Comments on: Egypt, Iraq and the Limits of Presidential Power

By: Matthew Dickinson

Matthew Dickinson — Mon, 14 Feb 2011 16:33:55 +0000

Peter – this is a really perceptive observation. I’m trying to think of other cases in which this reasoning applies. I guess it partly depends on how one defines a presidential “decision”. For example, Obama’s decision to – at least publicly – remain somewhat distant from the Egyptian uprising while urging restraint and reforms has sparked some concern that he wasn’t forceful enough, while others feel he went too far in pushing Mubarak to step down. In this case, it seems as if he decided not to decide one way or the other, but instead to let events run their course.

By: Peter Rothschild

Peter Rothschild — Fri, 11 Feb 2011 22:57:46 +0000

Matt,

By suggesting that outcomes would be driven to the extremes, I inelegantly am defining outcomes as the President being perceived as very weak or very strong on the basis of a decision made.

When decisions are based on well documented facts and information, they are likely to require less “selling” on the part of the executive. Less selling, combined with a possibility that the public in general understands the issues, would result in a perception that the decision did not require great brilliance or strength. The results of the decisions may vary from poor to good.

On the other hand, when decisions are made with imperfect information, where the stakes may not be clear to the public, the executive needs to push hard and put lots of skin in the game. Due to a high degree of uncertainty, the outcomes of decisions made with imperfect information will tend to run from the very bad to the very good, a wider range of perceived outcomes than when information was excellent. Couple the wider range of outcomes to a greater executive investment in political capital, and I see the President as having a higher probability of looking really strong and smart, or very weak and stupid.

By: Matthew Dickinson

Matthew Dickinson — Fri, 11 Feb 2011 14:35:15 +0000

Peter – Interesting observation, particularly the notion that presidents differ re: the amount of risk they are willing to take on. I think this is true – Bush made it clear that he was not interested in playing “small ball” and that he wanted to leave office having spent his political capital down. Obama, I suspect, is more cautious – at least his previous career suggests a tendency to adopt pragmatic, moderate actions.

I’m intrigued by the idea that decisions made with imperfect information will drive outcomes to the extremes. Can you elaborate the logic behind this – how are you defining “extreme”? Away from the “true” state of affairs?

By: Peter Rothschild

Peter Rothschild — Fri, 11 Feb 2011 14:20:49 +0000

Matt,

A different question might be, “Does a President appear more powerful in foreign v. domestic affairs?” Probably depends on the situation.

However, if one assumes that information available to Presidents has a higher probability of being incorrect in foreign situations than with domestic situations, then it follows that how a President acts when confronting a foreign affairs crisis would relate to willingness to take on risk; risk of making a mistake, risk of appearing weak, risk of appearing stupid.

My sense is that the opportunities to appear very powerful or very weak are greater in foreign affairs than in domestic, because decisions made with imperfect information will drive outcomes to the extremes.

The latest news on Egypt suggests that the intelligence information was not incorrect, just a bit out of synch with the timing of Mubarak’s relinquishing of power. Perhaps the old man wanted to show he still had a little piss and vinegar left in him.