Jonathan Schell

from *The Fate of the Earth*

(1984)

In this book, I have not sought to define a political solution to the nuclear predicament—either to embark on the full-scale reexamination of the foundations of political thought which must be undertaken if the world's political institutions are to be made consonant with the global reality in which they operate or to work out the practical steps by which mankind, acting for the first time in history as a single entity, can reorganize its political life. I have left to others those awesome, urgent tasks, which, imposed on us by history, constitute the political work of our age. Rather, I have attempted to examine the physical extent, the human significance, and the practical dimensions of the nuclear predicament in which the whole world now finds itself. This predicament is a sort of cage that has quietly grown up around the earth, imprisoning every person on it, and the demanding terms of the predicament—its durability, its global political sweep, its human totality—constitute the bars of that cage. However, if a description of the predicament, which is the greatest that mankind has ever faced, cannot in itself reveal to us how we can escape, it can, I believe, acquaint us with the magnitude and shape of the task that we have to address ourselves to. And it can summon us to action.

To begin a summary with the matter of war. By effectively removing the limits on human access to the forces of nature, the invention of nuclear weapons ruined war, which depended for its results, and therefore for its usefulness, on the exhaustion of the forces of one of the adversaries. War depended, above all, on the weakness of human powers, and when human powers came to exceed human and other earthly endurance—when man as master of nature grew mightier than man as a vulnerable, mortal part of nature—war was ruined. Since war was the means by which violence was fashioned into an instrument that was useful in political affairs, the ruin of war by nuclear weapons has brought about a divorce between violence and politics. I submit that this divorce, being based on irreversible progress in scientific knowledge, not only is final but must ultimately extend across the full range of political affairs, and that the task facing the species is to shape a world politics that does not rely on violence. This task falls into two parts—two aims. The first is to save the world from extinction by eliminating nuclear weapons from the earth. Just recently, on the occasion of his retirement, Admiral Hyman Rickover, who devoted a good part of his life to overseeing the development and construction of nuclear-powered, nuclear-missile-bearing submarines for the United States Navy, told a congressional committee that in his belief mankind was going to destroy itself with nuclear arms. He also said of his part in the nuclear buildup that he was "not proud" of it, and added that he would like to "sink" the ships that he had poured so much of his life into. And, indeed, what everyone is now called on to do is to sink all the ships, and also ground all the planes, and fill in all the missile silos, and dismantle all the warheads. The second aim, which alone can provide a sure foundation for the first, is to create a political means by which the world can arrive at the decisions that sovereign states previously arrived at through war. These two aims, which correspond to the aims mentioned earlier of preserving the existence of life and pursuing the various ends of life, are intimately connected. If, on the one hand, disarmament is not accompanied by a political solution, then every clash of will between nations will tempt them to pick up the instruments of violence again, and so lead the world back toward extinction. If, on the other hand, a political solution is not accompanied by complete disarmament, then the political decisions that are made will not be binding, for they will be subject to challenge by force. And if, as in
our present world, there is neither a political solution nor disarmament. Then the world will be held perpetually at the edge of doom, and every clash between nuclear powers will threaten to push it over the edge.

The significance of the first aim—disarmament—which, without being paradoxical, we can describe as a “strategic” aim, can be clarified if we extend its logical conclusion the reasoning that underlies the doctrine of deterrence. At present, the world relies on nuclear weapons both to prevent the use of nuclear weapons and to regulate the behavior of nations; but let us go a step—a very large step—further, and suppose, for a moment, that the world had established a political means of making international decisions and thus had no further need for nuclear or any other weapons. In order for such a thing to happen, we may ask, would the doctrine of deterrence and the fears on which it is based have to evaporate in the warmth of global good will? They would not. On the contrary, fear of extinction would have to increase, and permeate life at a deeper level until it was great enough to inspire the complete rearrangement of world politics. Indeed, only when the world has given up violence does Churchill’s dictum that safety is the sturdy child of terror actually become true. (At present, as we have seen, it is not safety but sovereignty that is the sturdy child of terror.) Under the current deterrence doctrine, one might say, safety is only the frail, anemic child of terror, and the reason is precisely that the terror is not yet robust enough to produce a sturdy offspring. For we still deny it, look away from it, and fail to let it reach deep enough into our lives and determine our actions. If we felt the peril for what it is—an urgent threat to our whole human substance—we would let it become the organizing principle of our global collective existence: the foundation on which the world was built. Fear would no longer dictate particular decisions, such as whether or not the Soviet Union might place missiles in Cuba; rather, it would be a moving force behind the establishment of a new system by which every decision was made. And, having dictated the foundation of the system, it would stand guard over it forever after, guaranteeing that the species did not slide back toward anarchy and doom.

This development would be the logical final goal of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. In the pre-nuclear world, the threat of war, backed up by the frequent practice of war, served as a deterrent to aggression. Today, the threat of extinction, unsupported, for obvious reasons, by practice but backed up by the existence of nuclear arms and the threat to use them, serves as the ultimate deterrent. Thus, in today’s world the actual weapons have already retired halfway from their traditional military role. They are “psychological” weapons, whose purpose is not to be employed but to maintain a permanent state of mind—terror—in the adversary. Their target is someone’s mind, and their end, if the system works, is to rust into powder in their silos. And our generals are already psychological soldiers—masters of the war game and of the computer terminal but not, fortunately, of the battlefield. In this cerebral world, strategy confronts strategy and scenario battles scenario, the better to keep any of them from ever actually unfolding. But we need to carry this trend further. We need to make the weapons wholly cerebral—not things that sit in a silo ready to be fired but merely a thought in our minds. We need to destroy them. Only then will the logical fallacy now at the heart of the deterrence doctrine be removed, for only then will the fear of extinction by nuclear arms be used for the sole purpose of preventing extinction, and not also for the pursuit of national political aims. In a perfected nuclear deterrence, the knowledge in a disarmed world that rearmament potentially means extinction would become the deterrent. Now, however, it would be not that each nuclear-armed country would deter its nuclear-armed adversary but that awareness of the peril of extinction would deter all mankind from reinvoking on nuclear armament. All human beings would join in a defensive alliance, with nuclear weapons as their common enemy. But since that enemy could spring only from our own midst, deterrent and deterred would be one. We thus arrive at the basic strategic principle of life in a world in which the nuclear predicament has been resolved: Knowledge is the deterrent. The nuclear peril was born out of knowledge, and it must abide in knowledge. The knowledge in question would be, in the first place, the unlosable scientific knowledge that enables us to build the weapons and condemns us to live forever in a nuclear world. This knowledge is the inexpungible minimum presence that the nuclear peril will always have in the life of the world, no matter what measures we adopt. In the second place, the knowledge would be the full emotional, intellectual, spiritual, and visceral understanding of the meaning of extinction—above all, the mean-
ing of the unborn generations to the living. Because extinction is the end
of mankind, it can never be anything more than "knowledge" for us; we
can never "experience" extinction. It is this knowledge—this horror at a
murderous action taken against generations yet unborn, which exerts
pressure at the center of our existence, and which is the whole reality of
extinction insofar as it is given to us to experience it—that must become
the deterrent.

In a disarmed world, we would not have eliminated the peril of hu-
man extinction from the human scene—it is not in our power to do so
—but we would at least have pitted our whole strength against it. The
inconsistency of threatening to perpetrate extinction in order to escape
extinction would be removed. The nuclei of atoms would still contain
vast energy, and we would still know how to exterminate ourselves by re-
leasing that energy in chain reactions, but we would not be lifting a
finger to do it. There would be no complicity in mass murder, no billions of
dollars spent on the machinery of annihilation, no preparations to snuff out
the future generations, no hair-raising lunges toward the abyss.

The "realistic" school of political thinking, on which the present sys-
tem of deterrence is based, teaches that men, on the whole, pursue their
own interests and act according to a law of fear. The "idealistic" school
looks on the human ability to show regard for others as fundamental,
and is based on what Gandhi called the law of love. (Whereas the differ-
ence between traditional military thinking and nuclear strategic think-
ing lies in the different factual premises that they start from, the differ-
ence between the "realistic" and the "idealistic" schools of political
philosophy lies in different judgments regarding human nature.) Histor-
ically, a belief in the necessity of violence has been the hallmark of the
credo of the "realist"; however, if one consistently and thoroughly ap-
plies the law of fear in nuclear times one is driven not to rely on violence
but to banish it altogether. This comes about as the result not of any ideal-
istic assumption but of a rigorous application to our times of the strictly
"military" logic of traditional war. For today the only way to achieve gen-
uine national defense for any nation is for all nations to give up violence
together. However, if we had begun with Gandhi's law of love we would
have arrived at exactly the same arrangement. For to one who believed in
nonviolence in a pre-nuclear setting the peril of extinction obviously
adds one more reason—and a tremendous one, transcending all others—
for giving up violence. Moreover, in at least one respect the law of love
proves to fit the facts of this peril better than the law of fear. The law of
fear relies on the love of self. Through deterrence—in which anyone's
pursuit of self-interest at the expense of others will touch off general ruin
that will destroy him, too—this self love is made use of to protect every-
one. However, self love—a narrow, though intense, love—cannot, as we
have seen, extend its protection to the future generations, or even get
them in view. They still do not have any selves whose fear of death could
be pooled in the common fund of fear, and yet their lives are at stake
in extinction. The deterrence doctrine is a transaction that is limited to
living people—it leaves out of account the helpless, speechless unborn
(while we can launch a first strike against them, they have no forces with
which to retaliate)—and yet the fate of the future generations is at the
heart of extinction, for their cancellation is what extinction is. Their lives
are at stake, but their vote is not counted. Love, however, can reach
them—can enable them to be. Love, a spiritual energy that the human
heart can pit against the physical energy released from the heart of mat-
ter, can create, cherish, and safeguard what extinction would destroy and
shut up in nothingness. But in fact there is no need, at least on the prac-
tical level, to choose between the law of fear and the law of love, because
ultimately they lead to the same destination. It is no more realistic than
it is idealistic to destroy the world.

In supposing for a moment that the world had found a political means of
making international decisions, I made a very large supposition in-
deed—one that encompasses something close to the whole work of re-
solving the nuclear predicament, for, once a political solution has been
found, disarmament becomes a merely technical matter, which should
present no special difficulties. And yet simply to recognize that the task
is at bottom political, and that only a political solution can prepare the
way for full disarmament and real safety for the species, is in itself impor-
tant. The recognition calls attention to the fact that disarmament in iso-
lation from political change cannot proceed very far. It alerts us to the
fact that when someone proposes, as President Carter did in his Inaugu-
ral Address, to aim at ridding the world of nuclear weapons, there is an
immense obstacle that has to be faced and surmounted. For the world, in freeing itself of one burden, the peril of extinction, must inevitably shoulder another: it must assume full responsibility for settling human differences peacefully. Moreover, this recognition forces us to acknowledge that nuclear disarmament cannot occur if conventional arms are left in place, since as long as nations defend themselves with arms of any kind they will be fully sovereign, and as long as they are fully sovereign they will be at liberty to build nuclear weapons if they so choose. And if we assume that wars do break out and some nations find themselves facing defeat in the conventional arena, then the reappearance of nuclear arms, which would prevent such defeat, becomes a strong likelihood. What nation, once having entrusted its fortunes to the force of arms, would permit itself to be conquered by an enemy when the means of driving him back, perhaps with a mere threat, was on hand? And how safe can the world be while nations threaten one another's existence with violence and retain for themselves the sovereign right to build whatever weapons they choose to build? This vision of an international life that in the military sphere is restricted to the pre-nuclear world while in the scientific realm it is in the nuclear world is, in fact, thoroughly implausible. If we are serious about nuclear disarmament—the minimum technical requirement for real safety from extinction—then we must accept conventional disarmament as well, and this means disarmament not just of nuclear powers but of all powers, for the present nuclear powers are hardly likely to throw away their conventional arms while non-nuclear powers hold on to theirs. But if we accept both nuclear and conventional disarmament, then we are speaking of revolutionizing the politics of the earth. The goals of the political revolution are defined by those of the nuclear revolution. We must lay down our arms, relinquish sovereignty, and found a political system for the peaceful settlement of international disputes.

The task we face is to find a means of political action that will permit human beings to pursue any end for the rest of time. We are asked to replace the mechanism by which political decisions, whatever they may be, are reached. In sum, the task is nothing less than to reinvent politics: to reinvent the world. However, extinction will not wait for us to reinvent the world. Evolution was slow to produce us, but our extinction will be swift; it will literally be over before we know it. We have to match swiftness with swiftness. Because everything we do and everything we are is in jeopardy, and because the peril is immediate and unremitting, every person is the right person to act and every moment is the right moment to begin, starting with the present moment. For nothing undercuts our common humanity as strongly as the peril of extinction does; in fact, on a practical and political plane it establishes that common humanity. The purpose of action, though, is not to replace life with politics. The point is not to turn life into a scene of protest; life is the point.

Whatever the eventual shape of a world that has been reinvented for the sake of survival, the first, urgent, immediate step, which requires no deep thought or long reflection, is for each person to make known, visibly and unmistakably, his desire that the species survive. Extinction, being in its nature outside human experience, is invisible, but we, by rebelling against it, can indirectly make it visible. No one will ever witness extinction, so we must bear witness to it before the fact. And the place for the rebellion to start is in our daily lives. We can each perform a turnabout right where we are—let our daily business drop from our hands for a while, so that we can turn our attention to securing the foundation of all life, out of which our daily business grows and in which it finds its justification. This disruption of our lives will be a preventive disruption, for we will be hoping through the temporary suspension of our daily life to ward off the eternal suspension of it in extinction. And this turnabout in the first instance can be as simple as a phone call to a friend, a meeting in the community.

However, even as the first steps are taken, the broad ultimate requirements of survival must be recognized and stated clearly. If they are not, we might sink into self-deception, imagining that inadequate measures would suffice to save us. I would suggest that the ultimate requirements are in essence the two that I have mentioned: global disarmament, both nuclear and conventional, and the invention of political means by which the world can peacefully settle the issues that throughout history it has settled by war. Thus, the first steps and the ultimate requirements are clear. If a busload of people is speeding down a mountainside toward a cliff, the passengers do not convene a seminar to investigate the nature of their predicament; they see to it that the driver applies the brakes. There-

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Before, at a minimum, a freeze on the further deployment of nuclear weapons, participated in both by countries that now have them and by countries that do not yet have them, is called for. Even better would be a reduction in nuclear arms—for example, by cutting the arsenals of the superpowers in half, as George Kennan suggested recently. Simultaneously with disarmament, political steps of many kinds could be taken. For example, talks could be started among the nuclear powers with the aim of making sure that the world did not simply blunder into extinction by mistake; technical and political arrangements could be drawn up to reduce the likelihood of mechanical mistakes and misjudgments of the other side’s intentions or actions in a time of crisis, and these would somewhat increase the world’s security while the predicament was being tackled at a more fundamental level. For both superpowers—and, indeed, for all other powers—avoiding extinction is a common interest than which none can be greater. And since the existence of a common interest is the best foundation for negotiation, negotiations should have some chance of success. However, the existence of negotiations to reduce the nuclear peril would provide no reason for abandoning the pursuit of other things that one believed in, even those which might be at variance with the beliefs of one’s negotiating partner. Thus, to give one contemporary example, there is no need, or excuse, for the United States not to take strong measures to oppose Soviet-sponsored repression in Poland just because it is engaged in disarmament talks with the Soviet Union. The world will not end if we suspend shipments of wheat to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, to break off those talks in an effort to help the Poles, who will be as extinct as anyone else if a holocaust comes about, would be self-defeating. To seek to “punish” the other side by breaking off those negotiations would be in reality self-punishment. All the limited aims of negotiation can be pursued in the short term without danger if only the ultimate goal is kept unwaveringly in mind. But ordinary citizens must insist that all these things be done, or they will not be.

If action should be concerted, as it eventually must be, in a common political endeavor, reaching across national boundaries, then, just as the aim of the endeavor would be to hold the gates of life open to the future generations, so its method would be to hold its own gates open to every living person. But it should be borne in mind that even if every person in the world were to enlist, the endeavor would include only an infinitesimal fraction of the people of the dead and the unborn generations, and so it would need to act with the circumspection and modesty of a small minority. From its mission to preserve all generations, it would not seek to derive any rights to dictate to the generations on hand. It would not bend or break the rules of conduct essential to a decent political life, for it would recognize that once one started breaking rules in the name of survival no rule would go unbroken. Intellectually and philosophically, it would carry the principle of tolerance to the utmost extreme. It would attempt to be as open to new thoughts and feelings as it would be to the new generations that would think those thoughts and feel those feelings. Its underlying supposition about creeds and ideologies would be that whereas without mankind none can exist, with mankind all can exist. For while the events that might trigger a holocaust would probably be political, the consequences would be deeper than any politics or political aims, bringing ruin to the hopes and plans of capitalists and socialists, rightists and leftists, conservatives and liberals alike. Having as the source of its strength only the spontaneously offered support of the people of the earth, it would, in turn, respect each person’s will, which is to say his liberty. Eventually, the popular will that it marshalled might be deployed as a check on the power of whatever political institutions were invented to replace war.

Since the goal would be a nonviolent world, the actions of this endeavor would be nonviolent. What Gandhi once said of the spirit of nonviolent action in general would be especially important to the spirit of these particular actions: “In the dictionary of nonviolent action, there is no such thing as an ‘external enemy.’” With the world itself at stake, all differences would by definition be “internal” differences, to be resolved on the basis of respect for those with whom one disagreed. If our aim is to save humanity, we must respect the humanity of every person. For who would be the enemy? Certainly not the world’s political leaders, who, though they now menace the earth with nuclear weapons, do so only with our permission, and even at our bidding. At least, this is true for the democracies. We do not know what the peoples of the totalitarian states, including the people of the Soviet Union, may want. They are locked in silence by their government. In these circumstances, public opinion in
the free countries would have to represent public opinion in all coun-
ctries, and would have to bring its pressure to bear, as best it could, on all
governments.

At present, most of us do nothing. We look away. We remain calm.
We are silent. We take refuge in the hope that the holocaust won't hap-
pen, and turn back to our individual concerns. We deny the truth that is
all around us. Indifferent to the future of our kind, we grow indifferent
to one another. We drift apart. We grow cold. We crowd our way toward
the end of the world. But if once we shook off our lethargy and fatigue
and began to act, the climate would change. Just as inertia produces de-
spair—a despair often so deep that it does not even know itself as de-
spair—arousal and action would give us access to hope, and life would
start to mend: not just life in its entirety but daily life, every individual
life. At that point, we would begin to withdraw from our role as both the
victims and the perpetrators of mass murder. We would no longer be the
destroyers of mankind but, rather, the gateway through which the future
generations would enter the world. Then the passion and will that we
need to save ourselves would flood into our lives. Then the walls of indif-
ference, inertia, and coldness that now isolate each of us from others, and
all of us from the past and future generations, would melt, like snow in
spring. E. M. Forster told us, “Only connect!” Let us connect. Auden told
us, “We must love one another or die.” Let us love one another—in the
present and across the divides of death and birth. Christ said, “I come not
to judge the world but to save the world.” Let us, also, not judge the world
but save the world. By restoring our severed links with life, we will re-
store our own lives. Instead of stopping the course of time and cutting off
the human future, we would make it possible for the future generations
to be born. Their inestimable gift to us, passed back from the future into
the present, would be the wholeness and meaning of life.

Two paths lie before us. One leads to death, the other to life. If we
choose the first path—if we numbly refuse to acknowledge the near-
ess of extinction, all the while increasing our preparations to bring it
about—then we in effect become the allies of death, and in everything
we do our attachment to life will weaken; our vision, blinded to the abyss
that has opened at our feet, will dim and grow confused; our will, discour-
egaged by the thought of trying to build on such a precarious foundation

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