Monthly Archives: December 2011

DC Deadlock, the Perils of Paul in Iowa, and Tonight’s Debate

So little time, so much to blog about.  Today’s topics: deadlock in DC, the Perils of Paul in Iowa, and tonight’s debate.

To begin, as I predicted in this earlier post, the Obama administration has backed away from its veto threat in response to changes Congress made to the detainee provisions in the 2012 military authorization bill. Given the already tepid nature of that threat in the administration’s Statement of Policy (SAP), I didn’t think it would take much to persuade Obama to take the veto threat off the table.  As you might imagine, party purists on the Left are again voicing their displeasure with the President’s willingness to compromise, and human rights and civil libertarian groups continue to argue the bill cedes too much power to the military.  But although the concessions the congressional conference committee made in response to the administration’s objections may not have appeased the Left, they were evidently enough to provide political cover to Obama, and he is going to sign this bill.  This is another illustration of something that I refer to often on this blog, but which – surprisingly – is not accepted by all political scientists: that presidential power is really nothing more than persuasion, and that in practice, persuasion takes place through bargaining.  The negotiations I’ve described here regarding the military authorization bill are the latest illustration of this fact.  Purists, in contrast, view the exercise of presidential power as part of a zero-sum game, where the president either wins by getting everything he wants, or he loses.  But that’s not how it works in a system of shared powers. To get anything, presidents need to be prepared to give something up.

Meanwhile, another congressional donnybrook is brewing. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid is now threatening to hold up the Senate vote on an omnibus appropriations bill until he gets Republican agreement to pass an extension of the payroll tax cut due to expire at the end of  the year. House Republicans are supporting their own version of a payroll tax cut extension that includes provisions expediting approval of the Keystone pipeline project.  So far, the Republican bill is a non-starter with Senate Democrats who are hoping to leverage the threat of a government shutdown to force Republican concessions.  In response, House Republicans have gone ahead an introduced their own omnibus spending bill. Their hope is to pass the bill by Friday, thus putting the screws on Reid instead, since Senate Democrats will be forced to either accede to Republican wishes or accept responsibility for failing to pass the spending bill and risking another government shutdown.

This latest round of legislative brinkmanship is sure to bring out the handwringers among the chattering class (and among academics too!) who will cite it as still another example of how our political system is broken.  As with the debt default crisis, however, I think this instead is the logical result of having two evenly matched, ideologically cohesive parties, each controlling one house of Congress.  As long as both sides see it is in their mutual interest to compromise, they will do so, but not before driving Congress to the legislative precipice in order to wring out every last feasible concession.  In this instance, neither Republicans nor Democrats see their brand name benefit by opposing a payroll tax cut, and so they will reach agreement on doing so.  Similarly, there’s not much payoff in shutting down the government, so I expect either some compromise on the omnibus spending bill, probably by decoupling it from consideration of the payroll tax extension, or a short-term spending extension while debate continues.   Obama, at least publicly, seems to want nothing to do with this confrontation, and who can blame him?  He received little credit for negotiating the debt default compromise.

It’s a messy way to legislate, to be sure.  But we should get used to it because, barring a return to unified government, it’s here to stay.

Turning to electoral politics, what are we to make of this Rasmussen automated poll of likely caucus voters in Iowa, which was in the field on Tuesday?  (Rasmussen surveyed 750 likely caucus voters. The margin of sampling error is +/- 4 percentage points with a 95% level of confidence)

2012 Iowa Republican Caucus

12/13/2011 11/15/2011 10/19/2011 8/31/2011 8/4/2011
Mitt Romney 23% 19% 21% 17% 21%
Newt Gingrich 20% 32% 9% 2% 5%
Ron Paul 18% 10% 10% 14% 16%
Jon Huntsman 5% 2% 2% 3% 2%
Herman Cain Withdrew 13% 28% 4% 4%
Rick Perry 10% 6% 7% 29% 12%
Michele Bachmann 9% 6% 8% 18% 22%
Rick Santorum 6% 5% 4% 4% Not Polled
Some other candidate 2% 1% 4% 0% 7%
Not sure 8% 6% 8% 10% 0%

Romney, who has been fading in most recent Iowa polls, is ahead here, albeit with a lead that is within the poll’s margin of error. Rasmussen does not provide crosstabs to nonsubscribers, so I can’t check the poll’s internals to gauge what lies behind the results. But a quick read of the topline results suggests that the real story is not that Romney is gaining in Iowa – it’s that some of Gingrich’s support has moved to Paul.  More generally, we see a tightening of the race in Iowa, almost certainly reflecting the media blitz targeting Gingrich issued by the Romney, Perry and Bachmann camps.  Note that all three candidates have registered small gains since the last Rasmussen poll.

In a video piece we have up at the Middlebury website, my colleague Bert Johnson argues that what pundits perceive as “momentum” coming out of Iowa and New Hampshire is really a function of the various factions solving a coordination problem; in effect, they use these early contests to decide which candidate to coalesce behind.   So, if there are two factions in Iowa – say, social conservatives and fiscal moderates – each group has to decide which candidate to support, or risk dissipating their influence.  To put this another way the reason we seem to think that a candidate gains momentum coming out of Iowa (or New Hampshire) is really a function of the winnowing process that eliminates second-tier candidates.   Their support has to go somewhere.   With only about 20 days to go before the Iowa caucuses, however, potential voters seem in no hurry to solve their coordination problem, to use Bert’s term. This is particularly true among social conservatives, who seem to have split their support among Gingrich, Perry, Santorum and Bachmann.  Newt has to hope he can get those voters to coalesce behind him.  Paul, meanwhile, draws his strongest support among independents, weak Democrats, and young voters.  It’s not clear whether he has hit his ceiling or not.

If the race is tightening in Iowa, it makes tonight’s Sioux City debate all the more crucial (and yes, I’ll be live blogging!)  The key question will be whether Newt now goes on the attack against Paul and Romney, and whether Perry, Santorum and Bachmann can turn in a second straight strong performance and move into the top four  to avoid getting culled from the field.

The debate is at 9 on Fox.  I’ll be on a bit earlier to set the table.  It is potentially the most significant debate of the campaign season to date so I hope those of you who aren’t studying for an exam  (you know who you are) can join me online.

Latest Iowa Results: Tim Tebow Haters Back Ron Paul!

Results from the first two polls to come out of Iowa since last Saturday’s debate were released today and both show that Mitt Romney is in deep trouble.   What is perhaps more interesting, however, is that at first glance, the two polls do not seem to agree regarding who will occupy the “Not-Newt” position in this key caucus state.  The first poll, by Insider Advantage, has Gingrich leading the field with 27.1% of the vote, and Ron Paul in second with 16.5%. (The poll was in the field yesterday.) This is entirely consistent with most recent polls that were in the field prior to Saturday’s debate.  However, the Insider Advantage poll also shows Rick Perry climbing into third place, at 13.2%, ahead of Romney who has fallen to 4rth, with 11.9% support, followed closely behind by Michelle Bachmann at 10.3%.  With the poll’s margin of error at 4%, this suggests that Perry, Romney and Bachmann are grouped together in the “Not-Newt” bunch, behind Paul.  Note that Paul only gets 13% support among Republicans – his second place standing is based primarily on support among independents; he leads among the latter group in Iowa with 27.3% of the vote, just ahead of Gingrich at 24.5%  In addition, Paul leads among the youngest voters age 18-29 with 39.6% (interestingly, Bachmann is second among this group with 22.6%).  All this suggests that Paul is not going to go much beyond 20% in contests restricted to Republicans.   More importantly, the Insider Advantage results are not good news for Romney, who only a few weeks ago was leading in Iowa, and as recently as last week seemed to be the most likely “Not Newt” candidate.   If, as I have long surmised, Paul does have a ceiling of support at roughly 20% among Republicans, whoever wins the remaining slot in the top three in Iowa has the upper hand in  claiming the “Not Newt” slot in the weeks ahead.  As loyal readers know, I have been suggesting that Perry, by virtue of his record as Texas governor and his fundraising prowess, is well positioned to overtake Romney for the “Not-Newt” slot.  What has held him back to date has been a series of dismal debate performances.  On Saturday, however, his exchange with Mitt  “All In” Romney may have boosted Perry’s standing in Iowa (more on that below.) Before we blame Romney’s “bet” for his decline, however, note that his support had already been dropping prior to Saturday’s debate.  Moreover, Perry’s rise is likely also a function of his strong media presence in Iowa; he has been blanketing the state with advertisements in recent weeks.

But wait. Before you  go online to Intrade and place $10,000 of your child’s tuition money on Perry, what are we to make of this second poll by Public Policy Polling?  It shows that Gingrich’s lead in Iowa has dropped from 9% to 1% since the debate; Gingrich is now at 22%, essentially in a dead heat with Paul who has 21%.  Romney is third at 16%, Michele Bachmann at 11%, Rick Perry at 9%,  and Rick Santorum is at 8%.  As I’ve noted several times before, polling a caucus is very tricky business; because turnout is so low, it is imperative that the pollster get an accurate sample.  And that’s hard to do.  In looking at the crosstabs of the PPP poll, we see that Paul leads among those who voted in the Democratic caucus in 2008 with 34% support. Mitt Romney is a distant second among these voters with 18%.  However, if we look only at those who participated in the Republican caucus in 2008, Gingrich is comfortably in the lead at 26%, 8% ahead of Paul. Paul also leads among those who describe themselves as very liberal, liberal or moderate, and among self-identified Democrats – but Gingrich is ahead among all conservative groups and he is comfortably ahead among Republicans. What this suggests, then, is that how well Paul does in Iowa come January 3 will depend on how many independents and Democratic-leaning voters show up in the Republican caucus.   I can’t tell from the PPP cross tabs what percentage of those surveyed voted in the Democratic caucus in 2008.

My point is that we shouldn’t overreact to the increase in Paul’s support.  Although it certainly bodes well for his performance in Iowa, much of his support comes from independents and those who voted in the Democratic caucus in 2008.  Neither bloc of voters is likely to determine the outcome of the Republican nomination. It does suggest, however, that Paul may be a formidable third-party candidate.

A couple of other interesting tidbits from the PPP poll:  Consistent with my read of the debates as reported in my live blog of that event, Gingrich leads at 30% among those who paid a lot of attention to Saturday’s debate, followed by Paul at 23%. Romney, on the other hand, leads among those who did not pay much attention at all to the debates. (Interestingly, given his marriage woes, Gingrich draws equal support among women and men.)  Again, this suggests that the debate bet may have adversely impacted Romney’s support at the margins, at least in the short run.

At this point, the number of those polled who say they may change their mind has dropped to 40% – still a large number less than 25 days before the Iowa caucus, but 20% less than the number of potential undecideds a week ago.  Nonetheless, this race is far from over.  Thursday’s debate may be the most important one to date, particularly for Perry and Romney, who are duking it out for that coveted top three performance.

Perhaps the most telling result from the PPP poll, however, is this: among those polled in Iowa who view Tim Tebow unfavorably, Paul is the first choice of 38% of them!  Among those who view Tebow favorably, however, Gingrich is ahead with 29%.  (Paul is second among this group with 25%)  To me, that is as clear a sign as any that Paul cannot win the Republican nomination.  Because among Republicans, if you don’t like Tim Tebow, you don’t like Mom, Apple Pie and, uh, er…..America.

My Cousin Veto and the Military Authorization Bill: A Lesson In Presidential Power

In this earlier blog post  I argued that it was unlikely that Obama would veto the fiscal 2012 military authorization bill that had just passed the Senate by overwhelming numbers, 93-7, despite objections from both progressives and conservatives that the bill, as worded, allowed military authorities to hold Americans indefinitely if they were suspected of engaging in terrorism on U.S. soil. Although Obama’s senior advisers were recommending a presidential veto, I noted that was not the same as Obama himself issuing a veto threat – a distinction that was sometimes lost in the impassioned debate over the bill that has consumed the blogosphere during recent days.

Yesterday, in  an effort to avoid provoking a presidential veto, members of the House and Senate armed forces committees, working in House-Senate conference,  apparently tweaked the fiscal 2013 military authorization bill by approving language clarifying that the bill would not affect the  FBI and other law enforcement’s national security authority. The revised bill also altered language to make it the President, rather than the Secretary of Defense, who can issue a waiver to move suspects from military to civilian custody.  The new language, which was included in a conference designed to iron out differences between the Senate and the House versions of the bill, must now pass muster again with both chambers, but it is likely to go in its current form to the President’s desk for his signature.  Civil libertarians are not mollified by the new language and are insisting that the President veto it. If he does, it will be only the third veto he has issued.

But, in my view, he won’t veto the bill.  If he doesn’t progressives undoubtedly will again criticize him for sacrificing principle on the altar of political expediency. However, this bill has bipartisan support and it includes a variety of other issues that have strong backing of key legislators in both congressional chambers.  Historically, presidents don’t veto military authorization bills in large part because of their omnibus nature; they usually contain something for everybody.   So while much of the attention is focused on the detainee section, the bill also has other key provisions agreed to in bipartisan deliberations headed in the Senate by the chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee Carl Levin and the ranking Republican John McCain.  Those provisions include restrictions on transferring Guantanamo detainees to the mainland for another year, freezing aid to Pakistan pending that nation’s cooperation on military matters, and a host of military-related pork barrel items pertaining to weapons production, base closings and other local matters of concern to influential legislators focused on bringing the bacon back home.  Getting 93 votes also meant that some senators lost out on key issues. McCain, for instance, was unhappy with a provision that would place the head of the National Guard on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Given the tepid nature of Obama’s “veto threat” in the administration’s Statement of Policy, it seems inconceivable to me that he will veto this bill. But that doesn’t mean his veto talk was cheap.  Instead, the language used in the SAP was enough to persuade members of Congress to change the bill’s language to provide Obama with the political cover he needs to sign the bill into law.  By political cover, I don’t mean that it was mere window-dressing – the modified language, while perhaps not enough to please everyone, did provide enough substantive clarity to at least meet some of the administration’s objections, even if it did not go as far as Obama’s aides might have liked.

We are sometimes tempted to judge a president’s influence on the legislative process by the number of vetoes he issues; a “strong” president will veto bills that do not conform to his preferences. But a better indicator is how Congress reacts to veto threats.  After all, if the president feels compelled to veto a bill, it is an indication that his threats were not effective. The distinction is a useful reminder of Richard Neustadt’s famous adage that presidential power – his effective influence on outcomes –  is rooted primarily in a president’s formal powers – including the veto.  However, because those powers are shared in our constitutional system, presidents cannot rely on formal authority alone to get what they want.  Indeed, the use of formal powers as the final option – think issuing a veto – often reflects presidential weakness.  But this doesn’t mean formal powers aren’t useful.  As Neustadt argues, “presidential ‘powers’ may remain inconclusive when a president commands, but always remain relevant when he persuades.”   And how does he persuade?  The answer, in Neustadt ’s classic phrase: “The power to persuade is the power to bargain.”  Formal powers such as the presidential veto, then, give the President a vantage point from which to influence the legislative process, even if those powers cannot determine the outcome.  This is precisely what we see happening with the military authorization bill.  Obama used his formal power – or more precisely, the threat of using it – to nudge the bill a bit closer to his preferred outcome. We shall find out, probably by the end of this week, whether it was moved close enough to avoid a veto.

Why Obama Continues Bush’s Foreign Policy

Against the backdrop of today’s joint Obama-al Maliki press conference it is worth noting that perhaps the strongest portion of Obama’s presidential record so far has been his handling of foreign policy. Public opinion polls give the President much higher marks for his conduct of foreign policy than of domestic issues, and some of his most notable policy successes – killing Bin Laden, overthrowing Gadhafi – have taken place abroad. The irony, of course, is that Obama’s success in this policy realm has come largely by building on the foundation laid down by his predecessor George W. Bush rather than dismantling it. And when Obama has sought to deviate from the path charted by Bush, more often than not he’s been unsuccessful.  Continuity, then, and not change, has been the byword of Obama’s foreign policy.

The most immediate reminder of this will occur at the end of this month, when after nine years, the last of the U.S military forces in Iraq will return home.  At its peak, the U.S. had over 170,000 troops in Iraq – now it is down to about 6,000. (The U.S. will retain a sizable force of military trainers and other civilian support staff, in addition to its diplomatic corps, although the exact size and composition is a matter still under negotiation.)   The troop withdrawal, of course, is based on the status of forces agreement negotiated by Bush with the Iraqis – an agreement the Obama administration had hoped to amend to allow some U.S. military forces to remain in Iraq to prevent a return to the sectarian violence that plagued the country in recent years.  The Iraqi government, however, proved unwilling to do so on terms acceptable to the U.S., and so Obama will largely adhere to Bush’s original withdrawal schedule.  In terms of electoral politics, however, this is not necessarily a bad thing – the U.S. military presence in Iraq was not very popular, and the military withdrawal allows Obama to keep a campaign promise to wind down the Iraqi war.

There are many other areas of continuity between Bush and Obama in the conduct of foreign policy.  Obama has expanded Bush’s use of drones as both offensive weapons in the War on Terror, but also in intelligence-gathering and reconnaissance operations.  Although Obama purportedly closed secret CIA prisons holding suspected terrorists, he continues the policy of rendition under which suspected terrorists can be sent to foreign prisons for interrogation.  He has authorized the use of military commissions to try some terrorists, and – with the courts’ consent – supports the Bush policy of holding enemy combatants indefinitely without charge. Despite opposition from both conservative Republicans and many Democrats, he signed a four-year extension of the Patriot act which, among other provisions, provides federal authorities roving wiretap power to listen in on conversations of foreign suspects even when they change phones or locations, and gives the government the authority to investigate foreigners who have no known affiliation with terrorist groups. (To do so, however, requires approval from a secret federal court.)

In some instances, Obama has out-Bushed Bush in the conduct of the war on terror.  In Afghanistan, of course, Obama built up the U.S. military presence in order to stabilize a rapidly deteriorating situation there, and thus lay the groundwork for an earlier U.S. withdrawal.  To date, Obama appears committed to the withdrawal schedule although his commanders on the ground are fighting a rearguard action in order to extend the U.S. presence there. Perhaps the most notable foreign policy success, of course, was the killing of Bin Laden, which required violating Pakistan’s airspace. And, in perhaps the most dramatic example of Obama’s willingness to push the limits of his authority, he authorized the assassination of an American citizen overseas who was suspected of actively working as a terrorist.

When Obama has sought to step back from Bush-era policies governing the War on Terror, however, he has often been unsuccessful.   After months of wrangling with Congress, Obama has implicitly admitted that Guantanamo Bay prison will not be closed, and in fact will continue to hold high value targets who may be caught in the anti-terror campaign. His effort to try 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed in a civil court collapsed in face of domestic opposition from New York officials.  And even Obama’s decree banning the use of waterboarding as an interrogation technique is now under reconsideration in the Republican House.

What explains this continuity in foreign policy between a Republican and a Democratic President? Why was Obama largely unsuccessful when he did try to break with his predecessor’s policies? At the most fundamental level, it reflects the common pressures both Bush and Obama feel, as chief executive and commander in chief, to protect the nation against attack. Political scientists have long debated whether the president wields a greater panoply of powers in the foreign versus domestic realm.  Depending on who one consults (and when), presidents are either characterized as imperial (think FDR, Nixon or Bush) or imperiled (Ford or Carter) in their ability to conduct foreign policy.  I’ve long argued that this debate misses the crucial aspect of foreign policy that differentiates it from domestic issues as seen from the president’s perspective:  because the repercussions of a foreign policy failure are far more damaging not to just to him (someday her) – but to the nation, presidents feel they have no choice but to expand their foreign policy powers as much as political constraints allow.  Put another way, they don’t feel nearly as powerful in foreign affairs as they think they should be to meet expectations. From the perspective of one sitting in the Oval Office, the constraints on the president’s ability to protect the nation feel far more onerous because the burden of responsibility that weighs on the president is so much greater.

Because Bush was the one in power when 9-11 occurred, he endured most of the political fallout resulting from his desire to meet the new expectations associated with fighting a different type of war.   The ensuing debate over how to balance the desire to give the President the powers necessary to prevent another attack with the need to hold him accountable for utilizing those powers was politically costly to Bush, but in the end a framework for balancing energy and accountability was developed.  That debate continues today, but mostly in fine tuning the measures negotiated between Bush, Congress and the courts in the immediate aftermath of 9-11. The most recent manifestation, of course, is Obama’s threat to veto the military authorization bill because it limits his flexibility in handling suspected terrorists. Obama’s opposition to a provision in the bill allowing Americans captured on American soil to be held in military custody without charge is only partly motivated by a concern for civil liberties. Of greater concern to Obama are the limits the bill places on him in his ability to prosecute the War on Terror.

In this desire for maximum flexibility, Obama is no different from Bush.  Indeed, Bush did not just bequeath Obama hot wars in Iraq and Afghanistan against the backdrop of a global war on terror – he also handed over a set of policy tools, forged in heated debate between our governing institutions,  for fighting those wars.  For the most part, Obama has chosen to use those tools because, as did Bush, he feels more than does anyone else the pressure to protect the nation from another terrorist attack.

When it comes to foreign policy, presidents may appear to be imperial – but they feel anything but.

I’ll Bet You $1.98 Romney’s $10,000 Wager Has No Impact On The Race

If Mitt Romney fails to get the Republican nomination, it won’t have anything to do with his much criticized $10,000 bet.  For those of you who didn’t watch last night’s 12th Republican debate or followed my live blog of that event (how could you not?), Mitt Romney offered to bet Rick Perry $10,000 that Perry’s claim that, in Romney’s autobiography, Romney advocated using the health care law he helped implement in Massachusetts as a model for the nation was in fact incorrect.  The exchange that precipitated Romney’s seeming spontaneous gesture went like this:

Romney: “You know what? You’ve raised that before, Rick.”

Perry: “It was true then, and it’s true now.”

Romney (holding out his hand): “I’ll tell you what, 10,000 bucks? Ten thousand dollar bet?”

Perry: “I’m not in the betting business.”

Here’s the video of the exchange:

I confess that when I saw this exchange I was struck more by the evident hostility between the two, and the fact that Romney was clearly rattled by the exchange, and didn’t really pay much attention to the size of Romney’s bet. It seemed obvious to me that Romney wanted to make the figure large enough to show that he was confident he was right. The size of the bet reflected his confidence, not his wallet. But that’s not how the pundits interpreted his words.  Almost immediately – and this is a reminder of how communications technology has changed the dynamics of debate coverage – Democrats were using twitter feeds to point out how Romney’s offer signified just out of touch he is with “ordinary” Americans who couldn’t possibly risk $10,000 in a bet.  And, just like that, the $10,000 bet became the defining moment of the debate for Romney, at least as viewed by the pundits. If Romney loses his campaign for the nomination, media wags will undoubtedly cite this as a turning point.

But they will be wrong. To begin, it’s common knowledge that Romney is a wealthy man, a point he acknowledged later in the debate in response to a question asking candidates if they understood financial hardship. (Romney’s net worth is estimated to be somewhere north of $200 million.) It’s not news to Iowans that he’s rich and Romney has never hidden that fact.  Moreover, the media focus on the bet “gaffe” ignores that fact that Romney has now been running for president for almost six years  – he’s practically a career campaigner! – and he’s never shown any ability to garner anything beyond minority support among Republican voters.  By my count, he won eight states in 2008 – none of them with the possible exception of Michigan played any real role in affecting  the outcome. I don’t say this to indict his candidacy – I say it to point out that it would be a surprise if he did attract enough Republican support to capture the nomination.  I’ve been saying this all along.  The media has largely missed this story, but the polling data doesn’t lie.  Here’s the RealClear Politics national polls composite reading (Mitt in purple):

In November, 2010 – more than a year ago – Mitt was standing at 22.6%, leading the Republican race. Today, more than a year later, and after 12 debates, constant campaigning, endless media coverage, unrelenting support from opinion leaders and party elders, he’s at – drum roll please! – 20.8%!  Now guess how much popular support Romney attracted in 2008 among those voting in the Republican nominating contests?  Yes, that’s right – he won 22% of the vote!

Since 2007, then, Romney hasn’t gained support, and hasn‘t lost support – although he has lost the lead during the current nominating campaign.  (Note – all polling data are from surveys in the field before last night’s debate). In fact, during the current nominating contests, his support has been amazingly consistent – never going above 25% and never dropping below 16%.  While the media has spent an inordinate amount of time documenting the rapid change in candidates’ standings, they’ve missed the bigger story: that the purported frontrunner can’t seem to persuade 75% of Republicans to support him. Now, of course, he’s not the frontrunner – but it’s not because he’s lost support.

But, you ask, wasn’t he leading the race until recently?  Yes, but Romney has been the “frontrunner” for two reasons: first, his name recognition put him high enough in the polls compared to lesser known candidates to make it appear that he was ahead early in the process, and because the Republican establishment has been fervently touting his candidacy.  But the simple fact is that despite all this pressure from opinion leaders to anoint Mitt as the Republican nominee (the Party Decides!), the voters are not buying it – and they never have.  Mitt’s sole road to the nomination has always been to win a war of attrition – to hope the other Republicans all flamed out leaving him the last man standing.  Nothing that happened last night changed those dynamics.

Don’t believe me? Here’s $1.98 that says I’m right.

Any takers?