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	<title>Comments on: The Real Story of Obama&#8217;s Presidency</title>
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	<link>http://sites.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2011/08/08/the-real-story-of-obamas-presidency/</link>
	<description>A NonPartisan Analysis of Presidential Politics</description>
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		<title>By: Matthew Dickinson</title>
		<link>http://sites.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2011/08/08/the-real-story-of-obamas-presidency/comment-page-1/#comment-19850</link>
		<dc:creator>Matthew Dickinson</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Aug 2011 00:17:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://sites.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/?p=9473#comment-19850</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Justin,

I have the utmost respect for Skowronek and the way he built on realignment theory to develop his analytic framework centered on the notion of  &quot;political time&quot;.  Indeed, along with Neustadt&#039;s book, it&#039;s the only other one I&#039;ve assigned every year in my presidency seminar dating back to my time at Harvard. I think it&#039;s a very good heuristic in that it makes you think about the context in which different presidents operate.  The problem is that it is very difficult to operationalize, which means it has not proved very useful in a predictive sense.  As I noted in a previous comment, Skowronek has struggled mightily to place Obama in political time.  You are correct that at the end of the original edition of The Politics Presidents Make Skowronek suggested that political time was waning and that all presidents would now  be locked into a permanent politics of preemption - but  he subsequently backed off that in light of Bush&#039;s presidency.  This suggests to me that his model is not fully developed. I should add that Skowronek&#039;s anlaytic framework is entirely consistent with Neustadt&#039;s - they just operate on a different level of analysis.  Neustadt looks at what presidents can do to secure power, given a particular context.  Skowronek looks at the context itself, and what it suggests for presidents&#039; opportunity to lead.  They examine two sides of the same power coin. 

As you note, Canes-Wrone does an excellent job providing additional empirical support for the relationship between presidents and the public that Neustadt first laid out in Presidential Power.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Justin,</p>
<p>I have the utmost respect for Skowronek and the way he built on realignment theory to develop his analytic framework centered on the notion of  &#8220;political time&#8221;.  Indeed, along with Neustadt&#8217;s book, it&#8217;s the only other one I&#8217;ve assigned every year in my presidency seminar dating back to my time at Harvard. I think it&#8217;s a very good heuristic in that it makes you think about the context in which different presidents operate.  The problem is that it is very difficult to operationalize, which means it has not proved very useful in a predictive sense.  As I noted in a previous comment, Skowronek has struggled mightily to place Obama in political time.  You are correct that at the end of the original edition of The Politics Presidents Make Skowronek suggested that political time was waning and that all presidents would now  be locked into a permanent politics of preemption &#8211; but  he subsequently backed off that in light of Bush&#8217;s presidency.  This suggests to me that his model is not fully developed. I should add that Skowronek&#8217;s anlaytic framework is entirely consistent with Neustadt&#8217;s &#8211; they just operate on a different level of analysis.  Neustadt looks at what presidents can do to secure power, given a particular context.  Skowronek looks at the context itself, and what it suggests for presidents&#8217; opportunity to lead.  They examine two sides of the same power coin. </p>
<p>As you note, Canes-Wrone does an excellent job providing additional empirical support for the relationship between presidents and the public that Neustadt first laid out in Presidential Power.</p>
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		<title>By: JustinP</title>
		<link>http://sites.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2011/08/08/the-real-story-of-obamas-presidency/comment-page-1/#comment-19847</link>
		<dc:creator>JustinP</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 09 Aug 2011 21:32:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://sites.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/?p=9473#comment-19847</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Gerald and Prof. Dickinson: 

I think that you are both rightfully critical of Skowronek&#039;s model (calling it that is a stretch since it is extremely difficult to see each individual piece) but I want to defend it for one reason: it provides a lens through which to examine the range of potential presidential action as soon as the president takes office. Unlike many historical analyses of the executive, Skowronek shows us exactly why we should *all* be &quot;ambivalent&quot; (in Prof. Dickinson&#039;s words) about the range of action available to a specific president. To me, this is a more realistic view of the office itself - indeed, it almost takes the person out of the office. 

Based on the points raised above (and in previous posts), I&#039;m not clear why you are both skeptical. Do you think that Neustadt&#039;s reliance on the &quot;skill and will&quot; of particular president&#039;s does a better job explaining Obama&#039;s difficulties?  

I also think the points you raise about &quot;going public&quot; are important. I&#039;d point to Canes-Wrone&#039;s work on the impact of public appeals as one way to demonstrate just how limited an option this truly is for any president.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Gerald and Prof. Dickinson: </p>
<p>I think that you are both rightfully critical of Skowronek&#8217;s model (calling it that is a stretch since it is extremely difficult to see each individual piece) but I want to defend it for one reason: it provides a lens through which to examine the range of potential presidential action as soon as the president takes office. Unlike many historical analyses of the executive, Skowronek shows us exactly why we should *all* be &#8220;ambivalent&#8221; (in Prof. Dickinson&#8217;s words) about the range of action available to a specific president. To me, this is a more realistic view of the office itself &#8211; indeed, it almost takes the person out of the office. </p>
<p>Based on the points raised above (and in previous posts), I&#8217;m not clear why you are both skeptical. Do you think that Neustadt&#8217;s reliance on the &#8220;skill and will&#8221; of particular president&#8217;s does a better job explaining Obama&#8217;s difficulties?  </p>
<p>I also think the points you raise about &#8220;going public&#8221; are important. I&#8217;d point to Canes-Wrone&#8217;s work on the impact of public appeals as one way to demonstrate just how limited an option this truly is for any president.</p>
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		<title>By: Matthew Dickinson</title>
		<link>http://sites.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2011/08/08/the-real-story-of-obamas-presidency/comment-page-1/#comment-19845</link>
		<dc:creator>Matthew Dickinson</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 09 Aug 2011 20:32:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://sites.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/?p=9473#comment-19845</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Gerald - If you look back at previous posts, or if you continue to lurk on this site, you&#039;ll find that I am very skeptical of the idea that presidents can change the political conversation.  The reason is  that they no longer command a national audience the way that presidents in the 1970&#039;s and early 80&#039;s did.  The media universe has become too fragmented for there to be a &quot;national&quot; audience receptive to what the president says.  Everything is narrowcasting today in the 24-7 hothouse media environment.  The President&#039;s voice is just one of many.  As Andrew points out in his comment, Obama actually did say many of the things Westen castigates him for not saying - but it largely fell on deaf ears.  And that&#039;s because media outlets are increasingly sorting themselves by ideology, the better to cater to a specific audience.  The result is an echo chamber effect, where people gravitate to sites that tell them what they already believe.  See RedState, or Sullivan, or Fox of MSNBC or the Daily Kos, etc.

Which is why I have this site, and why I encourage comments like yours. The idea here is to talk to each other, not past each other.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Gerald &#8211; If you look back at previous posts, or if you continue to lurk on this site, you&#8217;ll find that I am very skeptical of the idea that presidents can change the political conversation.  The reason is  that they no longer command a national audience the way that presidents in the 1970&#8242;s and early 80&#8242;s did.  The media universe has become too fragmented for there to be a &#8220;national&#8221; audience receptive to what the president says.  Everything is narrowcasting today in the 24-7 hothouse media environment.  The President&#8217;s voice is just one of many.  As Andrew points out in his comment, Obama actually did say many of the things Westen castigates him for not saying &#8211; but it largely fell on deaf ears.  And that&#8217;s because media outlets are increasingly sorting themselves by ideology, the better to cater to a specific audience.  The result is an echo chamber effect, where people gravitate to sites that tell them what they already believe.  See RedState, or Sullivan, or Fox of MSNBC or the Daily Kos, etc.</p>
<p>Which is why I have this site, and why I encourage comments like yours. The idea here is to talk to each other, not past each other.</p>
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		<title>By: Matthew Dickinson</title>
		<link>http://sites.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2011/08/08/the-real-story-of-obamas-presidency/comment-page-1/#comment-19844</link>
		<dc:creator>Matthew Dickinson</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 09 Aug 2011 20:25:42 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://sites.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/?p=9473#comment-19844</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Andrew - The experience question that both you and Michael asked really deserves a more extended response.  As I tried to suggest to Michael,  it&#039;s easy to say &quot;experience&quot; matters - harder to prove it.   In lieu of a longer post  on the topic, however, let me briefly point out  where I think Obama&#039;s relative lack of experience cost him.  Note that these are more speculative  than I&#039;d like. First, he had trouble getting to yes - that is, he allowed negotiations to drag on longer than would someone who understood the intricacies  of negotiating with Congress. I&#039;m thinking of health care in particular - the length of time it took to resolve that issue really allowed opposition to crystallize.  Second, he was too susceptible to being led by his substantive advisers, particularly the heavyweights on his economic  and national security teams.  It&#039;s not clear to me that he understood, at least at the beginning, how &quot;experts&quot; have their own interests and institutional vantage points that don&#039;t necessarily jibe with the president&#039;s.  Think, for example, about the decision to escalate U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. Obama basically chose from a menu developed by his generals.  Finally, he doesn&#039;t seem to have a feel for how the executive branch operates.  I&#039;m thinking here,  for example, about the role of the DNI in the intelligence community.  This is a position created ostensibly to solve the coordination problems that led to 9-11, but it simply lacks control over the institutional levers necessary to fulfill this mission.  I&#039;m not sure Obama realizes this.  Would a more experienced presidents have avoided these problems - assuming you even agree they are problems?  It&#039;s hard to say, particularly without specifying the type of experience that matters.  My educated guess is &quot;yes&quot;, a more experienced individual - say Hillary - would have avoided these issues.  But that is hard to prove.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Andrew &#8211; The experience question that both you and Michael asked really deserves a more extended response.  As I tried to suggest to Michael,  it&#8217;s easy to say &#8220;experience&#8221; matters &#8211; harder to prove it.   In lieu of a longer post  on the topic, however, let me briefly point out  where I think Obama&#8217;s relative lack of experience cost him.  Note that these are more speculative  than I&#8217;d like. First, he had trouble getting to yes &#8211; that is, he allowed negotiations to drag on longer than would someone who understood the intricacies  of negotiating with Congress. I&#8217;m thinking of health care in particular &#8211; the length of time it took to resolve that issue really allowed opposition to crystallize.  Second, he was too susceptible to being led by his substantive advisers, particularly the heavyweights on his economic  and national security teams.  It&#8217;s not clear to me that he understood, at least at the beginning, how &#8220;experts&#8221; have their own interests and institutional vantage points that don&#8217;t necessarily jibe with the president&#8217;s.  Think, for example, about the decision to escalate U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. Obama basically chose from a menu developed by his generals.  Finally, he doesn&#8217;t seem to have a feel for how the executive branch operates.  I&#8217;m thinking here,  for example, about the role of the DNI in the intelligence community.  This is a position created ostensibly to solve the coordination problems that led to 9-11, but it simply lacks control over the institutional levers necessary to fulfill this mission.  I&#8217;m not sure Obama realizes this.  Would a more experienced presidents have avoided these problems &#8211; assuming you even agree they are problems?  It&#8217;s hard to say, particularly without specifying the type of experience that matters.  My educated guess is &#8220;yes&#8221;, a more experienced individual &#8211; say Hillary &#8211; would have avoided these issues.  But that is hard to prove.</p>
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		<title>By: Andrew Piccirillo</title>
		<link>http://sites.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2011/08/08/the-real-story-of-obamas-presidency/comment-page-1/#comment-19843</link>
		<dc:creator>Andrew Piccirillo</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 09 Aug 2011 19:55:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://sites.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/?p=9473#comment-19843</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[This was incredibly vindicating and parallels much of my response to my friend (though explained much more succinctly and eloquently) right down to the multiple narratives the public has to choose from, FDR&#039;s waning domestic power in his second term, investors ignoring Obama&#039;s speech due to economic fundamentals, and the constitutional limits on presidential power. There has been no failure to communicate. I even pointed out the irony that demanding the president eschew compromise makes it just that much harder for Obama (as you put it), although as a liberal who would like to see liberal solutions disillusioned west wing types are incredibly frustrating for me. I imagine this irony is much more amusing to a bystander. 

I do have one question though. You suggest that had Obama been more experienced, the results of his Presidency may have been better for liberals. What specifically do you think he could have done to get legislation passed? I saw your response to Michael&#039;s question and if the results of studies on presidential experience are mixed, and if Obama is surrounded by experienced advisers, I&#039;m just not convinced experience is an issue in this case unless a good argument can be made for specifically what Obama could have done to get what he wants that he didn&#039;t do. That said, perhaps the experience issue cannot be ruled out entirely and I do admit to giving it slightly more consideration today than I did when voting for him. 


Back to Weston&#039;s piece.. what&#039;s funny is that a quick google search shows Obama attempting to define exactly the type of narrative Weston is seeking, especially early on in his term. I specifically remember him blaming Bush, Republicans, and Wall Street greed well into the first half of his term. The first link I clicked on is video of Lou Dobb&#039;s show playing a clip of Obama in August 2009 saying &quot;those who created this mess should get out of the way.&quot; The first response by Lou Dobbs&#039; commentator? &quot;Well it really comes across as sort of juvenile.&quot; When Obama pointed fingers and tried to define a good and evil narrative, he got called whiny. The response of that commentator parallels the falling poll numbers that greeted this narrative.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This was incredibly vindicating and parallels much of my response to my friend (though explained much more succinctly and eloquently) right down to the multiple narratives the public has to choose from, FDR&#8217;s waning domestic power in his second term, investors ignoring Obama&#8217;s speech due to economic fundamentals, and the constitutional limits on presidential power. There has been no failure to communicate. I even pointed out the irony that demanding the president eschew compromise makes it just that much harder for Obama (as you put it), although as a liberal who would like to see liberal solutions disillusioned west wing types are incredibly frustrating for me. I imagine this irony is much more amusing to a bystander. </p>
<p>I do have one question though. You suggest that had Obama been more experienced, the results of his Presidency may have been better for liberals. What specifically do you think he could have done to get legislation passed? I saw your response to Michael&#8217;s question and if the results of studies on presidential experience are mixed, and if Obama is surrounded by experienced advisers, I&#8217;m just not convinced experience is an issue in this case unless a good argument can be made for specifically what Obama could have done to get what he wants that he didn&#8217;t do. That said, perhaps the experience issue cannot be ruled out entirely and I do admit to giving it slightly more consideration today than I did when voting for him. </p>
<p>Back to Weston&#8217;s piece.. what&#8217;s funny is that a quick google search shows Obama attempting to define exactly the type of narrative Weston is seeking, especially early on in his term. I specifically remember him blaming Bush, Republicans, and Wall Street greed well into the first half of his term. The first link I clicked on is video of Lou Dobb&#8217;s show playing a clip of Obama in August 2009 saying &#8220;those who created this mess should get out of the way.&#8221; The first response by Lou Dobbs&#8217; commentator? &#8220;Well it really comes across as sort of juvenile.&#8221; When Obama pointed fingers and tried to define a good and evil narrative, he got called whiny. The response of that commentator parallels the falling poll numbers that greeted this narrative.</p>
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