In the second model, focusing on late deciders, the only variable that comes out as significant is partisanship, and only 77 percent of cases are correctly categorized. This suggests that there may be some effect involving people “coming home” to their natural party, but otherwise, the votes of late deciders are unpredictable.

In the second two models, I included the variables listed above, plus two “feeling thermometer” variables that reflect voters’ general affect towards the two candidates on a 0 to 100 “hot” or “cold” scale. My theory was that these variables might pick up any “miscellaneous” campaign effects that could exist. When these variables are included, we do much better at predicting the votes of late deciders. The feeling thermometer variables become very significant, partisanship drops off in importance, and the model correctly predicts 89 percent of late deciders’ vote choices.

So does this mean campaign effects do exist for the last-minute undecideds? Possibly, but there’s another explanation for the feeling thermometers’ significance: They may reflect post-hoc rationalizations of late deciders’ votes. If you’ve voted for a candidate, you may end up deciding that the candidate is an all right guy. I’m still more comfortable with predicting a mild effect based on previous party ID, but not much else.

“I’d believe Matt’s argument here if, in the article cited, the authors had attempted to predict late deciders’ votes solely on the basis of factors that occur in multiple elections — party ID, economic evaluations, and other issues. But the authors run separate models for each election and incorporate campaign-specific factors such as each voter’s response to questions like (for 1972) “Can Nixon be trusted?”, “Can McGovern be trusted?”, (for 1976) does Carter have a “presidential personality?” and (for 1988) how would you characterize Dukakis’s leadership qualities?

The fact is, none of these campaign-specific factors did a better job of predicting late deciders’ votes than the “fundamentals” (economy, party ID, etc.) or policy positions on foreign affairs, race relations, or social issues. Nothing explained late deciders’ choices very well. This group of voters, for example, is much more likely to cross party lines than other voters.

I buy the argument that there are some late deciders who are disgruntled Republicans who are less enthusiastic about McCain than Obama voters are about Obama. Interestingly, though, the Gopoian piece suggests that these people cannot be expected to support McCain based on party ID alone (see p. 66). I wouldn’t be surprised if McCain had a slight edge among those who make up their minds at the last minute, but I don’t expect the margin to be very large.”

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/30/AR2008103004365_pf.html

The gist of the story is that the McCain camp is making an argument very similar to the one Dickinson has made above: the demographics of the undecided voters seem to suggest that they will be more likely to vote for McCain. Nevertheless, the authors, Robert Barnes and Jon Cohen, also point out that other pieces of information complicate the picture:

“Among those voters who say they are still undecided or open to persuasion, more are currently McCain supporters than Obama backers. So McCain has to fight to hang on to those voters as well as persuade those leaning toward the Democrat. And Obama’s supporters seem more enthusiastic. Among all likely voters in the Post-ABC poll, 49 percent say they will “definitely” vote for Obama heading into the final weekend, compared with 40 percent who say the same about McCain.”

It may be true that undecided voters are more likely to vote for McCain, but the very fact that more of his supporters are “undecided” complicates the issue. The truth is probably not as simple as the McCain camp suggests: while the demographics of undecided voters suggest that they are more likely to vote for McCain, there is no guarantee that they actually will. It is Obama who has the larger number of strong supporters; the question is whether McCain can close the gap on election day.

To be perfectly frank, I think it is hard to trust any comments about the polls coming from either candidate with only a few days left in the race. McCain’s camp could easily be seeing this trend because they want to (or even because they have to). Obama’s campaign statements on the matter could also be equally biased because they also know that perceptions can easily become a reality on the campaign trail. Alternatively, Obama could use closer poll numbers to keep his base as mobilized as possible. The good news is that we’ll know the accuracy of the polls in a few days.

Perhaps it is a question better left for November 5, but I think it’s worth considering before the results come in:

One of the arguments against giving Obama the democratic nomination was that he won a lot of delegates in states that “wouldn’t matter” in the general election. While external factors (such as the economy) have certainly played a role in shaping the map, hasn’t Obama’s broad electoral strategy already been vindicated? Four days before the election, he is competing in traditional red states like Montana, North Dakota, North Carolina, and Indiana and holds significant margins in Nevada, New Mexico, Colorado, Virginia, and New Hampshire. Add to that Obama’s influence on down-ticket races in the South, and you have a pretty decent justification for what he has done.

I wonder what the race would look like now if Clinton were the candidate. My guess is that it would be significantly closer than it is right now.