African American Consumer Activism before and during the Civil Rights Era

The Civil Rights Movement, in the minds of many, is synonymous with the public career of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. His eloquent oratory, coupled with the media's near constant coverage of his activities from Montgomery to Memphis, has made him an American icon. Yet, while King's place in history has been deservedly illuminated, consumer activism, the most potent nonviolent strategy employed by African Americans during this period of civil rights activity, has not been similarly spotlighted. Minimizing the central role of African American economic retribution erroneously suggests that civil rights legislation resulted from white "moral transformation," rather than from the skillful use of African Americans' growing economic clout. Moreover, the sentiment of Civil Rights Movement-era black consumers to "hit 'em where it hurts" had clear historical precedents.

Decades before the commencement of the modern-day Civil Rights Movement, African Americans sought to use their collective spending power to affect positive social change. For example, Ida B. Wells, best known for her efforts to eradicate the bestial crime of lynching, stood as a pioneer advocate of African American economic retribution. Wells, after the brutal 1892 lynching of three African American businessmen in Memphis, used her position as editor of the Memphis Free Speech to urge fellow blacks to either leave the city or boycott Memphis's newly opened streetcar line. Significantly, her plea resulted in approximately two thousand blacks leaving Memphis and the near bankruptcy of the city's streetcar line. ¹

A few years later, at the turn of the twentieth century, African Americans in more than twenty-five southern cities conducted systematic consumer boycotts to protest "Jim Crow" streetcars. ² A June 9, 1906, editorial in the black-owned Lynchburg (Virginia) News summed up the goal of this movement.
when it stated: "Let us touch to the quick the white man's pocket. 'Tis there his conscience often lies."  

Although the forces of southern white racism ultimately crushed the 1900–1906 boycott movement against "Jim Crow" streetcars, this early manifestation of African American economic self-determination planted the seeds for later, more successful demonstrations of enlightened consumer activity.

Long before the celebrated Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1955–1956, the various "Don't Buy Where You Can't Work" campaigns of the 1930s fired the imagination and the initiative of the national African American community. After beginning in Chicago, at the behest of Joseph D. Bibb and A. C. MacNeal, editors of the militant Chicago Whip, this movement quickly spread to other cities. African Americans, whether they resided in Chicago, New York City, Cleveland, or Richmond, suffered the same overt economic exploitation; white-owned business establishments, which all but monopolized the commercial life of black enclaves, often refused to hire neighborhood residents.

While the "Don't Buy Where You Can't Work" campaigns primarily sought to increase the number of jobs available to blacks, they also educated the African American community as to the power and the potential of its collective economic strength. For example, in a July, 1931, Crisis editorial that supported the growing consumer boycott movement, W. E. B. Du Bois asserted:

> If we once make a religion of our determination to spend our meagre income so far as possible only in such ways as will bring us employment consideration and opportunity, the possibilities before us are enormous . . . a nation twice as large as Portugal, Holland, or Sweden is not powerless— is not merely a supplicant beggar for crumbs—it is a mighty economic power when it gets vision enough to use its strength.

Predictably, white ghetto merchants attempted to counteract organized black consumer retribution. In New York City, Cleveland, Baltimore, Newark, and Washington, D.C., these businesses obtained court injunctions that prohibited African American protestors from picketing establishments that practiced racial discrimination. Then, on March 28, 1938, the U.S. Supreme Court, reversing a lower court decision, guaranteed the right to picket establishments that practiced such discrimination.

Besides merely seeking to increase African American employment opportunities at white-owned businesses, some black consumers, during the Great
Depression, used their dollars to enhance African American business development. The Housewives' League of Detroit epitomized this phenomenon.

Convened in June 1930 by Fannie B. Peck, by 1935 the organization had grown from fifty to ten thousand members. To join the League, African American women pledged to support black businesses, buy black-produced products, and patronize black professionals. Realizing that African American women generally coordinated their families' spending patterns, the League sought to mobilize this power in support of community development. The Housewives' League of Detroit, along with similar organizations in Chicago, Baltimore, Washington, D.C., Cleveland, and New York City, were indeed powerful forces in their respective communities. 8

Besides the various "Don't Buy Where You Can't Work" campaigns and the activities of local African American Housewives' Leagues, the 1930s featured growing interest in consumer cooperatives within the black community. Cooperative enterprises, characterized by a communal distribution of profits, had a special appeal to African American consumers during this period.

Traditionally, individual black entrepreneurs have tried to convince black consumers that supporting black-owned businesses allowed their dollars to do "double duty" (simultaneously purchasing a product and building African Americans' collective strength). Still, a significant number of black consumers have viewed—and continue to view—black businessmen's promotion of the "double-duty dollar" as self-serving. In response, an increasing number of blacks came to believe that the best way for black businessmen to gain more black consumer support was for them to transform their enterprises into consumer cooperatives. As St. Clair Drake, a well-known contemporary proponent of cooperative ventures, asserted:

While the plea to make the dollar do "Double Duty" often falls on deaf ears, a dollar that will do "Triple Duty" might awaken some response, and a dollar spent with a co-operative (1) secures the desired goods, (2) helps to support a fellow Negro, and (3) brings a dividend on purchase at the end of the fiscal year. 9

Supporters of consumer cooperatives also contended that their widespread implementation and coordination within the black community would substantially enhance the group's collective economic and political bargaining power. 10

Perhaps the decade's most noteworthy black consumer cooperative was the Consumers' Cooperative Trading Company (CCTC), organized in
Gary, Indiana in 1932. The CCTC, the brainchild of Jacob L. Reddix, a local black teacher, sought to ameliorate the adverse effects of the Great Depression on Gary's black community.

In 1932, a reported 50 percent of Gary's twenty thousand African Americans were on public relief. In this setting of despair and frustration, Reddix, after familiarizing himself with the principles of organized cooperation and with initial working capital of $24, started the Consumers' Cooperative Trading Company as a buying club for fifteen families.

A major milestone in the evolution of the CCTC occurred in fall 1933, when Reddix began teaching night classes on cooperative economics at Gary's Roosevelt High School. A contemporary article, describing what the author called the "Miracle in Gary," elaborated on the significance of these classes:

With this move the negroes of Gary really launched their co-operative venture. The women members of the class, beginning to understand the true meaning of co-operation, formed a guild and began to organize buying power and co-operative sentiment. The class continued through the winter of 1934–35 with the largest attendance of any academic class at the evening schools, adding new and intelligent members to Gary's co-operative movement.

By 1935, mainly through the efforts of Reddix and his disciples, the Consumers' Cooperative Trading Company had grown to four hundred member families. Moreover, the organization now coordinated myriad enterprises, including a cooperative grocery store with annual sales of $35,000, a community credit union, and a cooperative ice cream and candy shop run entirely by children. Although the CCTC met an untimely demise in 1940 for undetermined reasons, its earlier success inspired similar projects across the country.

At the same time the Consumers' Cooperative Trading Company, albeit on a small scale, was demonstrating the potential of black economic cooperation, the venerable W. E. B. Du Bois sought to focus the national black community's attention on a collective economic project of massive proportions. Significantly, Du Bois's controversial June 1935 Current History article, "A Negro Nation within the Nation," all but repudiated his previous association with the integrationist-oriented National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).

After citing various manifestations of ongoing white racial bias and invoking the political, consumer, and intellectual potential of the African American community, Du Bois concluded:
There exists today a chance for the Negroes to organize a cooperative State within their own group. By letting Negro farmers feed Negro artisans, and Negro technician guide Negro home industries, and Negro thinkers plan this integration of cooperation, while Negro artists dramatize and beautify the struggle, economic independence can be achieved.

To doubt that this is possible is to doubt the essential humanity and the quality of brains of the American Negro.

Ironically, Du Bois's proposed blueprint for the future of black America appeared markedly reminiscent of the agenda of his former ideological adversary, Marcus Garvey.

Although African Americans did not subsequently embrace Du Bois's panoramic vision of racial self-sufficiency, his proposal, along with other consumer empowerment efforts of the 1930s, contributed to African Americans' growing assertiveness regarding their role as consumers. Moreover, black consumers' enhanced sense of self-determination increased during World War II.

The consumer militancy of African Americans during the World War II years was linked to the era's "Double V" concept. Popularized by the Pittsburgh Courier, blacks sought victory in their fight against fascism both abroad and at home. Consequently, black consumers were disinclined to passively ignore cultural assaults by U.S. advertisers.

During the early 1940s, several corporations incurred the wrath of American blacks. African American smokers boycotted American Tobacco Company products for its marketing of "Nigger Hair" tobacco. Black consumers also punished the Whitman Candy Company for its "Pickaninny Chocolate" product line. Similarly, African American automobile owners eschewed Shell Oil Company products because of the company's advertisements featuring a black man eating watermelon. These companies' subsequent public apologies to black consumers and their removal of offensive ads and products graphically demonstrated the potential power of black consumer activism.

This overview of enlightened African American consumer activity before the modern civil rights era reveals the most prominent historical reasons for black economic retribution. First and foremost, African Americans have staged consumer boycotts to respond to extreme acts of white racist violence. Similarly, blacks have constrained their spending with European American enterprises to protest against humiliating treatment based on race; white-owned businesses solely interested in blacks as consumers (rather than as employees); and white companies that used demeaning images of blacks in their advertising. Moreover, African Americans have proactively withheld
economic support of European American businesses in order to more fully support African American economic development.

These characteristics of African American consumer activism were, and remain, the primary motivations for black economic retribution and self-determination. An examination of the years 1955–1964 further clarifies this assertion.

The Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1955–1956 remains the model instance of organized black consumer retribution and self-determination. Although the actions of certain individuals have, over time, been magnified to almost mythical proportions, one cannot overemphasize the resolve demonstrated by Montgomery's black community during this action.

The internal unity associated with the Montgomery Bus Boycott appears all the more significant when Montgomery's preboycott African American community is examined. In Stride toward Freedom, a firsthand account of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, Martin Luther King Jr. described a sorry state of affairs in preboycott Montgomery. Factionalism had retarded the effectiveness of the leadership class. The middle class appeared self-absorbed and apathetic; the working class seemed passive and resigned to second-class citizenship.

In attempting to explain how a previously disorganized community could achieve the unity necessary to undertake a successful boycott of city buses, King mulled over a number of possibilities. He noted how the Supreme Court's May 17, 1954, Brown vs. Board of Education decision seemed to inspire blacks throughout the country. He also observed how the Rosa Parks incident touched a nerve that even a fractured, apathetic, and passive community could feel. Yet, King, the theologian, concluded that "God had decided to use Montgomery as the proving ground for the struggle and triumph of freedom and justice in America."

Notwithstanding King's assertions regarding divine intervention, the Montgomery Bus Boycott was motivated by several of the historical reasons for African American economic retribution against white-controlled enterprises. While there were no extreme acts of white racist violence perpetrated against Montgomery blacks immediately prior to the boycott, African Americans suffered from humiliating differential treatment on city buses. Moreover, while black bus riders accounted for nearly 70 percent of Montgomery Bus Lines' receipts, the company employed no African American drivers. Finally, as the boycott evolved, Montgomery's African American community sought to use its decreased spending with white enterprises to stimulate black economic development.
Historians, as well as participants in the Montgomery Bus Boycott, have focused considerable attention on the deplorable situation faced by African American bus riders before the boycott. Moreover, the Montgomery Bus Boycott has been placed in the context of the Civil Rights Movement's quest for racial integration. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that relatively little coverage has been given to the ways Montgomery blacks attempted to use the boycott to enhance community economic development.

For example, by the spring of 1956, King repeatedly told his listeners at public meetings that the Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA) had to move beyond simply fighting bus segregation. At one MIA gathering, King declared to his audience, "Until we as a race learn to develop our power, we will get nowhere. We've got to get political and economic power for our race." He followed up his public exhortations by recommending to the MIA executive board that "a strong emphasis . . . be placed on increasing our political power through voting and increasing our economic power through the establishment of a bank." Shortly thereafter, the MIA board, among other things, established a banking committee to seek a federal charter for a building and loan association.

King's increasing focus on economic empowerment, especially a community-based bank, reflected a growing interest in business development among Montgomery blacks. A contemporary examination of the Montgomery Bus Boycott that appeared in the October and November 1956 issues of *Negro History Bulletin* clearly indicated a strengthening of Montgomery's black business community in the wake of the boycott:

> It was common knowledge that many Negroes found it difficult to get downtown and found it easier to shop at neighborhood stores, particularly if they were owned by Negroes . . . Thus the neighborhood business, be it a gas station or grocery store, got a new front or was able to buy fresher vegetables and meats because of the quick turnover. Moreover, the thousands of dollars per week that left the Negroes' hands and perhaps went to the bus company was now being spent among Negroes. The clubs, the stores, the cleaners and almost every Negro business shared directly or indirectly in the new income.

Ironically, the unity that sustained Montgomery's black community during the bus boycott slowly evaporated after its successful conclusion. Among other things, the petty jealousies and factionalism that existed before the boycott resurfaced. Some MIA members became increasingly upset with the widespread attention and praise that King received for his role in the move-
ment; at the same time, some of King’s supporters sought to downplay the role of other blacks associated with the boycott. One King partisan even publicly referred to Rosa Parks as simply "an adornment to the movement." Still, while the spirit of Montgomery Bus Boycott dissipated in Montgomery, it spread, through the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (founded in January 1957), to such places as Atlanta, Birmingham, and Tallahassee.

While blacks in Montgomery were conducting an organized, systematic bus boycott to protest racial discrimination, their brethren in the Mississippi Delta were engaged in a less structured, but equally successful, campaign of economic retribution. The brutal 1955 lynching of Emmett Louis Till represented the spark for this boycott.

After Till’s accused murderers, the half-brothers Roy Bryant and J. W. Milam, were acquitted by an all-white Mississippi jury, they openly admitted their guilt in a January 24, 1956, article in Look magazine. However, in a follow-up report that appeared in the January 22, 1957, issue of Look, both men appeared down on their luck. Before Roy and J.W.’s slaying of Till, their family, the Milam-Bryant clan, had operated a number of small country stores in the Mississippi Delta that largely depended on African American patronage. In the wake of the brothers’ public "confession" to murdering Emmett Till, local blacks, without the benefit and direction of a charismatic leader such as King, quietly yet resolutely stopped doing business with the Milam-Bryant stores. Consequently, by early 1957, the family’s lucrative business had been all but destroyed.

Thus, while the legal system permitted Roy Bryant and J.W. Milam to literally get away with murder, black Mississippians ultimately meted out punishment in the “court” of consumer choices.

Traditionally, when the evolution of the modern-day Civil Rights Movement is presented, the scene jumps from the Montgomery Bus Boycott to the 1960 Greensboro, North Carolina, sit-ins. Although new evidence suggests that the sit-in movement actually began in Wichita, Kansas, in 1958, its birthplace is, perhaps, less important than its overall impact on the African American community. Regardless of where the sit-in movement actually started, this disruption of white business operations quickly captured the imagination of the black community, especially the youth.

Whether an African American resided in Wichita, Oklahoma City (site of another pre-1960 sit-in campaign), Greensboro, Nashville, or Atlanta, local custom provided blacks with only take-out service at downtown lunch counters. This disrespect was more marked given the fact that black con-
sumers, although prohibited from eating at lunch counters, were encouraged to freely spend their money in other sections of white-owned businesses. An examination of *Business Week* for the years 1960–1962 provides special insight into the campaign to force southern retailers to treat black consumers respectfully.

An article titled "Negro Groups Put the Economic Pressure On," which appeared in the February 27, 1960, issue of *Business Week*, declared: "More directly than earlier legalistic efforts at Negro equality, this movement affects businessmen. It hits straight at the pocketbook." Business Week's bluntness appeared ironic in that many in the white business community initially dismissed the black-student-instigated sit-ins as "college hi-jinks." Yet, as this strategy for black consumer empowerment rapidly spread throughout the South, the "hi-jinks" theory seemed to reflect more wishful thinking than reality.

Predictably, as southern whites began to realize that the "sit-in" movement represented the first stage of a concerted African American campaign for human dignity, they sought to suppress the movement. Throughout the South, tough enforcement of trespassing laws came to be seen as a means to dissipate the embryonic sit-in movement. Yet, strict enforcement of trespassing laws could have had dire consequences for stores that relied heavily on African American patronage. As an anonymous southern retailer told *Business Week*, "It's difficult to sell a Negro a ribbon at the notions counter, while you're having his friend arrested at the lunch counter." In fact, in most southern cities by 1960, African American consumer support determined whether a particular product reached the top spot in sales.

These economic realities, and their implications, received more coverage in an article titled "Negro Business Pressure Grows," which appeared in the April 23, 1960, issue of *Business Week*. Among other things, the business periodical informed its readers that the relatively spontaneous sit-in movement appeared to be evolving into a well-organized boycott of discriminatory stores throughout the South.

Nashville, Tennessee, according to *Business Week*, seemed especially affected by blacks' growing recognition of their economic clout. As one of Nashville's leading white retail executives described this phenomenon: "This thing has frightening ramifications. It is more serious than many people realize. It has now become an economic situation affecting the entire community, the whole city, the whole country." A study conducted by Vivian Henderson, a professor of economics at Fisk University in Nashville, verified these observations. Henderson discovered
that African American expenditures in shops in downtown Nashville accounted for approximately 20 percent of these stores' sales. Moreover, during a recent black boycott of downtown Nashville, these stores had witnessed a 90 percent decline in revenue from African American customers.  

In Nashville, as in other southern cities, black consumer boycotts spawned a similar, retaliatory movement by whites. Whereas African Americans boycotted stores that discriminated against them as consumers, whites threatened to boycott those stores that ceased to treat blacks as second-class customers. As one exasperated merchant told Business Week, "We're damned if we do integrate our eating facilities and damned if we don't." 

Some Nashville whites, citing an increase in local racial tension, questioned the wisdom of black economic retribution. In response, Vivian Henderson, speaking for the African American community, forthrightly asserted: "I believe the withdrawals are the most effective weapon the Negro has . . . It is simple—stores with the best service get the Negro dollar." 

As it became increasingly clear that black consumers in the South were prepared to employ economic retribution, regardless of the short-term consequences, the region's business community became increasingly concerned. As the president-elect of Atlanta's Chamber of Commerce declared in a December 17, 1960, Business Week interview, "Business just doesn't like chaos and confusion." 

Although southern white businessmen found themselves in an increasingly uncomfortable situation, economic imperatives necessitated their finding a solution. The August 5, 1961, issue of Business Week, which featured an article titled "New Business Ways in the South," revealed that many southern merchants were solving their predicament by fully desegregating their eating facilities (and taking their chances with white consumers). This gamble, for the most part, proved successful. 

Despite a conscious decision to placate their black customers, southern white retailers, in the wake of the sit-ins, realized that African Americans would intensify, rather than diminish, their demand for respect. As one southern department store manager told Business Week in 1961: "After this eating thing has settled down, we're going to have more upheaval. It's a social revolution, and we can't have it painlessly." 

No southern city experienced more pain and upheaval during the early 1960s than Birmingham, Alabama. The African American population of Birmingham, like that of other cities, was determined to be respected as consumers. The May 12, 1962, issue of Business Week included coverage of black Birmingham residents' boycott of discriminatory retailers during the
1962 Easter season. As a result, some downtown Birmingham stores witnessed a 90 percent decline in African American patronage. 41

Besides a resolute black consumer community, Birmingham also featured a white business community that, out of self-interest, sought to mitigate racial tension. Determined to emulate the partially successful efforts of their counterparts in other southern cities, Birmingham businessmen attempted to establish biracial meetings among themselves, representatives of the African American community, and political officials. Yet, as the president of a large local corporation told Business Week: “With a belligerently antagonistic governing body, little can be done.”42

The most "belligerently antagonistic" public official in Birmingham during this period was the infamous Eugene ("Bull") Connor, who left an indelible mark on history during the celebrated Birmingham campaign of 1963. Connor's reaction to 1962 African American consumer boycotts signaled his sadistic nature.

Besides the Easter boycott of 1962, black students from local Miles College coordinated a protracted boycott against discriminatory downtown Birmingham stores. Among other things, this campaign of economic retribution demanded the desegregation of lunch counters and the removal of racial designation signs on drinking fountains and restrooms.43

Birmingham's three-man City Commission, dominated by Public Safety Commissioner Connor, ignored pleas for moderation from the white business community and struck back hard. It suspended the city's significant subsidy of the county surplus food program. Since 90 percent of this fund went to needy African Americans, this action had an immediate negative impact upon Birmingham's black community. Yet, as Mayor Arthur J. Haynes rationalized this decision to Business Week, "We've got to do something to nip this boycott in the bud."44

Despite the City Commission's perverse use of economic retribution to quell black consumer discontent, Birmingham's African American community remained steadfast in its quest for self-respect. In fact, the Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth, a prominent Birmingham minister and activist and one of the founders of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, arranged for SCLC's 1962 annual convention to be held in Birmingham and announced that the September convention would feature well-publicized demonstrations against local merchants who discriminated against African Americans. Mass demonstrations during the SCLC meeting were averted only after downtown stores agreed to remove racial designation signs from restrooms and water fountains.45
This victory, however, proved to be short-lived. Soon after the SCLC convention ended, the segregationist restroom and water fountain signs reappeared. An understandably irate Fred Shuttlesworth had little difficulty in persuading SCLC leadership to return to Birmingham for a protracted battle against local racial discrimination.

Significantly, Martin Luther King Jr. and the SCLC used their recent unsuccessful experiences in Albany, Georgia, to devise a winning strategy in Birmingham. In Albany, black activists focused on pressuring politicians through mass marches to city hall. Yet, because African American political strength was then nonexistent, the Albany movement fizzled. On the other hand, during the 1963 Birmingham campaign, white businessmen felt the heat from mass demonstrations of disgruntled African American consumers. While southern blacks may not have wielded political power, they did possess noteworthy spending power. In fact, King himself, after Birmingham, concluded that organized black economic retribution represented the best strategy for achieving civil and human rights.

Although black consumers achieved a stunning victory in Birmingham during the spring of 1963, the national spotlight tragically returned to that city a few months later. On September 15, a powerful dynamite blast damaged the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church, killing four young black girls who were attending Sunday School. In addition, two black men were killed during disturbances following the bombing. These incidents, among other things, led to a call for a national black boycott during the Christmas season in late 1963.

The proposed Christmas boycott was the brainchild of an ad hoc organization known as "Actors and Writers for Justice." The members of this group included the author James Baldwin, the journalist Louis Lomax, and the husband-and-wife acting team of Ossie Davis and Ruby Dee. Baldwin, the apparent organizer of Actors and Writers for Justice, told one public rally that what occurred in Birmingham "cost this nation the right to be called Christian." Moreover, he declared: "We have got to bring the cat out of hiding, and where he is hiding is in the bank." From the standpoint of American businesses, the call by the Actors and Writers for Justice for a national black boycott during Christmas could not have come at a worse time. Ten days after the Birmingham murders, the Center for Research in Marketing released the findings of a study that, among other things, examined African American attitudes concerning consumer boycotts. When asked the question "If a prominent Negro were to tell you to boycott against a store or brand, what would you likely do?," 89 per-
cent of the blacks interviewed replied that they would follow the suggestion.  

Armed with the data from the Center for Research in Marketing, along with a fervent belief in the righteousness of their proposal, Actors and Writers for Justice sought the support of other black leaders for a national boycott during the Christmas shopping season. To their disappointment, they received a lukewarm response. Of the six major civil rights organizations, only SCLC endorsed the proposed boycott. The other groups, most notably the NAACP, expressed doubt as to whether blacks could indeed carry out such a dramatic demonstration of economic retribution.

The October 17, 1963, edition of Jet magazine provided insight into the intracommunity debate concerning the feasibility of the Christmas boycott. An article that asked the question “Should Negroes boycott Santa Claus?” started by acknowledging the concerns of Roy Wilkins of the NAACP and other critics. Yet, after surveying recent developments regarding the behavior and growing power of black consumers, the essay’s author asserted:

Bluntly put, available research, even that from white sources, scream loudly that Negroes, just like Congressman Adam Clayton Powell urges, are ready at a moment's notice to "withhold the dollar to make the white man holler.”

Ironically, while the October 17, 1963, issue of Jet appeared to subtly support the proposed Christmas boycott, the magazine's publisher, John H. Johnson, staunchly opposed such an action. In an October 16, 1963, interview with Advertising Age, Johnson blasted the proposed boycott as a senseless endeavor proposed by a minuscule segment of the Civil Rights Movement. Moreover, he stated, children should not be denied the right to enjoy Christmas.

Johnson's aversion to the Christmas boycott may have been based on more than a concern about children. By 1963 corporate marketers increasingly viewed advertising in Ebony and Jet as an ideal means to reach the black consumer market. Thus, Johnson, pleased with rising advertising revenues, had a vested interest in promoting African American consumption (see chapter 4).

Because of the strength and influence of its opponents, the 1963 black consumer boycott of Christmas shopping never came about. Still, just the threat of this action had a profound effect on white American business. As study after study revealed the growing importance of African American consumers to the U.S. economy, U.S. companies actively sought to befriend, rather than antagonize, black shoppers. In fact, as the June 20, 1964, issue
of Business Week noted, businessmen played an important role in smoothing the passage and the acceptance by whites of the monumental Civil Rights Act of 1964. Still, white business support of this watershed legislation appeared to have much more to do with potential profits than with altruism.

Title II, Section 201, of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 focused on issues related to black consumerism:

All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.

It went on to enumerate the establishments that would be covered by the new law. These included:

1. any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests
2. any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises
3. any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium, or other place of exhibition or entertainment.

On the surface, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in large part, appeared to be the culmination of years of sustained black consumer economic retribution. African Americans consumers, by legislative mandate, now had to be treated with respect wherever they spent their money. Nevertheless, succeeding decades would clearly suggest that white-owned businesses, rather than unfettered black consumers, were the primary beneficiaries of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The Revolution Will Be Marketed:
American Corporations and Black Consumers during the 1960s

The 1960s are generally viewed as a decade in which African American activism, supported by the liberalism of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, resulted in both social and economic gains for many blacks. Yet, when we consider the impact of black consumerism on white business, we see that any changes in business practices among white-owned companies resulted from pragmatic white conservatism, rather than from altruistic white liberalism. White-owned corporations, in response to the accelerated urbanization of African Americans, accelerated their quest to reach these increasingly important consumers; aided by black consultants, most notably John H. Johnson, they were able to maximize their profits and appear "socially responsible" at the same time. In addition, the 1960s graphically demonstrated the elasticity of American capitalism. Corporate marketers began the decade by developing advertisements that catered to African Americans' perceived interest in racial desegregation. By decade's end, as African Americans moved politically from a more passive to a more confrontational stance, U.S. corporations promoted the "soul" market, which extolled black culture and customs, to retain the allegiance of black consumers.

Although the African American experience in the 1960s often conjures up images of sit-ins, freedom rides, massive protest marches, clenched fists, and huge Afros, perhaps, the most striking characteristic of the national black community during this period was its overwhelmingly urban character. Between 1940 and 1960, the percentage of African Americans who lived in cities had grown from 48.6 to 73.2.1 By 1960, for the first time in U.S. history, the percentage of blacks who lived in cities exceeded that of whites (65.5). Table 4.1 provides a more detailed examination of the extent of African American migration and urbanization by 1960.
### Table 4.1

Percent of Urban Population by Region and Race, 1940–1960

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### Table 4.2

Percentage of African Americans Involved in Southern Agriculture, 1940–1960

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<th>Year</th>
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<th>1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers and farm managers</td>
<td>25.9/3.8</td>
<td>19.3/2.5</td>
<td>7.1/1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm laborers and foremen</td>
<td>23.8/16.6</td>
<td>14.5/11.4</td>
<td>11.7/4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>49.7/20.4</td>
<td>33.8/13.9</td>
<td>18.5/5.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Massive African American migration to cities across the country resulted not only in a change of address for the migrants but also in a distinct improvement in their occupational status. As Table 4.2 reveals, the percentage of African Americans in relatively low-paying southern agriculture work declined dramatically between 1940 and 1960. Moreover, as Tables 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 demonstrate, both African American men and women, by 1960, were moving into more prestigious and better paying occupations. These significant demographic developments contributed mightily to increasing the notice taken by U.S. corporations in the 1960s of the lucrative black consumer market.

To accommodate companies that had been slow to appreciate the importance of African American consumers, the 1960s witnessed a virtual ex-
### Table 4.3
**Percentage of Black Men in Selected Occupations, 1940–1960**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional, technical workers</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proprietors, managers</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks, sales workers</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers, foremen</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semiskilled operatives</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled laborers</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 4.4
**Percentage of Black Women in Selected Occupations, 1940–1960**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional, technical workers</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proprietors, managers</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks, sales workers</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers, foremen</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semiskilled operatives</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled laborers</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>55.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Hayes, "A Century of Change," 1364.

### Table 4.5
**Comparative Annual Median Income of Blacks and Whites, 1939, 1947, 1957, 1960**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Males</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>$460</td>
<td>$1,279</td>
<td>$2,436</td>
<td>$3,075</td>
<td>568.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>$1,112</td>
<td>$2,347</td>
<td>$4,396</td>
<td>$5,137</td>
<td>362.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Females</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>$246</td>
<td>$432</td>
<td>$1,019</td>
<td>$1,276</td>
<td>418.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>$676</td>
<td>$1,269</td>
<td>$2,240</td>
<td>$2,537</td>
<td>275.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Hayes, "A Century of Change," 1364.

Explosion of "how-to" articles in various advertising trade journals offering advice on selling to African Americans. An October 9, 1961, article in Sponsor titled "Know-How Is Key to Selling Negro Today," epitomized this trend.

*Sponsor* advised its readers that the key to success in marketing to African Americans could be summed up in three words: recognition, identification, and invitation:
The Negro needs to be recognized as a person. The very fact that an advertiser will undertake a special campaign [for] the Negro is interpreted as a form of recognition to the Negro. And that advertiser immediately stands to gain an important competitive edge over the advertisers who have not taken this step. Identification is equally important. Can the Negro identify with your product? Can the Negro identify with the ad that promises "lovelier, whiter hands with ABC soap"? Because of the Negro's history of suppression his need to be "invited" to try the product appears to be a strong one indeed. True, he may use it without invitation, but this power of a special invitation to him, alone, can be considerable.

Some corporations, besides relying on trade journal articles for insights about black consumers, employed African American consultants to obtain additional information about the African American consumer market. Perhaps the two most influential black consultants to corporate America during the 1960s were John H. Johnson, the publisher of *Ebony* magazine, and D. Parke Gibson, the president of D. Parke Gibson Associates, Inc.

Johnson had long been interested in making U.S. corporations aware of the potential profits associated with black consumers. As early as 1947, *Ebony* asserted that major corporations were missing lucrative opportunities by ignoring the African American market. Johnson's observations appear to have been based upon self-interest; in the years immediately following its 1945 founding, *Ebony* had experienced difficulty in attracting advertising from large corporations.

Nevertheless, by the early 1960s, *Ebony* had established itself as a major American magazine, and John H. Johnson stood as one of the country's top executives. Johnson's success as a publisher appeared to have been based on his ability to gauge the mood and the interests of his readers.

Therefore, to white corporate leaders seeking insights about black consumers, Johnson appeared to be an ideal ally. In his autobiography, *Succeeding Against the Odds*, Johnson described his consulting role to corporate America:

In the decade of the long hot summers, I held the unofficial position of special ambassador to American Whites... Enlightened self-interest: that was my theme. I asked corporate leaders to act not for Blacks, not for civil rights, but for their corporations and themselves. For it was true then and it's true now that if you increase the income of Blacks and Hispanics and poor Whites, you increase the profits of corporate America. And if you decrease the income of the disadvantaged, you decrease income and potential income of American corporations ... What it all boiled down to was that equal opportunity was good business.
Johnson's advice to major U.S. corporations deserves closer examination. His theme of "enlightened self-interest" suggests a major reinterpretation of the 1960s. If corporate leaders took Johnson's message to heart, it can plausibly be argued that some of the gains associated with the Civil Rights Movement were based on "conservative," rather than "liberal," impulses. For example, during the 1960s, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) stood in the forefront of the movement to force U.S. corporations to use African American models in their print and television advertising. To CORE and other civil rights organizations, this was a "civil rights" issue. However, when U.S. businesses realized that using black models increased black purchases of their products without alienating white consumers, corporations gladly utilized black models in print media and television. 7

John H. Johnson's concern about the "enlightened self-interest" (i.e., profits) of large white corporations appeared intimately connected with his concern about Ebony's financial well-being. Once he convinced corporate leaders that it was good business to reach more black consumers in a tasteful manner, these same corporations had to find a vehicle to do just that. Although Johnson's autobiography asserts that he did not directly approach white corporate leaders about advertising in Ebony during the 1960s, the magazine's advertising revenue nearly tripled between 1962 and 1969 (see Table 4.6). 8

Another manifestation of Johnson's service to American corporations during the 1960s was the Johnson Publishing Company's 1966 publication, The Negro Handbook. This book, on the surface, appeared to be a reference book aimed at a general audience. Considering Johnson's interest in assisting corporate America, however, as well as U.S. companies' growing desire for any and all information about blacks, The Negro Handbook may, in actuality, have represented a guide to black America for white corporations.

Regardless of the motivation behind the production of The Negro Handbook, this book conveyed a distinct bias against black-owned businesses:

As the barriers of race are hurdled, the Negro consumer who was once the private property of the Negro owner and operator of hotels, restaurants, night clubs, and beauty and barber shops has turned with increasing alacrity to white establishments which offer, in many cases, extra services, luxury atmosphere, and a degree of glamour for the same dollar. Even the long held monopoly of burying the dead is no longer an exclusive function of the Negro mortician, increasingly white undertakers have learned that Negroes spend vast sums of money annually in "putting their people away right," and are wisely seeking this lucrative market. 9 (emphasis added)
This excerpt suggests that African American consumers have historically been ill treated by African American businesspeople. Moreover, it implies that this situation existed because black businesses did not have to compete with white businesses for black customer support.

Besides denigrating the historical relationship between black consumers and businesses, The Negro Handbook implied that white businesses who sought black customers were not only increasing their profits but were freeing thankful blacks from the stranglehold of unscrupulous black-owned enterprises. Thus, The Negro Handbook subtly assured U.S. corporations that seeking more black customers was both profitable and socially responsible. Considering this publication and Johnson's other activities, it seems clear why he was the leading black consultant to corporate America during the 1960s.

While Johnson urged large, white-owned businesses to take a greater interest in selling to African American consumers, D. Parke Gibson advised corporate America on how to most effectively reach this increasingly important market. D. Parke Gibson Associates, Inc., established in 1960, specialized in market research and public relations consulting. The company provided its services to myriad companies, including Avon Products, Coca Cola USA, Columbia Pictures, Greyhound, and the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. 10 Gibson also wrote two books about the African American consumer market, The $30 Billion Dollar Negro (1969) and $70 Billion in the Black (1978).

An example of the advice Gibson's company gave its corporate clients appeared in the July 25, 1966, issue of Sponsor. Elsie Archer, director of the company's Women's Interest Bureau, published a brief article titled "How to Sell Today's Negro Woman." Archer offered the following insights about the black female consumer:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Advertising Revenue, Ebony Magazine, $1962-1969</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>$3,630,804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>$5,129,921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>$5,641,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>$5,495,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>$7,020,279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>$6,895,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>$8,551,463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>$9,965,898</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

She wants advertising and marketing people to understand that her needs and desires are often different. For example, she does not want a blue-eyed suburban housewife telling her to use a particular product when she is faced with urban living. Particularly in the area of personal care products, advertisers should use extreme caution to avoid pricking the high sensitivity of the Negro woman. One last word—never, never, under any circumstances refer to the Negro woman as "Negress" or "Negresses," a phrase guaranteed to produce an unfavorable reaction.

About the same time Archer was instructing corporate America on how to best reach African American female consumers, the black community was in the throes of a dramatic shift in political orientation. Despite corporate America's increasing recognition of black consumers, as well as the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, a significant proportion of African Americans remained frustrated and angry about continuing racial injustice in the United States. The Watts rebellion of 1965, along with the immediate popularity of the term "Black Power" in 1966, reflected a growing militancy toward, and distrust of, white society.

The appearance of overt black nationalist sentiment during the mid-1960s initially confused corporate executives. Earlier in the decade, they had been led to believe that African Americans were preoccupied with trying to assimilate into mainstream U.S. society. For example, the October 4, 1963, issue of Sales Management featured an article titled "The Negro Market: Growing, Changing, Challenging," which not only surveyed basic characteristics of black consumers but projected their activities into the immediate future. Considering what actually happened, the prediction it contained turned out to be way off the mark: "Negroes will de-emphasize race consciousness and differences, and focus attention on social and cultural similarities compatible with the concept and practice of an integrated society." Despite their initial confusion, corporate marketers quickly adjusted their marketing campaigns aimed at African American consumers. Ad campaigns in the early 1960s that sought to promote the image of a racially desegregated society were replaced with attempts to exploit blacks' growing sense of racial pride. The development of the "soul market" exemplified corporate America's attempt to adapt to African American consumers' political and cultural reorientation. Corporate marketers co-opted growing black pride by extolling the virtues of African American life and culture. Moreover, such things as "soul music" and "soul food" were promoted for both black and white consumption.
From a business point of view, the "soul market" appeared to be especially profitable. U.S. corporations would reach not only African Americans but also faddist whites wanting to be viewed as "hip." Nonetheless, as this excerpt from a June 1969 article in Sales Management suggests, corporations seeking to exploit the "soul market" had to demonstrate some knowledge of African American consumers and their cultural world:

A few weeks ago, 800 people sat down to a $100-a-plate "authentic Soul Food" supper in the Grand Ballroom of New York City's stately Waldorf-Astoria Hotel. After sampling the fried chicken, corn bread, collard greens, and sweet potato pie, TV star Bill Cosby, the charity affair's co-chairman, announced over the public address system that his meal had left an authentic grease ring around his mouth all right, but, he complained, "this is not how real Soul Food tastes." The Waldorf's flop with Soul is par for the course in the long, sad history of white encounters with virtually everything Negro . . . Now unless they are plugging into today's Soul scene, many a marketer risks yet another blunder with the nation's 23 million blacks—and a sizable number of whites too. 15

To help themselves "plug" into the "soul" scene, U.S. corporations once again relied on the expertise of black consultants. The black-owned Vince Cullers Advertising Agency of Chicago surfaced as the leading consultant to companies seeking to make their advertisements convey "soul." Perhaps Cullers's most noteworthy creation was a print advertisement used by the Lorillard Corporation to promote its Newport cigarette brand. A young bearded black man, wearing a dashiki, stood next to a huge pack of New-port cigarettes. The copy read "'Bold Cold Newport... a whole new bag of menthol smoking." 16

For white-owned companies that desired to construct their own campaigns to reach "soul brothers and sisters," the June 1, 1969, issue of Sales Management offered a "primer," titled "Communicating Soul Style." Readers were assured that the following definitions were part of "the vocabulary Soul Brothers cherish":

**Boss**—The ultimate in compliments.

**Burn**—To improvise superbatively, in music or in life. "Burn baby" was shouted at singers years before the first ghetto riot.

**Dap**—impeccably dressed.

**Down**—If something is so good it's out of sight, or is the best ever, it's "down."

**Fox**—A beautiful woman.
Gig—A job. Synonyms are "slave" and "hustle."

Hog—A very large automobile.

Jive—A persuasive talker but one prone to lies or excuses.

Pig—A sadistic, sometimes also corrupt person, usually a policeman. Blacks rarely qualify.

Whale—To run very fast, think very clearly, or be the top man in your field.

Despite such ludicrous discourse, which caricatured African American consumers of the late 1960s, some advertising professionals did indeed take black shoppers—and their concerns—seriously. Zebra Associates, a racially integrated advertising agency headed by an African American, Raymond A. League, represented one such instance.

The New York City-based Zebra Associates, established in 1969, viewed African American consumers as part of a larger inner-city consumer market. In a promotional document titled *Zebra Associates: Why We Are . . . What We Are . . . Who We Are*, the firm portrayed itself as the only advertising firm with both the sociological knowledge and the marketing expertise necessary to reach inner-city consumers.  

To build on its self-stated strengths regarding the inner-city consumer market, Zebra Associates early on established a training program to bring more African Americans into the advertising industry. To further accentuate its standing as a community-minded enterprise, Zebra Associates instituted a program to have its professional staff assist small African American and Latino businesses, especially those operating in "hard-core" inner-city areas. As a June 19, 1969, Zebra press release, quoting League, described the program:

Our first such account is Le Mans, a men's clothing store located at 715 Amsterdam Avenue, New York City. We recently completed a Father's Day promotion for the store and the results were highly successful. Frankly, we expected it. Our key people in publicity, promotion, and advertising worked on the promotion. Right now these same people are putting together a complete advertising campaign for Le Mans. Not only do we feel this is part of our responsibility to the community, but we believe that our staff benefits greatly from continuous first-hand experience in the heart of minority markets.

As Zebra Associates sought to become a truly socially responsible company; urban black consumers, Zebra's primary interest, had become even more of an economic force in America's major markets. As Table 4.7 reveals,
Table 4.7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Population 1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York, New York</td>
<td>1,087,931</td>
<td>1,666,636</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago, Illinois</td>
<td>812,637</td>
<td>1,102,620</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit, Michigan</td>
<td>482,223</td>
<td>660,428</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia, Pennsylvania</td>
<td>529,240</td>
<td>653,791</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>411,737</td>
<td>537,712</td>
<td>71.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore, Maryland</td>
<td>325,589</td>
<td>420,210</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland, Ohio</td>
<td>250,818</td>
<td>287,841</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Orleans, Louisiana</td>
<td>233,514</td>
<td>267,308</td>
<td>51.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta, Georgia</td>
<td>186,464</td>
<td>255,051</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis, Missouri</td>
<td>214,377</td>
<td>254,191</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memphis, Tennessee</td>
<td>184,320</td>
<td>242,513</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newark, New Jersey</td>
<td>138,035</td>
<td>207,458</td>
<td>54.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakland, California</td>
<td>83,618</td>
<td>124,710</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


the increasing number of African Americans living in U.S. cities by 1970 removed all doubts about the worth of courting black shoppers. Consequently, the next decade would witness even more aggressive attempts to influence the consumption patterns of African American urbanites. Moreover, it would become increasingly clear that, while many in the 1960s associated African Americans with the word "revolution," it was corporate marketers who had actually conducted a successful coup.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.

75. Interview, James Avery, October 22, 1996. Mr. Avery is a former president of the National Association of Market Developers.

76. Ibid.; Interview, Samuel Whiteman and James "Bud" Ward, September 17, 1994. Mr. Whiteman, now deceased, was one of the acknowledged founders of the National Association of Market Developers. Mr. Ward has held a number of positions within NAMD including president of the Washington, D.C. chapter and vice president, executive director, and chairman of the board of the national organization.

77. "History of NAMD," *Emphasis 95*, official program of the 43rd Meeting of the National Association of Market Developers, May 1995. 9; Interview, James Avery, October 22, 1996; Interview, Miriam Evans, October 5, 1994. Mrs. Evans, who worked in the Public Relations Department of Bell Pennsylvania (now Bell Atlantic), served as NAMD's treasurer for many years.


80. "NAMD," *National Black Monitor*, 8; Interview, James Avery, October 22, 1996; Interview, Chuck Smith, May 25, 1995. Mr. Smith served in a variety of capacities within the National Association of Market Developers, including vice president, president, and chairman of the board.


Notes to Chapter 3


2. August Meier and Elliott R. udwick, "The Boycott Movement against Jim

3. Ibid., 761.
4. Ibid., 775.


10. Ibid., 234.


18. Ibid., 70.

19. Ibid., 40–41.


23. Ibid., 198.

24. William Bradford Huie, "The Shocking Story of Approved Killing in Mis-


28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., 28.

30. Ibid.


32. Ibid.

33. Ibid., 32.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.


39. Ibid. Also, see Elizabeth Jacoway and David R. Colburn, eds., *Southern Businessmen and Desegregation* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982).


42. Ibid., 131.

43. Ibid., 130.

44. Ibid.

45. Garrow, *Bearing the Cross*, 220.

46. Ibid., 226–227.

47. Ibid., 291–292.


49. Ibid.


53. Ibid., 49.


55. Robert E. Weems Jr., "The Revolution Will Be Marketed: American Cor-