Course Discussion

This page will allow for a free-form discussion. Students should feel free to post whatever they like here: questions, comments, musings, &c.

42 thoughts on “Course Discussion

  1. Avery

    Having been reminded to do these discussion posts, I thought it might be worthwhile to clarify the scheme of “moral” global order I was attempting to describe in class on Tuesday. It is worth noting up front that this attempt is concerned with describing an “ideal” system of international order. I will take into account the strict natural limits on human knowledge, but not the difficulties of actually bringing the world I describe about.
    The basis of my argument was that Utility is the ultimate universal value and should therefore provide the basis of any moral international order, or any other human endeavor for that matter. I take utility to be defined as the fulfillment of rational desire, ie those desires which one would choose given total knowledge of various options and their outcomes. The value of this conception of the good lies with its universal applicability. It does not say what causes happiness in various people, only that what we should aim for is to be happy. It is nigh on impossible to prove in a logical sense that happiness, or any other possible good for that matter, is what we “should” pursue. However, I believe that happiness is the best good due to its self-sufficient nature. To the degree that we are happy, we are totally satisfied with our current state of affairs. If we were totally happy, we would want nothing more in our life whatsoever, ignoring the sort of immediate and recurring desires presented by hunger, thirst etc. which, even though we eat and drink, will always return.
    Of course, Utilitarianism presents several problems. First, it is impossible to actually quantify utility. Thus, the best we can do is to compare different outcomes utility in an ordinal rather than a cardinal sense. But even given that we can compare outcomes in terms of utility without quantifying it, it remains to determine how this comparison should be carried out. Should we focus on utility itself as a unit or should we instead focus on “satisfied people?” I favor the latter conception, as it ties utility firmly to humanity and prevents utility, a means to the good life for humans, from becoming a detached end in and of itself. The issue of “perfect rationality” also presents difficulties, as no human ever has perfect knowledge of outcomes. Just as with Utility, however, I believe that we must simply do our best to evaluate outcomes, with full respect paid to our limitations in this arena.
    In regards to international relations, Utilitarianism has several important prescriptions. The current Westphalian system will only be justified to the degree that it promotes Utility. There are good arguments that in fact the current system does promote Utility by creating a relatively ordered system. War is of course antithetical to utility in a general sense, as it kills off a great many people who could add to the total of happy people and renders those left alive less happy than they otherwise would be. However, I suggest that certain exceptions to state sovereignty make good sense in Utilitarian terms. Attempting to limit global human rights violations, increase freedom of conscience and political participation, and provide economic growth in poor nations all quite clearly promote utility by allowing people to determine what it is they desire and providing the resources to do so. A world in which every human was free to think and speak as they wish will allow them to more easily determine what their desires actually are, to the degree that any human can. Political representation will allow them to make sure their society is responsive to these desires. Finally, economic wealth will allow them to actually act on their desires. The law of diminishing returns suggests that one dollar to a poor man will count more than one to a rich man, which suggests a more egalitarian wealth distribution than the world currently possesses.
    Given that the world does not reflect this ideal world, what should actors do to bring it about? I believe that the sort of large state interventions which were seen in the Bush administration recently or in colonial empires in the past are too filled with uncertainty in regards to outcomes to be moral actions. To be sure, sometimes these interventions turn out well, but it seems often due to luck rather than any true knowledge at the time the intervention was decided upon, suggesting that the decision itself was poorly made. Actors do have a responsibility to improve the world, but must do so in a realistic fashion. More concretely, I believe this justifies a more “grassroots” approach to global improvement utilizing direct support for those groups which conform to the very basic Utilitarian standards. Foreign Aid is thus very important, though I think micro loans and other such “direct” aid is better than the easily corrupted government aid. Essentially, states must do whatever they can to enable Utilitarian values without forcing these values, as the use of force brings with it a great deal of uncertainty. Force should only be used in the most dire of circumstances, which I take to be peacekeeping sorts of missions rather than proactive imperial interventions. This opposition to proactive intervention is a practical concern; if we could have enough knowledge of the outcome of an intervention, I would have no objection to interventions which increase utility.
    This is only a sketch of what I was suggesting, but I think it gets the main idea across. I have avoided several issues, such as generational weighting and sacrifice for the greater good, which are key. However, I think that I’ve rambled long enough for now.

  2. Chris

    I would like to think that we could make decisions based on utility as defined by your definition by assuming that humans and even states are capable of making completely rational decisions with total knowledge but complete knowledge is simply impossible. I am not able to correctly maximize my utility even about choosing what I would like for to eat for dinner given already prepared options at the dining hall. Would it maximize my utility to have a salad, water, and a sandwich for dinner or would I prefer the short-term joy of Chicken Parm, Chocolate Milk, and a brownie (or three). Therefore, I wonder if that I as an individual am not able to maximize my utility with total knowledge even about simple decisions which I know a lot about, what applicability can a utility argument have to analyzing state actors? Theoretically, using a system of judgment in which all actions are completely calculated, rational, and benefit-maximizing is great but you criterion is relative to each person. As westerners, we consider self-representation, economic growth, and human rights essential values; however, from a utilitarian perspective aren’t individuals responsible for maximizing their utility? I do not think that Native Americans in the 1800s would have preferred representation in our political system and higher levels of GDP growth. Certain cultures have trials of manhood that place young men at significant risk of death. Some people value honor above life. Others would prefer to live in an authoritarian system in which freedoms are limited but life is very safe. How many Iraqis preferred life under Saadam?
    In conclusion, as individuals our knowledge of other people’s happiness is limited. I would like to say that we could globally provide all representation in government, economic growth, and human rights for all people but even if we did (and the process of providing all that might not be worth the benefit of potentially getting it-) that not all people would be maximizing their happiness. Cultural identity and values are incredible important. Maybe I’m missed part of your point but you seem to be using a completely relativist definition of utility and then applying you’re version of utility (even if it’s very basic) to encompass universal values.

  3. Sarah

    I would like to take advantage of this forum to reflect upon the lecture entitled “Trade and Poverty: When the Third World Falls Behind” delivered by Jeffrey Williams. During his talk, Williams probed the origins of the development gap between the Northern OECD core and the Southern periphery that became strikingly apparent during the nineteenth century and up until the First World War.
    Williams’ explanation for this development gap was a fairly straightforward causal chain: increased globalization in the nineteenth century, fueled by a transport revolution, caused a transitory trade boom in the periphery which caused a temporary secular (and by secular, I posit that Williams meant “occurring once in a century” instead of “not religious”) improvement in terms of trade in these areas. This led to increased specialization which meant, in the case of the periphery, de-industrialization. Clearly, de-industrialization is hardly a good precondition for long-term growth, and the periphery found itself in an even great dilemma when a subsequent trade bust (more robust markets began to search for alternatives to traditional primary products) threatened exports and compounded trade volatility.
    Hardly a cheerful picture for the third-world periphery in as the era of WWI dawned. The real issue I want to address in this post, however, revolves around one of the last statements that Williams uttered today, when he talked about the role that this stunted development has had in shaping institutions in developing countries. Williams clearly distinguished himself from the “institutionalists” (a school of thought whom he admitted carries most sway today) by asserting that it is economic preconditions that determine the type of institutions designed in these periphery countries. In this way, countries whose economies revolve around the export of primary products tend to develop a small and select wealthy class with control over these primary resources; this wealthy class then, creates institutions that maintain this hierarchy and thus entrenche societal inequality and further compromise growth.
    This argument interests me primarily because I have long wondered about where institutions fit into the causal chain when discussing domestic or international order. It’s the old “chicken or the egg” argument: do institutions determine domestic and international ordering (“yes”, Ikenberry would undoubtedly reply in response to the latter) or is there an antecedent variable that holds sway over the nature of the institutions developed? Robert Putnam is perhaps most famous for asserting in Making Democracy Work that it is plentiful social capital and a robust civil society that come first; these then determine the effectiveness of institutions and their ability to maintain an orderly and democratic society. Thus, in Putnams eyes, civic society –> institutions –> ordering of domestic systems. Others might argue that geography determines the institutions developed domestically (is the state’s climate best suited to an industrial society, or an agrarian?), which then determine the nature of order in that state.
    At any rate, I certainly have come to no conclusions regarding the predominance or primacy of institutions in determining international and domestic order, and thus will leave the questions in this discussion post unresolved but thoughtful and open-ended.

  4. Ted

    I found Avery’s post quite interesting, particularly because it covers a school of thought with which I’m unfamiliar. At first Utilitarianism seemed right up my alley. It brought me back to the simple abstractions of Intro Micro. Who can argue that an ideal world isn’t one in which happiness (an admittedly slippery concept) is maximized?

    As an aside before I start on the (relevant) international aspect of this discussion, I would like to comment on the section of Avery’s post that really jarred me. As any good student of the Middlebury Economics Department knows, “The law of diminishing returns suggests that one dollar to a poor man will count more than one to a rich man, which suggests a more egalitarian wealth distribution than the world currently possesses.” This comment in particular highlighted what I see as the shortsighted nature of this philosophy—that someone is entitled to a greater share of the wealth by virtue wanting it more. (Full disclosure: I’m reading Atlas Shrugged right now and I like it, thank you very much.) This kind of thinking, while generous, cannot lead to sustainable growth because of the perverse incentives it creates. Although our current system is not perfect, moving even farther away from a system in which the rewards of labor are commensurate to the value added to society would only lead to trouble.

    In terms of the international distribution of wealth (I believe that is closer to what Avery was referencing), it is also not clear that redistributing wealth through foreign aid to poor countries is an effective way to lift them out of poverty. William Easterly, for one, contends that aid has negative repercussions, similar to those caused by natural resource wealth. Anyway, from an economic point of view I do not believe giving people what will make them happy is necessarily the best long term plan. Although, perhaps this is why Avery focuses so much on the unreliability of ex ante assessments of international interventions…

    Defining the threshold for justifiable intervention is a tricky subject and it is probably impossible to come up with a functional definition agreed upon by a majority of people. Without broadening the rule to the point of uselessness, people will inevitably draw their own lines everywhere across the continuum of causes for intervention. That said, uncertainty is a cop out only an academic is fortunate enough to enjoy. Some very uncertain missions may be the most necessary of all. (I’m thinking of the Holocaust, but I admit playing the Nazi card just isn’t fair in this sort of discussion.) After all, if the outcome is certainly positive, then there shouldn’t be much debate.

    So, I believe (and I think Avery agrees with this) there is room for intervention even under uncertain conditions when the threat to the populace in question is great enough. (Yes, I know that’s basically turning the whole question into a statement.) In a country with the capability to affect change around the world, it is hard to stand idly by as innocent people are slaughtered.

    This is where the my pessimism about international relations comes into play: in the easy cases where we clearly see actions that fly in the face of our principles and we are almost certain we can stop them, there is no reason not to intervene altruistically. Unfortunately, the most pressing cases are those that involve a great deal of risk and, for better or worse, states are unwilling to compromise themselves purely on moral grounds. So, to me, this whole discussion of when states “should” intervene is rather trivial. I don’t really believe states have intervened in others’ affairs solely to spread the word of their god, or lift impoverished people out of their misery. I guess this means the threshold for intervention on moral grounds is very low, but only because of practical “what’s in it for me” considerations.

    I’ve thoroughly tangled my thoughts up on this one, but I just started thinking about WWI. Why did the US (lead by a positively idealistic President) enter such a remote war? I don’t think the Lusitania or the Zimmerman Telegram were significant enough threats. If anyone’s interested, I’d like to hear if you have a justification that fits with what I said above, or if you think it’s a good counter to my argument. Or, just do your thing.

  5. Jesse

    In viewing this run of posts regarding Utilitarianism, I thought it best to share with you all an interesting view on the subject which I was recently exposed to in my contemporary moral issues course. Before I do so, I must also admit that my initial impressions of Utilitarianism were indeed similar to the sentiments expressed by Ted; who really could argue that the ideal world is not one in which we seek to maximize happiness?

    In an article entitled “Against Utilitarianism” (you can guess what’s coming), philosopher Bernard Williams argues that Utilitarianism is a bad moral theory in that it violates the moral integrity of one’s own being. In brief, he gives an example, among others, that Jim having the choice to kill one man to save ten others is not the right thing to do if Jim’s own premonitions tell him it’s not the right thing to do, even though Utilitarianism would always tell us that it is. He argues in essence that going against our own moral intuitions and moral projects for the greater good will make integrity more or less an unintelligible value.

    I thought this view on things was interesting, and feel that could add do, and probably make more complex, our discussions regarding state action, and pertains particularly to Ted’s “what’s in it for me considerations” comment. While morally the threshold for intervention does seem low, that’s not to say, in my opinion, that something good can’t be done for others, while at the same time benefiting ourselves. Perhaps in this way, we might meld the two schools of thought in which states succeed in “making happier” states less well off, while at the same time maintaining a moral integrity through acknowledging that the benefits are often not one-sided.

  6. Mike West

    -Utilitarianism and Universalism-
    I am glad that Avery’s utilitarian manifesto has brought this discussion to examining universalism; when this discussion ended last Thursday I felt there was much more to be said about this subject.
    I enjoyed Chris’ lunch-line examples that brought forth the idea of innate knowledge, and whether we can know what is good for our own happiness, but I think that in analyzing such a messy and complicated problem, such as the international system, a more fundamental question is whether we can understand what is good for our neighbor. I can understand this original argument, that there are certain fundamental rights and needs that can supposedly increase utility, but this does not take into account the vast religious, cultural, and personal divergence within the world. How can one state, with no little to no understanding of a separate state’s religious ideology, accurately assess their happiness, if their happiness is largely based on afterlife beliefs. And how could we judge medieval rituals of African tribes, without understanding their cultural and social satisfaction from otherwise brutal practices. I will end this part of the argument with a remark Bill Maher made recently, though I may regret this. He mentioned that the Iraqi shoe-thrower was recently let out of prison, and has been inundated with gift from various Middle-Eastern leaders, including a Saudi Prince who sent him a woman as a gift. I believe Maher then said, “how the f*** are we supposed to understand this place, if it’s perfectly acceptable to send a women, against her will, as a get out of prison gift?”
    Secondly, I would like to briefly address one of Ted’s points. Ted said that he doesn’t believe “states have intervened in others’ affairs solely to spread the word of their god, or lift impoverished people out of their misery.” I agree that selfishness in the international system is rare or non-existent, but I also believe that both of these examples you mentioned could be self-benefiting as well. Spreading the word of god creates a transnational bond across states, which could supersede national sovereignty. Lifting impoverished people out of their misery, if accomplished successfully, will help the benefactor’s economy in the long run. Thus, the examples of African aid and early missionaries that were discussed in class, I believe are still examples of the “what’s in it for me” ideology.

  7. Jelena

    After reading your very interesting and stimulating posts I must say I found myself thinking of my own stand in the continuum between “the common/greater good” and “what’s in it for me”.
    On the one hand, Utilitarianism Avery talks about offers a great prospect of the world driven by a wish of maximizing happiness. The idea that human beings will act with their main aim as happiness is indeed very appealing to me. On the other hand how possible is this world? I agree that happiness is a very broad term, and even if we could agree on what exactly it means, I do not think it could be possible to expect every person to agree that happiness would be their logical and most wanted objective. Friedrich Nietzsche in his “The Birth of Tragedy” introduces two concepts: Apollonian, connected to reason and “the light side”, and Dionysian, connected to chaos, emotions and “the dark side” (of course this is an oversimplification). According to him, these two concepts are two sides, two parts of everything, of human nature and human beings as well. Therefore, each of us consists of these two sides and acts in different situations being driven by either one of the impulses. And these impulses can not always be controlled. My point is, people do not always think that rational approach is the best, and even if they do think so, it is not always possible for people to externalize it, since while choosing the Apollonian way, they could actually incarnate Dionysian one.
    At the same time, even if I would think that all people would/could agree to act according to this model, Chris’s comment about different cultures definitely makes sense to me. Having an experience of living in different states with quite various cultures and being a person of a mixed origin, I must stress that every idea and concept is always influenced by culture and traditions. Therefore, creating a united perception of happiness seems very difficult to me. And these difficulties can be found while applying this model on the human/personal level.
    Applying this model to states and their behavior seems even more problematic to me. Maybe because I am coming from a different culture or because I am quite a skeptical person when it comes to politics, I do not believe that in modern world we could expect countries to act solely with an aim of pursuing, maximizing and distributing happiness. I just do not think that states act taking in consideration moral issues in first place. In world of politics, in my opinion, common/greater good in theory is embedded in the United Nations, the organization that is “committed to maintaining international peace and security, developing friendly relations among nations and promoting social progress, better living standards and human rights”. If states would pursue utilitarian goals, they should have cooperated and acted united in the frame of the United Nations. In reality, it does not happen, since in so many situations obvious logical and beneficial decisions are not being made or being made too late just because of some single states or a group of states are following the “what’s in it for me” approach. Do I have suggestions about how to change it? No. Do I think it could be changed at all? Most likely no. (I do not think every single state would change its approach and knowing this other states are not going to change it; it is like a possibility of countries giving up their nuclear arms: country would agree to do that only being sure that others would do it, but you can never be sure ->prisoner’s dilemma)
    I am pretty sure that we all agree that these topics are controversial, multi-layered and hard; my own stand is still not quite clear to me, so I am open for new ideas and their explanations.

  8. Katie

    I would also like to discuss the Jeffrey Williamson lecture briefly. Since Williamson is an economic historian, the lecture tilted much more heavily towards econ-speak than we are used to in this class, but much of this discussion so far has been applying economic theories to international politics, so I don’t feel too guilty adding to the economic dimension of our international politics discussion. Williamson gave three principle theories for why the third world periphery is poor while OECD countries are rich. One of these theories is that this divergence can be explained by culture. Mike’s post where he writes, “How could we judge medieval rituals of African tribes, without understanding their cultural and social satisfaction from otherwise brutal practices?” I think is the “evidence” for this theory – that some cultures are so “backwards” that it impedes economic development. Williamson basically glossed over this theory and focused on his variation on what I found to be a somewhat circular argument, a new twist on the institutional explanation which Sarah describes: wealthy elite create institutions which keep wealth concentrated with the wealthy elite.

    On another note, I was thinking about comparing Lake’s sovereignty continuum and Keohane (and co.)’s legalization continuum. For some reason, I was struck by the similarities between the two approaches. Lake divides sovereignty into three different issue areas: security relationships, economic relationships, and political relationships. Then he puts each on a continuum with an anarchic form on one end and a hierarchic structure on the other end. This strategy resembles somewhat what Keohane did when he divided legalization into three characteristics: obligation, precision, and delegation, and then put each on a continuum with an anarchic form on one end and hard law as the opposite. Both spectrums can accommodate international organizations and rank them on a scale that involves anarchy as one extreme.

  9. Andrea Jones

    Hobbes states that without a sovereign, “there is no place for Industry…no Navigation…no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society…” Although state sovereignty can provide the base for such development, according to Pease and Forsythe, it can also be used “to deny international humanitarian protection” of the fundamental “rights to life, adequate nutrition, adequate health, adequate shelter, freedom from arbitrary detention, torture, and mistreatment” (305). Because the basic rights of individuals are universal, their protection should transcend the limits of domestic jurisdiction to be included in the realm of international law. Avery writes that humanity’s aim for happiness should “provide the basis for any moral international order,” but to what extent can we define this happiness? Is it the dignity afforded by basic human rights? Or is it a more extended set of universal values?

    Hobbes seems to argue that the security provided by sovereignty is fundamental to human innovation, but what of the peace and security that comes with the rigid state control of an example like North Korea? Such security could prove antithetical to the evolution of arts, letters, and society described by Hobbes. Furthermore, history provides us with too many examples of governments who have drastically reversed the promise of security through the perpetration of horrific crimes against their own citizens. I don’t believe that individual security is wholly dependent upon state sovereignty, nor that security in and of itself should be the ultimate goal of political organization. That being said, any universalist vision of security as a means to a higher end presents the difficult question of what that end might be. As an American, my pursuit of happiness depends not only upon my access to basic human rights, but also upon my freedom of expression and political participation—values which many believe should be universal. However, even if ideal governments were to reflect the will of their citizens, would these values emerge within the rich cultural context of our world today? How can we seek to create a just international order without a shared understanding of what values it should protect?

    In addition to the problem of universal applicability within the multicultural global sphere, I’d like to agree with the skepticism expressed many students regarding the likelihood of states upholding any moral international order without consideration of what Mike and Jelena describe as the “what’s in it for me” approach. Humanitarian intervention that overrides state sovereignty in the interest of upholding basic human rights is very rarely guided by purely altruistic motivations. As Pease and Forsythe point out, “in most contemporary incidents involving state use of force in another state, without the latter’s consent, strategic or economic objectives were as important if not more so than protecting persons” (300). The complicated concept of international order, what values it rests on and who is responsible for securing it, will no doubt keep the members of this forum engaged in thought-provoking discussion throughout the course of the semester.

  10. Caitlin

    Since most of the issues that come to my mind in regards to utilitarianism have already been raised (and since Avrey hasn’t gotten a chance to respond yet) I would like to instead comment on the conversation from the end of class this afternoon.

    It seems to me that most of the arguments raised against a constructivist approach to political theory revolve around the complexity of the theory itself (I’d be interested to hear if people have other arguments as well). Essentially that a theory that requires you to examine so many elements cannot be useful in the real world because it would take far too long to reach any conclusions. I agree with this in part, the purpose of theories is to act as tools through which we can simplify and clarify complex situations. I would however also argue that some other theories we have thus far studied seek to simplify the word so much that they become effectively useless, these theories are either inconclusive or even wrong when one moves outside of a specific set of case studies.

    Theories should help simplify and explain the world, but theories that lead policy makers to false assumptions are dangerous. I would argue that the lessons of constructivism, that previous relationships between actors matter for analysis of the present can be applied without overly complicating the issue. We don’t necessarily need to examine every interaction between two actors to get a sense of how their previous interactions are affecting their current sentiments. One doesn’t need to look at every movement of US politics to understand that our reactions to military shifts in Cuba will be different from our reactions if Canada made the same decisions. Without looking at historic relations however, one might be led to view a Canadian buildup as far more threatening (and perhaps Professor Morrison would agree) and thus expect a stronger reaction from the US. Looking at history however, we might instead argue that the US will feel more threatened by a Cuban buildup, even though Cuba is significantly smaller than Canada.

    Analysis of past relations can be a valuable addition to international political theory, at the end of the day we are going to have to conform our theories in such a way that they actually match with the world around us (as we cant really expect the world to somehow match itself to our theories).

  11. Kiko

    In class, I try to always relate the ideas we express, to the EU integration due to my personal experience/ background.

    During European History, European Empires had always been fighting together (i.e. Roman Empire, Napoleon’s Empire, Third Reich Empire, etc) and this led to terrible wars, that devastated Europe. After each war, Europe had to rebuild from scratch. Nowadays, we have an EU based on the idea of peace and with 27 members. What is interest for me is that I don’t find in the readings a clear and true answer to explain all this European integration.

    We talked a lot about the “universal values” and try to understand complicate ideas through theories. I don’t see any precise theory that can explain correctly what is happening in the EU. How countries that always fought in the past, came together under one unique idea of being European? How eastern European countries can be seated and talk about the future with former USSR countries? How countries that gave so much importance to their sovereignty, legitimacy, security, power, etc, lost part of it to be member of the EU?

    Taking the example of the EU integration, I think that the idea of “willing” is more important to explain international order, then theories.

  12. Kiko

    PS: One more thing: I’m sorry to say that, but I HAVE the greatest and healthier beard in the class!!!We should make a competition and then have the girls to grade them. Who is up for the challenge?

  13. Ted

    To use some economics, I’m just not convinced that the marginal benefit of adding another layer of complexity outweighs the marginal cost. Yes, we feel pretty safe around the Canucks and less so around the Commies, but there are still much more concrete considerations that have a greater influence on the decisions made by policymakers.

    I found this http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_Plan_Red on this website: http://copybot.wordpress.com/2009/04/07/the-50-most-interesting-articles-on-wikipedia/

    You can never be too careful,…eh?

  14. Catherine

    While we have claimed the constructivist theory to be complex, I find that there are still some merits we can take from this approach. What constructivists try do in regards to the international system is to analyze the elements of this system, by taking into account the history of a country or of the countries involved. This history is a catalogue of events in which stems constructed attitudes, laws, and norms. All of which the country supports and has in turn used to influence their actions in the realm of international relations.

    Surely using a constructivist viewpoint regarding the history of relations between countries can prove to be tedious, complicated and slow down an already extensive legal process. Yet when states act on a current political situation they reference their history while acknowledge the existing circumstances. As the WTO keeps note of violations of past breaches in tariff agreements, states also have their own record when considering interactions with other states. Their history, their past leaders, and political regimes will all contribute in influencing the present action.

    Thus recognising that states can’t erase their history, cultures cannot just forget past conflicts we must carry on constructing. However, these dispositions and attitudes towards certain cultures or governments have been tainted or negatively influenced. Therefore we must work on reconstructing relations between states. Since “it is collective meanings that constitute the structures which organize our actions” we can create new meanings, change old stereotypical ideologies to more positive ones to help build new relations, positively impacting order in the international system (Wendt 397).

    If “anarchy is what we make of it” can’t future attitudes and interactions between states be what we make of them and what we construct them to be?

  15. EY

    As Caitlin mentioned, today’s discussion about Wendt’s constructivist approach to explaining international relations was really interesting. I agree with Caitlin that constructivism is a complex theory itself, and it is possible to analyze relationships between states without going through all the events that occurred in the past. However, my objection is that it would take a long time to analyze the history before making a practical and rational decision. I do not, by any means, believe that constructivism is not a valid theory; in fact, it is an ideal way to approach studying international relations. Nonetheless, wouldn’t the current status of a relationship between two states reflect the history of those states already? When we see the current relationship between the US and Cuba, it is implied that two countries have not been getting along so great in the past. I understand that a “snapshot” of the current international relations can be misleading. However, what I mean by a “snapshot” is not just a simple status of “country A and B are friends” or “country A and B are enemies”; it is more or less a brief explanation of their current relationship that already reflects, in a compressed manner, the past. In addition to my argument, I agree with Kiko that sometimes history cannot explain what is currently happening in the world.

    When a state makes a decision about an international matter, I highly doubt that it considers the impact that the decision will have in 200 years. The president will probably be concerned about immediate consequences that may occur during his presidency. Others may consider potential consequences in a timeframe of couple decades. If it is not a state’s first priority to think about what its relationship with other states will be in 200 years, and rather it is focused on its immediate consequences, do we necessarily have to go to back 200 years (or more) and take into account all the events that happened in the history in order to analyze today’s international relations? Or can we just focus on what we have in today’s politics?

  16. Sarah

    I found the propaganda speeches by Hitler and Goebbels this past week to be startling on many counts, but perhaps most so for the striking similarity between the rhetoric of these former Germany leaders to that of another notorious European politician who has been recently causing a stir on the European continent. This European politician is the figurehead and de facto leader of a radical right party, most notorious for his denial of the Holocaust and ardent belief that his country’s economic and social troubles could be solved if only his country could revert to an “ethnically pure” state.

    Nick Griffin, head of the British National Party, has caused a wave of revulsion and resent across the British Isles and the European continent after winning a seat in the European Parliament in the recent 2009 elections. In a segment of recent BBC interviews (quite entertaining and divided into six sessions: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4iKfrY9l2kY ), the party leader espoused his views on race and British citizenship, claiming that anyone not of the Caucasian race might be “civically British, but to be ethnically British is a matter of being English, Scot, Irish, or Welsh”.

    Quite obviously, Nick Griffin is a radical anomaly of Britain whose outlandish, reactionary platform says little of mainstream British political sentiment. Yet the trend that Nick Griffin represents is significant and sobering: radical right parties in Europe made gains across the continent in the recent European Parliamentary elections, most noticeably in the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Denmark, and Greece. Increased support for the radical right contradicts Lijphart’s theory on permanent cleavages and consensus democracy, as well as Inglehart’s theory of postmodernism. These far right parties share in common a platform based on ultranationalism, ethnocentrism, xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, and a belief that the political unit should be congruent with the nation. Sounds vaguely familiar …

    The effect that these parties will have on the European political system is debatable. Their capacity to affect the European agenda or “drag” the whole system right will largely hinge on their ability to form a solid coalition in the Parliament. But whatever the outcome, it would be interesting to study European society today and that of 1933 in an attempt to find congruencies that might explain a desire to elect leaders with such similar rhetoric and ends.

  17. Nemanja Tepavcevic (Nems)

    I would definitely agree with Sarah’s post on the striking and scary similarity between Nazi propaganda speeches and the Euroskeptic-xenophobic rhetoric of several leaders in the EU today. A similar politician is gaining significant support in the Netherlands, Mr. Geert Wilders, leader of the Dutch Freedom Party, who calls for Koran to be banned and ironically compares it to Hitler’s Mein Kampf. I say ironically because Mr. Wilders’ comments are utterly racist as shown by his recent statement declared during his visit to the UK Independence Party: “I have a problem with the Islamic ideology, the Islamic culture, because I feel that the more Islam that we get in our societies the less freedom that we get.”

    Even though this is an interesting topic and would be an excellent comparative case study as Sarah mentioned, I would like to insist on Hitler’s remarks with regards to British hypocrisy during the pre-World War Two period and the general criticism of the Allies during the war. As I said in class earlier, Hitler’s words are very convincing and “easy to sell” when it comes to this topic – the British were constantly criticizing Germany’s imperial aspirations and their maltreatment of different ethnic groups, without making any effort to account for their own imperial hegemony (although declining at that time). It is a matter of fact and nobody can deny that the Great Britain, France and some other European countries controlled most of the planet, and did so to the detriment of all those colonized, occupied, enlightened, call it whatever you want. My point is not to go into historical analysis of these events, but simply to emphasize how dangerous this international hypocrisy is and how it can easily cause major disorder.

    I will just give one example to show this hypocrisy today: while the EU and the United States both affirm their adherence to the international law and the UN Charter (EU more so than the US, let’s be frank), they often tend to dismiss that in practice. Take the case of Serbian and Georgian sovereignty – 22 out of 27 EU countries and the United States simply ignored the principles of territorial sovereignty and inviolability of states’ frontiers in the case of Serbia but not in the case of Georgia. Most EU countries and the U.S. recognized and pushed for the secession of Kosovo, former Serbian province, with no grounds in the international law, basing their decisions on the humanitarian reasons. However, when Russia did the same thing with the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, those same EU states and the U.S. criticized the Russian Federation for violating international principles. Examples are so abundant in the Balkans – YES to Wilsonian self-determination for Kosovo Albanians, but NO to Wilsonian self-determination for Bosnian Serbs; acceptance of Kosovo’s (illegal) unilateral declaration of independence, but special (undemocratic) imposition of 55% +1 (instead of normal 50% +1) rule for the independence referendum in Montenegro… The list could go on and on. What I am aiming at is to show how this is a potential powder keg that may lead to serious violence explosions due to feelings of injustice, double-standards and hypocrisy.

    p.s. Don’t take me for a Russophile or a Pan-Slavic ideologist, or even worse for an anti-Kosovo-Albanian…Trust me, I am sick of our disputes in the Balkans, but I am just afraid that the “Western International Community” is sometimes unfair, incoherent, unclear and thus contributes to more chaos over there…

  18. Catherine

    After regarding both Nems’ and Sarah’s posts I can’t help but also think of France which has recently supported candidates with extremely nationalistic and rather racist views.

    In the 2002 French elections Jean Marie Le Pen, from the extreme right “Front National”, managed to receive 20 percent of the vote against Jacques Chirac. Le Pen is notably an advocate of “France for the French” and supports the establishment of the jus sanguinis.

    This sense of fierce, elitist nationalism recalls Hitler’s rhetoric about the Folk community that was “rooted in the soil and bound together by common blood”. Like Hitler’s perseverance of the nation, Le Pen advocates for a return to traditional values and opposes Non – European immigration. Furthermore Le Pen also proposed that the French government send back three million non – Europeans who resided in France. Once again this sounds like the Hitler’s hopes for a Europe or international system organized by racial communities.
    While Le Pen was easily defeated in the general election against Chirac, the fact that he even made it past the primaries is alarming. Typically, the party of Le Pen does not receive that much backing, however we still see support of this ideology and evidence of this racial discrimination in current French politics.

    This protection and promotion of this national identity, is evident in the effort to forbid the yashmak, or the Islamic veil, in public places such as schools or work places. Advocates of this possible legislation state that it is in protection of the French law statute “la laicité” or the separation of the church and the state. These politicians affirm that is to protect the idea that everyone is “equal” and French.

    Moreover, the recent efforts by Eric Besson, the minister of immigration, show a blatant display of Le Pen’s platform. Besson wishes to start the debate in hopes of defining the “national identity” and “what it means to be French”. Furthermore, the minister directly addresses the Muslim community stating that citizens who wear the burqa are “the contrary to the values of the French national identity”.

    One would think that the events of WWII would put an end to ideas of racial supremacy, in defining and establishing what is French or what is German. Yet this preservation of an identity, separation, or expulsion of other cultures, has presence in several sectors of European politics even today.

  19. Jesse

    Unit II and the comments preceding my own have made me think quite a bit about human nature. In particular, how and why people might reason for themselves the notion that voting for the Hitler’s and the Le Pen’s of the world is acceptable. Following the Hitler and Goebbels readings and considering the status of post-WWI Germany, the Nazi propaganda in combination with Hitler’s rhetorical skill might have been far more appealing than history has proven it should have been, largely because, I believe, desperate times called for desperate measures. Perhaps Hitler’s rise to power was as much a result of the German people needing something new-perhaps anything was better at the time-as it was about their perceptions of his ability to lead and/or agreement with his specific policies.

    As Sarah, Nems, and Catherine have pointed out, however, it doesn’t appear that radical politicians rise to power only under circumstances of the most dire nature. As far as I know, and someone correct me if I’m wrong, Britain and France are not in the state that Germany found itself in the early 20th century. While the prestige these man have gained among their populaces seems nowhere near that of Hitler in Germany, it is concerning, even frightening, to see men the likes of Griffin getting parliamentary seats and Le Pen twenty percent of the vote. Why is it then, that such radical views are getting notice, and even being supported, in the present day? And why do these situations seem to be largely pertaining to Europe?

    The notions of racial supremacy and ethnic purity do, unfortunately, seem to be very much alive. Is a wave of such radical ideology bound to once again sweep over the continent? And what might we be able to do to stop it? These questions at the time certainly don’t have any definitive answers, but I thought it might provide some food for thought.

  20. Chris Vandergrift

    “It is a matter of fact and nobody can deny that the Great Britain, France and some other European countries controlled most of the planet, and did so to the detriment of all those colonized, occupied, enlightened, call it whatever you want.”

    Nem’s statement seems to imply that a given group of people will be better off if foreigners do not enter currently occupied lands. Initially, I thought that certainly this couldn’t be the case. Technology greatly improved the lives of people in European colonies all over the globe. But stepping back, if I was the given group being invaded, is there any way that I could be better off? My answer would be no. There is no way that anyone else could bring their culture in a forceful manner for my benefit. Native Americans culture and lifestyle has been irrevocably changed from the past. The indigenous people of South America now live completely different lives than before the arrival of colonists. India and South Africa have completely different cultures due to colonization. There are innumerous examples of foreign intervention resulting in domestic strife and destruction of culture.
    However, what if this foreign intervention is not by force but instead through economic means? Should an American company be able to build a factory and hire workers, irrevocably changing the indigenous culture in order to make clothing? The governments of some South Asian countries seem to think so. Without the company, people could only work off the land. With the factory, people have the opportunity to either live off their land or work in the factory. Even though the final result often ends up the same, is colonization through economic means justified since it does not use force? The host country invites and often incentivizes the company to come, accepting the cultural change to occur. Even though the final result is the same, is the former method of force not acceptable while the latter is completely acceptable?

    I am not sure where I stand on either question though. Complete non-intervention can lead more severe consequences than intervention. Conversely, should sovereignty of indigenous groups be absolute (free of both political, social, and economic influence if they wish)?

  21. Jelena

    I must say that these great posts reminded me of the parallel I think about for about a year now: 1930s major economical crisis –>rise of nationalistic sentiments–> Hitler, Mussolini & Co come to power–>Second World War vs. 2008 another major economical crisis–> another rise of nationalistic sentiments–>many Right and even Ultra-Right parties gain significant support in elections throughout Europe–>???
    I definitely agree and think that this trend is very striking and alarming. I am disgusted and ashamed that some stupid ideas can find support among the generation of Europeans whose grand – and – great grandparents died fighting against Fascism and Nazism.
    On Jesse’s question about the rise of these extreme ideologies: I think it can in both cases be explained by same old Inglehart’s theory that Sarah already mentioned. In the times of economic crisis, when people loose their jobs and see their life quality decreasing, they first stress modern values and forget about postmodern values. If a couple of years ago Europe was working hard on creating programs on integration of immigrants, now people loose their jobs and want to get them back to be able to provide/enjoy basic needs. And since now they are struggling to provide basic needs they are ready to forget about new moral and intellectual stands, new identities and social-constructs and blame it all on immigrants. Postmodern values are dropped and modern values play the leading role.
    However alarming this trend is I do want to stress that usually these extreme-right and nationalistic ideas find support in lower classes, where people tend to be less educated (lack of money) and frustrated with their economical status . Therefore I find it extremely important to discuss publicly these issues and raise awareness among all citizens of the world (since I think this is not solely Europe’s problem) about the danger of targeting one group (ethnic, national, religious, social, etc) being responsible for miseries and misfortunes of majority.
    As much as these trends are alarming and disgusting I must say that I do not believe in possibility that these ideas will become predominant in Europe, where people usually remember their history quite well.
    P.S Regarding of Kosovo vs. South Ossetia and Abkhazia issue. I remember clearly having an argument in Middlebury when Kosovo declared independence – people I was arguing with did not see it as a precedent for South Ossetia and Abkhazia to do the same, whereas I did and was quite afraid of destabilizing of region in general, which actually happened (war in the region, increasing unrest in Dagestan and Ingushetia, etc). The history of conflict is very old (going back to pre-Soviet Union time) and I do not want to go into details now, but what I find very interesting is the media war between “western world” and Russia during the first days of the conflict. I think this is a very exemplary video of how one side had its own agenda and wanted to sell it. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bG3jBcxnpns Clearly there were same examples in Russia, trying to exaggerate the facts. This makes me think of mass media, which is often being called the 4th power, and its ability to twist and interpret facts quite differently. So, I guess we should all learn our history and be critical when we read/ watch news or hear some politicians blaming the unemployment on immigrants.

  22. Ted

    Wow, reading through these posts has really got me thinking about a whole slew of different topics.

    First I’d like to comment on the Kosovo = Georgia comments. Nems contends that the two situations were the same and the West’s reaction was hypocritical because both interventions were done for humanitarian reasons. While that may be true, the more important issue is the validity of those claims. Most sources outside Pravda do not confirm Russian claims of genocide. But anyway, that’s neither here nor there.

    I was also very interested in the comments about colonization and foreign economic intervention. Before I go on, let me be clear that I am not defending colonization or claiming that it was a net gain for those who were colonized. There are certainly better ways to bring the benefits of our culture, science, and technology to other people than to force it on them by conquest. This is why I have no problem with American (or other) companies building factories and leaving their mark on foreign countries. Unlike colonization, this gives the indigenous government the choice of living in the modern international world or conserving their way of life by resorting to autarky.

    Whether you think economic integration will bring peace à la Tom Friedman or you think increased contact with only breed more conflict, it’s hard to deny that in the grand scheme of things human society is increasingly organized in larger units. Interaction between different groups of people is no longer limited to tribes bumping into each other in the forest. Nations can’t live in isolation either, as people of different ethnicities travel and communicate more than ever. You can fight to preserve ever facet of every culture because they’re all precious in their own way and deserving of equal respect, but I don’t you’ll be successful.

    …which brings me to something more relevant to our course. The ethnocentrism of Germany in the 1930s is repugnant, but not very surprising. It’s a common human desire to be part of the group, especially a group that is somehow better than the others. Telling the downtrodden Germans that they were something special was certainly a good political platform from which to launch maniacal plans of world domination. People have an attachment to their culture and people “like” them. They want to see their customs live on forever. Sometimes, unfortunately, this desire manifests itself in an extreme, racist form.

    The Allied response to the Axis threat is similar in some ways. Leaving aside the discussion of whether the Allied leaders were acting according to realism or idealism, the rhetoric used to rouse the masses was certainly idealistic. In many cases they demonized “the Hun” and called on Americans/Brits to fight for what made them special peoples. In his Finest Hour speech, Churchill said, “Upon this battle depends the survival of Christian civilization. Upon it depends our own British life, and the long continuity of our institutions and our Empire.” Similar, if less depraved, to Hitler’s rhetoric. I would say the Allied propaganda at least made references to universal ideals like freedom and was therefore closer to the desire for harmonious global interaction. But then again, maybe you think that’s just America pushing its Western ways on the world.

  23. Caitlin

    One of the things that interests me most about this topic is the different factors that seem to motivate people towards these extreme nationalist/racist movements and ideologies. For me, reading and listening to the speeches by Hitler and other members of the German government helped to explain why so many people could support a movement that we look back on with such horror.

    One thing that really struck me (and was mentioned in class I believe) was how reasonable the speeches made by German officials appear when we look at them from the perspective of the time. His arguments against the European system, the Versailles treaty, and even democracy don’t seem nearly as far fetched if we look at them from the perspective of an average German citizen during the interwar period. Germany was suffering tremendous economic pressure and it’s multiparty democracy had led to a system in which power was constantly changing hands, the population was continuing to struggle in regaining its national identity after the defeat of WWI. It’s only through analysis and hindsight that it becomes undeniably clear how hollow these speeches were and how terrible the strategies they masked could truly become.

    In comparison it seems hard to imagine what might be driving this second wave of support for politicians with such extreme nationalist views. This is especially hard for me since my knowledge of modern European politics is fuzzy at best. I wonder if at least some of this support might be a sort of backlash against European unification, individuals who feel like their loosing some of their national culture to this new European identity and choosing to respond in extremes. I apologize if anyone has already mentioned this and I didn’t catch it, I know Jelena mentioned something similar with people reacting to economic integration in regards to the downturn but I feel that cultural integration might also be a distinct factor. While it is true that the global economy is suffering an economic downturn it isn’t of the same magnitude as what was witnessed in Germany during the interwar period. I don’t really think that it could be the only factor behind this increased support in radical nationalism. Anyone with more extensive knowledge of Europe want to take a stab at this?

  24. Jelena

    The most authoritative investigation yet made into the Georgia-Russia war was done by the European Union, the inquiry stated that the war was started by Georgia. As to the question of genocide : the most of the world does not recognize Armenian genocide, but you know, there was one.

  25. Avery

    In light of the several comments here denigrating the effects of colonization on subject peoples and the immorality of such coercive interventions in general, I though I might offer something of a defense for such efforts. I won’t defend empires as they actually existed, only the theoretical justification for coercive interventions. I’ll also use India as my only real example, since it’s the only case I know much about at all, and even here my understanding is sorely limited. Feel free to correct me, of course!
    By no means was the British East India Company or the Raj a liberal government. Nor were either government “invited” to rule by the local population. In these respects, both governments would seem to violate the widely cited right of self-determination of peoples which we’ve discussed so much. But it seems to be that these peoples did not in fact possess this right before the British came either. The Indian caste system led to the repression of thousands upon thousands of people by the upper classes, often in degrading and bloody fashion. Now, this system was justified by local beliefs. Indeed, it is unclear that even the “Untouchable” class was unsupportive of the caste system, based as it was in deeply held cultural and religious beliefs.
    Thus, the British were presented with a culture of intolerance and violence. Their response, creating an empire, had wider motivations than a humanitarian impulse, and for that the empire should be critiqued. But in so far as the empire was motivated by coercively changing the belief structure of Indians to bring about a more liberal society, I personally take no theoretical issue with it. We may defend the “organic nature” of Indian society in Burkian terms as something arising through natural processes and not to be trifled with. But it is a fallacy to think that the state of Indian affairs in the 1700s was not the product of outside interventions, such as the Mughul and Mongol invasions. As constructivist ideas demonstrate, culture is a product of group interaction. It has been changed in the past, and it can be changed in the future. Thus, if a culture is currently one in which there is widespread and quite obvious repression of peoples, it is not an unreasonable goal to change that culture.
    This argument immediately raises the oft cited “cultural relativist” argument that we must tolerate all cultures. Asian culture is more amenable to restrictive political and social constructs, and must simply be allowed to “do as it will.” However, this argument is 1. A misinterpretation of cultural relativism and 2. even if accepted does not lead to the conclusion that intervention is not allowed. Firstly, the assumption that cultural relativism leads to toleration assumes that toleration has some value. If we are total cultural relativists, however, how can we make this assumption? My cultural/ethical system may declare toleration “good,” but yours may not. The argument for toleration rests on the idea that there must be a justification for intervention to occur. But the entire point of relativism is that there can be no such justification, that the entire idea is simply inappropriate for cultural comparisons. Thus, we cannot judge a people for intervening outside of our own cultural norms.
    However, if we accept a softer version of cultural relativism, one that merely suggests that we should “live and let live” is in and of itself an important value, it is still unclear that societies which repress their people’s ability to choose what life they wish to live deserve to be left alone themselves. If we take individual people as the most important unit for these sorts of discussions, than how can a society exist based on the argument that it should be left to its own devices if it does not allow its people to do the same? Of course, all societies are repressive to some degree; this is the nature of shared existence. But then the best society will be one in which liberty is maximized to the fullest possible extent.
    Thus, it seems that it is difficult to opposed coercive interventions on a theoretical basis. Empirically, however, there are large hurdles. Do people actually change based on obvious external forces? Or must cultural change be “rooted” in reforms that stem from local forces? I think it is here that intervention may not be justifiable, and the softer forms of cultural exchange via social and economic interaction may prove better in the long run. Nonetheless, it is important I think to understand that there are good reasons for cultural intervention, if only at the very basic level of promoting toleration.

  26. Katie

    The unit two discussion posts have developed the theory of crisis causing an increase in power for politicians spouting ideas of racial supremacy, from Hitler to modern-day European examples. While some of you have noted that all of our examples are in Europe, I believe that this phenomenon is also seen in the US. At a lecture I went to last year, the speaker shared a statistic that during times of economic crises, many Americans (it might have been a majority, I don’t quite remember) believe that American citizens should be given jobs over foreign-born nationals. Another example is the response of a surprising number of Americans following the 9/11 attacks. For a class I am taking, we read examples this week of politicians and preachers-turned-politicians speaking about how “evil” and “wicked” Muslims are after 9/11.

    As a few of you noted, Hitler’s extreme statements about race are better understood in the context of the time, taking into account the vulnerability of the German people during a time of economic, social, and political crisis. However, even when considering these factors, I was amused by the blatant hypocrisies in the Hitler speeches that we watched and read. Just to name a few: 1) Hitler saying that his main objective was peace, and then starting a war, 2) Hitler saying how bad democracies are, and then pointing out that he has been overwhelmingly elected and supported by the people, and therefore has better democratic credentials than the leaders of democracies, 3) Churchill brandishing the paper that he and Hitler signed declaring their friendship, and then one year later Churchill saying that Hitler’s signature is worthless because he lies and doesn’t keep promises.

    On an unrelated note, I was interested by what Carr had to say about sovereignty. Carr predicts: “It is unlikely that future units of power will take much account of formal sovereignty…. The effective group unit of the future will in all probability not be the unit formally recognized as such by international law. Any project of an international order which takes these formal units as its basis seems likely to prove unreal,” (231). The readings on sovereignty from earlier this semester (defining sovereignty, different types of sovereignty, theories about sovereignty, etc.) partially prove Carr’s prescient statements. The concept of sovereignty has indeed expanded beyond the traditional sense of Westphalian sovereignty, but Westphalian sovereignty has not been completely replaced by other sources of order.

  27. EY Shin

    After watching the Youtube videos of Hitler, I should say that I was rather convinced by his speech. He was a charismatic leader, and unlike how we think of him nowadays as a cruel and evil person, he, during the inter-war period, probably seemed like the best and the most powerful leader that Germans had been searching for. Kennan states that “the great misfortune of the West, I suspect, was not Hitler but the weakness of German society which made possible his triumph.” (80) As we have discussed in class, Germans were desperate during the inter-war period, and in a way, Allies of the World War I pressured Germany to search for a strong leader who promised the Germans what they wanted: a stronger Germany. Jelena explains this phenomenon in the context of today’s world and shows how the rise of extreme ideologies occurs in Europe. I agree with Jelena’s point and would add that the economic crisis that the whole world is suffering from has made us “stingy” toward anyone who does not belong in our own ethnic, racial, and cultural group. Nems and Sarah gave examples from current European politics, and this rise of extreme ideologies is happening not only in Europe but also in other parts of the world. Koreans are probably the most homogenous population in the world, and Korea has been dealing with xenophobia for centuries (of course, implicitly). Nowadays, it has become popular to use one’s ancestral background to criticize one another. This is popular when politicians try to bring down other candidates in public, and the public image of a candidate is destroyed when another person reveals that the candidate’s ancestor has supported Japanese government during the Japanese occupation in Korean peninsula during the WWII. This is surely an absurd method to attack another, but it has been popular and effective to some point. My guess is that xenophobia in Korea has developed into another extreme ideology that Koreans should be pure Koreans and should be loyal to the country no matter what.

    According to Kennan, only if “something happens in a man’s mind that increases his enlightenment and the consciousness of his real relation to other people”, democratic purpose can prosper. (89) Applying his idea to the rise of extreme ideologies in today’s world, I am not sure how we would even start to change people’s ideas. If we can pinpoint the reason why people started to develop absurd extreme ideologies (economic crisis??), perhaps we can solve the problem, but the world has gotten so complicated. Actually, many thought that sharing democratic values after the WWII would bring peace to the world and pinpointed other types of regimes as the reason that the international society was in chaos. However, as we all have seen, even after democratization of many nations, chaos still exists (in different degrees). So, how do we change the problems that we have in this world without knowing the origen of them…?

  28. Andrea

    I’m glad that Katie brought Edward Carr into this discussion, his consideration of power and morality within the international sphere seems very relevant to the questions of colonization and economic intervention raised in the above posts. There have been many positive consequences of colonialism mentioned, the majority of which are tied to visions of progress and morality—“culture, science, and technology,” “toleration,” “a more liberal society,” etc. While Avery’s point that intolerance and violence existed in India (as well as in many other countries) prior to colonial intervention, his statement that the “humanitarian impulse” was even a factor in British empire-building seems troublesome according to Carr’s logic.

    Carr connects the problematic question of universal values introduced in Unit 1 in regard to state sovereignty to the idealistic policies presented by Wilson in the post-war settlement study of Unit 2. States Carr in “The Realist Critique,” “politics are not…a function of ethics, but ethics of politics (64).” Although Wilson’s policies may have been justified by ethical arguments, “ethical notions…are very seldom a cause, but almost always an effect, a means of claiming universal legislative authority for our own preferences (Bertrand Russell, quoted in Carr, 68). Carr cites Dicey’s statement that “men come easily to believe that arrangements agreeable to themselves are beneficial to others” to refute the validity of the harmony of interests doctrine so often connected to colonization. While undeniable benefits are associated with colonial expansion, they are benefits recognized in retrospect, rights created by history (67). Although I agree with Ted’s statement that contemporary economic intervention gives nations the “choice of living in the modern international world” instead of imposing change through coercion, the nature of that choice is questionable for many developing nations. Growth often requires loans supplied by international institutions that are controlled by wealthier nations, nations that have the power to impose conditions that benefit their interests. While morality and good intentions are replete in the rhetoric of international politics, I tend to lean more towards Carr’s statement that “every political situation contains mutually incompatible elements of utopia and reality, of morality and power (94).”

  29. Kiko

    After all the interesting talks we had this semester, I have a quick reaction to Dani Rodrik’s talk on Thursday October 8th. I want to comment some points he made concerning Europe, which relates also to the decline of the British Empire. He didn’t seem to give enough credits to the European integration. This particular integration in Europe is the first time we see it around the world. As I explained in my previous post, how countries that fought together during years are willing to give up some of their own sovereignty to embrace this new “European idea”? Even if it has some internals problems, it is remarkable what these European countries achieved, based on the great view of the Founding Fathers and the help of the US after the WWII.
    The point a want to make clear, is when Dani’s talked about the Treaty of Lisbon. He talked in a negative way, mentioning some of the issues that this treaty had to get ratified a few weeks ago. I don’t think that he was mentioning it, while thinking about the Irish issue, because they finally said “yes” in the second referendum. However, he told that thinking of the problematic declarations that Cameron said after the Irish vote.
    David Cameron is British Conservative party leader and he wanted to disrupt the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. This seemed to scare a lot of people and Dani’s seemed involved and interrogating one more time the future of this Treaty and therefore the future of Europe. Nevertheless, I don’t see some treats in what Cameron said, but yes very good news for Europe.
    In my opinion, the problem with some British politicians is that they were born when Britain was a major an important “Empire” and they do not really accept that it has lost all it colonies. Moreover, Britain never wanted a very powerful Europe, and therefore strong countries that can compete with. Britain has a complex due to the great success that the EU integration is having, and they are quiet jealous.
    Cameron declarations are exactly what Europe “needed” to go forward in a quicker way. I’m sure that with these declarations, the French will react fast and they will do everything they can to avoid that the UK will interrupt the EU integration. Tensions exists between these two countries and France really feel something particular for this EU idea; and they will never allow that an “enemy” will put barriers to EU integration. This will have a positive effect for the EU integration; it will go forward faster than planned due to the French pressure to eliminate the UK danger. However, it will have a negative effect of the Britain, because they would start being in a complicate situation: on one side they have a very dependant and particular relationship with the US and on the other side the EU integration is going forward, without waiting of them. From this situation, we would maybe see a more separate Britain, being “treated” as a special trade partners only, like Ukraine and Turkey.
    Treaty ratification two weeks ago showed that Cameron purposes pushed for a quick reaction from the EU. This shows that the EU always want to go forward despite the difficulties and we should give credits for all this integration process. Also that Britain cannot treat Europe as they was use to treat they colonies, by willing to impose they own ideas and/or desire. Thanks Mr. Cameron to scared Europe and push it to go even further in it integration with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. As Jacques Chirac said once: “[He] missed a great opportunity to shut up”.

  30. Nems

    Here’s a link to an amazing video, it is very long (3 hours), but trust me, it’s worth it (if you’re interested in European and especially in Eastern European politics). It is an American documentary made on the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the role of the western powers in its disintegration, how the war could have been avoided had the West reacted differently. I encourage you to watch it if you have time, it is highly objective, done with knowledgeable historians and politicians from that era who had witnessed everything (British and American officials and analysts mostly).

    The link to the first part:

    http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=5860186121153047571&ei=fhwLS4yGIoW0qwLi5vjZDw&q=the+avoidable+war+yugoslavia#

    The link to the second part:

    http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=5860186121153047571&ei=UhcLS4brL5TiqgL-prmKDw&q=yugoslavia+avoidable+war&hl=en#docid=6371060303901674397

    p.s. If the links don’t work, just go to Google Videos and search YUGOSLAVIA THE AVOIDABLE WAR

  31. Nems

    p.s. 2 about the video on Yugoslavia:

    – keep in mind that, despite the video’s efforts to make you understand that Croatian and Bosnian Muslim leaders were guilty, Milosevic (the Serbian leader) was one hell of a douche bag, nationalist to death who hated anything not Serbian…

    -also, at one point in the movie, they refer to Chetniks from WW2 as “the good guys” who helped the Allies — NOT TRUE! Chetniks were a monarchist nationalist Serbian movement who tortured non-Serbs and communist Serbs during WW2. The “good” guys were the Partisans who fought to liberate Yugoslavia from Nazis in 1940s…of course, crimes were committed on their part too, but against Chetniks this time.

  32. Jesse

    I’m sure I’m not the only one among those who caught President Obama’s speech this evening to notice its relevance to this course. In addressing the war on terror and what will be an increase of 30,000 American troops in Afghanistan, it became clear to me that Obama, unsurprisingly, does not fall neatly into any one of our three categorical perspectives: classical, revisionist, or universalist.

    Obama at points made it very clear that an essential element of finding success in Afghanistan and in the war on terror in general is through using international institutions, including NATO and the UN in particular, to join forces with our allies and end Al Qaeda aggression through multilateral action to the benefit of all nations. Further, he, as did Bush in 2002, made an appeal to the Muslim world to join in the cause in asserting that this is not a war on Islam, but rather, radical fundamentalist Islam specifically.

    In almost the same breath, however, Obama said that the war on terror is necessary for the security interests of the United States – that this is necessary because it is what “we” need to do. He made an appeal to the cadets at West Point by reminding them that it was our own country that was attacked on 9/11/01, and I got the sense that “we” no longer meant us and the rest of the world, but “we” meant the United States. While not going as far as saying “if you’re not with us, you’re against us” as Bush did in 2002, I wasn’t entirely convinced that Obama and his advisers wouldn’t have decided to act unilaterally if necessary. He also describes how success in the war on terror will lead to increased relations with Pakistan, which he also describes as serving our own interests.

    Obama also seems to make a humanitarian argument as well – that by ridding Afghanistan of terrorists, we will be doing the citizens of that state a favor – we will help them improve on their internal institutions, and will get the job done quickly and efficiently, making sure not to overstay our welcome and pulling out by the end of summer 2011 (a point which I found problematic – sure a “blank check” on war isn’t favorable, but it also seems hard to specify now that we’ll be out so soon without knowing what will happen between now and then).

    This brief summary touches on the “big picture” as I gathered from Obama’s speech. It seems that there might be some of all three perspectives in Obama – or maybe not. As Bush’s speech before Congress showed us and as we discussed, it’s difficult to tell whether Obama believes all of what he preaches, or if it is more so a necessary part of presidential politics. It remains to be seen if entering Afghanistan now was the right call. We will, after all, still be fighting two wars. I don’ think Pollack would be very happy with this…

  33. Sarah

    Ted’s analysis of Obama’s recent speech on Afghanistan is both insightful and relevant to our course content. Obama certainly does vacillate strategically between pledging adherence to coordinated action through international institutions and imploring Americans to support a troop surge in an unpopular war that has largely been delegitimized by an increasingly reluctant international community.

    Obama’s conundrum is that he has no choice but to walk this tricky line; the course that Obama has laid out for Afghanistan is inconsistent with his nature and ideals. Were I to categorize Obama I would mark him as a liberal whereas his predecessor demonstrated more realist tendencies. As such, Obama has frequently asserted his intention to revitalizing the United State’s commitment to multilateral international organizations and decision-making processes. But were Obama to immediately do in deed as in word and turn American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan over to the dictates of NATO or UN forces, the ensuing troop downscale and power vacuum would only create increased instability in the Middle East and harbor resentment toward the U.S. for failing to finish the task that it so boldly began in 2003.

    The international milieu in which a newly-elected world leader emerges is a powerful determinant that has the ability to either restrain or enable that leader’s policy goals. Last class I mentioned the important difference between the state of international order during Wilson and Bush’s presidencies: Wilson emerged President in a world of post-war anarchy largely devoid of international institutions, while Bush came to power in a world managed by pre-existing , powerful, and comprehensive institutions. Both leaders spoke as if their destiny were to spread grandiose, universalist ideals, but Wilson created institutions while Bush shirked them. Difference of type, or difference of context?

    I am a firm believer in the need for international institutions. I also recognize, however, the difficulties involved in reforming these institutions and keeping them relevant to today’s challenges. Rule-based institutions, once created and imbued with power, take on a life of their own and supersede individual member’s interests. They are slow to respond and even slower to change. Although there have been some success stories related to the reform of these institutions – the World Bank was immediately deemed insufficient to finance Europe’s debts and replaced for this purpose by the Marshall Plan, and the GATT was reformed in 1995 to become the WTO – for the most part, our world is governed by relics of a 1945 world. I disagree with Brooks and Wolhforth’s conclusion that the United States must act unilaterally to revise the institutional order. Had we the power to do so (which is doubtable), such an attempt would be brash and foolhardy. Obama is best to be patient, to leave Afghanistan with minimal disruption possible, and to work with other key leaders to address the reforms needed to insure that our international institutions respond to today’s challenges.

  34. Avery

    Having finally remembered that I must do a third posting, I thought I might quickly discuss the importance of studying IR theory. Of course, we mentioned in class that it provides a lens through which to view various “empirical” events, and gives us a measure of predictive power which we might not otherwise possess. What I would like to suggest, however, is that studying theory is in itself an empirical pursuit in the history of ideas.
    The theorists we read are of course real people, whose lives were not solely lived within the pages we read. Many of them had direct impact on government policy, whether through direct employment as in the cases of Kennan or Keynes, or through the impact of their ideas. I spent time working for the military, and while most of the soldiers I met had never heard of Kenneth Waltz, they nonetheless espoused views similar to his in an example of an ideological “trickle down” effect. The ideas of these theorists have clear impact on how policy is made and how states act in the international system. Even Bush’s foreign policy was based on decades of neoconservative ideological development via theorists like Francis Fukuyama.
    The point of this review is to show that theories are not only for helping us view the world differently, but for understanding how the men who conduct international politics thought. We can better understand Truman’s foreign policy if we know that he was informed by Kennan’s theory, just as we can better understand Nixon’s in light of Henry Kissinger’s Realpolitik. Studying theory is therefore not divorced from “empirical” studies, but is in fact part of it. To not study theory extensively would be as pointless as attempting to understand why Osama bin Laden acts as he does with no knowledge of his militant Islamic beliefs.
    Thus, while theory may be dry and boring, if we merely remember that it provides not only a way for us to view the world but a valuable window into why actors throughout the history of foreign affairs have acted as they do, we might find that we enjoy it more.

    Thanks for a great class!

  35. Caitlin

    One thing that has struck me as interesting in this course is how important it seems to be to use analysis from a combination of different fields if you want an accurate picture of international order. No one political theory (realism exc) seems able to accurately explain all factors of the global political structure. If you really want to understand how States act and interact you need to examine not just political power structures but also economics, psychology and sociological issues associated with different government structures. Without looking at all these factors it seems that there will always be some cases that will be difficult/impossible to accurately describe with a given political theory.
    The flip side, is that to explain and examine all political problems through this sort of multi-focus lens would take more time the most analyst are willing or able to devote to the subject. We are forced to find a balance between over simplifying the world to the point where our theories are no longer relevant and focusing in on so many different complexities that we are unable to determine any broad trends that can be applied to future decisions. It seems to become impossible to find any one theory that will both fit a wide variety of situations and at the same time not so vague or so far separated from reality as to be useless. Trying to find a balance between these two competing forces has been one of the most interesting aspects of this class for me.

  36. Ted

    Although it was actually Jesse who wrote the post for which Sarah gave me credit, I mostly agree with his analysis and complement him on his work. I will take this opportunity, though, to offer my own two cents.

    It is certainly difficult to fit President Obama’s foreign policy in one of our neat conceptual boxes. I would say he doesn’t believe the classical arguments, as he surely recognizes that international politics can sometimes be hierarchical, while domestic politics is not always as ordered as we would like. I also can’t see him as a universalist because I doubt he would claim that the pursuit of some universal ideal would compel him to disregard another state’s sovereignty.

    The confusing part comes down on the idealist-realist split. I remember him repeatedly claiming to be a realist, but I’m not sure how accurate that is. He seems to be pragmatic in not wanting to get too tangled in foreign wars, but as Sarah mentioned, he also has great faith in the abilities of international organizations. Also, reaching out to our enemies to start a constructive dialog is hardly the first policy choice of a realist. I hate to say it, but I think international relations could just be a distraction from his domestic priorities. Only time will tell, but I wouldn’t be surprised if the troop withdrawal deadline is as strict as the Guantanamo closure deadline. He will deal with developing conditions pragmatically, even if they don’t turn out they way he had initially hoped.

  37. Mike

    This discussion about how Obama fits into the theories from class is interesting. I think Ted is correct in saying that Obama looks at the world as hierarchical, and is not universalist; whereas Bush seems to fit into the universalism framework, which was seen in both of their China policy. During the Bush administration, meetings with the DDalai Lama, and discussions about Chinese human rights abuses were often made around or during his trips to China. Obama’s recent “rescheduling” of his meeting with the Dalai Lama until after his meeting with Hu Jintao was a classic example of respect for sovereignty over all else. Because the Dalai Lama essentially has no land to be sovereign over, Obama places Hu Jintao above him in the hierarchy.

  38. Mike West

    I realized that I didn’t get to post about Unit II of the class, and there is something in there that I wanted to include in my final paper but didn’t have room. It pertains to the surprisingly understandable rhetoric that we see coming from certain politicians that have pejorative, or worse, reputations. As Nems mentioned in class, after reading the Bush Doctrine literature, he was very impressed by some of the messages in Bush’s 9/20 speech to congress. And as the class started talking about this, several people brought up the possibility that Bush’s universalist rhetoric following 9/11 was setting the stage to cloak the realist actions that would characterize the next seven years of Bush.
    EY brought up a similar point about Unit II, that after watching some of the earlier Hitler speeches on YouTube, she became “rather convinced by his speech.” It seems that the universalism cloaking realist underpinnings argument can be applied to Hitler in two main ways: social engineering universalism, and self-determination universalism. The reason his speeches can be convincing is the self-determination universalism aspect; Germans wanted a strong Germany, and Hitler wanted to make this possible and rule by the will of the people. Obviously, the Nazi universalist outlook during World War II, which desires the social engineering of society to eliminate undesirables, reminds how unconvincing and bizarre the Hitler vision was. With that said, I want to be clear: Just because I used Bush and Hitler as my two examples in this post, I am by no means trying to draw any parallels between the two. This is done far too often these days, as seen by the Hitler mustaches that are thrown on every leader that attempts centralized political initiatives.

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