The Libyan Revolution and its aftermath. Cole, Peter, and McQuinn. 2015.

Book Critic:

In an effort to describe the events that led up to the Libyan revolution and its repercussions, this book goes into great detail, outlining many important characters, and militant forces that contributed to the Libyan revolution. Additionally it describes the variety of motives for the revolution through a geographic lense. Although there are two main sections of this book, each chapter is an essay written by a different author. Together these essays form a complex narrative of the Libyan revolution. For a person who is looking for a deeper understanding of the Libyan revolution we highly recommend this book. 

The first section analyzes Libya’s uncertain revolution, including details on the fall of Tripoli as well as NATO’s intervention and the National Transitional Councils battle for legitimacy and recognition, finalizing with transitional justice in Libya. I especially thought the section on NATO’s intervention was interesting as the author discussed both the point of view from the Libyan people and their frustrations and tension with NATO.

The second section discusses sub national identities and narratives. This section looked at Libya in a regional lense which was very beneficial for understanding the effects of conflicts that built up within the region. Understanding the regional conflicts is not only vital to understanding how the revolution played out the way it did, it breaks down the international narrative that describes the aftermath of Libya as “chaos”. Instead, the reader realizes that at the local level, people have been effective with political organization and efforts towards reconciliation have been made. For anyone looking to understand how Libya can move forward, this is a good resource because it explains the relationships and structures put in place that one can work off of to promote healing and begin large scale political structure.

The compilation of essays affords the reader a variety of unique perspectives to understanding the variety of conflicts within the country without repeating too much information. However, one possible critique is that there is no clear chronology of events. While the stories were written in an intentional order, each essay follows its own time frame, making it difficult to consider the important events of each essay in chronological order.

In conclusion, each essay and it’s coinciding author brought a unique point of view to the Libyan revolution and we highly recommend this book to anyone in search of a multifaceted understanding of this time period. (Hanna Mass, Sabrina Quintanilla, and Raouf Belkhir)

Chapter Summaries: 

Chapter 1:  

Author Peter Cole discusses the main challenges the Libyan people faced in rebuilding their country after the 2011 revolution and the lasting effects that Gadhafi’s regime had on this process.  During Gadhafi’s era, he created a government where the only encompassing institution was himself. This along with Libya’s tumultuous history and Gadhafi’s systematic use of economic patronage, led to the people’s distrust in national institutions and lack of interpersonal trust which made building a new stable state extremely difficult. To add to this, he also nullified all forms of affiliations leaving a low sense of political community. During the debate over federalism and decentralization Libyan’s lack of national identity was highlighted. This lead to an uncertain revolution where the people were still in search of their own identity and torn between different visions with little understanding of the concept of national rather than personal or group interests. However, the main achievement that shone hope on Libya at the time is that the people finally owned their revolution and considered themselves state citizens rather than subject to their rules.

Chapter 2:

Chapter 2 describes how the National Council formed and its battle for legitimacy and recognition as it transformed from a committee to a political entity. On February 26th, an agreement was reached to bring the local councils under a national council to run the liberated areas in the east. This emerging political body grew as other politicians joined until March 5th when its 30 members came together to make a founding statement. They did not declare themselves as a government, however their goals were to set protocols for regular and emergency meetings; make decisions in accordance with the peoples demands; the fall of the Gadhafi regime; and the establishment of civil, constitutional, and democratic state. It wasn’t until March 10th that the first outside nation, France, formally recognized the NTC, soon followed by many other nations. The NTC knew their legitimacy would be largely based upon their ability to pay salaries and run a wartime economy; hence, on March 19th they began by designating the central bank of Benghazi as a monetary authority and established the Arabian Gulf Oil Company. The NTC also relied heavily on donations from foreign countries and ad hoc pledges to keep the economy running. This lead to the liquidity crisis which presented the challenge of how to distribute cash to recipients on the ground. On June 27th senior military officer, Yunis, was assassinated, highlighting the internal crisis with NTC leadership. After continuous hardships and criticism, on August 3rd the constitutional declaration was finally enacted which stated that an interim government would call for elections for a national congress of 200 members and the NTC would then dissolve itself. Following this, congress would choose a prime minister who would then appoint a cabinet and form an interim government endorsed by congress.

Chapter 3:

Chapter 3 describes the events leading up to the fall of Tripoli. Beginning on February 17th, Gadhafi’s speech made many rebels realize there wouldn’t be any political reforms under his regime. This led to the February 20th movement where thousands of protestors poured into the street and occupied the green square. Within the following few days protests continued and were met with strong opposition and brutal police force killing several dozens and wounding many more. The February 17th coalition was formed, as well as many youth groups that were connected through blood line and satellite communications. In March, the NTC began negotiations with EU countries to support the fall of Tripoli. In the third week of May they met with President Bashir and secured 120 million in small arms, paid for by Qatar. Throughout this process clear internal conflict occurred around who was in charge of the situation. On May 5th, the Ministry of Defense was created, and in June attention turned to arming allied proxies in the Nafusa Mountains.  Leaders Jibril and Nayed continued to seek out more support from France, the UAE and the US. They attempted to train a small group of Tripolitania ‘special forces’ who later became known as the ‘red companies’. Jibril was pushing for a plan centered around an internal uprising in Tripoli supplemented by NATO strikes on the 27 operating rooms that had been identified.  In July, an operations room was set up, however the battle of who was in charge continued to cause tumult as well as the conflict between Islamists and secular networks that plagued the fall of Tripoli and beyond.

Chapter 4: 

Chapter 4 analysis the events and alliances that ultimately lead to the fall of Tripoli. By July 2011 two plans around the liberation and governance of Tripoli had emerged. Military councils grew larger as cells learned of each other and routes were established for the distribution of weapons. Once the Misrata airport was secured on May 15th Sudanese aircrafts began flying in weapons and the first Qatari shipments arrived soon after on June 12th.  On August 14th, it was decided that the armed uprising would occur on August 17th. An ‘operations center’ was created in Djerba and armed groups were built up in the Nafusa Mountains. Within Tripoli, I’tilaf focused on organizing the popular uprising. Nafusa Mountain fighters effectively surrounded the capital by August 17th and morale was at a high. Strikes hit August 18th-20th destroying 24 of the 28 targets. On August 20th, Jalil gave a televised speech with a code word and youths poured into the streets. Fights broke out everywhere as Misrata and Nafusa Mountain fighters swarmed into Tripoli. On August 25th Tripoli’s liberation was announced. After the fall of Tripoli, Nayid’s Stabilization committee and the Tripoli Local Council, which was set up by I’tilaf, were designated to address governance challenges. On August 30th the NTC called for all government employees to return to work and the UN met to discuss humanitarian aid issues. Issues quickly arose with the lack of an accepted military council, resulting in unknown groups springing up. In the first week of September meetings in the prime minister’s office set out a four-point agenda which would guide Tripoli in the following weeks.

Chapter 5:

Chapter 5 examines NATO’s involvement in the Libyan revolution and its interactions with the Libyan people. NATO entry began on March 19th and by March 29th the no-fly zone was established. Defected officers in Benghazi that form Libyan special forces were crucial interlocutors with NATO. During this time NATO’s civilian protection mandate was the subject of ambiguity, and frustration among many anti-Gadhafi forces. NATO also faced a shortfall of aircrafts and ISR assets needed to vet and corroborate targets which created frustration among anti-Gadhafi forces as NATO was not meeting their inflated expectations. Libyan rebels tried to influence NATO’s targeting process by flooding them with information, which in the end slowed down the process. There was a disconnect in communication between NATO and fighters on the ground, until April, when NATO began deploying their own ground advisors directly into operation theatres which sped up the flow of communication and precision and pace of airstrikes. During this time, Revolutionary fighters were reluctant to publicize errant strikes and civilian casualties for fear that NATO would stand down operations for a few days or that the Gadhafi government would exploit the mistake for propaganda. However, while cooperation between Libyans and NATO was frustrating at times, the Libyan people that worked with NATO were nearly unanimous for their appreciation on the campaigns strategic impact.    (Chapter 1-5 Hanna Mass)

Chapter 6:  

In this chapter, the author discusses NATO’s intervention in the Libyan Civil war on the side of the rebels. Without the assistance of the NATO forces, the capacity of the opposition to topple Gadaffi and his forces seemed very doubtful. Libyan reports of the NATO operation describe a partnership and collaboration wherein the Libyans were much more active collaborators than is commonly assumed. However, there were at the same time significant strains, divisions, and frustrations that marked the relationship. The NATO campaign significantly fortified the opposition’s resolve in the objective in ways that are difficult to measure. In many ways , the Libyan campaign represented a variation of the “Afghan model” with a combination of precision airpower, ground advisors, supplies and training to help local allies overcome their very clear deficiencies in military and fighting capacity

Chapter 7:

Chapter 7 focuses on Transitional justice in Libya and confronting Gadaffi’s legacy immediately after his downfall. According to the author, the phrase transitional justice “comprises the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses”. In Libya, the revolutionary powers moved to detain a widespread group of perceived Gadaffi powers, in an attempt to protect the revolution as a well as the strong desire to punish the previous authority. The transitional justice movement in Libya focused on political isolation, and the punishment of members of the former regime. Going forward, Libya should focus on building legitimate state institutions to prevent future violations as the long-term transitional justice goal for Libya. This will require the strengthening of justice and security institutions and the writing of a constitution that enshrines fundamental human rights.

Chapter 8:

Chapter 8 describes the role of the Libyan Islamists during and after the Revolution. According to the author, Islamism can be defined as the support for the introduction of Islamic tenants into political life through the teachings of Sharia. The rebel groups that first sprang upon in opposition to the Gadaffi regime in the 2011 uprising, in large part had roots to groups based in Islam, with a wide range of opinions as to exactly how significant a role Islam should play in such political and social policies. The two major islamist groups were components of the Muslim Brotherhood and Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Members of these two groups were both imprisoned at a large scale, and it was arguably here in large prisons such as Abu Slim that allowed the revolutionaries to organize and join forces, as they could talk with less fear. Revenge for imprisonments and executions of the members of such groups were central to the revolutions narrative, and perhaps what ultimately led to Gadhafi’s downfall. After the revolution, the differences between the original revolutionary groups proved to be problematic in creating one cohesive government. Particularly in regards to the wide range of opinions as to exactly how significant a role Islam should play in such political and social policies. As such, this struggle based on Islamic ideology within will continue to shape the political and social landscape of the country for some time to come.

Chapter 9: 

Chapter 9 looks at the development of Eastern Libya from its situation as a place of promise after the revolution, to dire state we see it in today. The start of a federalist movement, defining the region as a separate state, adopting eastern Libya’s historical name: Barqa. The opposition of the militant groups in this region to the policies and implementations of the NTC, called on eastern Libyans to boycott the national election. This movement tapped into the long-standing sentiment of the easterners for autonomy and growing dissatisfaction with the government, even in the post-Gadaffi political development.

Chapter 10:

Chapter 10 examines the emergence of revolutionary battalions in Misrata. This chapter argues that Misratans self-reliance and vision of Libya are rooted in its history and reinforced to its insurgency – first in reference to the states history of colonial rule, the insurgency against the Italian colonial powers then, and then the 2011 uprising against Gadaffi. In the eyes of the Misratans, this was all one continued struggle, against an oppressive authoritarian regime. It took 100 years, before they succeeded in their original objective. The chapter examines the historical events and underpinnings that shaped the Misratans sense of manifest destiny, and how the historic and contemporary narratives shaped each other, and in turn the Misratans vision for its role in Libya’s future (Chapter 6-10 Raouf Belkhir).

Chapter 10

This essay uses the Misratan experience to demonstrate how the Tunisian struggle for national unity is deeply ingrained in ancestry. The author describes stories passed down through generations and interviews one man who shows the author a painting of the Italian colonization. The painting illustrates the 100 year struggle and describes how this story of strife has shaped the Misratan vision for the future of Libya. The essay then breaks down the fighting that took place in Misrata, 2011 into 3 stages; the success of the Misratan protest, the occupation of tripoli street, and the emergence of revolutionary battalions. Although each stage defined key turning points, the complex social, and military organization that took place between the citizens of Misrata emerged gradually and organically.

Chapter 11

Before the revolution, the people of the Nafusa mountains did not have a large role in Libyan politics. In addition, the communities in this region have historically not gotten along. However, during the uprising, solidarity and cooperation burgeoned and the geographic advantages of the mountains granted these communities political leverage in Libya. This chapter follows the divisions between the various communities, (in terms of values, politics and genealogy) and how these localized issues have transformed into identity politics. It then focuses on the Zintani tribe; how it’s social organization has changed since the revolution, and the means by which its people acquired a strong political standing.

Chapter 12

The city of Bani Walid fought with the regime. It was largely loyal to Gaddafi for two main reasons. First, citizens were enticed by Gaddafi’s anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist speeches. These speeches strengthened the Bani Walid identity which is based on the narrative of resistance to the Italian and Ottoman occupation and protection of Libyan statehood. Second, lasting repercussions of a past revolution by Bani Walid left citizens unwilling to rebel. In order to prevent another rebellion, Gaddafi altered the political and military organization of Bani Walid to become more dependent on the regime. In addition, the unsuccessful rebellion fractured relationships between Bani Walid and its neighboring communities, leaving it unwilling to join forces in 2011. Due to the success of the 2011 rebellion, the divisions between Bani Walid and its neighbors have amplified.

Chapter 13

The indigenous Tebu people joined the revolution with the hope of gaining full rights as citizens and dismantling the systematic oppression they faced under the regime. Starting with the Libya-Chad war, the chapter goes through the series of events that led the Tebu to create the Tebu resistance. The resistance was planning its own revolution for July of 2011 until the revolution in Benghazi, which catalyzed their rebellion. While the Tebu people still have not been granted the civil rights they originally sought, their social connections with tribes in Chad, Niger and Sudan, and Northern Libya, have allowed them to dominate trade routes for oil and weaponry. This role gives them a large part in the stability of the south.

Chapter 14
This essay challenges the western stereotype that the Sahara is a “no mans land”, devoid of politics. It follows the Tuareg people and its political relationships with Mali and Niger, largely influenced by Gaddafi. The Turab region plays a large role in the Trans Saharan trade which fuels the narcotics and arms trafficking economies. The Trans Saharan trade has a long history. When Islam was introduced to the region, a social stigma grew around the drug trade due to the increased motive to make pious decisions. However, an increase in Jihadism in conjunction with the fragility of the Libyan economy has complicated the social dynamics around the trade. (Chapter 10-14 Sabrina Quintanilla)

 

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