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54. See, for example, Karen Thimm and DuRell Echols, *Schwarze in Deutschland* (Munich: Protokolle, 1973); Katharina Oguntoya, "Die Schwarze deutsche Bewegung und die Frauenbewegung in Deutschland," *Afrekete: Zeitung von afro-deutschen und Schwarzen Frauen* 4 (1989): 3–5, 33–37; Opitz et al., *Showing Our Colors;* Tina Campt, "Afro-German Identity and the Politics of Positionality," *New German Critique* 58 (Winter 1993): 109–26; and May Ayim, "Die afro-deutsche Minderheit," in Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen and Georg Hansen, eds., *Ethnische Minderheiten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1995).

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CHAPTER EIGHT

Guest Workers and Policy on Guest Workers in the Federal Republic

FROM THE BEGINNING OF RECRUITMENT IN 1955 UNTIL ITS HALT IN 1973

ULRICH HERBERT AND KARIN HUNN

IN THE LATE SUMMER of 1944, there were some 7.6 million foreign forced laborers (civilian workers and POWs) officially registered in the territory of the Greater German Reich. At that juncture there were also about 200,000 concentration camp prisoners in forced labor. Together they made up about one-quarter of all registered workers in the economy of the Third Reich. Some 35 percent were employed in the defense industries, and in certain enterprises, they constituted over 50 percent and even up to 80 percent of the workforce. The National Socialist system of enforced labor thus represented the most massive coerced deployment of foreign laborers in history since the end of slavery in the nineteenth century.[1]

Yet in 1961, only 16 years after the end of the war, when foreign workers began to be hired once again in Germany on a large scale, there was no public mention whatsoever in the Federal Republic of this dark historical backdrop to the employment of the new Gastarbeiter (guest workers) from abroad. That rupture in historical perception resulted primarily because after the war, the jobs that the foreign forced laborers vacated as they returned to their native countries were occupied in large part by a new influx of migrants: the German refugees and expellees pouring into West Germany from the occupied Eastern territories and the Soviet occupation zone (the later GDR). The sheer magnitude of this migration movement is apparent from the figures: down to 1960, the Federal Republic had absorbed some 13.2 million refugees; they accounted for nearly a quarter of the total West German population at the time.[2]

The history of integrating the expellees into the society of the Federal Republic was a success story in one key respect: time proved that contemporary fears about the potential political and social explosiveness of this immigration process were unfounded. Generous programs for housing construction, financial aid to help people get started, and especially the expellees' absolute determination to work their way up the ladder again pushed social-structural differences between the indigenous population and the newcomers into the background. One important reason for this was that after the war, much of German society was on the move: returning soldiers, evacuated children coming back from the countryside, and the veri-

table army of civilians who had been bombed out and lost everything. Yet often forgotten today is the fact that there were indeed substantial tensions and conflict between established locals and newcomers. These tensions lingered far down into the 1950s, especially where expellees from the East had relocated to communities that were relatively homogeneous socially and culturally.

This problem, which was serious both in quantitative and qualitative terms, served to eclipse the question of the integration of the so-called Displaced Persons (DPs), or "stateless foreigners," as they were called in bureaucratic jargon—a label applied from 1951 on to former forced laborers as well as other groups of victims.[3] Furthermore, it facilitated the fiction that there was no relevant precedent for the new wave of foreign workers because after the war there was no recognition whatsoever in West Germany that the deployment of foreign slave laborers under the Third Reich was among the specific crimes perpetrated by the National Socialists. That explains why people did not come to critical grips with this question in public discussion during the 1950s.

On the one hand, the recruitment phase of foreign workers in the Federal Republic in the 1960s stands in a line of historical continuity with the employment of seasonal workers in Imperial Germany on down to the end of the Weimar Republic, with a fluid transition to the establishment of the system of forced labor during World War II. On the other hand, it links up with the phenomenon of the Federal Republic as a country of immigration that did not define itself as such and thus developed a foreigner policy that was correspondingly restrictive and contradictory.[4]

The organized (re-)recruitment of foreign workers for jobs in the Federal Republic commenced with the signing of the German-Italian agreement on 20 December 1955.[5] It came to an end on 23 November 1973, when in the wake of the oil crisis, the minister for labor and social order declared a recruitment halt. During this period, there were repeated changes, depending on prevailing interests, in the attitude of government authorities, unions, and management—and in the general public—toward the importation of foreign labor. The primary decisive factor was always the given situation in the labor market.

By the mid-1950s, there was already a shortage of labor, especially in West German agriculture. That was the result in part of the poor working conditions and low wages in farm work, where a working week of up to seventy hours without overtime pay was not uncommon. Given this situation, farmers, especially in southwestern Germany, began in 1953 to call for foreign laborers to be brought in.[6]

At the same time, the Italian government suggested holding initial talks on possible employment of Italian workers in the Federal Republic. Their objective was to redress their negative balance of payments and trade and reduce unemployment in Italy by sending workers abroad. The Economy Ministry of the Federal Republic had already begun to look into the question of just what circumstances would warrant recruitment of foreigner workers, specifically from Italy, for work in Germany.[7] In the spring of 1954, initial discussions were held with the Italians. In these talks, the German negotiators remained a bit cool toward the ideas the Italians put forward, but apprehensions about the potential negative consequences for foreign policy (and trade) made them careful not to antagonize the Italian government.[8] Economy Minister Erhard believed that given the state of the economy, the employment of foreigners in certain branches would soon be unavoidable. He pointed to the anticipated upswing in the defense industries, the expansion of the fledgling Bundeswehr (Federal armed forces), and the earlier drop-off in the birth rate, which was soon to have a negative impact on the labor market. Erhard argued that it was time to take prophylactic measures. It was necessary to examine to what extent, under what conditions, and when, if necessary, the German economy could—or would have to—fall back on foreign workers. Given the pace of economic and technological development, German workers would increasingly have to be trained and retrained as urgently needed skilled workers. In order to assure that would be feasible, Erhard contended, it was only natural that if the boom continued, the relatively more unskilled jobs in Germany would ultimately have to be filled by foreign laborers.[9]

Erhard formulated here one of the central principles of employing foreign workers, namely, the formation of an "underclass" of unskilled foreign workers in the labor market. It was believed the economic utility of employing foreigners lay in their high mobility and flexibility, their lower levels of consumption, and what both sides viewed as the temporary nature of their employment. In this way, guest workers were to be deployed wherever needed as an industrial reserve army and an economic buffer. Considerations of wage policy also played a role in the thinking of the Economy Ministry, however. As a result of the regional and structural labor shortage, competition was on the rise among labor-hungry firms in quest of workers; that had begun to be manifested in pay concessions. It was thought this development could be countered by expanding the labor supply.[10]

The employers' federations shared the view of the economy minister, while the unions, the Labor Ministry, and the Ministry for Expellees were adamantly opposed. The latter ministry argued that given the more than one million unemployed, officials should consider recruiting foreign workers only after the massive numbers of unemployed refugees and expellees had regular jobs.[11] Foreigners could be employed only if there was full employment of Germans—that was the consensus.

But what was meant by *full employment*? This was a moot point about which estimates and opinions differed, partly because of the uneven development of the postwar labor market. In 1955, average unemployment stood at 5.1 percent nationally but showed strong regional variation. It was only 2.2 percent in Baden-Württemberg and 2.9 percent in North-Rhine–Westphalia, yet had climbed to an alarming 11.1 percent in the northernmost state of Schleswig-Holstein. On 30 September 1955, male unemployment in the Federal Republic had declined to an average 1.8 percent; this meant that at least in economically healthy regions, the readily mobilizable German workers could be considered virtually fully employed. The number of vacancies had risen to 220,000, and given the continued high anticipated levels of economic growth, it was likely there would be an acute regionally structured labor shortage in the foreseeable future.[12]

In view of this development, the government decided that as long as the economic upswing continued, it would be possible to consider recruiting foreign workers in limited numbers the following year. The unions, however, remained skeptical. In any case, they made their agreement conditional on two basic principles: German workers should get priority and be the first hired and foreign workers had to be guaranteed equal pay and working conditions to prevent employees' social rights being undermined and to avoid depressing wage levels.

The German-Italian Agreement on Worker Recruitment was concluded and signed in Rome on 20 December 1955. It is interesting that neither the Bundestag nor the public was informed in any detail about the agreement. A representative of the Foreign Ministry commented that because they had, after considerable effort, succeeded in creating an amicable climate between management and labor in these delicate matters by adopting a skillful tactical approach, it would be better not to inform the Bundestag in greater detail at that point. After all, that might induce the opposition to raise difficulties in the Bundestag, the public, and the press. And the executive branch of the government thought that would be an unwarranted intrusion by the legislative branch in its affairs.[13]

The first version of the German-Italian agreement served as a paradigm for most of the later recruitment agreements. It spelled out a detailed, definite, and rather bureaucratic procedure for recruitment extending from the selection of workers to examination of their physical fitness and health. Nonetheless, numerous Italian workers also continued to come into Germany directly and obtain jobs. Such workers were not subject either to the supervision procedures of the two labor administrations or the stipulations of the model labor contract, such as the rule stating that workers were not allowed to change their jobs during the first six months of employment. Many workers attempted to get around these stipulations, especially because German employers were competing in a scramble for workers.[14] On the other hand, they had to accept being excluded from the special protection provisions of the recruitment agreement and the model labor contract, such as basic social-political equality on a par with German workers, wages based on agreed rates, and protected contract length. Especially important was the clause in the official contract document guaranteeing suitable living quarters; one of the early criticisms of foreigner employment had been the sometimes appalling living conditions, especially of those foreign workers who had not arrived in Germany through official channels.[15]

In the subsequent period, in discussions on expansion and the employment of foreign workers, the conviction was repeatedly expressed that if continued economic growth was what people wanted, there were no economically and politically meaningful alternatives.[16] At this stage, however, the mass recruitment drives of the 1960s and 1970s were neither foreseen nor planned. In this early phase, emphasis was on securing the possibility for cheap foreign labor, chiefly in agriculture, the construction industry, and mining—those sectors with the most difficult working conditions and the least prospect for meeting their needs through the domestic labor market. This measure enabled employers to stabilize wage scales in agriculture and construction at a relatively low level, especially because,

at least in the early phase of recruitment, seasonal workers were often the c
cruited. These workers regularly returned to Italy, so that in the beginnin
was no question about arranging a permanent place to live, bringing in othe
bers of the family, or providing unemployment benefits, whose transfer
was not among the stipulated provisions before 1960. Seasonal unemploym
clined, however, under the impact of mechanization in agriculture, rising c
for labor in industry, and successful efforts to deseasonalize the construc
dustry by introducing various new measures such as bad-weather pay.[17] C
ample of the problems before 1960 involved a group of Italian constructio
ers who were sent home in mid-December 1959 although a number of th
been working for years in the Federal Republic. They "had to go through t
in Verona once more in January 1960. If all went according to plan, they wc
turn to their jobs in Germany again at the end of January or sometime in
ary."[18] The "mill in Verona" was the German recruitment office in that c
scribed in the following terms by a German diplomat after his visit there
entire complex almost gives you the impression of a prisoner transit or dis
camp. That impression was strengthened by the loudspeakers barking instr
to the Italians waiting there, and when I was there, by the bad weather and
grounds."[19]

A further criticism that repeatedly surfaced later on in connection with r
ment from other countries was the lack of accurate information about livi
working conditions and pay scales in the Federal Republic. The often unf
issues such as the distinction between gross wages and take-home pay, pie
bonuses, and deductions taken out of pay for housing provided by the em
provoked dissatisfaction among the foreign workers, some of whom thoug
had been unjustly treated or cheated. In a number of cases, that disgruntlem
them to quit their jobs, refuse to work, or stage wildcat strikes.

Yet on the whole, the employment of foreign labor proved a success, an
man employers were very satisfied in particular with their Italian worker
Federal Labor Institute noted that experience with Italian workers had largel
positive: the Italians were especially well suited for work with root crops
truck farming.[20] The State Labor Office of Lower Saxony expressly state
contrary to earlier expectations, the southern Italians were getting on fine.[21]
ing firm also wrote in 1957 that contrary to their fears, foreigners had not sw
the mining profession. However, "due to their attachment to having some
their numerous children and their tendency to be less efficient on the job,"
ern Italians were not so well liked.[22]

Yet there was no public debate at this juncture on the traditions of foreign
ployment in Germany, a discussion that might well have suggested itself a
ten years after the end of the war. Nonetheless, beyond the realm of pc
rhetoric, the renewed recruitment of foreign workers was indeed often intui
associated with events before 1945. Among other things, that was reflected
virtually unquestioned and natural continued use of the customary term *Fre*
beiter (foreign worker) to designate such workers. Common before 1945 as a
dard term for conscripted laborers, it was not replaced by the more friend

nevertheless distancing expression *Gastarbeiter* (guest worker) until during the 1960s.

Thus in an article in September 1955 the *Handelsblatt* offered certain suggestions on how Italians should be properly treated. Already during recruitment, employers should make sure

> to reserve the right in all cases to select workers yourselves, so as to avoid the risk of getting someone you would later like to get rid of. . . . Ultimately, a liaison person will be needed who knows the local conditions and can put together the necessary information on the worker's character, industriousness, family situation, criminal record if any, et cetera. . . . In all this, it would be a grave error to assume that experience gathered with foreign workers during the last war—both positive and negative—is still valid today. Today the situation is completely new. One big difference is that back then the foreigners were coerced into coming here. Today they do so voluntarily. Back then, the war situation led to fewer expectations on their part. Today, even in the case of the Italians, their expectations as to living standards and wages are high. Moreover, any omission or failure, each and every little incorrect decision [by the employer] is immediately interpreted as a personal and even national unfriendly act, one that can be responded to only in one way: by quitting the job. And if one person leaves, many follow suit.[23]

On the whole, though, statements such as these hints admonishing that Italians could no longer be treated like they had been in wartime were fairly uncommon. In the years that followed, recruitment of Italian workers to Germany remained at a low level; in 1959, they numbered less than fifty thousand, most of these employed in agriculture. In addition, in the early phase, the proportion of workers who quit their job and returned to Italy before completing their contract obligation was very large; in mining, it amounted to more than a third.[24] Nor was there any reason to increase the number of foreign workers as long as the steady stream of refugees from East Germany provided for manpower reserves in the West German labor market.

Between 1959 and 1962, a turning point was reached in the German labor market. For the first time, the number of vacancies exceeded that of the registered jobless. In 1962 the total number of German wage earners (all those gainfully employed or registered as jobless) began to decline. Between 1959 and 1965, the number of foreign workers jumped by one million. The total figure for gainfully employed in the Federal Republic, which had soared by 4.5 million in the period 1950–60, climbed, however, only about 500,000 from 1960 to 1965, leveling off at some 26.5 million. From the beginning of the 1960s, several interacting factors had been decisive for this development.

Since economic growth continued unabated, but the stream of refugees from East Germany dwindled with the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961, gaps in the German labor market were now being filled solely by foreign workers, more and more of whom were so-called permanent workers. These gaps grew larger because of three additional factors: the generation of war babies, born in a period of lower birth rates, was now entering the labor market; better pension and

retirement conditions had led to earlier retirement; and the average work week dropped from 44.4 hours (1960) to 41.4 (1968), while the period for training : workers had been lengthened.[25]

The shortage of workers now sparked more intense competition for worl among German firms. In the summer of 1959, the weekly *Der Spiegel* noted: " struggle to find more workers has become an exhausting constant effort in wl the personnel departments of both large industrial enterprises and smaller fi with few employees now find themselves embroiled."[26] Employers and the g ernment concurred that increased recruitment of foreign workers offered a pla ble and effective remedy.

In March 1960, Labor Minister Blank signed recruitment agreements with S] and Greece patterned on the agreement with Rome.[27] As in the case of the Ita agreement, the governments of Spain and Greece had taken the first initiative, years letting it be known that they were interested in an international labor ag ment.[28] They too wished to relieve pressures on their domestic labor marke means of regulated emigration and to consolidate their economy by means of expected transfer of wages earned by their nationals as workers in Germany. cause of the continuing need for labor, the prospect of new recruitment areas ı seemed more and more attractive to German employers, especially because tl was a hope that along with skilled workers, they might also recruit urgently nee female workers in Spain and Greece. Additional agreements were later conclu with Turkey on 30 October 1961, Portugal on 17 March 1964, and finally with goslavia on 12 October 1968, after a large number of Yugoslav workers had ready been working in Germany.[29]

The 1961 recruitment agreement with Turkey was a special case in that here the first time was a partner state located largely outside Europe. Turkey too had c siderable economic interest in an arranged emigration of its surplus labor, and si the change of government in 1960, Ankara had been working on plans for a gui migration policy. Yet recruitment of Turkish workers, especially in the mining dustry, had commenced even before the German-Turkish agreement was sigı For example, in the summer of 1961, the *Bergbau AG* in Hamborn, acting oı own initiative and with the agreement of the appropriate labor office, had recru Turkish miners, even arranging to fly in some of them on Air France.[30] Moreo early experience with Turkish trainees in agriculture had been given a very posi assessment by employers and the authorities. They noted that the Turks knew I to take orders, were very well behaved and hard-working, and that to date no pı lems had cropped up. One comment was that "If Turks are handled properly, t can fit in well and be useful workers."[31] That belief was also confirmed by the g ernment in Bonn: "Based on previous experience to date with Turkish worker the Federal Republic, the Turkish worker is no less productive than his Italian cc terpart, nor in any way inferior in natural ability and personal attitude."[32]

So the interest on the part of the Turkish government met with a positive sponse in Bonn. The government wanted, however, to avoid encouraging inte in such arrangements in other non-European capitals by concluding an offi labor agreement with Ankara and decided instead on the more simple form oı

exchange of notes. That document did not expressly include, however, the possibility for recruited workers to send for their families. The main reason was that based on economic planning policy, Ankara was interested only in a temporary arrangement for employing Turkish workers abroad; after their return, they were expected to apply the know-how they had acquired to help build up Turkish industry.[33] Long-term employment was not envisaged; rather, the idea was to limit the duration of foreign employment to two years. It was not until several years later that this reservation on the part of the Turkish government was dropped at the wish of German employers (and against the opposition of the Interior Ministry).[34]

In April 1964, at the request of the Turkish government, Turkish workers in Germany were granted the then customary allowance for the second child even for their children living in Turkey. Subsequently, they were given the same rights in social legislation as their Greek and Spanish counterparts.[35] For the first time, here in the case of Turkey, the German government obligated itself to pay social benefits to the citizens of another country that itself had no social security system and thus could not reciprocate by providing benefits to possible German employees working in Turkey. The reasons for this decision were obvious: the Turkish workers generally were well liked and there was great interest in having them on the payroll, especially in the mining industry. The trend to employ Turkish workers was constantly rising, especially because it was likely there would be a large drop in the number of qualified workers from Italy. The proportion of skilled and semiskilled workers among the Turks was some 38.3 percent, far greater than that among workers from other countries with a recruitment agreement (Italy, 20.9 percent; Spain, 5.7 percent; Greece, 10 percent).[36]

In view of the rising need for new workers, a trend that could not be halted even by continued rationalization and mechanization in production, the employment of guest workers was perceived as a clear expression of a phase of virtually unending economic growth and the so-called economic miracle. Doubts about possible undesirable consequences were broached only, and then but rarely, in internal discussion on importing foreign labor.[37] Here, and especially in public discourse, what counted were the positive effects for the Federal Republic, though opinions on these differed. For example, the paper *Die Welt* wrote in 1964 that foreign workers were

> important—one is tempted to say indispensable—for economies that wish to develop and grow. Economic progress is always bound up with changes in economic structure. . . . Investments shift, and with them the need for workers. . . . Labor mobility is also on the downturn. This happens because dismissals and layoffs no longer occur as abruptly, and rarely on such a large scale, or are . . . prevented or at least restricted by government measures, for reasons of social and economic policy. The new or more rapidly advancing branches in the economy are dependent on the influx of foreign labor if the mobility of the domestic labor force is no longer sufficient to meet market needs.[38]

This function of foreign workers as a reserve labor force was paramount in arguments on behalf of employing foreigners. By deploying them where needs arose,

it was believed that it would be possible to compensate for the effects of fluc tions in the economy on the labor market. Already back in 1959, the *Frankfu Allgemeine* had underscored one major advantage of foreigner labor: the worl were expendable. "Should there be unemployment in Germany, the foreign w ers could be sent back home again."[39] At a conference of the Employers' Ass ations on the topic of guest workers, that view was formulated quite explicitl

> What advantage do foreign workers have when it comes to mobility? Upon cl scrutiny, we can note that the foreign workers here in Germany are totally mobile— just the individual but the entire foreign workforce as a whole because of the strong i of workers returning home and then coming in again. . . . Firm A, which no longer n any workers during the year, will not take on any new help, while firm B, in a grc sector of the economy, will get the hundred or thousand workers it needs in the con year. As I see it, this process generates an extremely favorable effect.[40]

In terms of management calculations, the additional expenses associated hiring foreign workers were set off against the financial advantages gained f their utilization. The provision of hostels, payment of interpreters, a general per head for recruitment via the Federal Institute for Labor, various measures their welfare, and training costs were weighed against the specific advantages cruing from the employment of foreigners:

> As a rule, the foreigner does not take part in the company pension scheme and is not sidered eligible for special bonuses for having worked a long number of years in the f or for early medical therapy or rest cures. A foreigner in our employ generally give the best productive years of his labor. For the employing firms, the advantage tha crues from this is that only rarely must an older foreign worker or one no longer full be retained on the payroll because of the requirements of social policy.[41]

An additional advantage of employing guest workers was that their tendenc get by on fewer consumer goods acted as a damper on inflation; at that stage, n were eager to send as much of their earnings as possible to their families t home. On the occasion of the arrival of the one millionth guest worker (Arma Sa Rodrigues from Portugal) in the Federal Republic on 10 September 1964 was received with much pomp and circumstance. Labor Minister Blank c mented: "These one million persons at work in Germany help contribute to m taining production growth while keeping prices stable and preserving our rep tion in world markets. The role of the *Gastarbeiter* in the labor market certainly become more significant in the years to come."[42]

Not only did the advantages of employing foreigners benefit the economy; government also profited from their presence, as was stressed by the state se tary in the Labor Ministry, Ludwig Kattenstroth, in a speech in March 1966:

> Thus the foreign workers, 90 percent of whom are at their most productive age betv 18 and 45, contribute substantially to goods production while not increasing the den for consumer goods in the Federal Republic to the same degree. . . . In addition, for workers in the Federal Republic pay income tax and social security deductions acc

> ing to the same scales as indigenous German workers. Given the age of the foreign workers, this presently has a very favorable effect, especially in connection with old-age insurance, because far higher revenues are taken in from the foreign workers than are currently being paid out in pension benefits to this category of individuals. . . . Consequently, it is possible to claim that the employment of foreigners not only brings advantages for the economy itself but also entails far more benefits than disadvantages for the general public as a whole.[43]

In the eyes of those in responsible positions in government and industry, such advantages for the national economy springing from the employment of foreigners were matched by corresponding positive effects for the home countries of the workers and the workers themselves. For example, unemployment figures declined in the labor-supplying countries, balances of payment there were improved by the transfer of wages, and the qualification levels of their workforce were enhanced by their experience in German industry. This was viewed as a kind of "development aid for southern European countries," as it was often called. Moreover, no politician concluded a speech on guest workers during this period without referring to the extremely positive political effects of their presence in the Federal Republic in the sense of enhancing internal understanding and European integration. As Labor Minister Blank commented in 1964, the employment of foreigners in Germany had made "the merging together of Europe's peoples and closer ties between individuals of very diverse backgrounds and cultures in a spirit of friendship" a reality.[44]

Thus almost all those officially involved with foreigner employment were upbeat about its political impact during this period. For the government in Bonn, the paramount concern was to keep the economic growth rate up and prices down. For employers, it had now become much easier to find workers for lower-skilled jobs. In addition, it proved possible in this way to avoid potential upward pressure on wages from the lower end of the wage scale resulting from a shortage of workers. Finally, the trade unions found that as a result of employing foreigners, conditions were far more favorable now for reducing working hours.

Yet all were firmly convinced that this was a temporary phenomenon, a transitional development that would eventually disappear. In any event, the leadership echelon in business and government gave little serious thought at this juncture to the consequences and longer-term prospects of employing an ever-larger contingent of guest workers in the Federal German economy.

In the early 1960s the proportion of foreign workers to the total number of gainfully employed in the economy soared from 1.3 percent (279,000) in 1960 to 6.1 percent (1,314,000) in 1966.

If any fear haunted the economic and political leadership, it was that of possible subversive Communist activity among foreign migrants. In order to counteract any such activity, anticommunist newspapers for guest workers were launched in the 1960s to check the tide of propaganda coming from the East.[45] In addition, excursions to areas along the border with East Germany and to West Berlin were organized for groups of guest workers by organizations such as the League for

Peace and Freedom and *Caritas.* This proved to have a great impact. A report Caritas speaks of the enormous impression—quite favorable from the West G man perspective—a trip to Berlin had made on the Spanish workers. It conclud "There is no more concrete and vivid visual lesson on Communism that we c give these workers than this."[46] Especially graphic is a report on a bus trip of It ian guest workers to Berlin organized by the Catholic Mission in Munich:

> The Italians were impressed by the fact that the East Berliners seemed more poo dressed and less well fed than the West Germans, and all wore an indeterminable sad pression on their faces. They also noticed that the young men they saw were almost in uniform. When the group returned to West Berlin, several of the Italians fell to th knees, kissed the ground and exclaimed: "We're back in freedom again!" The Comn nists among them were so dejected that three proceeded demonstratively to tear up th party membership books. That same evening several wrote to their comrades back Italy, reporting that they had seen Communism with their own eyes and now ne wished to be Communists again.[47]

The widespread view that the employment of foreigners was only a provisior measure of limited duration was also reflected in the new Law on Foreigners April 1965. It replaced the Foreigner Police Ordinance from the prewar peric though it incorporated some of its features.[48] Even if this new law was intend as the expression of a "liberal and cosmopolitan policy on foreigners,"[49] the sti ulations on residence and work permits, with express reference to protecting t interests of the Federal Republic of Germany (paragraph 2, Law on Foreigner did not grant foreigners any notable legal rights. The large latitude in discretiona powers it gave the authorities allowed them to control flexibly not just the dur tion of stay for foreigners but also their access to the labor market. In contra workers from EEC countries—in this instance, the Italians—were to be put on equal footing with their German counterparts, as stipulated in agreements wh the European Economic Community was set up. This policy was indeed impl mented step-by-step down to 1970 through a series of corresponding ordinance

The concept of temporary residence was codified, however, by the legislatic on foreigners into a legal regulation that was binding for the majority of them ar had a decisive shaping impact on the life of foreign workers in the Federal R public. Initially, they were granted a residence permit valid only for one year, du ing which period they were bound to their employer in Germany. Extension of tl work and residence permit beyond the first year was at the discretion of the fe eral German authorities. It was granted only if the generally formulated "interest of the Federal Republic were not harmed as a result. Taking up permanent res dence in the Federal Republic was interpreted by the courts as a violation of th regulation,[50] although during this phase, most guest workers in the Federal R public did not generally intend to stay on a long-term basis.

Even if most guest workers initially wanted to return in the near future to the homeland, their gradual adjustment to a longer but still provisional stay led to kind of split in consciousness. In contrast with their actual situation, the realitie back in their native country dominated their everyday lives. Even workers wh

had gained solid social rights over time, had brought their families to Germany, and had become de facto immigrants still remained psychologically fixated for the most part on the world they had left behind.[51]

In the initial phase, by contrast, the orientation toward a better future in their homeland was what had triggered their desire to seek work abroad. For what was presumed to be a limited stint, the young workers were prepared to endure numerous deprivations in their personal lives, putting in as much overtime, shift, and piece work as possible to improve their wages in order to achieve their aim of returning home quickly. It is also true, however, that they were often disappointed in the great hopes with which they had set out on their journey. For example, the metaphor of "Germany fever" that was spread in Turkey by the media, the Turkish Institute for Labor, and verbal propaganda suggests that from the perspective of the migrants, the decision to migrate was not made primarily on the basis of objective information. Rather, it was driven by inflated expectations that were simply too beguiling and powerful to resist.[52]

This also meant that the social and economic conditions back in their homeland remained for the guest workers the yardstick by which to measure their lives in Germany. Their plan was to earn as much money as possible in the shortest amount of time and to save the bulk of their earnings as a nest egg or transfer them back home so that they might return home after a few years, far better off in economic terms. They could then either work at some job or even become self-employed.

All these attitudes had a powerful impact on the behavior of guest workers in Germany. They were more willing than Germans to take on dirty or especially heavy physical work and put in more overtime. They did without a standard of living and consumption that might have been more in keeping with their income, spent as little as possible on rent, and showed but minimal interest in politics or union activity. Their relation to conditions in the Federal Republic was totally oriented to the short term; as they saw it, longer-term changes in Germany were no concern of theirs.

These aspects had also been characteristic of the situation of foreign workers in agriculture and industry prior to World War I. Another similarity was the fact that it was not mainly the foreigners themselves who expressed concern about their poor working and living conditions; simply the constant threat of possible revocation of their residence permit had an intimidating and disciplining effect on their willingness to complain. Rather, those who voiced criticism were the trade unions, the authorities, and the media back in their native countries. And, after some delay, German institutions such as segments of the press, welfare organizations, and the churches also joined in the critique.

Some notion of the working conditions of guest workers in German firms in the 1960s can be derived from the statistics: in 1966 fully 90 percent of foreign males were employed as blue-collar workers, compared with 49 percent of the German male workforce. In 1961, 71.8 percent of all gainfully employed foreigners were in the secondary sector, contrasted with 47.8 percent of the German workforce. In

1966, 72 percent of all foreign males were employed in Germany as unskill semiskilled laborers.[53] In 1963 the highest concentrations of foreign workers in construction, the iron and metal industry, and mining.[54] Because of their l skill level or job classification, foreigners received lower wages, had far mor cidents on the job, and changed their jobs more often than their German co-w ers.[55]

In summary, foreigners during this period were employed mainly as unsk or semiskilled industrial workers, especially in branches where heavy ma work, dirty work, piecework, shift work, or serial production methods that n sitated few skills (assembly line production) were extremely common. Thi tailed substantial advantages for employers in a period of high labor deman cause German workers were either not available to fill such jobs or would had to be paid much higher wage concessions to attract them, thus making t low-skill jobs unprofitable for industry. A 1965 analysis by an economist desc this aspect in a condensed formulation:

> Since in-migration is on a selective basis in the sense that it is made up predomin of workers with a low level of vocational skills, migrants must often begin by eng in activities that are unpopular among the domestic indigenous work force or poorly In this way, it remains possible in the open labor market to recruit workers for these as well without making wage concessions. In a closed labor market, however, bec of the ultimate effects of labor demand, pressure to equalize wages irrespective o ferences in productivity and compensation for the unpopularity of certain kinds of by correspondingly higher remuneration would be more operative as factors.[56]

The history of guest workers in the 1960s is a history of men. In 1962 more two-thirds of all guest workers were living in hostels and were young unma men without a family. In their leisure time, which in any event was limited, generally remained among themselves. Contacts with German fellow wo were initially quite infrequent and developed only after they had spent a nu of years in Germany.[57] Even more difficult were contacts, if at all, with Ger girls and women. In the early phase, the number of guest workers who ma German women was minuscule. Not until the late 1960s was there an increa the number who brought along their wives and children to Germany. To marry l home and then to move with the family to Germany was already a clear sign o change from guest worker to immigrant, even if many such workers only gr ally became aware of this shift.

The way the German authorities dealt with the question of allowing worke bring in their families constituted one of the first inconsistencies in a long se of contradictory measures in policy on foreigners. On the one hand, the autl ties endorsed the idea of reuniting families because this reduced fluctuation am the workers and allowed them to settle in to a certain extent. That was certa desirable from the employers' perspective, even if only for an indefinite pe On the other hand, the authorities did not want to restrict guest-worker flexib by allowing them to sink more permanent roots. Another compounding fact the time was that housing in the Federal Republic was still in short supply,

there were fears that the additional pressure on the housing market through the arrival of workers' families could spark social tensions. Many German firms, however, now supported the efforts of their foreign employees to bring their families to Germany and settle down for the longer term. That policy was also supported by the labor authorities. While unskilled workers would, as in the past, not be permitted to become more settled, it was thought desirable to allow guest workers who were skilled workers, proven employees, or foreigners in a priority job classification needed in Germany longer-term to bring in their families.[58]

It was newspaper reports about the foreigners' living conditions—not their working conditions or status under German law—that awakened in the German public a certain interest in the guest workers. Other than that, they were given only marginal public attention and aroused little concern in the first half of the 1960s.

In August 1960, the Hamburg daily *Die Welt* published a sensational article on the living conditions of Italian guest workers:

> By comparison, bunkers are almost attractive. Even barracks with double beds and often even three-decker beds appear quite commendable after you have seen one of these cramped rooms where there's just enough space for ten men to sleep on straw sacks. Everything else, even blowing your nose, so to speak, has to be done outside. . . . "Look, we don't know how long it's going to stay like this" is an answer you are often given, which can be interpreted to mean: "Maybe we will have to give jobs to a few of our own unemployed again, and then what will happen with the specially constructed living quarters?" So fears about the future of the economic miracle are being lived out in fantasy precisely associated with those persons who were brought into the country to ensure that the trumpets of economic advance do not grow silent.[59]

The provision of adequate living quarters for guest workers was the most crucial cost factor for firms related to employing foreign labor. While there were fixed agreements that foreigners had to receive the same wages and social benefits as Germans, there were possibilities for cost-cutting when it came to housing that were reflected in the primitive accommodations in which *Gastarbeiter* found themselves.[60] The foreign workers themselves had a keen interest in cheap solutions to the problem of housing because they proceeded on the premise that their stay in the Federal Republic would only be temporary. Consequently, a certain gap was created between the interests of the workers and the employers, allowing some leeway that many private landlords soon took advantage of. Moreover, at least in the early 1960s, discriminating against foreigners was considered a trivial transgression, and it was unlikely there would be any protest, especially from the still extremely green and intimidated newcomers.

The federal government in Bonn tried to promote construction of dwelling units for foreigners by providing special loans and subsidies. And from the mid-1960s, that policy increasingly led to a definite improvement in living conditions, especially for workers in large firms.[61] In a lengthy feature article that appeared in the progressive monthly *Konkret* in 1966 on problems of the guest workers, Ulrike Meinhof wrote that "the range of variation runs from the criminal milieu to the modern youth-hostel style."[62] As a whole, however, well down into the late 1970s,

the living conditions of foreign workers remained externally the most visible s
of their underprivileged and disadvantaged status in Germany.

The neglect of the social dimension is also reflected in the fact that the quest
of how the foreign workers should be cared for was dealt with only with great h
itation, taking considerations of economic effectiveness into account, and of
only under pressure from the governments of their native countries. Rome was p
ticularly vigorous in its support for the social concerns of the Italian workers in
Federal Republic and was able to achieve various improvements in recruitm
procedures, housing, leisure activities and training.[63] Yet it should be noted t
Italy, as an EEC member, enjoyed a decided political advantage for advancing
interests when compared with the other recruitment countries.

By contrast, the efforts by the Turkish government to make sure its citizens w
properly taken care of in Germany were more limited and generally came too la
Not until the 1970s did the Turkish authorities introduce measures aimed at p
viding for the needs of workers in respect to schools for their children and pla
of worship. These efforts were largely oriented toward creating a counterweigh
the antilaicist private organizations by establishing their own mosques and Ko
schools and trying to preserve the attachment of Turkish workers in Germany
their native land.[64] They paid little attention to the particular concrete situati
faced by their compatriots in Germany because the operative basis for their init
tive was the assumption that Turkish workers were in the Federal Republic o
for a limited time. For that reason alone, efforts were made to ensure that Turki
workers and their families would be able to reintegrate after returning to Turk
Another compounding factor impacting the situation of Turks in the Federal F
public was the fact that Moslems in Germany were largely left on their own: u
like in the Christian community, there was no umbrella organization that knit t
gether their places of worship. The vacuum created here provided great sco
particularly for sectarian Islamic groups.[65] The German Workers' Welfare Ass
ciation (Arbeiterwohlfahrt), which had set up in 1962 a special office for the co
sultation of Turkish guest workers—Türk Danis (Turkish Advisory Center)—w
unable to remedy this lack.[66]

There were a number of German institutions that dealt with provisions and ca
for the foreign workers. Down into the 1970s, however, the German authoriti
did not view social services for the workers as an independent task, but more pa
ticularly as the prerequisite for raising foreign worker productivity[67] and for stru
gling against alleged Communist threats to them. Thus, for example, in one di
cussion the Interior Ministry dutifully stressed its intention to undertake great
efforts to close the gap between the German population and the foreign worke
It was important, however, not to exaggerate measures for providing services
the foreigners; German workers should not be left thinking they were at a co
parative disadvantage.[68]

Finally, on 1 August 1965, the Labor Ministry created a special section for pr
moting the integration of foreign workers; this section was charged with the ta
of unifying all efforts and initiatives in this area. Along with provisions in the s
cial, cultural, religious, and political spheres, it was also deemed necessary to tal

measures to counteract the possible isolation of foreign guest workers. Moreover, resistance was to be intensified against destructive propaganda being guided and directed from the outside.[69] The increasingly sharp public criticism of the social situation of foreign workers and the social consequences of employing foreigners in the Federal Republic apparently had had their impact. Yet the institutionalization of special education for foreigners and research on foreigners in the Federal Republic did not really get rolling until the 1970s. Even then, for a long period these initiatives developed under the impress of the ongoing political debate, for the main part leaving the wider basic set of social conditions shaping foreigner employment out of the picture.[70]

As the number of foreign workers rose, signs of growing aggressive defensive reactions also increased in the local population. Aside from stressing the economic necessity of guest workers and the need for mutual understanding, the government had little to say. Beginning especially in 1966–67, when the first postwar recession interrupted the previous unbroken upward trend in the German economy, there was an upsurge in public sentiment against foreign workers in certain segments of the population. Concomitantly, the extreme right NPD was able to score electoral gains from 1966 to 1968, picking up representatives in seven state legislatures. In the early 1960s, the press had carried reports about signs in restaurants proclaiming in incorrect Italian "Probizione per Italianos," (forbidden for Italians),[71] but media reports in the early 1960s on the whole give no indication of the presence of open or widespread hostility toward foreigners. Rather these articles suggest that politicians and journalists were trying hard to avoid providing any new impetus to the unpleasant memories abroad of the ugly German. By appealing to the German public to exercise more tact and hospitality, attempts were made, often coupled with a dash of didacticism, to counteract possible tendencies of xenophobia. For example, the *Hamburger Echo* commented in 1962:

> Relations between guest workers and the Germans in general, and their fellow German workers in particular, are anything but harmonious. Only by careful application of patience and understanding . . . can the difference in mentality be eliminated as a potential factor aggravating the work climate. The guest worker is not some sort of "strange animal," who gesticulates and talks in a loud voice. Nor is he some mere appendage to a machine. Every people has its "national" plus points and drawbacks. The fact that thanks to economic and technological development, some peoples would seem to have a more advantageous position than others certainly does not mean that there are first- and second-class nations. . . . Another aspect worth considering is that these hundreds of thousands of guest workers are the object of a successful form of development aid—successful because it is very effective in human terms. And precisely when it comes to these human relationships, the hosts should never forget that down through history, guests have often proven quite useful for their hosts—and vice versa. If these guests have positive experiences while working in the Federal Republic, later on they will become Germany's best personal ambassadors back in their native countries.[72]

Yet repeatedly beating the drum on the economic utility of foreign labor now began to lose its persuasiveness. According to a 1966 study, the press contained

almost three times as many negative as positive judgments regarding foreign wor ers; fully a third of all newspaper reports on the guest workers dealt with sens tional criminal or sexual stories.[73] Among conservative politicians, the criticis of the employment of guest workers as a policy in general—and criticisms of gu workers themselves in particular—became a standard applause-getting paragra included in every speech on the campaign trail.[74] In May 1966 the Bavarian dai *Abendzeitung Nürnberg* commented:

> For about a year now, it has been possible to garner applause at almost any organized p litical event in West Germany by making a few negative and disparaging remarks ab guest workers. At one factory, the workforce decided to put in a few hours extra a we as nonovertime in order to prevent management from hiring guest workers. Reports the industrial associations comment about the difficult problem of housing guest wo ers for one specific reason: they are not wanted in the existing residential neighborhoo of these towns. The reports say they are too noisy, or that they finagle a bit of extra p by an organized form of "reporting sick." Or that the incidence of crime has risen b cause of them. Or that they are sending "our good German money" back home to f eign countries. And so on. Even a few members of the Bundestag have started to ride t neo-nationalist wave, fed by the murky waters of prejudice, ignorance, and narro minded bias.[75]

Nonetheless, the relationship of Germans toward guest workers in this peri cannot be characterized simply as an ideologically fixated xenophobia.[76] Rath it would seem that the quite natural and unquestioned expectation and acceptan of one's own social and economic advantages vis-à-vis foreigners was widespre (coupled with a soothing sense of satisfaction in one's own generosity for allo ing these foreigners a "share" in the German economic miracle). Yet foreign lab more generally was not a riveting topic that attracted any special attention at t time. In a society that had developed no vistas for the future and was spellbou with the fascination of its own economic dynamism, the *Gastarbeiter* tended to l seen more as a veritable symptom of this newfound affluence—analogous to col TV and pedestrian shopping malls.

A problematic constellation did not emerge until employment of guest worke and a rise in unemployment in the German workforce collided during the 196 67 recession. Many people demanded that German workers should be given u conditional priority over their foreign counterparts, and this demand was e pressed in polemic railing against the purported preference enjoyed by forei workers.[77] The complaints, however, were not associated with any calls to do aw totally with foreigner employment, even in times of economic boom. What w desired was a reserve army of expendable workers for jobs that had little appe an army of laborers that would pack its tents and vanish in periods of econom slack just as quickly and silently as it had appeared in times of boom, a labor rese voir that was not in competition with German workers and was consistently su ordinate to them both socially and economically.

This attitude was given rather scurrilous expression in a sensational incident Baden-Württemberg in 1966. At a convention of the Federation of German En

ployers (BDA) devoted to the topic of guest workers organized that spring, there were a number of reports, clashing with widespread prejudices to the contrary, about the high level of *Gastarbeiter* productivity. One report stated that their productivity was "certainly no less than that of their fellow German workers."[78] The next day the tabloid *Bild-Zeitung* came out with a lead story on this convention entitled "Do Guest Workers Work Harder than German Workers?"[79] The story sparked a wave of unrest among German workers, especially in Baden-Württemberg, spreading at a number of plants into token strikes involving some 5,000 participants.

The headline had apparently struck a sensitive nerve. The economic miracle over the previous fifteen years had generated a new sense of self-confidence in the German population, which sought proof for its own competence and honesty through economic prosperity. This newfound self-confidence had permitted others, foreigners, to share in that success—as long as Germans' own position was not called into question but was even reinforced. The allegation that guest workers were "harder working" than Germans was going too far: it was tantamount to a frontal attack on the very foundations of the collective surrogate identity of the West Germans. Some West Germans mustered hastily assembled evidence to prove that foreigners were *not* more hardworking than Germans and called for a boycott of the nefarious *Bild-Zeitung*.

Compared with the economic slumps since the late 1970s, the 1966–67 recession was overcome in a surprisingly short time. After turning negative in 1967 (–0.2 percent), growth rates bounced back and soared to 7.3 percent in 1968 and 8.2 percent in 1969 and remained consistently on the plus side until 1973. Precisely because the recession had been reversed so quickly, thus demonstrating the possibility that the government could step in effectively and steer the economy, an economic optimism took hold in the ensuing period under the Social-Liberal coalition of Brandt and Scheel. In scope and depth, that optimism was fully the equal of the buoyant mood that had prevailed in the 1950s and 1960s. It differed, if at all, from that earlier era in that under the Brandt government, there was a stronger faith in the effectiveness of government measures to guide the economy.

That optimism was manifested in a particular way in the labor market: the number of vacant positions soared, and with it the demand for foreign workers. Once again public discussion of the issue was characterized by repeated reference to the positive effects of employing foreigners. Thus the *Industriekurier* wrote in the autumn of 1968:

> Even from the perspective of public funding, the return on foreign labor far exceeds investment costs. Since the foreigners come to Germany at an age when they are already productive, there are no costs for their education (schools, kindergarten) or their old-age retirement (homes for senior citizens). Annually, the foreigners pay in a far larger sum in unemployment insurance deductions than what the government pays out to them in such entitlements. To date, social security pension insurance has always shown a positive balance when it came to guest workers. The surplus from pension payments by foreigners and the relatively low pensions amounts annually to over one billion marks. will take 20 to 25 years before incoming revenues and outgoing benefits balance ea other. The calculation for the Treasury Department probably will show a similar plı The income accruing from taxes from foreign-labor employment is likely to exceed pu lic investments by a considerable margin.[80]

In view of the economic recovery and the associated pressure for upward reva uation of the D-mark, *Die Zeit* praised foreign labor as a prescription in econom policy for dealing with currency problems:

> A guest worker probably increases the German GNP by some 20,000 marks annual His wages average around 10,000 marks, while an additional 10,000 marks is generat in the form of taxes, social security deductions, and the gross profit of the employer. respect to social security contributions, he represents a highly favorable risk category, least when it comes to compulsory health insurance schemes. That is because his inc nation to knock off from work for reasons of illness in the case of slight indispositio is far weaker than his overriding desire to earn and put away in the form of savings much as possible during his stay in Germany. . . . An initial increase in the number guest workers from 1 million to 1.5 or even 2 million would not be excessive. It will extremely beneficial for our internal economic accounting to build up our reserves highly skilled guest workers.[81]

This article indicated the direction for the ensuing period: the number of forei workers rose steadily from 1.014 million in 1968 to hit a peak of 2.595 million 1973. Thus in just the three years between 1968 and 1971 as many new forei workers were added to the workforce as in the entire period before 1968. The nur ber of Turkish workers in particular soared dramatically, from 130,000 in 1967 more than 600,000 by 1973. By the end of January 1972, Turkish workers cons tuted the largest single national contingent in the foreign workforce in the Feder Republic.

The structure of foreign labor had not undergone any essential major chang in comparison with the years before 1967. At the beginning of 1973, 35.7 perce of all guest workers were employed in the iron and metals industry (manufactu and processing), 24.1 percent in processing industries, and 16.6 percent in co struction. During this period, the highest percentages of foreign workers were structural and civil engineering firms (21.9 percent), restaurants and catering (20 percent), and the plastics, rubber, and asbestos industries (20.6 percent). In 19 every ninth worker in the Federal Republic was a foreign national; in the man facturing trades, including construction, the corresponding figure was every six worker, some 16.6 percent of the total workforce.

The trend that had traditionally marked foreign labor since the 1880s had pe sisted: foreign workers tended to be concentrated disproportionately in unskill and low-skilled jobs involving especially heavy manual labor or dirty, dangerou or generally unpopular kinds of work. Because of the creation of an underclass low-skilled foreign laborers, there had been an increase in the possibilities for a vancement for German workers. Thus Labor Minister Arendt, a Social Democr

was still sanguine at the beginning of 1971 regarding the further prospects for foreign labor: "The extent to which foreign nationals will be required beyond the present levels of employment depends on developments in the labor market. In that regard, there can thus be no talk of imposing some kind of 'ceiling' on employing foreign nationals."[82]

With the onset of the recession of 1966–67, economists were increasingly skeptical about the stereotypical justification for hiring foreign workers that stressed the advantages of such a policy for the economy. The trigger for their doubts was an article published by the Berlin economist Carl Föhl. Föhl attempted through his calculations to prove that, first of all, "Without additional guest workers, every new job with high productivity replaces an old job, while the utilization of additional guest workers acts to maintain the old position, with its lower productivity, alongside the new job in the firm." The upshot is that, as in Switzerland, low-skill jobs were not eliminated by technological upgrading (rationalization) but rather were retained and were filled by guest workers, thus delaying the necessary modernization of the plant.

Second, Föhl showed that the favorable calculations of the economic utility of employing guest workers were based on the circumstance that these foreigners remained in Germany only temporarily, thus abrogating any need for large-scale public investment in their connection. "Yet the result appears much less favorable when, in the case of additional guest workers, a portion of private investment must be utilized for constructing dwellings, meeting rooms and the like for purposes that do not contribute to increased productivity. . . . If additional public investments are required, financed by tax revenues, then per capita consumption—that is, the living standard—declines even further than it would have otherwise as a result of augmenting per capita productive investment."

Föhl's third main point involved the long-term character of problems associated with foreign labor, if only because the length of stay by foreign workers in the Federal Republic was on the increase: "The previously attained level of deployment of guest workers in the economy cannot be easily reversed. Workers who in the meantime have advanced to higher, better-paying positions have no desire to return to their former jobs. That fact alone renders any reduction difficult."[83]

Föhl's article and its slant sparked a certain amount of interest within the Federal Republic. Even if his arguments were nothing new, they took on a new importance in the light of the economic slump at the time that was regarded as a highly alarming turn. The employment of foreigners was perceived no longer solely as a theoretical or moral issue, but as an economic and social problem as well. It shattered the way the Federal Republic had viewed itself until that point as the nation of the economic wonder. The matter-of-fact manner in which the economic miracle and guest workers had previously been yoked together now dissolved.

In the Bundestag, Karl Schiller, the new Social-Democratic economy minister, countered Föhl's controversial theses by putting forward the basic position of the government, reiterating its familiar arguments. The guest workers were a mobile reserve force that could be used to compensate for regional structural differences

(that could not be done away with by rationalization in any case) and imbalan in the labor market. Schiller avoided a direct response to the objection that the o inal utility of employing foreigners was nullified by the necessary long-term p lic expenditures the guest workers necessitated, stating that those costs were greater than the average that the government invested in a German employee. Schiller could also point to a new element that supported his theses: in the w of the recession, some 400,000 foreign workers had left the Federal Reput Schiller viewed this as splendid confirmation of the thesis that guest workers c stituted a compensatory flexible reserve of deployable labor in times of econo crisis: "Since a substantial percentage of foreign workers only wish to stay in Federal Republic for a limited time, a large proportion of them must be constai replenished via new recruitment. One of the upshots of this, however, is that t employment is kept flexible simply because of the changing demand among fi for such foreign manpower."[84]

Since the number of workers returning home had remained constant at abou percent annually in the 1960s even independent of economic developments, possibility that foreigner employment offered for a flexible reaction to fluctuati in growth now became the main argument in support of continued recruitmen had already become clear by this point, however, that those foreigners who not returned to their country of origin during the recession hardly correspon with the image of the supposedly mobile guest worker.[85] Schiller's bluntly p tive assessment signaled the readiness to resume recruitment once the econc picked up. There were few apprehensions about longer-term consequences, pı lems, and strains resulting from the employment of foreigners in the event economy should slump.

But only shortly thereafter, employers and the government began to look at o tendencies with some concern and grew increasingly more critical in their c ments. The length of stay of guest workers continued to rise steadily, and more more were sending for their dependents to come to Germany.[86] More and n foreign women were working in the Federal Republic.[87] And above all, the nı ber of foreign nationals resident in Germany but not in the workforce was c stantly on the rise. In 1967 there were a reported 815,000 foreign citizens livin Germany who were not employed, contrasted with 1961, when there were c 137,200 not working compared with some 550,000 who were gainfully emplo By 1973 the number of foreigners not in the workforce had soared to 1.3 mill These figures were all a clear indication of a trend toward long-term stay or e permanent settlement in the Federal Republic by a mounting number of fore nationals.

From the perspective of business and government leaders, this development l bored a clear fiscal danger: the prospect of greater financial burdens for the F eral Republic. There were as yet few fears that a disguised process of immigra might be at work here because the figures for guest workers returning home 1971–72 some 16.1 percent of all foreign workers in Germany) were still high though gradually decreasing. That perception was reinforced by the especi high number of workers who returned home during the recession; that appeare