I also think it is an open question as to whether the events of 9/11 in some senses dictated Bush’s reaction as President. While difficult in today’s political climate, I think it is important to attempt to consider what it would have been like to be the President of the United States at that moment in time and how that event would have affected one’s approach to future decisions (I probably would have wanted to sit in that classroom in Florida and figure out what I wanted to do also!) On the other hand, I think there are many who would claim that Bush carried a certain degree of short and single-mindedness into his administration, not just out of it. For me, the truth probably lies somewhere in the middle: the terrorist attacks raised the stakes tremendously and put the existing, perhaps inadequate, decision making processes under a considerable amount of strain.

In such a scenario, I think we needed a prescient leader or a prescient team of aides capable of showing respect and restraint towards the magnitude of the responsibility placed at the hands of the executive in the months and years that followed. While Congress and the Courts had a role in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the informal and formal powers of the Presidency expanded dramatically as the nation turned to Bush for leadership and our laws bestowed him with the authority to address a grave threat to our country. This is not in-itself the problem: as you know, I think that the strength of our Constitution lies in part in the remarkable powers we grant to the Presidency in times like these – authority that allows our country to take necessary actions when time is of the essence. Rather, the problem is that it takes a remarkably prudent president to recognize that the only real form of restraint in exercising such powers is self-restraint. My guess – as I have no evidence, only impressions – is that there was not a great deal of restraint within the Bush Administration, either before or after 9/11 and that those elements that had the potential to stand in the way of administration policy, such as Colin Powell, were marginalized from the beginning.

The beauty of the Constitution is that it allows considerable room for strong, individual leadership at precisely those moments when such leadership is required. The trouble is that events conspire to decide which president is in office at those moments when individual leadership becomes paramount. But perhaps, as you and Neustadt have argued, there is a way around dependence on fate – a way to build prudence into the very institution of the Presidency whether it is changing the way in which we think about Presidential power or whether it is adopting a more effective staff structure. In any case, I think it is clear from my comments that I think we benefited neither from prudent leadership nor from institutional prudence in the wake of 9/11, much the same as you argue above.

I think you raise an excellent point regarding Bush’s failure to guard his power prospects by bringing in Congress, and the courts for that matter, or at least anticipating their reactions, in the early days of the War on Terror. It’s one I’ve made as well. In the end, he had to negotiate iwth both – so why not start from that position, rather than being forced to bargain and all the lost of prestige and reputation that caused? I think Bush officials would probably cite two responses: first, the urgency they felt to act quickly after 9-11. I think they didn’t believe they had sufficient time for a long, drawn out policy process. My response to this has always been that Congress likely would have been more pliable early in the crisis than later. But there’s a second response Bush officials might make: that they DID keep Congress apprised. We often forget that Bush did get Congress to pass resolutions of support to prosecute the war on terror and to invade Iraq. More importantly, as the Pelosi controversy suggests, there may have been alot more behind the scenes consultation going on than we know about, at least so far. That’s one reason why I suspect Obama is not eager to take up a Truth Commission-like inquiry – it may implicate Democrats as architects, or at least willing participants, in the early controversial stages of the war on terror.

A final thought: don’t underestimate the advantage Obama has with hindsight – it enables him to continue those pieces of the Bush war on terror that have worked and have political support, while jettisoning the others. So although you and others are correct, I think, to point out that he has changed the tone of the prosecution of the war on terror, I’m not so sure he would have used the same language had he been in Bush’s position, presiding the in the immediate aftermath of 9-11. Of course, we’ll never know….

http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=1e733cac-c273-48e5-9140-80443ed1f5e2

Goldsmith points out additional areas in which Obama has largely continued Bush’s policies, including the use of predator drones to target suspected terrorists, the continuation of the Bush domestic surveillance practices, and support for the State Secrets doctrine used to protect sources of information in court in the interest of national security.

As I did, Goldsmith argues that Obama’s continuation of these policies reflects the movement from candidate to president, and the change in perspective that entails.

And for still another version of my claim, but with a more partisan tinge, see today’s Washington Post piece by Charles Krauthammer.

Of course, if you don’t have time to read all these pieces, just go back to my op ed piece from several months ago, linked above. It lays it out all…. :~)

Still, as you point out, Professor Dickinson, the approach and tone of the Obama administration has proven to be remarkably different from the Bush administration, a fact that was brought into even greater relief when Cheney took to the podium at the American Enterprise Institute. I would concede that this is partly due to the passing of time: the 9/11 attacks have faded from public consciousness. Obama can afford to lay out a relatively complicated argument and policy because the country has become much more patient and deliberative than it was in the wake of the terrorist attacks.

Nevertheless, it struck me yesterday that the stylistic differences between Cheney and Obama cannot simply be cast aside as being “superficial” because the language employed by these two men highlights profound differences in the way these two individuals (perhaps administrations) approach questions of national security. The fact that Cheney and Bush mention 9/11 at the beginning of almost every important speech on security is not just a rhetorical device, it is also evocative of the way in which they seem to have approached such decisions intellectually. I say this because recounting the events of September 11 is often (and in Cheney’s speech was) the premise upon which diametrically opposed policy options are presented: you’re either with us or against us; we either do everything we can to stop terrorism or we let the terrorists win; or in Cheney’s words yesterday,

“we’re left to draw one of two conclusions – and here is the great dividing line in our current debate over national security. You can look at the facts and conclude that the comprehensive strategy has worked, and therefore needs to be continued as vigilantly as ever. Or you can look at the same set of facts and conclude that 9/11 was a one-off event – coordinated, devastating, but also unique and not sufficient to justify a sustained wartime effort. Whichever conclusion you arrive at, it will shape your entire view of the last seven years, and of the policies necessary to protect America for years to come.”

Contrast this approach with Obama’s: yesterday, he touched briefly on the very real threats facing our country today before complicating the picture by emphasizing the importance of the rule of law and the other values enshrined in the documents surrounding him (and let’s not downplay the symbolism Obama sought by holding his speech in the National Archives). From a rhetorical and, I believe, intellectual standpoint, Obama frames his position by considering the implications of policy option on both national security and on the core values of American democracy: liberty, justice, and the rule of law. What is the outcome? Obama’s speech does not present a black and white view of the world, instead, he explains in great detail that it has been difficult to balance two competing interests, but also that he has identified some pragmatic approaches that he believes will improve national security without sacrificing key values.

But according to Cheney’s worldview, this is simply not possible: “Critics of our policies are given to lecturing on the theme of being consistent with American values. But no moral value held dear by the American people obliges public servants ever to sacrifice innocent lives to spare a captured terrorist from unpleasant things. And when an entire population is targeted by a terror network, nothing is more consistent with American values than to stop them.”

Here we come to the basis of the disagreement: for Cheney, national security trumps other considerations – fighting terrorism is the preeminent American value; for Obama, there is more of a balancing act between security and values, forces that are not necessarily always in opposition to one another. There are countless debates that stem from this specific point of disagreement, and many are worth careful consideration. For instance, I think it is fascinating that such different modes of comprehending the issues at stake nevertheless result in substantial points of agreement between the two individuals.

As a student of history and political science, I am particularly struck by the fact that Administrations that show public disregard for the rule of law often jeopardize the very causes they seek to promote. It is perhaps Machiavellian of me to suggest that the Bush administration might have created a more solid legacy if it had paid more rhetorical and symbolic fealty to the very values Obama highlighted in his speech; yet, there is also a part of me that instinctively rejects the practicality of such deception, for I think that it is still true that in American politics, public perception is not altogether removed from reality. In other words, it would have been nearly impossible for Cheney to adorn his speech with some of Obama’s language because the words would have been so obviously hollow and flat that they would have betrayed Cheney’s true convictions. The irony of course, is that if things continue as they stand now, a large number of controversial Bush-era policies will find new life under the Obama Administration, and that Obama’s mastery of symbolism and balanced rhetoric may be the only thing that has changed. Which would only beg the question: why didn’t Bush adopt a similar tact all along?

Brooks’ point is that the more controversial aspects of Bush’s war on terror all took place very early after 9/11, and that the current, less controversial framework for the war on terror that Obama has largely ratified was largely in place during Bush’s second term. This is a point that I made in my op ed piece last January – here’s what I wrote then: “Ironically, Obama will benefit from Congress’ and the judiciary’s pushback against the Bush administration efforts to broaden the scope of presidential authority in the national security realm; new limits negotiated in the areas of domestic eavesdropping, torture, and the treatment of prisoners means Obama will be spared the need to fight these battles from scratch. “