And back to split-party balloting, it just seems to be that when people split their tickets, it’s because they either dislike their normal party’s candidate or like the other party’s candidate – not a conscious desire to see divided government. I do not believe that the decisions made in the ballot booth are that strategic.

Believe it or not, there is actually strong evidence suggesting that Congress is more productive under pure divided government (one party controlling the presidency, with the other party controlling both chambers of Congress) than under a unified government characterized by a high degree of partisan polarization. See, for example, research by Dodd and Schraufnagel they present in the 9th edition of Congress Reconsidered. Whether that finding extends to a quasi-divided government, in which control of Congress is split, is an open question – Dodd and Schraufnagel suggest quasi-divided governments are, in fact, more prone to stalemate, but they acknowledge that there are fewer cases on which to base a judgment.

As for voters consciously choosing divided government, note that only a small percentage of voters in each election have to pursue this strategy to make it come true. Mo Fiorina does a good job developing this point in his book Divided Government. If I get a chance, I’ll develop his argument. I present data on the number of split-ticket voters in my President and Congress chapter in the Nelson reader. After peaking at more than 25% of voters in the mid-1970′s it has dropped considerably in recent elections. In both 2008 it was about 16% of voters.