sorry for the delay in responding – bluebooks called! Again, keeping in mind that we can’t be sure what advice Obama actually received, my read is that Biden played an assigned role – devil’s advocate – but that in fact he did not differ dramatically from those who supported an increase in U.S. troops. As evidence, see:

http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2009-12-15/joe-bidens-secret-mission/?cid=bs:archive2

Again, this is more speculative than I’d like, but until the archives are opened, it is the best I can do.

What do you make of Biden’s role in the process? Both as a continuation of the Gore-Cheney enlargement of the office and as a dissenter in the ranks who, according to the Times, did ask the very questions that Obama brushed aside?

Will

You make an excellent point – that the problem, if one accepts my analysis, is with Obama’s initial decision to limit his policy options in order not to “lose” Afghanistan, and thereafter his lawyer’s response may in fact have helped craft a reasonable course of action. My point, however, is that because Obama is trained as a lawyer, he did not dig deep enough to test the assumptions underlying that initial conclusion – nor did he structure his advising process in a way that would generate alternative to the working supposition that he couldn’t afford to be perceived as having “lost Afghanistan.” It may be that he lacked the political clout or experience to take on his generals – I suspect this is true. But I see no evidence that he even truly pushed for an alternative plan of action with which to take them on. And I blame his lawyer’s training in part for that.

(Interestingly, Klein ultimately accepts the proposition, but doesn’t think Obama sells it well enough. see http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1945232,00.html).

I’m not sure, however, that Obama’s law training is the dominant reason for the approach he took. You mention his lack of political capital. This seems sufficient to suggest that Obama’s chief concern will be appearing not to fail, whether he was a lawyer or not. Lacking the political clout, it seems Obama could not have arrived at a different position, even if his advising process brought out more options. You write “Early on, he made the decision that he couldn’t afford the perception that he had “failed” by losing Afghanistan. Obama, like any good lawyer, took that conclusion and came up with the best possible response.” Lawyer training may shape his response, but does it shape his initial conclusion? Or is that simply the effect of being a politician?

That decision being made at the outset, the debate would have proceeded as it did, Obama pressing his advisers for defenses of their position rather than challenging assumptions.

I’m not sure the decisionmaking process he employs with his advisers dictates that he will neglect the underlying assumptions of his position. Indeed, the decision process seems to follow from the decision to remain in Afghanistan, a position already arrived at. On his own, he neglects questioning assumptions. His interests, then, are served precisely by a process that allows him to make the best possible case for a tenuous proposition, because early on, as you note, he chooses a surge as his policy.

It seems that your concern is Obama’s crafting of a political policy, rather than one that addresses fundamental questions about the importance of Afghanistan. Gates and Mchrystal are not interested in crafting a political policy and would not lead Obama explicitly in that direction. The problem is not in the advising process but in Obama’s initial decisions, which seem to be made a priori.

http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/07/ask-the-times-how-obama-came-to-plan-for-the-surge/?hp