that focus on specific topics. Each of its about 230 committees and 500 subcommittees has a rotat-ing secretariat provided by one of the ISO member bodies. The committees conduct much of their discussion electronically and when they meet face-to-face, they usually do so only for a day or two at a time. In 2008, about one-third of ISO's technical committees and subcommittees met in more than 90 cities spread across 34 countries and six continents.

On top of the large committee structure rests a 150-person secretariat in Geneva, one much smaller than those of most of the UN Specialized Agencies based in the same city. Nonetheless, the vastness and complexity of ISO's decentralized structure means that the number of people actively working on establishing new international agreements throughout the ISO network is probably larger than the staff of the entire UN system.

The organization's highly decentralized structure somewhat obscures the relatively complex way in which the work of voluntary standard setting is funded. Ultimately, much of the funding comes from the major consumers of standards, the firms and other organizations that adopt them.

Similarly, ISO's insistence on the *voluntary* nature of its standards – for example, the ISO web site states that "*ISO itself does not regulate or legislate*" – somewhat