Stanovich and West (S&W) attempt to maintain the rationality of human thought by explaining the gaps between descriptive and normative models for decision making. Often times humans’ patterns of judgment do not follow the normative models of decision-making and rational judgment. There are two major schools of thought in regards to how these inconsistencies should be accounted for: the Meliorists and the Panglossians. Meliorists believe that there is a deficiency in human cognition and that we should reevaluate and reform our way of thought to coincide with the normative model. Panglossians believe that these gaps are not a result of human irrationality and that the normative model should be changed rather than our way of thinking.
Rather than clearly identifying themselves Meliorists or Panglossians S&W aim to lay out the possible explanations for the differences between human responses and normative performance. They attribute these deviations from the normative to four possibilities: 1) performance error, 2) computational limitations, 3) application of the wrong normative model and, 4) alternative task construal, all of which maintain the rationality of human reasoning.
Performance Error
Performance error is the unsystematic deviation from the normative model, or essentially random lapses in judgment due to either distraction, lack of attention, temporary memory deactivation, etc. It is these momentary attention, memory, or processing lapses that cause the individual variation in judgment. Performance error as an explanation can be taken to its farthest limits by attributing all deviations from the normative model to performance error.
Computational Limitations
Computational limitations, unlike performance error, are systematic deviations from the normative model as a result of deficiencies in human cognition. The individual differences in human decision-making result from different levels of computational limitation (some people have more brain power than others). Variations in cognitive ability lead to variation in human judgment.
Application of the wrong normative model
The process of assigning a normative model to a problem is a complex and involved action and it is extremely difficult to find a problem that can be clearly matched with a normative model. As a result of this complexity there is a lot of room for error in decision-making and possible application of the wrong normative model, leading to individual variation especially if everyone cannot identify and then use the same models for judgment.
S&W identify a correlation between the understanding and the acceptance of a normative model, otherwise known as the understanding/acceptance principle. The greater the understanding of a model is, the higher the acceptance of that model. With more understanding an individual is driven towards to normative model, making individuals with higher cognitive ability more likely to fall in line with normative thought. It is not always clear which pattern of reasoning should be used for specific decision making situations. Higher understanding decreases the possibility of applying the wrong normative model by increasing one’s ability for reflection and evaluation of an issue, thereby increasing one’s ability to identify the appropriate response.
Alternative task construal
Alternative task construal attributes individual variation in reasoning to the subject having a different interpretation of a task than the experimenter intended, leading the subject to provide the appropriate normative answer to a different problem, unlike with application of the wrong normative model. Application of the wrong normative model focuses on individuals’ inability to identify the correct way to solve a problem, while the variation from alternative task construal comes from individuals interpreting different problems all together.
Given that normative reasoning is being used as a standard for decision-making and because alternative task construal is a source of variation among individuals’ reasoning, we have to evaluate which interpretations/construals are appropriate or inappropriate for that standard. The possibility for various interpretations implies that we now need principles for rational construal. Finding these principles can be done using the same methods of justification used in instrumental rationality. For example, a construal could be deemed appropriate or inappropriate based on how efficient they are at helping a subject reach their goals.
S&W propose the dual process theory as one possible explanation for why we interpret tasks differently. System 1 processing is a system of intelligence focused on the maximization of advantages based on the evolutionary interests of the human race and is largely unconscious. System 2 processing is a system of intelligence focused on the maximization of individual advantages based on the interests of the whole person. The two systems tend to yield different construals and cause variation in individual reasoning because not everyone has the cognitive ability to employ system 2 processing in the same manner.
Conclusion
S&W after laying out the four possible sources of variation between individual reasoning, conclude that the most compelling explanations for the sources of decision-making differences are application of the wrong normative model and alternative task construal. Ultimately, S&W agree with the Meliorist conclusion that there are individuals differences that do not fit in with the normative model of decision-making and human reasoning is not ideal “as is”.
Responses:
Note: We will focus on the responses up to pg 680 with Hunt.
One of the biggest points of concern for a lot of the commentaries we encounter in this section is S&W’s claim that failure to use a certain normative model in a given situation is indicative of human irrationality. Ayton argues that trying to determine what is “normative” is not useful because decisions cannot be evaluated so easily. Bees, for example, violate what we expect to be the normative model, but their behavior is still successful if they survive. So although bees do not follow the normative model, they are not considered “irrational.” Baron states that normative models should not be justified by consensus/intuitive judgements, but should instead come from analysis of specific situations that are supported by more evidence. Goodie & Williams question defining reasoning in terms of aptitude, because aptitude must be measured using reasoning and this is circular.
Others are compelled by the way S&W outline the dual-processing model, but think that it could be better developed. Ball & Quayle provide an especially interesting view by further explaining different scenarios in which the systems are used, highlighting that System 1 is often used as an escape hatch for when System 2 is overloaded. Friedrich takes issue with the distinction between the two systems, especially the overemphasis on System 2 that comes from the experimenter’s expectations and from the fact that most study samples come from elite universities where analytic processing is emphasized. Frisch offers that instead of trying to figure out which system is “better” or used more often, we should view the systems as working in tandem (like yin and yang) – and that a careful balance between the two would be most effective.
Finally, some commentators question how S&W’s system would actually function in the “real world.” DeKay et al and Greene & Levy argue that S&W need to consider the evolutionary aspect of our psychological mechanisms so that we can better understand our behavior and more clearly define what is normative. Using the evolutionary lens explains that sometimes errors exist because they were evolutionarily advantageous in the past, and that variation is important to allow us to adapt to new and unpredictable environments. Girotto also explains that people in “real world” scenarios might choose non-normative responses in order to choose a response that would be optimal for a group (ie, a collectively optimal decision). Hardman questions the viability of the understanding/acceptance principle and provides examples of when that has not actually been true (sometimes people do not pick the option they know more about).
Discussion Questions:
- Of the four explanations that S&W provide for deviations from normative models, which do you think is most compelling?
- Are we satisfied by S&W’s use of the SAT as a way to measure intelligence? What would be a better way to account for different types of intelligence?
- Of the various critiques to S&W, which do you think is most problematic for them?
- S&W ultimately seem to favor the Meliorist perspective. Do you agree with this conclusion, or do you find the Panglossian view more accurate?
I am also particularly drawn to the problem of what “normative” is and applying the wrong normative model. I find it problematic that human rationality follows the normative model and this model is then used to determine what is irrational. Can we really determine what is “normative” without experimental bias?
Finding this problematic, I looked up some of the examples Stanovich and West present of normative models wrongly applied on page 649. I found the taxicab base-rate problem particularly interesting because it demonstrates that people often jump to conclusions before taking into account all relevant information. What made this particularly interesting is that this fundamental flaw in human reasoning stems from the representative heuristic. However, as seen with the taxicab problem, just because something is more representative doesn’t mean it is more likely. As we discussed earlier in the semester, heuristics are useful for simplifying decision-making. However, in this case, the use of a heuristic causes people to overestimate their ability to accurately predict the likelihood of an event. In the summary paper Audrey and Kendall say, “Application of the wrong normative model focuses on individuals’ inability to identify the correct way to solve a problem”. How does this inability to identify the correct problem solving technique relate to individual differences in heuristics? Is the taxicab example a problem with heuristics rather than a wrongly applied normative model? Are there other instances of individual differences in reasoning that stem from fast and frugal heuristics?
Meliorism seems to be taking flak from a couple different people who’ve responded, and while I don’t necessarily disagree with their posts there are a couple of ideas I’ve been struggling with that might offer some defense for S&W’s argument.
Eunice’s point that there can exist different definitions of rationality is a compelling one, although I still think that it is fair to evaluate reasoning that is based on these other types of rationality against “normative” rationality. The idea of “evolutionary” or “adaptive” rationality, at the “level of the genes,” is an interesting example (660). Maybe we have certain heuristics or decision-making processes that are completely rational on this “evolutionary” level – in fact, as a couple posts have mentioned, this might be the level that best describes how the hard-coded parts of our brain actually think. But regardless, there can still be the idea of what rationality would be in a perfect world, and it is still worthwhile to consider how our evolutionarily-derived decisions differ from those of perfect logic.
It could also be a mistake to view human rationality solely as the product of evolution. It is clear that the brain has a huge capacity to learn and adapt, and so I think it’s hard to refute the idea that people can learn different “types” of rationality. Philosophers, for example, can train their brains to reason using normative rationality, which is why we were all stumped by the card-flipping problem on the first day of class but Prof. Khalifa knew exactly how to approach it. Isn’t it better to be able to think in an optimal way to solve these sorts of problems? Could you argue that we got that questions wrong as a result of something other than “faulty” reasoning, as Panglossians would claim? It seems to me like normative reasoning is a fair standard for determining if actions are truly “rational.”
And if you accept this, then one of the cruxes of the Panglossian argument is really frustrating to me. In order to claim that humans are completely rational and any seemingly irrational decisions are a result of one of the four excuses that S&W describe, you’ve got to prove it. Instead of proving it, they simply say that it can’t be disproved (or at least that’s the impression that I got). And while this sort of counters Meliorism, it doesn’t really support Panglossian.
Both Maddie and Eunice both introduce Ayton’s critic and the issue of defining what is “normative” (666). S&W attempt to use computational models to address normative and rational decision-making, and found a positive correlation between performances of reasoning asks and intelligence cognitive ability. However, I feel as though it is impossible to create a normative model without the expectation and biases of the experimenters. Friedrich makes a good point that studies use normative models enriched with experimenter expectations and have use a sample of individuals from the same elite educated background. Therefore, how can a study define a model when what is defined as “normative” comes from one individual or group of individual’s opinions? This brings up the question, can normative rules and reasoning really be tested? Is it possible to create a perfect model of normatism without bias?
S&W acknowledge the great variability in human reasoning and decision and that decisions are made that are considered suboptimal (664). In the section 4 and 5, they suggest that it is possible that we misinterpret a task and which leads us to use the “wrong” normative model to solve a problem rather than the “correct way to solve a problem”. Is it possible that there is not one correct model and that there are many correct normative models to solve a task?
On the whole, I found the counterarguments outlined by this week’s presenters to be more compelling that the Stanovich and West article’s presentation and explanations of normative models and deviations from them. A point that I found to be most central and enticing to the counterarguments was the idea that failure to use a certain normative model for a given scenario does not equate to “irrationality.” Rereading the explanation of alternative task construal, I can’t help but think of the conversation we had earlier in this course pertaining to the programming of ECHO, and how bias occurs when only one, or several, programmers’ opinion of what is correct–or in this case, what normative model is the most correct, efficient, and maximally effective for decision making–is taken into account. If alternative task construal considers individual variation in reasoning to be a product of a subject having a different interpretation of a task than the experimenter intended, which leads the subject to provide the appropriate normative answer to a different problem, and alternative task construal comes from individuals interpreting different problems all together, then how that problem is presented, and how effective the experimenter was in devising and implementing the task, must be taken into consideration. The entirety of this consideration made me think about how reliant our evaluation of rationality, and what rational decision-making looks like, is upon the environment in which the decision is being made–i.e. how effective an experimenter is in conveying the task, or evolutionary factors that underscore how humans developed and are predisposed to respond to certain presentations of a task. Before, for instance, agreeing on principles for rational construal, we not only need to consider whether we need new principles for rational construal, but whether we need principles in place for rational construction of the metrics we use to measure normative reasoning as used as a standard for decision making.
I disagree with S&W on the subject of the SAT as an indicator for intelligence. As Frisch mentions on page 672, S&W think that those who agree with the experimenters on tough questions are apt to have higher SAT scores. While I understand their reasoning behind this assumption, I think that the Meliorist point of view is very rational, as it still works around the basic idea that with effort from humans, the world can be a better place, but the complementary, or non-Meliorist, view allows room for integration of different ways of thinking to be incorporated, rather than thinking one way trumps the other.
Behind this, I agree with Kendall and Audrey- we also should consider the fact that intelligence cannot be based on one standard test such as the SAT. How many of us can think of someone who we consider brilliant who does not attend a top-notch school or even college at all? The world’s best mechanic doesn’t need to get a perfect SAT score. In addition to that, I also would question that there is always a direct link between intelligence and understanding. While you do need a certain level of intelligence to understand, a full comprehension of the questions being asked in an experiment and the ability to back up your answer with proper and logical reasoning makes more sense than to just “get the right answer” (I guess I thought of this as similar to when we make an educated guess and happen upon the right answer in a multiple choice scenario, without true understanding of why it is right). This is very similar to Epstein’s argument, and thus makes me question the reasoning that S&W have a dual-process theory but make the argument that one is better than the other.
Expanding on Maddie’s comment regarding the term “normative,” I struggle with Stanovich and West’s claim that rational human reasoning is one that strictly follows the normative model. S&W further argue that deviations from normative processes explain for the irrationality in human cognition. Ayton responds to this claim with an imperative, yet strikingly simple question: “What is ‘normative’?” (666). It seems to me, S&W’s argument that we should evaluate the rationality of our reasoning processes against the normative model suggests that the normative model holds conditions and processes that are infallible. Such is the position of the Meliorist thinkers. I find this argument quite problematic as it claims that one particular model, in this case the normative one, qualifies to provide us a concrete rubric on how to evaluate our rationality and from there make changes to our rationality to rid of the “deficiency” in human cognition. Is this possible? Is it possible that the normative model considers all possible variations in human cognitive processes?
I am less convinced by the Meliorist argument and am more willing to explore the Panglossian argument for the latter offers us the opportunity to consider the “errors” and “gaps” less as problems to and deviations from the normative model, but instead as parts of normal human reasoning that are necessary for the evolution of human cognitive processes. Of course, a Merliorist or S&W may, perhaps, respond with concerns that the absence of a concrete model- the normative model- results in cyclic, unproductive debates as to what makes something rational or irrational.
But with what confidence can one make claims of what it means to be rational – even with the normative model? Our way of reasoning and even more so our understanding of the way we reason continues to evolve. If this is the case, then it would mean that no one model could fully encompass all that is to do with human cognition. What makes the normative model immune to revision? Why can’t it be open to revision?
In reference to his bee case, Ayton states “…one feels that it is the axiom that is limited in capturing what it means to be rational – not the bees” (667). Is it possible that the same applies to humans? Perhaps, it is not our “errors” and our deviations from the normative model that explains for the “gap” that S&W discuss, but it is the limitations of the normative model itself that creates the “irrationality” in human cognition.
Something that stuck out to me as potentially problematic for S&Ws argument was the dual-process theory. Because the processes differ in terms of their properties, task construal, and type of intelligence, wouldn’t it make sense that there should also be different explanations as why they produce a descriptive/normative gap? Is one system more prone to error over the other? Do some of the errors S&W cite (performance, computational, etc) apply more to one system over the other?
When discussing performance errors (pg. 646) S&W attribute them to a “mere mistake” or “momentary lapse” in typical behavior. However, how do these lapses come about? Are there particular triggers that make one more likely to make these errors? It seems as though this explanation for the differences between descriptive models and normative models is a cop-out, as it simply says the differences are due to random error- there doesn’t seem to be an explanation of WHY it happens, just that it does.
Throughout this article I was reminded of the visual system and how, when forming beliefs from perception, there can be errors along the way. Likewise, there seems to be “errors” in the reasoning process that lead to the gap between normative and descriptive outcomes. Could it then be beneficial to look at reasoning like visual perception and divide it into stages and see where it might be cognitively penetrable? Going off of this, I found that S&Ws bias/heuristics tasks were similar to optical illusions. Although these two task differ in the which process we use to decode them (human reasoning/cognition vs visual perception), they both essentially look at the differences between what we ought to reason/see and how we actually reason/see. Would it then make sense to investigate what occurs when we make visual mistakes and then apply that to help explain what happens when we make reasoning mistakes?
S&W say that “the term bias is reserved for systematic deviations from normative reasoning” (646), but if everyone has biases, regardless of intensity, should we change the way we model rationality? I think this would fit into the Panglossian model.
Also, I’m intrigued by the debates around levels of education and how this affects rationality, in particular with the examples about SAT scores. I think it might be too difficult to attempt to categorize different individuals’ education levels and how this affects their rationality. There are so many different types of intelligence that I don’t think using data from SAT scores (or GPA, or even different levels of education) would be accurate in determining rationality. I agree with the Panglossian view that the normative response should not be prescriptive because people have different levels of cognitive capacity (648). However, I think this is also a very difficult task to take on because of the different ways of determining different types of intelligences that may not always be able to be summed up by a number/score.
From my understanding of the Panglossian and Meliorist positions, Panglossians believe that the gap between the normative and descriptive is not due to human irrationalities in cognition, while Meliorists believe that they are. Ultimately, S&W appear to present the fact that their findings support this Meliorist notion of individual differences in rationality, due to variabilities in reasoning that cannot be accommodated without accounting for human irrationality. Meliorists believe that while human behavior and cognition can be irrational, we can learn to reform it and reason better. In addition to this, in terms of the understanding/acceptance hypothesis, Meliorists would agree that scientists and expert reasoners are the most effective individuals to approach the most appropriate normative model in a situation. This immediately makes me think of Thagard’s ECHO model. What would Stanovich and West think about ECHO’s ability to assess information and undergo a ‘biscriptive’ (combination of prescriptive and descriptive) approach to theory evaluation? Would they concur with Thagard’s hope/assertion of utilizing ECHO to improve human reasoning?
I thought that the connection made by S&W to economics and models of perfect market rationality were extremely interesting (647). For example, I would say that in terms of advertisement, Meliorists believe that humans can be influenced by advertisers to choose irrationally and against the normative model, while Panglossians believe that humans would maintain rationality in this situation. What are the greater implications of the Panglossian/Meliorist positions in society, including influences on decision making in politics and economics?
Finally, I would completely agree with Kendall and Audrey’s questioning of the use of SAT scores as a judgment of intelligence. Additionally, to build upon this. I wonder if intelligence in itself should be the only way to measure rationality or test cognitive functioning. Although there are many studies that show that higher intelligence correlates to higher scores on a variety of reasoning tasks, it is still not an exhaustive measure of cognitive functioning. How can this be accommodated as well?
I think the most problematic aspect of S & W’s argument is, as pointed out by Ayton, the use of the word “normative.” If there were an identifiable normative model for human reasoning, would this imply that there is no room for individuality or personality in the process of decision-making? I suppose S & W would reply that, given the understanding/acceptance theory, the closer an individual is to understanding the normative process the more rational their decisions will be. However, I think that argument assumes that the normative model is the apex of human reasoning without any indication that there could be a more accurate model that is beyond our capacity for understanding because of our intellectual limits.
I agree with many commentators (such as Greene & Levy) that there should be a greater emphasis on the evolutionary aspect of our reasoning. Rather than looking at gaps in the normative and descriptive models of behavior as indication of irrationality, wouldn’t it make more sense to look at our behavior as a product of an incomplete evolution? By assuming humans fit the normative model of reasoning, S & W are assuming that we have completed evolution with respect to intelligence and should be at the stage of perfect rationality. I think this is far from the truth. An interesting question to consider would be something that Girotto touches upon: how does behavior and decision-making change when it is in the interest of a group rather than an individual? Are these decisions more often rational or irrational?